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China: new engine of world growth 
Ross Garnaut 
China is now the centre of attention for international business. For the main global 
producers of travel and financial services, resources, electronic products, aeroplanes 
and machines, the annual reports this year contain statements about the importance 
of the China market to growth. 
There is good reason for the focus on China. Since the eve of financial crisis in 
Korea and much of Southeast Asia in 1996, China has contributed one quarter of 
global growth in output and international trade. In the sluggish world economy since 
the Clinton-era boom in the United States ended in late 2000, China has contributed 
the whole of the global expansion in international trade. Over these years it has 
supplanted the United States as the world's largest recipient of direct foreign 
investment, with annual levels exceeding US$50 billion. 
These are immediate causes of the current international excitement about China. 
More important than these indicia of recent relative success, however, is an older 
reality. Over the quarter century since Deng Xiaoping won decisive control of the 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and moved policy decisively 
towards reform and opening to the outside world in 1978, economic output and 
international trade have expanded much more rapidly in China than in any other 
country, even through periods of exceptional prosperity in Asia, North America and 
Australasia. 
These last half dozen years have been but one stage in what is inevitably a long 
and difficult Chinese journey towards the emergence of a productive modern economy. 
The last half dozen years have actually seen the lowest average growth for any 
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period of comparable duration in the reform era, most importantly because the 
external environment has been exceptionally difficult. 
The world is noticing Chinese economic success now not because economic 
reform and growth are different and more impressive in China (although the increase 
in economic mass that comes with sustained growth itself increases China's impact 
on the rest of the world, even if growth rates are a bit below earlier heights). The 
world is noticing now because the rest of the world is different. The rest of the world 
is growing more slowly, a weakened international trading system is supporting less 
growth in trade, and the United States is going through a period in which it is inclined 
to see China as a strategic partner rather than a rival. And the modernisation of 
China is a project of such immense dimension that those who turn their minds to it 
now and then have difficulty keeping it in perspective, with a consequence that 
expectations overshoot in both positive and negative directions. 
The contemporary international excitement about China's economic performance 
should be a cause for caution rather than exuberance. The Chinese reality of reform 
and economic growth since 1978 has been much more stable than foreigners' 
perceptions of them. 
Th~ Chinese economy is likely to continue to perform relatively strongly on the 
pattern of the past quarter century. But as at each stage of the reform journey so 
far, success may be broken at any time by inadequate responses to immense 
challenges. Policy and institutional innovation of historic dimension on a world scale 
will continue to be necessary, to overcome barriers to growth as their importance 
becomes apparent through the process of reform. China's reform, international 
integration and growth will continue to make extreme demands on the quality of 
Chinese leadership and the energy and capacity for transformation within the Chinese 
people. It could not ever have been otherwise in an economic, political and social 
transformation on a scale that is unprecedented in human history. 
It is not in the nature of Western businesspeople to reflect on what has gone 
before. But it takes little reflection to appreCiate the volatility of Western expectations 
of China. It is only a year since books by Joe Studwell and Gordon Chang became 
bestsellers and part of every American business conversation about China predicted 
the imminent collapse of the Chinese economy and the Chinese Communist Party. 
Australians over the past quarter century-officials, businesspeople and citizens-
have been steadier than Americans in their perceptions of China. For the most part, 
they have been closer to the reality-less apocalyptic; less alarmist in the difficult 
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times and less extreme in their enthusiasm in the better times. Less downbeat in 
the periodic inflationary crises of the first fifteen years of reform, in the dark days 
after the split in the Chinese leadership over management of the Tian An Men crisis 
and through the external challenges of the Asian financial crisis. A bit less excited 
in the periods of exceptional growth in domestic demand, Chinese ferment over 
political change, and more obvious identity between Chinese and Western strategic 
interests. 
It is possible that the current Australian mood on China is absorbing more of the 
amplitude of the American, through the contemporary tendency for Australian 
business to look at its international opportunities through lenses ground in New 
York, California and Washington DC. This new assessment, in China: new engine of 
world growth, will help to place the Chinese reality into perspective. 
The reality is much as it has been forthe last 25 years of reform. Nothing is more 
important to the health of the global economy and especially of Australia's Asia 
Pacific neighbourhood than the success of China's efforts to build a productive 
market economy, deeply integrated into the international economy through 
mechanisms that promote trade on the basis of global comparative advantage. The 
good progress so far augurs well for the future of reform and growth in China. The 
challenges that remain are less daunting than some that have already been overcome. 
But the challenges of today and tomorrow are nevertheless immense. 
THE KEYNESIAN EXPANSION 
These last six years, since the collapse of the Thai baht heralded financial dislocation 
in much of East Asia and recession in more, have been more challenging for Chinese 
economic growth than any similarly extended period in the reform era. Growth has 
been sustained at rates comfortably above the 7.2 per cent that doubles output 
each decade and which has been an un heralded official target since Deng Xiaoping 
in 1980 promised that Chinese output would quadruple by the end of the century 
(Table 1.1). But this success was built on a risky strategy of Keynesian fiscal 
expansion with a fixed exchange rate that has costs for systemic efficiency and 
long-term growth. It was built on risks that no-one could define at all clearly when 
there was great uncertainty about the depth and duration of the Asian financial 
crisis and after that of the United States' recession. Now that we know how things 
turned out, we know that the risks were worth taking, although we also know that 
the costs that must be paid for in the period ahead were real and large. 
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Table 1.1 Output growth and inflation performance in China, 1979-2003 
Gross Domestic Retail Price Consumer Price 
Product Index Index 
1979 7.6 2.0 
1980 7.8 6.0 
1981 5.2 2.4 
1982 9.1 1.9 
1983 10.9 1.5 
1984 15.2 2.8 
1985 13.5 8.8 9.3 
1986 8.8 6.0 6.5 
1987 11.6 7.3 7.3 
1988 11.3 18.5 18.8 
1989 4.1 17.8 18.0 
1990 3.8 2.1 3.1 
1991 9.2 2.9 3.4 
1992 14.2 5.4 6.4 
1993 13.5 13.2 14.7 
1994 12.6 21.7 24.1 
1995 10.5 14.8 17.1 
1996 9.6 6.1 8.3 
1997 8.8 0.8 2.8 
1998 7.8 -2.6 -0.8 
1999 7.1 -3.0 -1.4 
2000 8.0 -1.5 0.4 
2001 7.3 -0.8 0.7 
2002 8.0 -1.3 -0.8 
Jan-Jun 2003 8.2 -0.4 0.6 
Average 1979-2002 9.40 5.53 
Average 1979-1996 9.92 7.84 
Average 1997-2002 7.83 -1.39 0.16 
Variance 1979-1996 11.239 42.412 
Variance 1997-2002 0.348 1.846 2.307 
t-statistic for difference in the means 
of 1979-96 and 1997-2002 2 .. 521 5.661 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, various years. Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian [China Statistical 
Yearbook], Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, Beijing. Created by Wing Thye Woo, Chapter 3, this 
volume 
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The systemic costs of heavy reliance on public expenditure to maintain growth 
since 1996 have been substantial, and future growth must contend with the legacy 
of expanded direct and contingent public debt. 
However, some other elements of the policy response to the past six years of 
difficult external economic conditions have been helpful to long-term growth. The 
years in which growth has been sustained by fiscal expansion have also been the 
years in which China prepared for and then achieved entry into the World Trade 
Organization. WTO entry supported the continuation of the radical trade liberalisation 
of the reform era when the political economy of change might have been expected 
to force some easing of the pace. These were also the years in which the legitimacy 
of the private sector's role in the economy was recognised by constitutional 
amendment, in which legislative and governmental reform was implemented to 
facilitate private sector growth, and in which rapid and extensive growth in the 
private sector came to contribute a majority of the country's economic output for 
the first time. 
Thus two major elements of the policy response to external weakness pulled in 
opposite directions. The maintenance of growth in aggregate demand through 
increased direct public expenditure and lending by the state-owned banks to other 
state-owned enterprises was a step backwards into a larger role for unproductive 
entities. But the recognition at this time that the state sector could deliver neither 
the rapid increase in productivity nor the strong employment growth necessary to 
sustain political stability through rapid structural change led to the removal of many 
constraints on private business activity. 
The resultant of these powerful developments was a state sector absorbing a 
high proportion of investment resources but contributing proportionately less on the 
supply side through employment and productivity growth. 
There are several senses in which the Keynesian expansion of the past six years 
is unsustainable. It is unsustainable in the public finances. Huang (Chapter 4) and 
Wing (Chapter 3) in this book discuss the challenge of servicing the public debt and 
above all of managing the new contingent liabilities of the banking system. 
The Keynesian expansion is unsustainable in its concentration of investment 
resources in the parts of the economy that use it least productively. If it continued 
much longer, it would be associated with increasingly disappointing growth 
performance. 
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it is unsustainable in political economy terms. Reform has been a long struggle 
against the vested interests that have inevitably grown around the state sector, and 
these have been strengthened at a time when further reduction of their power is 
essential for continued success of the reform process. 
Fortunately, the other developments have made it possible now to withdraw the 
Keynesian stimulus without stopping growth. The growth in scale of the private 
sector, with policy and institutional reform supported by high rates of direct foreign 
investment, has generated new sources of demand growth. The inevitable 
monetisation of part of the external payments surplus is boosting private consumption 
and investment demand. The recent stronger and more broadly based demand 
expansion has tightened the utilisation of productive capacity in many areas, and 
has ended the deflation that has troubled policymakers since the Asian financial 
crisis. The end of deflation itself has provided a boost to private consumption. 
For the moment and for a while it seems, and will seem, that productive capacity 
and demand are broadly in balance. But this may turn out to be the appearance of a 
stopped clock showing the correct time twice each day. If there were no withdrawal 
of the Keynesian stimulus in the near future, the momentum in demand growth 
would be likely to push the economy into unsustainable over-expenditure, manifested 
in the re-emergence of inflationary pressures and rapid movement of the current 
account of the balance of payments from surplus into deficit. Developments along 
these lines were postponed in the first half of 2003 by the negative effects of SARS 
(analysed by McKibbin and Lee, Chapter 2), but will re-emerge now as the effects of 
the epidemic pass into history. 
In these circumstances, the rate of expansion in public expenditure and investment 
by state-owned enterprises could be cut back without endangering growth 
performance. If this step were taken now, the emerging problems of public debt and 
contingent liabilities, of wasteful over-investment within large state enterprises, and 
of emerging excess domestic demand can be corrected before they damage long-
term macroeconomic performance. 
THE UNDERVALUED YUAN 
The exuberance about Chinese growth, the external payments surplus and above 
all the bilateral trade surplus with the United States have led in 2003 to calls from 
foreign business and Governments for China to abandon the nine-year-old peg of 
the yuan against the US dollar. The call has mostly been for the floating of the 
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currency in the expectation that this would lead to a large appreciation. Some calls 
have been for an appreciation of the yuan within the framework of the established 
peg against the US dollar. 
The current official peg against the US dollar was adopted in early 1994 as part of 
a currency reform that embodied the integration of official and 'grey market' foreign 
exchange rates. Prior to these developments, the yuan had been loosely pegged to 
the US dollar, but uninhibitively devalued from time to time to correct recurrent 
external payments weakness that had there origins in rates of demand expansion 
and inflation that were high relative to the rest of the world, at a time of rapid trade 
and payments liberalisation. Since the 1994 reforms, the yuan has been firmly fixed 
to the US dollar, although in the year immediately preceding the Asian financial crisis 
there was discussion of moving to a floating rate by the end of the twentieth century. 
In the lead-up to the foreign exchange market unification, the yuan had been 
going through one of its more pronounced periods of overvaluation, on the back of 
the huge boom in domestic investment triggered by Deng Xiaoping's exhortations 
to accelerate reform and growth on his famous last journey to the south of China. 
The overvaluation was reflected in large premia over the official rate on the black 
market and the officially-sanctioned grey market. The unification of the foreign 
exchange market at a rate close to the 'grey market' level represented a substantial 
devaluation for firms operating at the official exchange rate (principally the large 
state-owned corporations) but not for the foreign joint ventures and many others 
who had access to the officially-sanctioned 'grey market'. This partial devaluation 
was seen as underpinning China's competitiveness through a period of accelerated 
trade liberalisation, and in practice had this effect. 
The unified official exchange rate, pegged against the US dollar, came under 
downward pressure through the Asian financial crisis, when the East Asian economies 
went into recession and experienced large devaluations of their own. These economies 
together absorbed almost half of China's exports and were China's most intense 
competitors in exports to global markets. China's payments came under pressure, 
prompting large efforts to accelerate reform to make China more attractive for direct 
foreign investment and to raise productivity in the export industries. There was 
frequent comment through 1998 that the yuan would need to be devalued. The 
Chinese authorities responded that such action would not be helpful to the Chinese 
economy and would undermine the attempts by other East Asian economies to 
restore stability in the aftermath of financial crisis. 
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From time to time through 1998 the peg against the US dollar came under 
speculative attack, directly, and by proxy through speculative sale of the more 
exposed HK dollar. The attacks on the HK dollar could be resisted because of the 
Special Administrative Region's exceptional levels of fiscal and monetary reserves. 
Speculation directly against the yuan was never effective because of China's 
retention of foreign exchange controls on international capital movements. Some 
controls on use of foreign exchange were made more restrictive. This episode, and 
parallel observation of the contribution of large-scale fluctuations in capital movements 
to macroeconomic instability elsewhere in East Asia at this time, led the Chinese 
authorities to announce indefinite postponement of any movement towards a floating 
exchange rate and a more open capital account. 
China's strategy of seeking to maintain growth through the Asian financial crisis 
with public sector demand expansion and a fixed exchange rate worked well for 
China and the international economy. Import growth remained positive in China 
when it was contracting elsewhere in East Asia. This helped to moderate the 
downward spiral of import contraction and slower economic growth that was at the 
centre of the contagion that continued after the initial recessionary impetus from 
the financial markets. Until 2001 , the only questions about the sustainability of the 
peg focussed on yuan weakness. 
The strategy depended on the judgment that the East Asian economies would in 
a relatively short period-no more than a couple of years-emerge from recession, 
have their currencies stabilise and then strengthen against main currencies outside 
the region, and return to import expansion. These developments would have to 
occur early enough for China to ease the domestic stimulus before the macroeconomic 
imbalances that they would produce had themselves caused major problems for 
sustainable growth in China. 
In the event, the judgment was validated by the trajectory of East Asian recovery 
from late 1998. The sustainability of the strong yuan policy was supported by Chinese 
deflation, which generated some depreciation of the real exchange rate even at a 
time of low inflation in industrial countries. The macroeconomic strategy had been 
proven to have been successful before the depreciation of the US dollar, and with it 
the yuan, against most currencies between late 2002 and mid 2003 added to emerging 
concerns that the Chinese currency may have entered a period of undervaluation. 
Both exports and imports have increased rapidly since 1998. Chinese import 
expansion accounted for around one-quarter and exports for the whole of the world 
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total in the two years from 2000. The faster export expansion has been associated 
with a significant current account surplus, amounting to US$21 billion or 1.7 per 
cent of GDP in 2002. 
This is the context of the growing clamour for appreciation of the yuan. The claim 
that rapid export growth deriving from an undervalued yuan is causing unwarranted 
pressure for manufacturing production and employment to decline in the rest of the 
world has become part of United States' electoral politics in 2003, with dangerous 
implications for the political economy of protection in that country. The pressure on 
Chinese exchange rate policy reached a new height during the visit of United States 
Treasury Secretary Snow to Beijing in late August 2003. The Secretary's 
representations were met by a Chinese response that it would eventually free up 
the foreign exchange market, but not yet. 
If China had had a freely floating currency, it would probably have depreciated 
with its East Asian neighbours in 1997 and 1998, and appreciated with the tendency 
towards payments surplus since 2001. China with a freely floating and at first a 
depreciating currency would have found it neither necessary nor feasible to embark 
on the huge Keynesian fiscal expansion of these last six years. China would have 
contributed less to holding up East Asian and global trade through and in the 
immediate aftermath of the East Asian crisis, but would probably have placed less 
strain on the global trade and payments system in the current, less inherently 
dangerous circumstances. 
Would it make sense for China now to liberalise capital transactions in its foreign 
exchange markets and float the yuan? Not unless and until China has taken reform 
of its financial system to the pOint where its financial institutions can be expected 
to respond with foresight and flexibility to the huge flows of capital and their reversal 
over short periods that is a normal feature of contemporary international financial 
affairs. China is not yet at that point. Priority needs to be given to financial system 
reform, including facilitation of the emergence of strong private banks, and to 
effective imposition of hard budget constraints on state-owned enterprises generally 
through privatisation or other means. Important aspects of financial sector reform 
are discussed in the contributions to this book by Huang (Chapter 5), Shan (Chapter 
6) and Cheng (Chapter 7). 
Pending the necessary progress on reform, would discrete revaluation of the yuan, 
without liberalisation of the foreign exchange markets, be helpful to Chinese and 
international macroeconomic stability? 
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It is hard to see how a minor adjustment, achieved through widening the band in 
which the yuan exchange rate is set against the US dollar, would be at all helpful. 
But is there a case for a larger, discrete revaluation? 
Perhaps, if the current tendency towards external payments surplus were expected 
to be of large dimension over a long period. However, the current account surplus 
does not seem to have these characteristics. It is likely to fall quickly as the 
acceleration in domestic demand expansion, itself deriving to a considerable extent 
from monetisation of part of the external payments surplus, together with recent 
measures to liberalise trade and payments, flow quickly into increased imports. 
Indeed, in the first seven months of 2003, the import growth of 43 per cent in US 
dollars exceeded export growth of 33 per cent over the corresponding period of 
2002. The time that China has bought in its discussions with the Treasury Secretary 
will probably be enough for the fragility of the current account surpluses to become 
widely apparent. 
The capital account surpluses are contributing a large component of China's 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. Since the capital inflow takes the form 
of direct foreign investment to an unusual degree, it seems at first sight that this 
element of the external payments surplus would be more durable, and therefore 
make a stronger case for yuan appreciation. Closer analysis raises questions as 
well about the durability of this element of the payments surplus. When high levels 
of direct foreign investment were associated with weak external payments generally 
and speculation about yuan devaluation during and in the aftermath of the Asian 
financial crisis, they were accompanied by high levels of net capital outflow in other 
forms. Speculators ultimately found ways around the capital controls through leads 
and lags in current payments and variations in the ratios of locally sourced to imported 
capital associated with direct foreign investment. All of these mechanisms have 
gone into reverse in the current period of speculation about yuan appreciation. The 
capital controls inhibit but do not completely block the speculative movement of 
capital, and the residual movements are closely correlated with the balance and 
direction of change of the current account. The large contemporary surpluses on the 
capital account are likely to diminish as the current account moves from large 
surplus towards deficit. 
To the extent that the downward adjustment of the Chinese external payments 
surplus as a result of the processes described as being too slow or incomplete, 
there is a stronger case for China to accelerate the growth in imports through faster 
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trade and payments liberalisation rather, than through currency appreciation. The 
pace of trade liberalisation is currently impressive, as China meets the far-reaching 
conditions on its entry into the WTO. But the barriers to international trade at China's 
borders will remain considerable after the completion of the currently agreed program. 
It is open to China to accelerate the implementation of the current WTO commitments, 
and to move beyond them. China has done something of each of these things, most 
recently with the announcement of liberalisation of restrictions on money taken 
abroad by tourists and other travellers. Going further in this direction would contribute 
to macroeconomic adjustment in much the same way as currency appreciation. 
However, it would have a more favourable impact on the efficiency with which 
domestic resources were used. And it would have a favourable effect on global 
discussions of trade liberalisation at a time when the Doha round of multilateral 
trade negotiations is experiencing trouble for want of trade liberalisation leadership 
in any major economy. 
CHINA'S GROWTH AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY 
As China, with a fifth of the world's people, moves towards the average productivity 
levels of industrialised countries, it inevitably comes to assume a large place in the 
fortunes of other countries and of the world economy. This is a natural and inevitable 
process. It should take no-one by surprise, although it does involve radical 
rearrangement of power relationships in the global economy and eventually the 
world's political system. 
If China's reform and economic growth proceed broadly along the lines of the past 
twenty five years-and that is the most likely course, despite the bumps in the 
road, the detours and dead-ends that will inevitably be part of such a long and 
complicated story-then China will catch up with the United States in total economic 
size more quickly than is commonly supposed. I discussed the economics and the 
arithmetic of catching up with the United States in chapter one of China 2002: WTO 
entry and world recession (Garnaut and Song 2002). It would not be at all surprising 
if China were the world's largest economy by all the relevant way of measuring 
economic size within a few decades. 
China's foreign trade and investment have been growing even more rapidly than 
its economic output, absolutely and in comparison with the rest of the world. This 
follows partly from the reform and growth strategy, which from the beginning have 
emphasised deep integration into the global economy. The tendency is also promoted 
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by the considerable and increasing concentration of Chinese economic activity and 
population in coastal cities and provinces and up the Yangtze River with relatively 
easy access to the coast. It is reinforced by the highly skewed nature of China's 
resource endowments relative to other major participants in international trade, 
endowments which expand opportunities for profitable international exchange. China's 
growing and changing role in international trade are discussed by Song and Sun 
(Chapter 10), Tong (Chapter 9), Tang (Chapter 15), Wu (Chapter 16), and Chang and 
Tyers (Chapter 14). Some implications for the world and Asia Pacific trading systems 
are the focus of the contributions by Raby (Chapter 8) and Findlay (Chapter 11). 
The emergence of China as an increasingly large and internationally oriented 
economy generates opportunities and challenges for the rest of the world. There are 
opportunities for incomes growth through greater specialisation by other countries 
in what they do best. Utilisation of this opportunity is especially valuable at a time 
of diminished economic dynamism in much of the world. The challenges are the 
other side of the same coin. The utilisation of opportunity requires the transfer of 
resources from activities that compete directly with emerging comparative strengths 
of China, into others in which China's trading partners have stronger comparative 
advantage as a result of the growth of China and its increased participation in 
international exchange. There are short-term adjustment costs, and negative domestic 
political reactions. 
Geography matters in international trade, and the largest positive and negative 
effects of China's emergence as a major trading economy are close to China in the 
Western Pacific region. Pacific Economic Outlook 2003 discusses major effects of 
mainland China's growth on the economic outlook for Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, 
Chinese Taipei and the economies of Southeast Asia (PECC 2003). Australians are 
closely aware that elements of recent strength in international markets for minerals, 
metals, petroleum and agricultural products and services (notably education and 
tourism) have origins in Chinese demand. 
East Asian economies are also experiencing tendencies towards 'hollowing out' 
of old manufacturing industry, as competitive productive capacity expands in China. 
Most analysts as well as political leaders in the Western Pacific have taken the 
view that the net effects are positive, but there are still costs and negative perceptions 
to be managed. 
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More recently, there has been wider international concern about the shift of global 
manufacturing capacity to China. Some political discussion in the United States in 
2003 has identified growing imports from China as a significant factor in the decline 
in manufacturing employment, and the under-valuation of the yuan as a contributing 
cause. While the arithmetic of increased imports from China and decline of 
manufacturing employment in large industrial countries does not suggest strong 
causation, there is no doubt that the issue has political traction. 
China's growth and integration into the international economy can go badly wrong 
if reactions to the costs of adjustment to rapid structural change become influential 
in political processes at home or abroad. The nature of domestic and international 
institutions through which political reactions to structural change are mediated can 
therefore have an important influence on the sustainability of growth. 
China's institutions for managing resistance to structural change are weak. That 
partly reflects the traditions of a highly centralised pOlitical system, in which leaders 
have not had to pay attention to day to day community reactions to policy. 
Improvements in education and in communications amongst Chinese, greater 
freedoms of movement and association and what could be described as the 
democratisation of daily life (as distinct from the democratisation of the political 
superstructure) are increasing the openness of policymaking processes to community 
pressures. The chances of political resistance leading to partial retreat from open 
policies would be reduced if China developed domestic institutions that had credibility 
as sources of independent (from government and business direction) and transparent 
analysis of the costs and benefits of trade policy changes (see Carmichael and 
Garnaut (2003) for more general articulation of this point). 
The WTO is the most important of the international institutions in mediating pressure 
for restrictive reactions to adjustment pressures arising from the rapid growth of 
Chinese foreign trade. Chinese (and Chinese Taipei) membership from late 2003 
has reduced the risk that reactions to domestic political pressyres in China or in its 
trading partners would ever block expansion of profitable trade relations between 
China and the rest of the world. The value of China's WTO membership for productive 
expansion of trade has been enhanced by several innovations in the Uruguay Round 
of multilateral trade negotiations. The most important of the Uruguay Round 
developments for China were the strengthened disputes settlements mechanism, 
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the constraints on agricultural subsidies, and the complete phasing out of the multi-
fibres arrangement and with it quantitative restrictions on imports of textiles and 
clothing by 2005 in the high-income countries of the North Atlantic. 
China's membership of the WTO has delivered the benefits for China and the 
world that had been sought in negotiations on entry conditions. China has been 
disappointed at the extent of other countries' recourse to anti-dumping devices and 
has responded by making more use of them itself. This is a development with 
potential significantly to reduce benefits to China and its trading partners of 
internationally oriented growth in China. Constraints on protectionist uses of anti-
dumping arrangements are an important Chinese interest in the new, Doha Round 
of multilateral trade negotiations, alongside the expansion of market access in many 
areas that is necessary to maintain international interest in and support for the 
multilateral system. China has been inclined so far to take a back seat in the Doha 
Round, in the belief that the substantial liberalisation which it has effected in recent 
years or to which it has already committed will be recognised as a substantial 
contribution that obviates the need for further initiatives ahead of a comprehensive 
settlement of the issues. However, China's economic dynamism in a world that is 
struggling for sustained growth, and its external payments surpluses, place it in a 
good position to take a lead in global trade liberalisation in the Doha Round, at a 
time when the WTO is lacking clear leadership on trade liberalisation from other 
countries. 
Findlay (Chapter 11) discusses one surprising and troubling feature of contemporary 
Chinese trade policy: the recent interest in discriminatory trading arrangements, 
especially with East Asian trading partners. It is surprising because the dimensions 
of Chinese trade expansion suggest the advantages of specialisation in line with 
global comparative advantage Trade on a non-discriminatory basis in China and its 
trading partners allows the adjustment stresses of Chinese trade expansion to be 
spread broadly through the international community. This would seem to be the 
logic of China's recent membership of the WTO, the benefits of which have been 
explained extensively within China. 
Preferential trading arrangements concentrate pressures of adjustment 
disproportionately amongst favoured partners. To the extent that discriminatory trading 
arrangements were with East Asian partners, it would compound the tendency for 
economic geography to concentrate adjustment costs in this region. The absorption 
of the huge expansion in Chinese trade that follows naturally from China's open 
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policies is accommodated most easily within a global trading system. The breakdown 
of the multilateral trading system into small-group free trade areas, with East Asian 
and some other Asian partners inside, and the United States, the European Union 
and some others outside, would greatly complicate international accommodation to 
internationally oriented growth in China. It would increase the chances that 
protectionist response to the costs of adjustment in China or elsewhere would bring 
slow the productive process or even bring it prematurely to an end. 
The implications of Chinese growth for the international political system are even 
more complex. Two years ago, it seemed that feelings of strategic rivalry with a rapidly 
growing China in the young administration of George W. Bush in the United States 
may lead to such serious conflict that productive economic relations would be at 
risk. These risks subsided with the United States focus on the war against terrorism, 
in which China was seen as a helpful ally, and the security crisis on the Korean 
peninsular, in which China was seen as an essential contributor to any satisfactory 
solution. China has worked to build a less problematic relationship with the United 
States more generally in this new context, and the United States has reCiprocated 
the efforts. Austin discusses these important developments in Chapter 24. 
RESPONSES TO GROWING INEQUALITY 
Of the many innovations in doctrine and policy that were necessary conditions for 
the success of the reforms from 1978, none were more important or difficult than 
the acceptance of wider dispersion in the distribution of incomes and wealth amongst 
the people of mainland China. 
Three aspects of the Chinese reforms made their effects on inequality of wealth 
and incomes benign in the early years. 
First, China's reforms had their first large impact on farming, with the rapid 
replacement of almost all the People's Communes by the household responsibility 
system in agriculture between 1978 and 1984. Alongside the institutional 
transformation, the removal of the bias against agriculture in the old central planning 
system was associated with an increase in the price of farm products relative to 
manufactured goods purchased by farmers. Agricultural output and real farm incomes 
rose rapidly all over China. This was highly favourable to equitable income distribution 
in the early years of reform. 
Second, China is a relatively densely populated country, especially in coastal 
areas, with comparative advantage in labour-intensive products in the early stages 
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of development. This meant that opening up to foreign trade generated exceptionally 
strong growth in labour-intensive industries. This caused many of the early gains 
from trade to be passed directly to labour and therefore distributed widely through 
the community through the operation of the labour market. 
Third, the provinces with the highest average incomes at the beginning of the 
reform period were the favoured locations for heavy industry and other activities 
which were concentrated in large, state-owned enterprises. These included Shanghai 
and the provinces of Northeast China. By contrast, the early beneficiaries of reform 
were provinces with opportunities to take full advantage of agricultural reform, growth 
in township and village industries and international exports of labour-intensive 
products. These were led by Guangdong, Zhejiang and Jiangsu, the rapid growth of 
which for a few years involved catching up with some other provinces. 
So until the mid eighties, reform was favourable to equitable income distribution. 
For a few years after that, it was, at worst, ambiguous in its effects. 
That all changed in the 1990s and the early twenty first century. The further 
development of the market economy has greatly widened the dispersion of the 
distribution of personal incomes and wealth. At the top of the distribution, and 
inevitably in a market economy, there are concentrations of wealth. Meng (Chapter 
17) shows that these are correlated with political privilege. Rural-urban income gaps 
have widened markedly, exacerbated by a partial retreat from the use of market 
mechanisms to allocate resources within agriculture, and by the favoured position 
of large-scale state-owned enterprises through the period of Keynesian fiscal 
expansion. The distribution of income amongst provinces has widened as the more 
successful coastal provinces have continued to grow rapidly after their average 
incomes have come to exceed those of the provinces that had been favoured by 
central planning. 
Many elements of the contemporary economic reform program are widening still 
further the interpersonal, inter-sectoral and interprovincial income gaps. Loss of 
jobs associated with restructuring of state-owned enterprises has made 
unemployment a significant contributor to inequality amongst individuals and 
households. Inequality in the interpersonal distribution of income continues to widen 
as the private sector matures and expands its role (Mei, Chapter 20). Direct foreign 
investment is concentrated in coastal provinces with high average incomes (Chen, 
Chapter 12). The opportunities for incomes growth that are created by trade 
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liberalisation are concentrated disproportionately in coastal China-even in 
agriculture, where WTO entry favours the labour-intensive production of the coastal 
provinces and forces contraction in the land-intensive production of the inland. 
These developments have the potential to undermine political support for reform 
and productivity-raising structural change. They have generated much discussion 
of and some action on policy change to moderate adverse effects of reform on 
income distribution. Recent developments in policy with implications for the 
moderation of income inequality are discussed in Wang and Duncan (Chapter 13), 
Qun (Chapter 18), Murton (Chapter 19), Golley (Chapter 22), Houghton and Davies 
(Chapter 21) and Jiang and Zhao (Chapter 23). 
THE PATH AHEAD 
China's reform and growth have recently emerged from a sustained period of adverse 
external conditions. Chinese economic strategy was successful in maintaining 
domestic growth momentum during this period, and in the process was helpful to 
economic activity abroad at a difficult time for East Asia and much of the world 
economy. 
The current environment appears to be more benign. In some senses it is. But it 
is dangerous to forget the dimensions of the reform task that lies ahead. Focus in 
the policy discussion is containing larger components on measures to moderate 
the income distribution of effects of contemporary reform. It is inevitable that the 
debate on the income distribution issues will become intertwined with a debate on 
the more sensitive question of the distribution of political power. The maintenance 
of reform momentum and political stability will require wise leadership and steady 
achievement in these areas. 
The outstanding agenda of reform of economic institutions, with the financial 
system first of all, contains immense challenge. There is unlikely to be a dramatic 
financial crisis, but failure to make steady process is likely to be associated with 
attrition of economic performance to an extent that soon shows up in the growth 
statistics. 
The current over-excitement about China in international business will be brought 
to heel as realisation spreads that China's external strength is of modest dimension, 
as the strong domestic demand growth is instrumental in turning a current account 
surplus into a deficit over a short time. Observers who hold the view that China's 
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economic success is a positive development for people everywhere will then be 
glad that Chinese economic leaders kept their feet on the ground when foreigners 
talked of the need for huge exchange rate appreciation in mid 2003. Maybe this time 
the foreign misperception can be corrected without over-reaction. Because, for all 
the problems and risks which lie ahead, China's emergence as a modern, 
internationally oriented economy will remain the big story of world economic history 
for some time yet. 
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2 
The impact of SARS 
Jong·Wha lee and Warwick J. McKibbin 
The outbreak of SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) has had an important 
impact on the People's Republic of China (hereafter referred to as China). When the 
virus was at its most virulent, from November 2002 to July 2003, it had a direct 
impact on economic activity. But it has also had a more fundamental and long 
lasting impact on possible political and economic reforms in China. 
The first outbreak of SARS was in Guangdong Province, the source of annual 
cycles of disease for over a century. China has been criticised for its initial response, 
in which lack of transparency and attempts to minimise the impact of the disease, 
in apparent violation of World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines, were a primary 
cause of the propagation of SARS to the world. The experience of SARS has 
illuminated weaknesses in China's public health system and raised questions about 
the ability of the government to respond to serious crises and coordinate responses 
between the central government and regional authorities. These issues have potential 
impacts on the political system as well as on the economy because of the possibility 
of future diseases and resulting impact on FDI flows into China. 
This chapter gives an overview of the SARS outbreak, presents some estimates 
of the economic costs to date and possible costs over the medium term and draws 
some lessons for policy in China. Our empirical estimates of the economic effects 
of the SARS epidemic are drawn from our earlier paper, which was based on a 
global model called the G-cubed (Asia Pacific) Model. A few recent studies including 
Chou, Kuo and Peng (2003), Siu and Wong (2003), Hanna and Huang (2003) and 
Wen (2003) provide some estimates of the economic effects of SARS on individual 
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Asian countries such as China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. But these studies focus 
mostly on assessing the effects of SARS on industries such as tourism and the 
retail service sector. However, merely calculating the effects on the number of 
cancelled tourist trips or declines in retail trade does not provide a full picture of the 
impact of SARS because such a calculation ignores links across sectors, and 
across economies through international trade and capital flows. The multi-sector 
multi-country model captures important links across sectors, as well as across 
countries, through goods and services trade and capital flows. 
The G-cubed model also incorporates individuals' expectations and their forward-
looking intertemporal behaviour. We are interested in distinguishing the effects of a 
temporary shock from those of a persistent shock, for instance, when foreign investors 
expect that SARS or other epidemics of unknown etiology may break out in some 
Asian countries not just this year but at some time in the future, they demand a 
greater risk-premium from investing in affected economies. Long-term impacts of 
this type would have far more devastating consequences for China than the short-
term cost of SARS. 
CHINA'S RESPONSES TO SARS 
The SARS virus is contagious and often fatal. In the eight months after its first 
outbreak in China in Guangdong province on 1 November 2002, the SARS disease 
spread to 30 economies, infecting 8,437 people and causing 813 deaths worldwide 
(Table 2.1). 
By July 2003, SARS seemed to have disappeared, and WHO declared that SARS 
outbreaks had been contained worldwide (Table 2.3). Yet scientists still do not know 
details about the coronavirus that causes SARS. The precise mechanism by which 
this atypical pneumonia is spread is still unclear. Many countries have successfully 
contained the SARS outbreaks and local transmission, but the disease may recur 
later in 2003. 1 There is speculation that even if it diminishes in the Northern 
Hemisphere summer, it could re-emerge in an even more fatal form in the next 
influenza season. Experts assess that the likelihood of discovering a vaccine or 
treatment for SARS in the foreseeable future is very low. Crowds of anxious patients 
may overwhelm the hospitals during the next flu season (Enserink 2003). 
SARS has posed a big challenge to China. Hong Kong and Taiwan were worst hit. 
As of 14 July 2003, 5,327 people had been infected with SARS in China and 813 of 
those had died. This represented 63.1 per cent of SARS cases and 42.8 per cent of 
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Table 2.1 Cumulative number of reported probable cases of SARS, 11 July 
20031 
Date for which 
Cumulative Date last cumulative 
number Number of Number probable case number of cases 
of case(s)2 deaths recovered3 reported is current 
Canada 250 38 194 9 Jul2003 10 Jul2003 
China 5327 348 4941 25 Jun 2003 11 Jul 2003 
China, Hong Kong 1755 298 1433 11 Jun 2003 11 Jul 2003 
China, Macao 21 May 2003 10 Jul2003 
China, Taiwan 671 84 507 19 Jun 2003 11 Jul 2003 
Malaysia 5 2 3 20 May 2003 4 Jul2003 
Mongolia 9 9 6 May 2003 2 Jun 2003 
Philippines 14 2 12 15 May 2003 11 Jul 2003 
Republic of Korea 3 0 3 14 May 2003 2 Jul2003 
Singapore 206 32 172 18 May 2003 7 Jul2003 
Thailand 9 2 7 7 Jun 2003 1 Jul 2003 
United States 75 67 23 Jun 2003 9 Jul2003 
Viet Nam 63 5 58 14 Apr 2003 7 Jun 2003 
Other countries 49 2 45 
Total 8437 813 7452 
Notes: 1 Cumulative number of cases includes number of deaths. As SARS is a diagnosis of 
exclusion, the status of a reported case may change over time. This means that previously 
reported cases may be discarded after further investigation and follow-up. As of 14 July, WHO no 
longer publishes a daily table of the cumulative number of reported probable cases of SARS. 
2 Decrease in the number of cumulative cases and discrepancies in the difference between 
cumulative number of cases of the last and the current WHO update are attributed to the 
discarding of cases. 3 Includes cases who are 'discharged' or 'recovered' as reported by the 
national public health authorities. 
Source: World Heath Organization, n.d. CSR Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
homepage, World Health Organization, Geneva. Available online at 
http://www. who. intlcsr/sars/en/. 
deaths worldwide. Hong Kong reported 1,755 cases and 298 deaths. Taiwan had 671 
cases and 84 deaths. 
The SARS outbreaks have highlighted several sociopolitical problems in Chinese 
society, including lack of transparency, inaccurate information, and lack of 
coordination between central and local authorities. The response by the Chinese 
government to the epidemic has been fragmented and opaque. Only on 11 February 
did the Chinese Ministry of Health inform the WHO of an outbreak of acute respiratory 
syndrome for the first time (Table 2.3). There is even later evidence that the Chinese 
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government was attempting to hide the epidemic, making only minimal information 
available. As a result, public fears began to rise as rumours spread by telephone 
and email. Responding to mounting criticism of its lack of transparency, the 
government quickly adapted to encourage more open reporting. On 20 April, Chinese 
leaders removed the mayor of Beijing and the Minister of Health from their posts. 
The quick spread of SARS has raised doubts about the capability of China's 
medical system to deal with major epidemics. Overall healthcare spending is not 
low as a proportion of GDP in China, amounting to about 5 per cent of GDp, but 
health expenditure per capita is only US$45 in China (Table 2.2). About one-third of 
the population has no access to improved sanitation. The government announced a 
comprehensive scheme to set up a nationwide health network to fight SARS and 
prevent other diseases. The response to SARS could represent a breakthrough for 
the improvement of the health care system in China. 
The slow government response to this previously unknown disease raises grave 
concerns about China's institutional quality and its potential for growth. Although it 
Table 2.2 Health expenditure and sanitation indicators for selected countries 
Health expenditure, Health expenditure Improved 
total per capita sanitation facilities 
(per cent of GDP) (Current US$) (per cent of population) 
China 5.3 45 29 
Hong Kong 4.4 950 100 
India 4.9 23 16 
Indonesia 2.7 19 47 
North Korea 2.1 18 99 
South Korea 6.0 584 63 
Malaysia 2.5 101 n.a. 
Philippines 3.4 33 74 
Singapore 3.5 814 100 
Thailand 3.7 71 79 
Vietnam 5.2 21 29 
United States 13.0 4499 100 
Japan n.a. n.a. n.a. 
High income DECD 10.2 2771 n.a. 
World 9.3 482 55 
Source: CEIC, 'World development indicators', presented in Hanna, D. and Huang, Y., 2003. SARS 
Impact on Asian Economies, Paper presented at Asian Economic Panel, Keio University, Tokyo, 
11-12 May. 
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is difficult to quantify the impact of the disease on the decision making of foreign 
investors, they must surely have lost some degree of confidence in China. The 
impact of SARS on FDI has been relatively minor but its recurrence, or that of 
another epidemic, in China could have disastrous impacts on future foreign investment 
flows. 
MODELLING ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE SARS EPIDEMIC 
Most earlier studies on the economic effects of epidemics focus on direct medical 
costs or incomes forgone as a result of disease-related morbidity and mortality. 
Costs include private as well as public expenditures on diagnosing and treating the 
disease. Costs are increased by the need to maintain sterile environments, implement 
prevention measures, and do basic research (Commission on Macroeconomics 
and Health 2002). 
Previous researchers have also focused on the long-term demographic 
consequences of epidemics. The first impact of epidemics is a negative shock to 
the population and labour force. Epidemics can have further effects on demographic 
structures by influencing fertility decisions of households. Another important 
mechanism by which a disease has an adverse impact on the economy's long-term 
growth is the destruction of human capital (Lee and McKibbin 2003). 
However, the direct consequences of the SARS epidemic in terms of medical 
expenditures or demographic effects seem to be rather small, in particular compared 
to such major diseases as HIV/AIDS or malaria (see Bloom and Mahal 1997; 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 2002; Haacker 2002). 
The number of probable SARS cases is still small compared to other major historical 
epidemics. Unlike AIDS, the duration of hospitalisation of the infected patients is 
short, with more than 90 per cent of patients soon recovering fully, so medical costs 
are low. The SARS-related demographic or human capital consequences are also 
currently estimated to be insignificant. But SARS has had detrimental economic 
effects in other ways. 
SARS influences the global economy in three ways. First, fear of SARS leads to 
a substantial decline in consumer demand, especially for travel and in retail since 
the fast rate of contagion makes people avoid social interactions. The decrease in 
consumption has a more detrimental effect on regions with more service industries 
and higher population densities, such as Beijing and Hong Kong. 
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Table 2.3 Chronology of SARS and major responses by the Chinese 
government 
16 November 2002 
11 February 2003 








16 April 2003 
18-20 April 
20 April 
First known case of atypical pneumonia occurred in Foshan City, 
Guangdong Province, China, but was not identified until much later. 
The Chinese Ministry of Health informed the WHO of an outbreak of acute 
respiratory syndrome with 300 cases and 5 deaths in Guangdong 
Province. 
The Chinese Ministry of Health informed WHO that the outbreak in 
Guangdong Province was clinically consistent with atypical pneumonia. 
The outbreak was said to be coming under control. 
WHO issued a global alert about cases of severe atypical pneumonia 
following mounting reports of spread among staff at hospitals in Hong 
Kong and Hanoi. 
China provided a first brief report to WHO about the Guangdong outbreak. 
The outbreak was said to have tapered off. 
China reported a cumulative total of 792 cases and 31 deaths in 
Guangdong Province from 16 November 2002 to 28 February 2003. 
Officials had previously reported 305 cases and 5 deaths from mid 
November to 9 February. 
Hong Kong announced the closure of schools until 6 April and placed 
1,080 people under quarantine. 
Chinese authorities reported SARS cases in other parts of China. 
China joined WHO collaborative networks. 
Hong Kong health authorities announced that 213 residents of the Amoy 
Gardens housing estate had been hospitalised with SARS since reporting 
on the disease had begun. 
WHO recommended that persons travelling to Hong Kong and Guangdong 
Province considered postponing all but essential travel until further notice. 
This was the most stringent travel advisory issued by WHO in its 55-year 
history. 
WHO team arrived in Guangdong and started work immediately. All team 
requests for access to sites and interviews with health staff at all levels 
were granted. 
China began daily electronic reporting of cases and deaths nationwide by 
province. 
WHO announced that a new pathogen, a member of the coronavirus 
family never before seen in humans, is the cause of SARS. 
China's top leaders advised officials not to cover up cases of SARS. 
The mayor of Beijing and the Minister of Health were removed from their 













The government established a national SARS task force headed by Vice-
Premier Wu Vi, and a national fund of two billion yuan (US$243 million) for 
SARS prevention and control. Beijing officials suspended all primary and 
secondary schools for two-weeks. 
Chinese authorities reported a cumulative total of 2305 probable cases of 
SARS and 106 deaths, including 693 probable cases in Beijing. 
WHO sent a team to Taiwan, which was reporting a cumulative total of 100 
probable cases. 
Travel recommendations were extended to Tianjin and Inner Mongolia in 
China and to Taipei, Taiwan. 
The Ministry of Finance announced that it would allocate an additional 
812.6 million yuan (US$98.3 million) to improve the infrastructure and 
capacity of local medical institutes in a bid to prevent SARS from 
spreading to rural areas, which was on top of 1.55 billion yuan (US$187 
million) already channelled to the construction of a nationwide disease 
prevention and control network. It also announced that taxes and 
administrative fees levied by the government on some industries affected 
by the outbreak of SARS would be waived or reduced. 
Travel recommendations were extended to all of Taiwan. 
Travel recommendations for Hong Kong and Guangdong Province were 
removed. 
Research teams in Hong Kong and China announced detection of a 
SARS-like virus in the masked palm civet and racoon-dog. 
Travel recommendations for Hebei, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi and Tianjin 
provinces, China, were removed. Guangdong, Hebei, Hubei, Inner 
Mongolia, Jilin, Jiangsu, Shaanxi, Shanxi and Tianjin provinces were 
removed from the list of areas with recent local transmission. 
Hong Kong was removed from the areas with recent local transmission. 
Travel recommendations were removed for Beijing, the last remaining area 
subject to WHO travel advice. Beijing was also removed from the list of 
areas with recent local transmission. 
Taiwan, the last area with recent local transmission, was removed from 
the list. 
WHO declared that SARS outbreaks had been contained worldwide, but 
called for continued vigilance. 
Sources: Compiled from World Health Organization, n.d. CSR SARS homepage, 'SARS: 
Chronology of a Serial Killer', World Health Organization, Geneva. Available online at http:// 
www.who.intlcsr/don/2003_07_04/en/;andAsianDevelopmentBank.n.d.Asia Recovery 
Information Center, SARS WATCH homepage, 'Chronology of Country Responses', Asian 
Development Bank, Manila. Available online at http://aric.adb.org/infocus/sars/ 
chronology_sars_policy.asp. 
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Second, uncertainty concerning any future epidemics reduces confidence in the 
future and this effect is very important, particularly in China, which has been a key 
recipient of foreign investment. 
Third, SARS undoubtedly increases the cost of disease prevention, especially in 
the most affected industries, such as travel, retail and the service industries. As 
long as the disease is transmitted only by close human contact, this cost may not 
be substantial, but if it were found to be transmitted by other channels, such as 
international cargo, the global cost would be enormous. 
ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SARS 
We use the G-Cubed (Asia Pacific) Model to quantify the effects of SARS on China.2 
We first generate a baseline projection of the world economy from 2002 to 2100 
under assumptions about exogenous inputs such as productivity growth rates by 
sector and country, population growth rates by country and settings for fiscal and 
monetary policies by country.3 We then apply the shocks outlined below to this 
underlying baseline projection. 
Design of simulation 
We make two alternative assumptions about the duration of SARS. In an original 
paper we assumed in the first scenario that the shock would last a year. In reality, it 
lasted only six months so we have scaled down the shocks by 50 per cent. This is 
called a temporary shock. The second assumption is that future shocks are of the 
same magnitude in the first year as the temporary shock but are more persistent in 
that they fade out proportionally over ten years. This gives some inSight into what 
might happen to the region if the SARS virus were the beginning of a series of 
annual epidemics emerging from China. 
We first calculate the shocks to the Chinese and Hong Kong economies and then 
develop some indices summarising how these shocks would be likely to occur in 
other economies. There are three main shocks based on financial market analysts' 
observations about the data emerging from China and Hong Kong. 
Initial shock to China and Hong Kong. In our representation of SARS, we assume 
three broad shocks to China and Hong Kong. These are 
.. a sector-specific demand shock to retail sales: a 15 per cent drop in demand 
for the exposed industries in the service sector 
.. a 5 per cent increase in costs in the exposed activities in the service sector 
.. a 200 basis pOint increase in the country risk premium. 
26 
These shocks are scaled to last six months (by dividing by two) rather than a 
year, which is the frequency of the model. 
We could also consider several other shocks, such as the impact on health 
expenditure and fiscal deficits. It is not clear how large this would be or for the 
persistent shock. Nor is even the direction of change clear. Since SARS kills a 
higher proportion of vulnerable people in a short time it follows that a large amount 
of expenditure for these people would thereafter be reduced. We might also anticipate 
the effect of the reaction of medical authorities with substantial investments in 
public health. 
Shocks to other countries. In Lee and McKibbin (2003) we note that the transmission 
of SARS, as distinct from the economic transmission through global markets, 
depends on a number of factors. We refer to this as the global exposure to SARS. 
The speed of spread is likely to depend, among other things, on 
.. tourist flows 
.. geographical distance to China (and Hong Kong) 
.. health expenditures and sanitary conditions 
.. government response 
.. climate 
.. per capita income 
.. population density. 
We develop indices that enable us to estimate the likely transmission of SARS to 
other countries. We do not present these in this chapter but use them in the simulations. 
Simulation results 
We apply the shocks outlined in the previous section to the global economy. We 
begin the simulation in 2003, assuming that the SARS outbreak was completely 
unanticipated. Both the temporary and persistent shocks are assumed to be 
understood by the forward-looking agents in the model. Clearly this is problematic 
when it comes to a new disease like SARS, which is likely to be associated with a 
period of learning about the nature of the shock. In this case, an assumption of 
rational expectations might not be justified. Yet there is no clear alternative. In our 
modelling we presume that only 30 per cent of agents have rational expectations 
and 70 per cent of agents are using a rule of thumb in adjusting to contemporaneous 
information about the economy. 
Table 2.4 sets out results for the percentage change in GDP in 2003 as a result of 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































component (that is, demand decline for services, cost increase for services and 
country risk premium). 
The full dynamics of adjustment will be outlined shortly. Focusing on the effects 
on GDP, there are interesting differences between the various components of the 
overall shock as well as between the temporary and permanent shocks. The temporary 
shock has the largest impact on China and Hong Kong. The loss to Hong Kong of 
2.63 per cent of GDP is much larger than the 1.05 per cent for China. This reflects 
the larger role of the service sector in Hong Kong and Hong Kong's greater reliance 
on trade. Taiwan is next most affected, losing 0.49 per cent of GDP in 2003, followed 
closely by Singapore, with a loss of 0.47 per cent. For Hong Kong, the increase in 
costs in the service sector is by far the largest contributing factor to the loss of 
GDP. In China, the contributions are evenly spread across the three factors. 
A persistent SARS shock would be much more serious for Hong Kong and China. 
The primary impact would be from the rise of the country risk premium. Although 
the initial shock in 2003 is the same as for the temporary shock, persistent elevation 
of the country risk premium causes a much larger capital outflow from China and 
Hong Kong. This results in a sharp contraction in investment and an ongoing decrease 
in production. The growth of capital stock declines, which in turn further reduces 
investment. 
The results for GDP just illustrated how the costs of SARS can be very different 
in 2003 depending on expectations of how the disease will unfold. It could also be 
instructive to examine the economic impact over time on other variables. 
Figure 2.1 compares the adjustment over time for China under the two scenarios-
when SARS is temporary, and when it is expected to be persistent. This figure 
contains six panels. Results for real GDP, investment, net capital outflows, real 
effective exchange rates, real interest rates and price levels are presented. Detailed 
discussion of these dynamics can be found in Lee and McKibbin (2003). The more 
persistent SARS is expected to be, the larger the impact on expectations, the larger 
the capital outflow and the larger the negative effects on investsment and real GDP. 
With an exchange rate pegged to the US dollar, the real exchange rate adjustment 
is achieved through a fall in the price level induced by a spike in real interest rates. 
Thus the exchange rate regime causes a larger GDP loss than would be the case if 
the Chinese exchange rate were flexible. 
Other studies have estimated the potential effects of SARS, but it is difficult to 
compare their results directly with our own. Table 2.5 contains the various forecasts 
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Table 2.5 Forecasts for China's GDP growth 
Pre-SARS Height of SARS Post-SARS 
forecast forecast forecast 
Asian Development Bank 7.5 7.3 7.3 
World Bank 8.0 7.5 n.a 
JP Morgan Chase 8.0 7.4 7.4 
Morgan Stanley 7.0 6.5 7.5 
Goldman Sachs 7.5 6-7 n.a 
Citigroup 7.6 7.0 7.5 
Source: Asian Development Bank, 2003. 'Social and economic impacts of SARS in the PRC', 
Asian Developement Bank, Manila. http://aric.adb.org/infocus/sars/SARSlmpacCPRC.pdf 
of Chinese GDP growth made before SARS and after SARS from a recent ADB 
study. There are more changes in the forecasts than just the impact of SARS. 
Nonetheless our estimate for temporary SARS of a cost of around 1 per cent of 
GDP in 2003 is larger than the results in this table. Our estimates are, however, a 
touch lower than those of Garnaut and Findlay (2003). 
Policy lessons 
The large short-run economic impact of SARS on China is not the consequence of 
the disease itself for the affected people, but of effects on the behaviour of many 
people within China and abroad. Estimation of impacts also depends on the 
adjustment of expectations as reflected in real and financial markets. The more 
persistent SARS is expected to be, the larger the negative economic impacts will 
be in 2003 and in the future in affected economies. 
There are some important lessons for policy. Transparency is vital, especially 
when dealing with uncertainty (Grant 2003). The experience of SARS has moved 
China towards more transparency, but much more could be done. It is important to 
manage unnecessary public fears and maintain people's confidence. Transparency 
is more important in a globalised world in which a loss of foreign investors' confidence 
could have large impacts on foreign investment flows and consequently economic 
growth. This is shown in our simulations. It also emphasises the need to strengthen 
international cooperation regarding disease response.4 
There is a strong economic case for the improvement of public health in China. 
Public health expenditure has been inadequate and there has not been enough 
investment in research into disease prevention. 
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There is a need to improve the quality of government responses such as 
coordination between agencies and between central and local governments in China. 
A large part of the short-term costs that we estimate derive from the rigidity of the 
exchange rate. Given the underlying pressure for an appreciating yuan in the baseline, 
the lack of a depreciation may have been less pressing in practice, but still causes 
the costs of SARS to the larger in China and Hong Kong. 
Finally, the outbreak of SARS has reinforced the idea that an important role of 
governments in an interdependent but uncertain world is to manage risk; to establish 
processes for responding appropriately to unforeseen events, and to coordinate 
policy responses and information sharing globally. 
NOTES 
1 See WHO SARS website (www.who.intlcsr/sars/en/). 
2 See McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1998) for the theoretical specification and McKibbin and Vines (2000) 
for an overview of key features and applications of the model. 
3 See Bagnoli et al. (1996) for an overview. 
4 A point made by Richard Cooper in Cooper (1989). 
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3 
The travails of current macroeconomic 
and exchange rate management 
Wing Thye Woo 
The quandary in macroeconomic management that the Chinese government is 
currently facing cannot be seen more clearly than in the following two newspaper 
headlines. On 18 August 2003, an article in Singapore's Straits Times under the 
headline 'Hu calls for more work creation as jobless rate rises' reported that the 
Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party, Hu Jin Tao, had called for 
'stronger measures ... [including] fiscal subsidies, tax incentives, insurance subsidies 
and credit opportunities' to spur economic growth. On 19 August 2003, Hong Kong's 
South China Morning Post carried an article with the headline 'Investments soar 
amid reluctance to rein in growth', reporting that the Chairman of the State 
Development and Reform Commission, Ma Kai, had 'urged the nation to be wary of 
overheating and unveiled measures to cut back lending at state-run banks.' 
Have China's recent macroeconomic policies been too cautious? Or have they 
been too inflationary? Evidence in favour of the first assessment can be found in 
the successive negative inflation rates since 1997, and continued weak aggregate 
demand is suggested by the -004 per cent inflation rate in the first half of 2003. The 
case for overheating is based on the following facts: first, the GDP growth rate in 
the first quarter of 2003 was 8.9 per cent; second, fiscal and monetary stimuli were 
greatly ramped up in the March-June period to offset the negative consequences of 
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SARS2; third, the price index for intermediate input has risen by five per cent since 
the beginning of 2003; and, fourth, inflation has traditionally lagged behind excessive 
growth by 9-12 months. 
The cost of erring on the conservative side is certainly a high one. The official 
growth target of seven per cent in 2003 could only create 10 million new urban jobs, 
while there are 24 million urban job-seekers.3In addition, 150 million of China's 500 
million rural workers are 'effectively' unemployed-and this is the most conservative 
estimate.4 The cost of overheating could also be very big because high inflation in 
the past has sometimes undermined social stability. Furthermore, overheating is 
often a sign that the state credit system has been undermining economic 
restructuring objectives by bailing out inefficient state enterprises and funding 
investments in sectors with excess capacity. 
As if China's macroeconomic managers were not already sufficiently vexed by 
the confusing signals of 'overheating' and 'below-potential growth', they now face 
tremendous political pressures from Japan, Western Europe and the United States 
to substantially revalue the renminbi (RMB).5 The current indignation over an 
undervalued RMB was set off on 1 December 2002 when two senior officials of 
Japan's Ministry of Finance wrote in the Financial Times that 'China is exporting 
deflation ... through export growth and a combination of price deflation and an 
exchange rate pegged to the dollar', and asked China 'to allow the currency to 
appreciate' (Kuroda and Kawai 2002). This call to mobilise international opinion for 
action on the RMB appears to have succeeded. By mid 2003, South Korea, Western 
Europe and the United States had joined Japan in urging an appreciation of the 
RMB, probably in response to the adamant charges levied by their domestic industries 
about unfair competition from cheap Chinese imports.6 How China will respond to 
this foreign clamour for RMB revaluation will, not surprisingly, depend on its diagnosis 
of the current macroeconomic situation. The Chinese leaders are more likely to 
agree quickly to making the RMB much more expensive if they are convinced 
that the economy is overheated, and unlikely to go beyond the immediate 
introduction of a minor trading band around the current RMB-US dollar exchange 
rate if they conclude that deflation is a more plausible threat to China's economic 
growth. 
In assessing the two contradictory desired stances of macroeconomic policies, 
the relevant analytical issue for an economist is whether China is already at its 
'natural' rate of unemployment. An output growth rate that pushes the actual 
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unemployment rate above the natural unemployment rate would not be unsustainable 
but would also risk generating a high inflation rate. The point is that, at any given 
moment, there is a maximum value on the sustainable output growth rate that is 
determined by the existing material and institutional conditions of the economy 
(and of the outside world). Thus, unless the higher growth rate desired by the 
policymaker is below the 'natural' growth rate, more expansionary macroeconomic 
policies will not deliver the desired higher growth rate. 
The operational difficulty for macroeconomic management is that the natural growth 
rate of an economy is not immutable. For example, a rise in the rate of technological 
innovation would increase the natural growth rate, while the steady convergence of 
a formerly autarkic developing country to the frontier of modern science would cause 
a steady decline in the natural growth rate. Because of the latter phenomenon of 
growth slowdown as a consequence of economic maturation, it is not so 
straightforward to claim that China's annualised growth rate of 8.2 per cent in the 
first half of 2003 is below the natural output growth rate despite two crucial facts. 
The first fact is that the 2003 growth rate is more than a percentage pOint below the 
9.4 per cent average growth rate of the 1979-2002 period; the second is that the 
inflation rate of -0.4 per cent in the first half of 2003 is substantially below the 5.5 
per cent average of the 1979-2002 period.7 One needs a more compelling argument 
against the alternative explanation that the lower 2003 growth rate simply reflects a 
lower natural output growth rate and that slightly negative inflation is compatible 
with being on the natural growth path. 
While it is important to manipulate aggregate demand via monetary and fiscal 
policies to keep the actual unemployment rate close to the natural unemployment 
rate, fortunately China is a position to implement other economic policies that will 
move the natural unemployment rate downward-that is, increase the natural output 
growth rate. To use a production analogy, the biggest gain comes not only from 
keeping an engine running at peak efficiency but also from having the engine with 
the largest capacity. The most important economic task for China is to adopt the 
best economic growth engine that world economic history has identified-a market 
economy where competitive private enterprises constitute the norm, and where the 
state focuses mainly on the provision of public goods and social insurance. The 
case for making this type of market economy the new growth engine is obvious 
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when one recognises that China's remarkable growth in the post 1978 period has 
come from deregulation that has allowed Chinese economic institutions to converge 
with those of private market economies, especially those of the East Asian variety.8 
My second argument is that many of the major macroeconomic challenges facing 
the Chinese government have their roots in China's inadequate marketisation and 
continued discrimination against the domestic private sector. Because of bureaucratic 
incentives within the state-controlled banks which monopolise the financial system, 
the large volume of savings is inefficiently intermediated into investment (with the 
private component of investment particularly deprived of bank loans). The significant 
consequence of inadequate intermediation is a level of aggregate demand that 
expands slower than the natural output growth rate. The state has thereby responded 
to deflationary tendencies by undertaking massive public investment to soak up 
excess savings in the banks. While increased public-directed investment can be a 
satisfactory solution in the short run, it is a disaster in the long run. The pOint is that 
an efficient banking system is an indispensable component of the new growth engine 
that China needs to put in place. 
My third argument is that China's persistent trade surplus is fundamentally linked 
to the deflation phenomenon, and successful solution of one will mean successful 
solution of the other. A chronic trade surplus means that national savings are 
chronically larger than domestic investments, which is exactly the malaise of 
inadequate financial intermediation. An alternative to revaluing the RMB would 
therefore be increasing the level of domestic investment, especially targeting 
investment projects that require large amounts of imported capital equipment. It is 
hard to over-emphasise that it is extremely anomalous for a developing economy 
like China to be exporting capital to the rest of the world the counterpart of a current 
account surplus. Something must be fundamentally flawed when capital-short China 
is investing abroad in the same way as capital-abundant Japan. 
My fourth argument is that the state-owned sector and state-controlled companies 
are still a serious threat to sustained high growth, banking sector solvency, and 
price stability. Worse yet, corruption within state enterprises undermines social 
stability. The switch to the new growth engine necessitates continued privatisation 
of non defence-related state enterprises that are not natural monopolies, and the 
elimination of legal discrimination against private sector activities. 
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A SLOWER GROWTH PHASE, AND ATTEMPTS AT 
MACROECONOMIC STIMULATION 
Towards the end of the 1990s, the partially reformed Chinese economy entered a 
slower growth phase, having largely exhausted the growth potential created by 
significant economic deregulation and internationalisation (Table 1.1). The average 
annual growth rate in the 1997-2002 period was 9.4 per cent, and growth rates from 
1997-2002 were below 9.4 per cent. This extended period of below-average growth 
was unprecedented in the market reform period. When I compared mean growth 
rates for 1979-96 (9.9 per cent) with mean growth rates for 1997-2002 (7.8 per 
cent), I found the difference between them to be statistically significant. The t-
statistic is 2.52. 
The analytically difficult question is whether lower growth rates for 1997-2002 
reflect inadequate growth in aggregate demand or a reduction in the growth potential 
of aggregate supply. The fact that there was a statistically significant downward 
shift in the inflation rate between the two subperiods-the t-statistic is 5.6-with 
price changes negative for 1997-2002, raises the possibility that inadequate demand 
contributed to the lower growth rates in the second subperiod. This implication follows 
because, in the absence of a drop in aggregate demand growth, a fall in supply 
growth would have produced an outcome of lower growth-cum-higher inflation (that 
is, stagflation) rather than the observed outcome of lower growth-cum-deflation. The 
evidence suggests that the natural output growth rate at present is likely to be 
higher than 7.8 per cent. 
The explanation for the lower growth-cum-deflation phenomenon for 1997-2002 is 
that there was not only a slowdown in supply-side growth but also a slowdown in 
aggregate demand growth. In the next section I will develop the argument that 
China's dysfunctional banking system has created a deflationary bias in the economy. 
In thinking about the growth of aggregate supply there is little justification for the 
belief that there is a positive relationship between the actual growth rate and the 
inflation rate for all values of the growth rate. It is more likely that, if a positive 
relationship exists at all within any short period, it will be limited to a small range 
clustered around the natural growth rate-say, half a percentage point on each side 
of the natural growth rate. 9 My estimate is that the natural output growth rate in 
2003, as permitted by China's material conditions and institutional structure, is 8 
per cent. My estimate is higher than the 7.5 per cent in Huang (2003) and the official 
growth target of 7 per cent, and is at the high end of the 7-8 per cent range in Yu 
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(2003). I also estimate that, in the absence of substantial reforms enabling the rapid 
emergence of a dynamic private sector, the natural growth rate will decline to 7.5 
per cent at the end of the decade as the catching-up process proceeds further. If 
the necessary comprehensive reforms are implemented, however, the natural growth 
rate at the end of the decade will be 8.5 per cent. 
The hypothesis that China has entered into a slower growth phase is consistent 
with employment data (Table 3.1). Average annual employment growth in the industrial 
sector was 2.8 per cent during the 1992-97 period, with a minimum of 2.1 per cent 
in 1997. Employment growth fell significantly after 1997-0.3 per cent in 1998, -1.1 
per cent in 1999, -1.2 per cent in 2000, and 0.4 per cent in 2001. Employment in 
manufacturing had actually turned bad earlier in 1996. Manufacturing employment 
growth was negative throughout the 1996-2000 period, with a particularly large 
decline of 13.5 per cent in 1998. 
Table 3.1 Employment in China's industries, 1978-2001 
Employment level Employment share Growth in employment 
Secondary Manufacturing Secondary Manufacturing Secondary Manufacturing 
industry sector industry sector industry sector 
(in millions) (percent of total employment) (percent per year) 
1978 69.5 53.3 17.3 13.3 
1988 121.5 86.5 22.4 15.9 5.8* 5.0* 
1989 119.8 85.5 21.6 15.4 -1.4 -1.2 
1990 138.6 86.2 21.4 13.3 15.7 0.9 
1991 140.2 88.4 21.4 13.5 1.1 2.5 
1992 143.5 91.1 21.7 13.8 2.4 3.0 
1993 149.6 93.0 22.4 13.9 4.2 2.1 
1994 153.1 96.1 22.7 14.3 2.3 3.4 
1995 156.5 98.0 23.0 14.4 2.2 2.0 
1996 162.0 97.6 23.5 14.2 3.5 -0.4 
1997 165.5 96.1 23.7 13.8 2.1 -1.5 
1998 166.0 83.2 23.5 11.8 0.3 -13.5 
1999 164.2 81.1 23.0 11.4 -1.1 -2.5 
2000 162.2 80.4 22.5 11.2 -1.2 -0.8 
2001 162.8 80.8 22.3 11.1 0.4 0.5 
Note: * Annual compound growth rate between 1978 and 1988. 
Source: State Statistical Bureau. various years. Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian [China Statistical 
Yearbookl. Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, Beijing.1990-2001 data from 2002 edition, earlier data 
from 2001 edition. 2002 and 2003 GDP growth rates are from Citigroup. 2003. China Economics. 
Citigroup, 6 March. 
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Price deflation appeared in the Retail Price Index (RPI) in October 1997, and in 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in February 1998. When it became apparent in the 
middle of 1998 that the economy was slowing significantly, the government 
implemented monetary and fiscal measures to boost aggregate demand (Figures 
3.1 and 3.2, Table 3.2). Interest rates have been reduced eight times in less than six 
years, with the latest rate reduction on 21 February 2001, bringing the one-year 
deposit rate to 1.98 per cent and the one-year lending rate to 2.34 per cent (Figure 
3.1). However, financial growth rates followed a declining trend in 2001. The central 
bank then began not only to increase reserves more aggressively but also to lean 
even more on the state banks to extend credit. 
The annualised (year-on-year) growth rate of fixed asset investment of the state 
sector was kept above 15 per cent from July 1998 to July 1999, then lowered as 
exports to the other East Asian economics recovered (Figure 3.2). Fiscal stimulus 
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was renewed in 2001. State spending on capital construction jumped from 209.5 
billion yuan in 2000 to 251.8 billion yuan in 2001, keeping the annualised growth rate 
of state sector fixed asset investment above 15 per cent for 11 of the 12 months in 
2001. When the CPI slipped again into negative growth rates, (falling in November 
2001 and reaching -1.3 per cent in April 2002), the Chinese government increased 
the intensity of the fiscal stimulus; for example, the growth rate of state sector fixed 
asset investment was above 23 per cent in the January 2002 - November 2002 
period, and was 17 per cent in December 2002. Apart from investment in capital 
construction, the government also implemented several pay rises in this period. 
The increased government spending meant the fiscal deficit increased substantially 
from 1.1 per cent of GDP in 1998 to 1.9 per cent in 1999,2.5 per cent in 2000, 2.7 
per cent in 2001 , and 2.9 per cent in 2002 (Table 3.2).10 Most government economists, 
for example Jia (2002), believe that investment funds raised through the issuing of 
treasury bonds contributed about 2 percentage points to GDP growth each year in 
the 1999-2002 period. 
With the encouragement of the central bank, especially with the onset of SARS in 
early 2003, the state banks greatly expanded their loans, especially to the real 
estate sector, and financial growth went from 16.8 per cent in the fourth quarter of 
2002 to reach 20.0 per cent in the second quarter of 2003. Additional fiscal and 
monetary stimuli created to offset the deleterious effects of SARS on aggregate 
demand caused the rate of fixed asset investment to jump from 21.6 per cent in the 
fourth quarter of 2002 to 32.4 per cent in the first quarter of 2003 and 31.7 per cent 
in the second quarter of 2003. The unfortunate feature about encouraging state-
owned enterprise (SOE) investments, as emphasised by Fan and Woo (1996), is 
that, in a partially reformed centrally planned economy, there are many institutional 
features that motivate SOE investments to veer out of control and overheat the 
economy. 
THE DEFLATIONARY AND TRADE ACCOUNT 
CONSEQUENCES OF INADEQUATE FINANCIAL 
INTERMEDIATION 
At a superficial level, systemic deflationary pressures that have plagued China 
since 1997 have their sources in a shrinking money multiplier (a phenomenon that 
many Chinese economists have called 'the liquidity trap'), and a slowing down in 
the growth of consumption (a phenomenon commonly known as 'the paradox of 
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thrift').11 China has tried to boost the domestic economy with successive cuts in 
interest rates, but the rise in credit creation has been much lower than expected, 
except for the periods when the central bank has leaned heavily on the banks.12 The 
paradox of thrift refers to the low level of private aggregate demand due to increased 
private savings. The savings rate increased from almost 20 per cent of GDP in 1981 
to 30 per cent in 1988 and almost 40 per cent in 2001. 
At a deeper level, however, both these phenomena spring from the same cause-
the absence of adequate financial intermediation in China. The liquidity trap made 
its appearance in the mid 1990s when Zhu Rongji called for the removal of the state 
bank manager if the ratio of NPLs in her bank were to rise two years consecutively. 
As the majority of state enterprises are either in the red or just breaking even, the 
banks became unwilling to lend money to SOEs. Lending more to private enterprises 
was not really an option, however, since their legal status was lower than that of 
state enterprises and there was no reliable way to assess their balance sheets. The 
only activity to which the banks were happy to allocate their funds is the purchase 
of state bonds-that is, the financing of the government's deficit.i3 The elimination 
of the liquidity trap requires the state to remove barriers to lending to the private 
sector, ending legal discrimination against private activities and establishing uniform 
accounting and auditing standards with credible enforcement mechanisms. 
In discussions about the increasing savings rate, a common view is that it reflects 
uncertainty about the future. Many SOE workers feel this uncertainty in the face of 
widespread privatisation of loss-making SOEs. This explanation is incomplete, 
because there has also been a rise in the rural saving rate, even though rural 
residents have little to fear about the loss of jobs in the state-enterprise sector 
because none of them are employed there. On the basis of the work of liu and Woo 
(1994) on savings behaviour, I conjecture that the desire to invest is an important 
reason for the rural sector's increased savings rate. The most dynamic industrial 
expansion in China during the period 1984-94 occurred in the rural areas. Since 
non-state firms in rural areas cannot borrow from the bank, the only way they could 
establish themselves was through self-financing, requiring would-be entrepreneurs 
to save first. 
In the very first phase of rural industrialisation, the amount of capital needed to 
start a factory workshop was very small. After a decade of rapid industrial growth, 
the Chinese countryside is saturated with labour-intensive enterprises. As competition 
among rural enterprises is fierce at present, it no longer makes economic sense to 
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invest and open the same type of factory workshop. Rural enterprises must therefore 
move up to the next stage of value-added production to be more profitable. 
The new generation of rural enterprises is much more capital-intensive, thus it 
requires larger startup funds. Rural residents have responded to the higher capital 
requirements by increasing their savings. Since the phenomenon of investment-
motivated saving must also be present within the Chinese urban community, 
pessimism-based explanations for the rise in urban savings are only partially correct. 
In fact, with the steady relaxation of regulations against the establishment of private 
businesses in rural and urban areas, the amount of investment-motivated savings 
in China could only have risen more. According to Williamson's (1988) summing up 
of the historical record of Western Europe and North America, 'investment demand 
seems to have been the driving force behind private saving and accumulation, past 
and present.' 
Total fixed investment has increased spectacularly as a proportion of GDP, with 
annual averages of 28.8 per cent in 1984-88, 34.0 per cent in 1992-96 and 36.3 per 
cent in 1997-2001. SOE investment increased in 1992-96 (19.8 per cent), then 
returned to its initial 1984-88 level (18.7 percent) (Table 3.3). However, the amount 
of state-directed investment in 1997-2001 could be more than three percentage 
points higher than 18.7 per cent of GDP, because many of the big SOEs of 1988 
had by 1999 converted themselves (or components of themselves) to shareholding 
companies listed on the stock exchanges, while remaining state-controlled. 
Furthermore, many SOES have formed joint-venture firms with domestic and foreign 
companies, with themselves as the controlling shareholders. 
In contrast to the spectacular rise in total investment and the probably equal rise 
in state-directed investment, rural investment has fallen from 8.2 per cent in 1984-
88 to 7.7 percent in 1992-96 and 7.5 percent in 1997-2001. My hypothesis is that 
a major reason for the decline in the rural investment ratio is that the traditional 
labour-intensive factory is no longer profitable, and rural entrepreneurs have been 
unable to borrow the money to undertake the more capital-intensive investments 
required for the next generation of rural enterprises. 14 The investment-GDP ratio 
rose at the national level because FDI rose while state investments (through the 
budget, SOEs and state-controlled enterprises) fully utilised higher domestic savings. 
I now turn to show that another outcome of inadequate financial intermediation is 
a chronic current account surplus. To see this pOint, consider the following accounting 
relationship: 
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Current account surplus = (government budget surplus) 
+ (savings of SOEs - investments by SOEs) 
+ (savings of the non-state sector - investments of the non-state sector).'5 
The facts for the recent period are that the current account surplus (or, loosely 
speaking, the trade surplus) is positive, the government budget surplus is negative 
at an unprecedented level, and SOE savings are less than SOE investments. This 
means that the savings of the non-state sector must greatly exceed the investments 
of the non-state sector. As documented earlier, the government has sought to fight 
Table 3.3 Investment trends by ownership (per cent of GDP) 
Total Rural SOE 
1981 19.8 5.1 13.7 
1982 23.2 6.2 16.0 
1983 24.1 7.0 16.0 
1984 25.6 7.7 16.5 
1985 28.4 7.6 18.7 
1986 29.6 8.0 20.4 
1987 30.4 8.9 19.2 
1988 30.1 8.9 18.5 
June 4th Tian An Men disruption, 1989-91 
1992 29.5 7.5 19.8 
1993 36.0 8.0 22.1 
1994 36.4 7.5 20.6 
1995 34.2 7.5 18.6 
1996 33.8 7.9 17.7 
1997 33.5 7.7 17.6 
1998 36.3 7.5 19.6 
1999 36.4 7.5 19.4 
2000 36.8 7.5 18.5 
2001 38.8 7.5 18.4 
Average 1984-88 28.8 8.2 18.7 
Average 1992-96 34.0 7.7 19.8 
Average 1997-2001 36.3 7.5 18.7 
Notes: Investment refers to fixed asset investment. 1984 was the year when the central 
government gave the clear signal that it had no ideological objection to the formation of rural 
enterprises. Rural = rural collectives and rural individuals. SOE = state-owned units only, does not 
include state-controlled units listed as various types of joint-owned units (for example, share-
holding units, joint-venture units). 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, various years. Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian [China Statistical 
Yearbook], Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, Beijing. 
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deflation by increasing public works (that is, running record budget deficits) and 
encouraging SOE investments to soak up the excess savings. The rise in total 
investments has not been sufficient to use up the excess savings, however, and 
these residual excess savings have leaked abroad in the form of an aggregate 
trade surplus. Inadequate financial intermediation has made China a capital-exporting 
country! 
This perverse current account outcome is not new. Taiwan had exactly this problem 
up to the mid 1980s when all Taiwanese banks were state-owned and operated 
according to the civil service regulation that the loan officer had to repay any bad 
loan that he had approved. The result was a massive failure in financial intermediation 
that caused Taiwan's current account surplus to amount to 21 percent of GDP in 
1986. 
China's tendency to generate persistent current account surpluses manifested 
itself only after 1994 because of major policy changes implemented in that year. 
Before 1994, with the government budget deficit being usually small, the voracious 
absorption of bank loans by SOEs, in the soft-budget environment, to invest 
recklessly kept the current account usually negative. In 1994, Zhu Rongji implemented 
stricter controls on the state-owned banks (SOBs) to reduce the then 24 percent 
inflation rate and the explosion of NPLs. This lower growth rate in SOE investments 
from 1995 onward is the reason China's built-in propensity for current account 
surpluses revealed itself only from 1995 onward. This propensity is mainly caused 
by the secular rise in the savings of the non-state sector for the reasons identified 
earlier, for example, secular rise in the required amount of start-up capital, secular 
improvement in the official attitude toward market capitalism. 16 China is not producing 
the gargantuan current account surpluses seen in Taiwan in the mid 1980s because 
of its record budget deficit and still overly large amounts of SOE investments. 
Obviously, increasing budget deficits and SOE investments to counter deflation 
and reduce the trade surplus can only be a satisfactory solution in the short run. In 
the long run, the increased public investments could follow an increasingly rent-
seeking path that is wasteful as in Japan (where, for example, a second big bridge 
would be built to a lowly populated island almost solely to benefit a politically 
connected construction company), and the increased SOE investments could 
convert themselves into non-performing loans at the SOBs. 
The solution to the problem of excess saving is not for the government to absorb 
it by increasing its budget deficit but to establish an improved mechanism for 
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coordinating private savings and private investment. This solution is correct 
regardless of my hypothesis about investment-motivated savings. 
THE BANKING SYSTEM AS A SINKHOLE 
Undeniably, China's banks are in serious financial straits. According to the People's 
Bank of China (PBOC), the proportion of NPLs of the four big SOBs is presently 
about 26 per cent, about 2 percentage pOints lower than a year ago. However, recent 
scandal over improper loans given to a Shanghai developer by the Hong Kong 
branch of the Bank of China suggests undiscovered problems. Citigroup (2002) 
suggests that NPLs amount to 35 per cent of outstanding loans to the four big 
SOBs at the beginning of 2002, and that the average capital adequacy ratio (CAR) 
of these four banks is 5.0 per cent (Table 3.4). 
Bank reform efforts of the past several years have failed. The proportion of NPLs 
declined from its record high of 48 per cent in 1998, but this reduction was achieved 
mainly by the transfer of NPLs to the state-owned asset management corporations 
(AMCs). Most NPLs still need to be dealt with and are the responsibility of the 
People's Bank of China or the Ministry of Finance. i8 Worse still, most of the problematic 
SOEs remain the clients of the parent banks and continue to create new NPLs. New 
NPLs have been created by intermittent pressure on the banks from the government 
to expand investment credit to combat deflation, and to expand social stability 
loans to reduce firm closures. This may be an important reason forthe deterioration 
in the quality of banking assets in recent years, causing the capital adequacy ratio 
to fall to 5 per cent in early 2002 from the more than 8 per cent in late 1998 after the 
recapitalisation of the banks. 
Table 3.4 Rising fragility of China's banking sector 
End-1996 End-1998 Beginning-2002 
Proportions of NPLs (%) 
Big four banks 40.0 48.0 35.0 
Ten joint-stock banks 13.5 15.5 
Average CAR (%) 
Big four banks 4.4 >8.0 5.0 
Notes: CAR: capital adequacy ratio. Proportion of NPLs for the four major banks for 1996 and 
1998 are re-estimated on the basis of new information made available at the beginning of 2001. 
The proportion for 2001 excluded the Rmb1.4 trillion transferred to the AM Cs in the previous year. 
Source: Citigroup, 2002. Greater China Insights, 14 June. 
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However, it is possible that a large part of the post 1998 NPLs may actually be 
pre 1998 NPLs that were not recognised during the 1998 recapitalisation. At that 
time, the SOBs might not have wanted to reveal the actual NPL situation because 
this would have revealed previous official NPL estimates to have been wildly inaccurate. 
In any case, the state banks are now in need of another round of recapitalisation. 
With such a fragile banking system, China has committed itself to opening up the 
banking system completely after five years of joining the WTO. Foreign banks have 
been able to conduct transactions in foreign currencies from the beginning of WTO 
membership (December 2001), conduct transactions with the local corporate sector 
in renminbi after two years, and conduct transactions with local households in local 
currencies after five years. Although foreign banks are likely to compete only in the 
coastal cities, the pressure on domestic banks would be great, as the big four 
banks extract about 95 per cent of their profits from about half a dozen coastal 
cities (Shanghai, Beijing, Xiamen, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, and Tianjin). Because 
there is no depositor insurance in China, the obvious question is whether depositors 
will believe that foreign banks cause SOBs to bankrupt, and rush to withdraw their 
savings from the SOBs, setting in motion the vicious downward spiral of credit 
contraction, leading to business failures, rendering sound financial institutions 
insolvent, and contracting credit further. 
Even if pressure on the state banks does come from depositor withdrawals, there 
will not necessarily be a full-blown crisis, since the central bank will be able to issue 
currency to the state banks to meet withdrawals. This expansion of high-power 
money cannot be easily translated into a loss of foreign reserves because capital 
controls, which I support, remain in place and are likely to do so for the foreseeable 
future. The resulting expansion of high-power money will not have an impact on 
inflation because it represents a shift from bank deposits to cash, or from some 
banks to others, and not a shift to goods. In the current deflationary atmosphere, a 
run from bank deposits to goods would be stabilising. The government has the 
technical ability to accommodate shifts in bank deposit preferences, even a modest 
bank run, without risking exchange rate collapse or runaway inflation. 
If the banking system is plagued by frequent bank runs, its role as a financial 
intermediary will be greatly reduced, and economic growth could suffer significantly. 
The real issue is not whether depOSitor shifts or a run on a bank could be 
accommodated, but how a banking crisis could be prevented from occurring in the 
first place. The government must keep the banks adequately capitalised at all times. 
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Another reason for the banks to be recapitalised is that this will lower the lending 
rate, and hence spur capital formation. To see how NPLs raise lending rates, note 
that the cash-flow constraint that a bank (regardless of solvency) must meet in the 
absence of state subsidies, operating costs, and a reserve requirement is given by 
ro 0 = rL [D-NPL] 
where r D = deposit rate, r L = lending rate, and D = amount of deposit. 
This means that if an NPL equals one-third of deposits, then the lending rate has 
to be at least 50 per cent higher than the deposit rate. The significant implication, 
however, is that a new bank (domestic or foreign) can undercut the lending rate of 
the existing SOB because it will not have any NPLs on its books. Since the 
government recapitalised the banks in 1998, and needs to do so again now, the 
important question is whether there are technical and political obstacles that can 
prevent China from implementing another round of bank recapitalisation. How many 
more rounds of bank recapitalisation can China afford without generating a fiscal 
crisis? 
HOW SERIOUS IS THE THREAT OF FISCAL iNSOLVENCY? 
The prolonged use of loose fiscal policy carries two major risks. The first risk is low 
economic efficiency of state investment, especially of many infrastructure projects 
implemented in the last four years. Almost all these projects were implemented 
hurriedly, with some projects approved even before the feasibility reports were 
completed. In 1998 and 1999 there were frequent reports about the collapse of 
recently built bridges and roads. This risk of fiscal inefficiency has been confirmed 
by an internal study by the Ministry of Finance, which found that the amount of 
investment required to create one additional unit of GDP has increased significantly 
in recent years (Gao 2002). 
The second, and possibly more serious, risk to fiscal management is fiscal 
sustainability. Proactive fiscal policy contributes to fiscal risks in two ways, directly 
by increasing both fiscal deficits and public debts, and indirectly by increasing the 
amount of NPLs through influencing banks' lending decisions. A higher debt-GDP 
ratio means more debt serviCing in future periods, and this could require expenditure 
cuts to prevent an upward spiral of the debt-GDP ratio-a development that could 
convince financial markets that the state is resorting to the Ponzi scheme (or pyramid 
scheme) to finance its deficits. 
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Fiscal sustainability lies at the heart of whether a banking crisis would actually 
occur. As long as the state is perceived as able and willing to bailout failing SOBs, 
depositors will retain their confidence in the SOBs, regardless of the actual state of 
their balance sheets. The stock of publicly acknowledged government debt is 16 
per cent of GDP, and it is common to hear official assurances that current fiscal 
deficits of less than 3 per cent of GDP do not pose a problem for debt servicing by 
the state. Analytically, however, the correct measure of public debt should be the 
consolidated debt of the state sector, including at least some part of contingent 
liabilities (for example, foreign debts of SOEs and SOBs, and unfunded pension 
schemes in the SOE sector). If an analyst counts NPLs as contingent liabilities, 
then she is really computing what the public debt will be after one more round of bank 
recapitalisation. According to Fan (2003), consolidated public debt at the end of 2001 
amounted to 72 per cent of GDP; according to Citigroup (2002), it could be as high as 
115 per cent (Table 3.5). So, is China's present debt-GDP ratio too low or too high? 
In 1995, central government debt-GDP ratios in Italy, Sweden and the United 
States were, respectively, 117.6 per cent, 70.8 percent, and 50.5 per cent in 1995.19 
So, if China undertakes its second bank recapitalisation, its public debt will still be 
within the range of advanced OECD countries that are not experiencing fiscal crises. 
However, two important points show that this finding is not optimistic. 
First, the forthcoming recapitalisation of China's banks appears to be the last 
major one that the government could implement in the short term without risking the 
Table 3.5 Contingent liabilities in China, end of 2001 
Accumulated public debts 
Special T-bonds in 1998 for recapitalisation 
Estimated costs for bank restructuring 
Estimated costs for social security funds 




















Note: This is an updated estimation based on new information available on both gaps in social 
security funds and municipal government contingent debts for which the central government is 
the guarantor. These were estimated on the basis of communication with government economists. 
Source: Citigroup, 2002. Greater China Insights, 14 June. 
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stability of the domestic financial markets and its credit standing in the international 
financial markets. A third recapitalisation (since 1997) would push the debt-GDP 
ratio to over 150 per cent, well above the OECD norm. 
Second, if China recapitalises the SOBs a second time, it will have to compromise 
the expansionary fiscal policy that has been keeping GDP growth above 7 per cent 
since 1997. This is because China raises much less state revenue (as a share of 
GDP) than the OECD countries, and hence has a much lower capacity to service 
its public debt. The revenue-GDP ratio was 16.2 per cent for China in 2001 ,30 per 
cent for Italy in 1995,38 per cent for Sweden in 1995, and 21 per cent for the United 
States in 1996.20 China's additional debt service from the second bank recapitalisation 
will be about 1.5 to 2.5 per cent of GDP'21 If China increases tax collection or 
reduces infrastructure spending to cover this increased debt service, then this second 
recapitalisation of the SOBs will reduce the fiscal stimulus that has been keeping 
GDP growth rate above 7 per cent. Between these two options, expenditure reduction 
cannot be considered the less likely outcome, because in China's experience during 
the reform era frequent changes to the tax system have not been able to raise 
revenue Significantly for sustained periods. The reason for the low revenue-GDP 
ratio could be that increasing tax collection is as much a political as an administrative 
challenge. 
If the issue of fiscal sustainability is viewed in the broader context of debt 
dynamics, one might be tempted to be more optimistic about the present situation, 
and thus dismiss the existence of a trade-off between bank recapitalisation and 
fiscal stimulus. Such an optimistic assessment is based on the assumption that 
China's annual growth trend over the next decade and a half will continue to be at 
least 7 per cent, meaning that the high debt-GDP ratio of 115 per cent of today 
would be reduced over time by the high rate of output growth. There would be no 
need to cut back on the fiscal stimulus to service the additional debt from the new 
round of bank recapitalisation. China could just borrow more to cover the additional 
debt service, and wait for the economy to 'grow' out of its debt. 
This optimism is based on the evolution of the debt-GDP ratio as given by 
d (In[DebVGDPJ) / d t = r + p + b - y 
where r = real interest rate on government debt; p = primary fiscal deficit rate = 
[state expenditure excluding debt service - state revenue] I GDP; b = NPL creation 
rate = [change in NPL in SOB] I GDP; and y = trend growth rate of real GDP. 
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For convenience, I assume y to be 8 per cent, and p to be 2 per cent. (According 
to Deutsche Bank (2003), p was 1.8 per cent in 2001 and 2.2 per cent in 2002, and 
is likely to be 2.1 per cent in 2003.) One seemingly plausible estimate of the real 
interest rate (r) is 4 per cent, obtained by combining the government bond rate on 25 
March 2003 at .65 per cent, and a negative 1 per cent inflation. If we now add the 
unrealistic assumption of b = 0 to this example, we see that y exceeds the sum of 
rand p by 2 percentage points, implying that the debt-GDP ratio declines over time. 
However, this safety margin of 2 percentage point for China's debt situation is 
based on the wrong assumption of b = O. The fact that China must now undertake 
another recapitalisation after 1998 to solve the problem of NPLs valued at 35 per 
cent of GDP suggests that b = 7 per cent! If we make the assumption that the 
SOBs will be able to reduce the annual NPL creation rate (b) to 2 per cent of GDP 
after this second recapitalisation, can we reach the optimistic conclusion that China 
can simply grow out of its debt without having to face the trade-off between bank 
recapitalisation and fiscal stimulus? 
This optimistic conclusion is also dependent on two other highly unrealistic 
assumptions 
.. that there will not be another round of bank recapitalisation in the future-an 
assumption about state banks that has been falsified not only by international 
experience but also by China's own experience since 1998 
.. that China can promote the development of its financial sector without freeing 
state-set interest rates. 
Because the real interest rate of 4 per cent (used above) is the product of interest 
rate ceilings, the shadow interest rate is likely to be substantially higher. As China 
is a capital-shortage country, the real rate of return on physical capital in China 
must be higher than in the United States, suggesting that it is likely to be over 15 
per cent. Thus, if there were an efficient government bond market in China today, 
the lower boundary of the real government bond rate could be at least 6 per cent. 22 
This two percentage point rise in the real interest rate is made more plausible by the 
fact that the state would have to issue new bank recapitalisation bonds that amount 
to 40 per cent of GDP. In short, under interest rate liberalisation and with b == 2 per 
cent, the primary fiscal deficit (p) would have to be cut from two per cent to zero, 
that is, the fiscal stimulus would have to be eliminated in order for the debt-GDP 
ratio not to spiral uncontrollably upward. 
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As international experience shows interest rate liberalisation to be crucial to the 
increasing sophistication of financial markets, I really see no reason to feel assured 
about the sustainability of China's fiscal situation. The lesson from this debt dynamics 
exercise is that we have to be very cautious about a benign scenario for China's 
fiscal situation. Even with the optimistic assumption that NPLs equal two per cent 
of GDp, China has no margin of safety to ensure fiscal solvency. There is a trade-off 
between maintaining its fiscal stimulus to reduce unemployment and liberalising 
interest rates to promote financial sector development. 
In summary, China's consolidated debt-GDP ratio would be relatively high by 
international standards after a second bank recapitalisation, while its revenue-GDP 
ratio would remain relatively low. The threat to the stability of China's financial markets 
is fiscal sustainability, and the threat to fiscal sustainability is successive rounds of 
bank recapitalisation. This precarious outcome is a systemic feature of the current 
banking system, a relic from the era when central planning was the preferred engine 
of economic growth. We cannot attribute the creation of NPLs entirely to the SOBs; 
their chief customers, the SOEs, deserve an equal share of the blame. The fact is 
that the problem of NPLs cannot be solved unless the SOE problem is also solved.23 
MACROECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INSTABILITY FROM THE 
STATE ENTERPRISE SECTOR 
The inflationary problem generated by the traditionally biggest macroeconomic 
destabiliser (the SOE sector) still exists. If anything, the SOE sector in 2003 has 
not only become a potential source of more macroeconomic instability, but also 
emerged as a source of socio-political instability. To see the origin of these negative 
developments, we review the Fan and Woo (1996) argument that the reform strategy 
for the SOE sector during 1978-93 was inherently inflationary.24 
The crux of the 1978-93 SOE reform strategy was to transfer decision-making 
power from the industrial bureaus to the state enterprises. The increased operational 
autonomy of the SOEs reduced the ability of the industrial bureaus to monitor the 
financial situation within the SOEs, and hence created the incentive for SOEs to 
greatly increase their demand for investment funds. The reduction in bureaucratic 
oversight of SOEs in a soft-budget environment allowed the SOEs to use creative 
accounting to privatise profits from good investment projects, and to receive state 
subsidies to cover losses from bad investment projects. Until about 1996, SOEs 
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were generally able to satisfy their large appetite for investment because the local 
govemments, in the interest of local development, inevitably lobbied local branches 
of the state banks to grant the SOEs' applications for investment loans. The evidence 
is overwhelming that local bank branches, at least until 1995, were unable to resist 
the demand for easy money.25 
Losses at SOEs exploded after 1992 with the fall of the former Soviet Union, 
when many Chinese SOE managers saw the same fate for China and concluded 
that this was their last chance to steal. SOE losses skyrocketed, even though GDP 
grew in the range of 10-14 per cent annually in the 1992-95 period. By 1995, it was 
common to summarise the SOE situation in terms of one-third losing money and 
another one-third making no money. From the vantage point of 2003, it seems that 
continued inefficiency and de facto asset-stripping and embezzlement of profits by 
managers and workers were the primary causes of the general decline in SOE 
profits, with the latter being the more important. Devolution of financial decision-
making power to the SOEs, and steady reduction in discrimination against the 
private sector have made it increasingly easy for the managers to transfer state 
assets to themselves. Of the 327 cases of embezzlement, bribery and misuse of 
public funds that were tried in Beijing in 1999, 76 per cent took place in SOEs'. 26 
Increasing public outrage over the inequity of the informal privatisation of the 
SOE sector is well captured by He Qinglian who wrote that the SOE reform has 
amounted to 
a process in which power-holders and their hangers-on plundered public wealth. The primary 
target of their plunder was state property that had been accumulated from forty years of the 
people's sweat, and their primary means of plunder was political power.2? 
By 1994, the Chinese leadership had recognised the increasingly serious economic 
and political problems created by the principal-agent problem innate in its 
decentralising reforms of market socialism. thus it announced that the clarification 
of property rights of SOEs would be added to the SOE reform program. In July 
1997, the Communist Party of China (CPC) publicly committed to convert most of 
the SOEs to publicly traded shareholding corporations-a form of industrial 
organisation that originated in capitalist economies. Employment growth in the 
industrial sector (Table 3.1) fell from 2.1 per cent in 1997 to 0.3 per cent in 1998, 
then became negative in the following years. The restructuring of state manufacturing 
industries had occurred even earlier, in 1996. 
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The state's decision to accelerate diversification of the ownership structure of the 
SOEs in 1997 was a bold move, because experiences with mass privatisation in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (EEFSU) demonstrated that the task 
was extremely difficult and outcomes consistently fell below initial expectations. In 
Russia, 'Ioans-for-shares' privatisation transferred the country's enormous mineral 
wealth to a group of oligarchs, and the weak administrative and legal structures 
allowed many managers to take effective control of the privatised firms and loot 
them instead of improving their operations. Furthermore, the EEFSU experiences 
warn that mass privatisation is an exceedingly dangerous business politically, since 
it generates great amounts of rent and the resulting corruption inevitably affects 
government. The governments of both Vaclav Klaus and Boris Yeltsin were affected 
in this way. 
Privatisation has been going forward in China (albeit with occasional stops) for 
two main reasons. The first reason comes from John Nellis (1999), who pOints out 
that 'governments that botch privatisation are equally likely to botch the management 
of state-owned firms'. The answer is not to avoid privatisation but to implement 
more careful privatisation: governments in transition economies should 'push ahead, 
more slowly, with case-by-case and tender privatisations, in cooperation with the 
international assistance community, in hopes of producing some success stories 
that will lead by example.' 
The second reason lies in the fact that delaying privatisation would be costly to 
China's government politically. The maintenance of the status quo has become 
increasingly difficult because SOE managers in China know from the EEFSU 
experience that they are in an endgame situation. Widespread spontaneous 
privatisation by SOE managers could create grave social instability. 
The solution to the SOE problem in China is not privatisation per se, but a 
transparent, legal privatisation process that society at large can accept. Because 
an adequate privatisation program must compensate retired and laid-off workers, 
permit takeover by core investors, and respect the rights of minority shareholders, 
it is important that legal reforms be carried out Simultaneously. Only with a 
transparent, equitable privatisation process overseen by an adequate legal framework 
would China be likely to avoid a state-created Russian-style kleptoklatura. 
Recently, there has been some questioning about whether the case for privatisation 
has been overstated.28 When Zhu Rongji was designated the new premier in 1997, 
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he announced that he would solve the SOE problem in three years. In 2000, he 
declared victory on the SOE front when the profits of the industrial SOEs leaped 
from 53 billion yuan in 1998 to 241 billion. Zhou and Wang (2002) quantified the 
sources of the financial turnaround, and found that 
.. the lower interest rate in 2000 increased profits by 52 billion yuan (28 per cent 
of the increase in SOE profits) 
.. the higher oil prices boosted overall SOE profits by 79 billion yuan because 
almost all oil companies are state-owned (42 per cent of the increase)29 
" the conversion of the bank loans of SOEs into equities held by state asset 
management companies raised profits by 10 billion yuan (5 per cent of the 
increase). 
About 75 per cent of the increase in the profits of industrial SOEs in the 1998-
2000 period was not due to actions taken within these enterprises but to external 
factors. When Zhou and Wang (2002) calculated the profit rate after deducting the 
profits from the more favourable external environment, they found profits had 
increased from 0.7 per cent in 1998 to 1 .2 per cent in 2000 for the SOE sector, and 
from 2.8 per cent to 4.8 per cent for the non-SOE sector. Despite the recent good 
news on SOE profitability, the fact remains that the SOE sector still lags considerably 
behind the non-SOE sector in efficiency. 
While the recent rise in profits gives some breathing space, the capacity of SOEs 
to 'dissipate rents' through high payments to managers and workers, if not illegal 
transfer of assets, should remain clearly in the policymakers' minds, otherwise any 
gains could be squandered, if not reversed, in a relatively short period of time. It is 
important for China to replace uncontrolled (and uncontrollable) asset stripping in 
the SOE sector with transparent and equitable privatisation in order to improve 
macroeconomic stability and defuse socio-political instability. 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that China's dysfunctional financial system has imparted a deflationary 
bias to the economy and made China a capital-exporting country by constraining 
the growth of aggregate demand to a lower level than the growth of aggregate supply. 
The government has been actively trying to neutralise deflation through an aggressive 
fiscal policy. I recommend that it should now expand its investment program to 
incorporate large import-intensive infrastructure projects so that the trade surplus 
can be reduced as well. This move would be a better alternative to the appreciation 
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of the RMB as suggested by China's foreign friends. The additional infrastructure 
construction would create jobs, relieve production bottlenecks, and, on top of all 
this, preserve employment in China's export-oriented sectors. However, the most 
efficient solution is for private investment rather than public investment to recycle 
the pool of private savings back into the economy. The key to eradicating the deflation 
bias and the tendency towards current account surplus lies in establishing an efficient 
financial intermediation mechanism. 
If the Chinese government decides to keep the SOBs as the dominant financial 
intermediation mechanism, there is really little to be gained by recapitalising the 
SOBs. This suggests that an effective way to slow the pace of NPL creation in an 
SOB-dominated financial system and to sustain the fiscal situation might be to 
keep the NPLs on the books of the SOBs, and 'the financial status of these loans 
should be constantly watched and openly discussed' in the public media (Fan 1993). 
For Fan Gang's suggestion to work, it is necessary that foreign banks (which by 
2008 will face no more restrictions than Chinese banks) will not expand aggressively 
out of the big coastal cities. If the foreign banks do expand rapidly, then their lower 
costs from the absence of NPLs will allow them to charge lower lending rates than 
the SOBs. This will eliminate the SOBs, because WTO regulations make it illegal 
for the government to subsidise SOBs against foreign competition. Fan Gang's 
method should work for 7-1 0 years because only HSBC and Citibank are likely to 
expand their banking network actively in China in the next decade, and even then 
only in the main coastal provinces. 
The most important priority for financial sector reform is the establishment and 
growth of competitive domestic banks. As China is required by its WTO accession 
agreement to allow foreign banks to compete against its SOBs on an equal basis 
by 2007, it would be ridiculous not to allow the formation of truly private banks of 
domestic origin. There is no reason to favour foreign private banks over domestic 
private banks, and no reason why China should not allow its best financial minds 
compete with the best foreign financial minds. I therefore recommend that, after 
recapitalisation of the big four state banks, at least two be broken into regional 
banks, and that the majority of these regional banks be privatised.30 At the same 
time, the laws on the establishment of new banks should be loosened, and interest 
rates deregulated. However, it is crucial that the speed of financial sector liberalisation 
should proceed no faster than the development of the financial regulatory ability of 
the state. Even then, the danger of substituting financial crash for financial repression 
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is still a real one. A modern financial system requires a modern system of financial 
supervision and prudential regulation for its proper functioning. 
It would be a good idea to sell a few of the regional state banks to foreign banks. 
This would facilitate the transfer of modern banking technology to Chinese banks. 
The more local staff foreign bankers train, the larger will be the pool of future managers 
for Chinese-owned banks. An accelerated process of promoting the growth of sound 
domestic private financial institutions and allowing the entry of foreign financial 
institutions would certainly shorten the time it would take for Shanghai to assume 
its rightful place among the major international financial centres, and to contribute 
to more efficient intermediation in the world's savings. 
Entry of Western banks into China's financial markets is not the same as 
liberalisation of the capital account in the balance of payments. China would not be 
well served by a rapid opening of the capital account, since that could subject 
China to the same rapid swings of short-term capital that shattered the economies 
of Southeast Asia and Latin America. Capital account opening should also proceed 
gradually, because it must be accompanied by sophisticated financial market 
regulation, something that is clearly not in place now. Foreign banks could become 
conduits for large-scale capital flight, or for rapid swings in short-term lending and 
repayments, or facilitators of bank runs (in which depositors do not merely switch 
banks, or switch from domestic banks to domestic currency, but actually switch 
from domestic deposits to foreign assets). 
Besides successive rounds of bank capitalisation, other shocks could also 
undermine the fiscal sustainability of the state. One such shock would be an AIDS 
pandemic that would necessitate increased state spending on public health; another 
would be massive construction to offset a major ecological disaster and significant 
climatic changes (for example, water shortages in the northern provinces, alternative 
energy systems to traditional methods of burning coal). The SARS epidemic is an 
important reminder that macroeconomic stability depends on more than just traditional 
shocks. The economic costs of SARS have been greatly magnified by an inadequate 
public health system and by structural weaknesses in information dissemination. 
China's new leaders should take a more comprehensive view of economic growth 
and the implications of socio-political influences on macroeconomic management. 
There can be no greater confirmation of China's determination to make the private 
sector its new growth engine than the tenacity with which it pursued WTO membership. 
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The WTO is limited to private market economies, and it requires that the economic 
institutions of its members converge within a specified period to some broadly 
defined norms compatible with the main forms of market capitalism. The challenge 
to China's new leaders is the proper management of institutional convergence in the 
wake of low, or negative, employment growth in the industrial sector in the four 
years leading up to WTO accession.31 The fiscal burden of installing the new economic 
growth engine is a heavy one, and my analysis shows that China can just afford it. 
The absence of a safety margin in fiscal management highlights the importance of 
competent economic management. This does exist in China, however the absence 
of a safety margin also highlights the importance of continued good luck. While the 
many reform tasks ahead are challenging, we take heart from the fact that during 
1979-2002 many other challenges were faced and overcome. 
NOTES 
1 This chapter emerged from an ongoing project on Economic Growth in China conducted by the 
East Asian Program of the Center for Globalization and Sustainable Development at Columbia 
University. I am grateful to Fan Gang, He Uping, Huang Yiping, and Yu Yongding for sharing their 
insightful analyses on the Chinese economy with me. I am deeply indebted to the Citigroup office 
in Hong Kong for assistance in data compilation. 
2 Employers in SARS-affected areas were also ordered 'not to layoff workers'. See 'China tries to 
stanch economic fallout as disease, worry spread: emergency policies boost public spending', 
Washington Post, 9 May 2003. 
3 If realised, the official urban employment rate would rise from 4 per cent at the end of 2002 to 4.2 
per cent at the end of 2003. Data are from 'Economy not working hard enough', South China 
Morning Post, 16 August 2003. However, it is well known that the official data on urban unemployment 
tend to understate the problem. When the official urban unemployment rate was 3.6 per cent in 
June 2002, a Chinese Academy of Social Studies report estimated the actual urban unemployment 
rate to be 7 per cent, and Uu Wei of Beijing University estimated it to be 14.6 per cent. See 'China 
jobless figures enter danger zone', Straits Times, 15 June 2002. 
4 'Budget and job woes threaten stability', South China Morning Post, 19 December 2002. 
5 For example, 'Snow calls on Beijing to let currency float', Financial Times, 2 September 2003. 
6 See, for example, 'Behind the debate over China's currency', Barrons, 28 July 2003; 'US job losses 
blamed on China's currency', The New York Times, 26 August 2003; and 'Economic ministers 
discuss Chinese currency', Pacific Business News, 23 July 2003. 
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7 The inflation rate is calculated from the retail price index (RPI). The average inflation rate according 
to the consumer price index (CPI) (available from 1985) is 0.6 per cent for the first of 2003 and 7.7 
per cent for 1985-2002. CPI is broader than RPI because it also covers services and housing. The 
2003 GDP growth rate is from 'National economy faces a string of challenges', China Daily, 26 
August 2003. 
8 This interpretation of China's economic performance after 1978 is elaborated in Woo (1999) and 
Woo (2001). 
9 Graphing the growth-inflation relationship, with the inflation rate on the y-axis, the relationship is a 
vertical line at each endpoint of the range. This does not mean that the positive portion of the graph 
could be exploitable for macrostabilisation, since changes in expectations could shift it up and 
down very quickly. 
10 Citigroup (2003) has projected the budget deficit to be 2.8 per cent in 2003. The scale of the fiscal 
stimulus has evoked comparisons with the New Deal, and provoked catchy headlines in the 
media, for example, 'China gambles on big projects for its stability', New York Times, 13 January 
2003, and 'Public spending explodes', Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 January 2003. 
11 Keynes coined these both terms. Strictly speaking, the Chinese characterisation of the liquidity 
trap as a 'shrinking money multiplier' does not correspond to Keynes's original meaning. Keynes 
was referring to the situation where the interest rate would not fall despite the addition of reserves 
because of the predominant expectation held by investors that the interest rate would rise soon. In 
brief, the difference is 'the shrinking money multiplier' versus 'the non-falling interest rate: 
12 For example, during the SARS period, the banks faced intense pressure from the central bank to 
extend credit. 
13 The Chinese government has sought to increase bank lending to private individuals by encouraging 
banks to establish mortgage loans, which are perceived as less risky because of their seemingly 
fully collateralised nature. While it is still early to tell, it appears that the enthusiasm for real estate 
lending in 2002 might have started a speculative bubble in that sector. 
14 Woo (2000) presents a proposal of how to meet investment financing needs in rural China. 
15 It is important to note that this equation applies only to China's total trade surplus, not to any 
bilateral trade surplus between China and another country. The equation in standard textbook 
notation is 
CA = (T-G) + (S-I). 
16 Of course, just as the current account outcome is the product of the three terms in the equation, 
multi-variable causation also applies to the savings outcome, for example, demographic features, 
60 
expected future income growth. Our discussion has concentrated on how one of these variables, 
the type of financial intermediation mechanism, can affect the savings rate. 
17 It appears that the AMCs have started by concentrating on the 'NPLs with the best prospect for 
recovery', and that the 'average cash-recovery rate' on the small amount processed by June 2002 
is 21 per cent. This recovery rate is expected to drop substantially when the more difficult loans are 
processed. See 'On the road to ruin', Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 November 2002. 
18 The US ratio is for 1996. Ratios were constructed from the IMF's International Financial Statistics. 
19 The revenue-GDP ratio for China is from Deutsche Bank (2002) which estimated that it will rise to 
16.4 per cent in 2002 and 16.6 per cent in 2003. Debt-GDP and revenue-GDP ratios for other 
countries are from the IMF database. 
2l This assumes a bond rate of four-six per cent-an assumption discussed in the next paragraph. 
21 According to Solow (1991), the stylised fact for the real interest rate in the United States is that it 
is 5-6 per cent. 
:?2 See Wen (2003) for a recent analysis of the joint reform of the SOBs and SOEs. 
23 See Huang et al. (1999) for an account of the failure of SOE reform. 
:>l The institutional reforms of the central bank and the state banks implemented in July 1993 as part 
of an austerity campaign have not been successful in changing the situation. Chen Yuan (1996), 
Deputy Governor of the Central Bank, reported that 'the enthusiasm for economic growth in some 
localities is so strong that it is very difficult to stop completely excessive investment financed 
through forced bank credit' (emphasis added). 
23 'Judicial attention to SOEs pledged,' China Daily, 19 February 2000. 
2l He Qinglian, Zhongguo de Xianjing, (China's Pitfall), Mingjing Chubanshe, Hong Kong. The translated 
quote is from Liu Binyan and Perry Link, 'China: the great backward?', The New York Review of 
Books, 8 October 1998:19. 
Z1 See Nolan and Wang (1999) for a recent assertion of a turnaround in SOE performance. 
23 This estimate has taken into account the additional production cost of the non-oil SOEs. 
29 Partial recapitalisation is likely to occur soon, and it is likely that the target will be the reduction of 
the NPL ratio from 35 per cent to 15 per cent. The cost is estimated to range from 700 million yuan 
to 1 trillion yuan (7 to 10 per cent of GDP)-see 'Massive bailout proposed for banks', South China 
Morning Post, 26 August 2003. 
3) Recent insightful discussions on the conditions for meeting this challenge successfully, and on the 
impact of WTO accession on the Chinese economy can be found in Lu et al. (2003), Song (2002a), 
Song (2002b), and Yu (2003). 
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STRONG GROWTH PERFORMANCE UNDER PREMIER ZHU 
Five years ago, when Zhu Rongji became premier, he launched a comprehensive 
and ambitious package of reforms, including improving the profitability of SOEs, 
reducing financial risks, and downsizing the government. 
Wen Jiabao's first battle after becoming premier in early 2003 was to control the 
SARS epidemic. Now that the outbreak is effectively under control, the new 
government is likely to shift its focus to the reform agenda. The economic challenges 
facing the new government today are still similar to those of five years ago: loss-
making SOEs, huge bad loans, rising unemployment rate, and so on. 
We should nonetheless not underestimate Zhu's contribution to the Chinese 
economy, made mainly in two areas-WTO entry and strong growth. China's 
successful conclusion of the negotiations on wro accession, under Zhu's leadership, 
has set the direction and pace for future economic reforms. 
China's growth performance over the past five years has been very impressive, 
particularly in comparison with growth of other Asian economies during the same 
period (Figure 4.1). 
Over the past five years, most Asian economies' growth rates have been volatile 
because of the East Asian financial crisis in 1998 and then a significant slowdown 
in the US economy in 2001. China's GDP growth rate, however, has stayed between 
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7.1 and 8 per cent. Interestingly, the growth performance of the Indian economy 
was also quite consistent during this period, suggesting that there might be a large-
economy factor. 
Some economists have questioned the reliability of China's official statistics. We 
believe, however, that even after taking into account possible data problems, China's 
GDP was stili strong and steady. 
What was the main contributor to China's extraordinary growth performance? This 
is one of the key questions. The most important question now is whether the growth 
pattern of recent times is likely to change or persist under the new leadership. 
GROWTH DRIVEN MAINLY BY STATE INVESTMENT 
China's fixed asset investment is still dominated by the state. There are two definitions 
of state sector investment. 
Figure 4.1 Annual GDP growth, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Japan and 
India, 1998-2002 (year-on-year, per cent) 
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If only SOEs are considered, the share of the state sector in total investment 
was 48 per cent in 2002. 
2 If the state sector is taken to include shareholding and listed companies 
controlled by the state, its share in total investment was 76.3 per cent in 2002. 
This indicates that 'marketisation' proceeds much more slowly in investment than 
in the goods markets. There are three main channels for the financing of broadly 
defined state sector investment. 
,. Direct investment under the budget. Over the past five years, the government 
has issued RMB 650bn in treasury bonds to finance the construction of large 
infrastructure projects; another RMB 140bn is earmarked for direct investment 
in 2003. 
.. Financing of state-sponsored projects through either bank loans or bond 
issuance. The government has often called on the banks to provide loans for 
state-sponsored projects to supplement projects run directly by the state, and 
over the past five years an estimated RMB 3 trillion in loans has been provided 
for such projects. 
• Bank loans for the state sector. While banks should in theory treat the state 
and non-state sectors equally in loan applications, in practice they still favour 
the state sector in their lending decisions, sometimes under pressure from 
local governments. 
Broadly defined state sector investment may also include some investment by 
foreign investors in joint ventures. But this contribution is probably still limited. The 
Table 4.1 Investment by state* and non-state sectors, 1997-2002 (per cent) 
Growth of state Growth of Share of state 
Growth of sector non-state sector sector in total 
total investment investment investment investment 
1997 8.8 8.1 11.3 75.3 
1998 13.9 12.3 18.8 74.3 
1999 5.1 6.2 1.8 75.1 
2000 10.3 8.1 16.7 73.6 
2001 13.0 14.8 8.2 74.8 
2002 16.1 18.4 9.3 76.3 




average growth rate of actual FDI has only been 3.1 per cent during the past five 
years, and FDI accounted for 11 per cent of total investment. 
How important is state sector investment for China's GDP growth? We can do 
some simple calculations. First, recall that GDP includes consumption, investment 
and net exports: 
GDP=C+I+AX 
We can further decompose consumption into household and government 
consumption, and investment into state sector and non-state sector investment. 
Therefore, we can express GDP growth as a weighted average of growth in 
1 household consumption 
2 government consumption 
3 state sector investment 
4 non-state sector investment 
5 net exports. 
The weights used in this calculation are their respective shares in GDP over the 
past five years. State-related activity (government consumption and state sector 
investment) accounts for roughly 40 per cent of GDP, while net exports' share was 
only 2.8 per cent (see Figure 4.2). 
Average GDP growth was 8.1 per cent in the period 1998-2002. Of this, 1.3 
percentage points were contributed by government consumption, 2.7 by state 
investment, 3.4 by household consumption and 0.8 percentage points by non-state 
sector investment (Figure 4.2). 
In other words, state sector-related activity accounted for half of GDP growth 
over the past five years (4 percentage points out of 8.1 per cent). This is the secret 
of China's growth success, but it is also one of our main concerns for the future. 
WHY THE CURRENT GROWTH PATTERN MAY NOT BE 
SUSTAINABLE 
Investment-GDP ratio already unusually high 
In recent years, growth in fixed asset investment has accelerated and has consistently 
outpaced GDP growth. As a result, the investment-GDP ratio increased to the 
unusually high level of 42 per cent in 2002 from 34 per cent in 1997 (Figure 4.4). In 
other words, a smaller proportion of GDP was spent on consumption. How much 
longer can this continue? 
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Investment-GDP ratios for many other Asian economies range between 20-30 
per cent (Table 4.3). 
Thus there is very little room for China to raise the share of investment in GDP 
further in the coming years, even if the government doesn't change its behaviour. In 
fact, the investment-GDP ratio is likely to fall, meaning that at some pOint in the 
future investment growth may be slower than GDP growth. 
Inefficiency of state investment 
State-dominated investment is often inefficient. China is no exception. In the past, 
when the government aimed at a minimum 7 per cent GDP growth, the inefficiency 
of the state sector investment became evident. When the proactive fiscal policy 
was introduced in 1998 and 1999, there were frequent reports of the poor quality of 
state-financed infrastructure projects. 
More recently, there has been a visible improvement in construction quality, but 
low returns remain a general problem as projects are concentrated in less developed 
areas. 
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According to our estimates, while GDP growth has remained stable, the contribution 
of total factor productivity (TFP) to GDP growth has declined from 37 per cent in 
1997 to 25 per cent in 2002 (Figure 4.5). In other words, growth has become 
increasingly reliant on the mobilisation of resources rather than on productivity 
improvement. 
This is perhaps the strongest signal that China's past growth pattern may not be 
sustainable. This argument may sound odd given current strong growth momentum 
in China, but the former Soviet Union provides a good example. The Soviet Union's 
economic growth was attributable mainly to resource mobilisation, supported by 
central planning. In the early stages, particularly in the 1930s and 1950s, it was one 
of the world's fastest-growing economies. Such growth was not sustainable, however, 
because of the lack of productivity improvement. 
Table 4.2 China and Asian economies: growth of GDP components and 
investment-GDP ratio, 2002 (per cent) 
GDP Consumption 
growth growth 
China 8.0 8.8 
India 5.5 6.1 
Korea 6.3 6.2 
Malaysia 4.2 6.4 
Taiwan 3.5 1.5 
Thailand 5.2 4.1 
Note: Data for India are for fiscal year 2001-02. 
Source: CEIC and Citigroup estimates. 
Table 4.3 Contingent liabilities 
Accumulated public debt 
Special T·bonds in 1998 
Costs for bank reform 
Costs for Social Security Fund 
Municipal contingent debt 
External debt 
Total 
Source: Citigroup estimate. 
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Figure 4.3 Contributions to GDP growth of various components, 1998-2002 
(percentage points) 
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Usually, economists consider a growth pattern sustainable ifTFP growth contributes 
more than one-third of GDP growth. According to this criterion, there is a large 
question mark over China's growth sustainability. 
Limited ability to obtain financing 
China's ability to maintain state investment-driven growth is also constrained by its 
ability to finance. The fiscal deficit grew from less than 1 per cent of GDP in 1997 to 
3 per cent in 2002 as a result of the proactive fiscal policy in operation during the 
period (Figure 4.6). 
While the current fiscal deficit is not necessarily dangerously high, the level of 
contingent liabilities is more alarming. Taking into account the potential cost of 
restructuring the banks and financing the social security fund, total liabilities are 
probably around 115 per cent of GDP. This is already comparable to those of Japan 
and some of the Scandinavian countries. 
The government can continue to rely on bank lending to boost investment, as 
most of the banks are still state-owned. With a bad loan ratio above 20 per cent, 
however, the banks themselves are also under enormous pressure to improve asset 
quality. 
Accelerated boom-and-bust cycles for industries 
Another side-effect of state investment-driven growth is a build-up of inventories. 
Indeed, since the beginning of 2003, inventories have been accumulating rapidly in 
the electronics and communication, and transport equipment sectors. 
A consequence of this is that the growth of the whole economy is always dependent 
on a small number of industries and the boom-and-bust cycles of such industries 
are accelerated when state investment is involved. Since the beginning of economic 
reform, we have already seen several cycles. 
.. In the mid 1980s, the textile industry was the growth engine, but excess capacity 
became a serious problem, and later the government ordered the closure of 
many textile factories across the country. 
.. In the early 1990s, the electronics industry (particularly producers of televisions, 
refrigerators, and so forth) became a hotspot, but in the late 1990s price wars 
became endemic in the markets. 
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.. From 1998, the government promoted the property sector as one of the main 
growth drivers. In late 2002, however, policymakers voiced concerns about a 
possible bubble in the market and, in mid June this year, the central bank 
introduced a series of new measures to cool property investment. 
.. Now, the only growth engine is the automobile industry. Growth in car production 
should stay at around 100 per cent this year. Our question is how long it will be 
before collapse in this market, too, becomes necessary or inevitable. 
Of course, both private sector investment and FDI have also played important 
roles in these industry booms. But policies designed to encourage pillar industries-
particularly with the involvement of state investment, which usually means less 
attention paid to efficiency and returns-are also responsible for the accelerated 
boom-and-bust cycles. This often leads to the waste of scarce investment resources. 
Figure 4.5 Annual GDP growth and share ofTFP in GDP growth, 1997-2002 
(percent) 
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PROMOTING PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT AND 
IMPROVING INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY 
Long-term growth potential 
In the absence of any major disruption, China should be able to maintain GDP 
growth at 7.5 per cent per annum for at least another 10 years. Only India and 
Malaysia can match this potential. 
Our optimism is based mainly on China's expected ability to achieve productivity 
growth. On one hand, the expected structural reforms, particularly those to which 
China is committed in the agreements on WTO accession, should lead to more efficient 
use of resources. On the other hand, China is still a relatively poor country with 
GDP per capita at US$1 ,000. In other words, China is far from the world's economic 
Figure 4.6 China's fiscal deficits, 1997-2002 (RMB billion, per cent) 
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Source: Citigroup estimates. 
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and technological frontiers, which makes the growth highly visible as it catches up. 
This is typically described as the 'advantage of backwardness' in growth literature. 
Promoting private sector investment 
Before this long-run growth potential can materialise, China will need to change its 
growth pattern. At the centre of this transformation will be the rise of private sector 
investment. The share of the state sector in overall investment should decrease 
significantly from the current 75 per cent as a natural part of the process of structural 
reform. Specifically, the following changes need to be made to ease such a transition 
.. The government needs to cut back on budget-supported investment projects 
and loan-financed state sector investment programs. 
.. The state-owned commercial banks need to extend more loans to the more 
profitable non-state sectors. 
10 The authorities need to create more favourable conditions for private enterprises 
to access the capital markets, both stock and bond markets. 
Most importantly, however, policymakers need to abandon their obsession with 
achieving GDP growth rates above 7 per cent. In 1998, Zhu Rongji's government 
set 7 per cent as its GDP growth target. The result was that every province reported 
GDP growth of more than 7 per cent that year. The government recognised the 
political incentive for local leaders to exaggerate their growth performance and thus 
gave up setting any growth target after that. Nonetheless, the critical level of GDP 
growth remains 7 per cent in many policymakers' minds. Whenever GDP growth 
falls toward this level, the government tries to support growth, mainly through 
increased fiscal spending and state sector investment. The implicit reasoning is 
that slowing growth would lead to higher unemployment, which has broader social 
and political implications. In reality, however, state-backed growth has not had the 
desired effect as far as job creation is concerned. 
Once more efficient private sector investment starts to take a more dominant 
role, the pressure for continued rapid investment growth should begin to ease off. 
Indeed, over time, sustainable rapid GDP growth may be compatible with a slowly 
declining investment/GDP ratio. 
Bullish on consumption in the long run 
A falling investment-GDP ratio is equivalent to a rising consumption-GDP ratio. This 
is the first reason we believe that in the long run China's GDP growth will be driven 
by consumer spending. 
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The second reason is that we are confident that China's high growth is sustainable, 
and thus that household income is likely to increase rapidly. Assuming GDP growth 
of 7.5 per cent and population growth of 1.5 per cent, China should easily be able to 
achieve 6 per cent growth in per capita income. Chinese households' purchasing 
power should grow even faster if the renminbi appreciates. Something similar has 
happened in most newly industrialised East Asian economies over past decades-
a strong economy leads to currency appreciation, and income catches up with GDP 
growth faster than predicted. 
Figure 4.7 Growth of inventories by industry, end-April 2003 
(per cent change, year-on-year) 
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Last, given China's family planning policy, it is also likely to have a more severe 
problem with population aging than other populous Asian economies. Over time, 
this will lower households' savings ratio. 
NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK AND IMPLICATIONS 
Reforms under the new government are likely to facilitate the promotion of private-
sector investment. Specifically, the new administration has established two new 
organisations 
1 The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) aims at the speedy 
restructuring of the state-owned commercial banks. This should lead to bank 
lending being guided more by commercial considerations than by government 
fiat. 
2 The State-Owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
takes under its control about 196 large companies with assets worth RMB 6.9 
trillion (US$834 billion). It is likely to speed the restructuring process, through 
public listings, foreign strategic investors. We expect the establishment of the 
SASAC to lead to a new wave of privatisations nationwide. 
Growth will continue to depend on state sector investment, FDI and 
exports in the near term 
No immediate end is foreseeable to the economy's heavy reliance on state sector 
investment for growth 
.. For one thing, the SARS epidemic probably strengthened rather than weakened 
the state investment mechanism. As some officials are worried about the 
implications of the SARS outbreak for growth, the government may consider 
increasing stimulus measures to support economic growth. 
.. Since 2002, the state banks have become more aggressive in extending loans 
to the corporate sector, particularly private enterprises. But this process may 
be reversed. China recently revealed a number of cases of corruption among 
senior bank officials, all involving high-profile private entrepreneurs. This is 
likely to discourage banks from lending to the private sector. For most bank 
managers, the same old principle still applies-if a loan turns bad with an SOE, 
it may be a bad commercial decision; but if a loan turns bad with a private 
enterprise, it may be a criminal act. 
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Table 4.4 Selected Asian economies, long-term growth potential (per cent) 
Avg. output growth Long-term growth potential 
196(}-99 Citigroup Consensus 
China 9.8 7.5 7.3 
India 5.8 7.5 6.4 
Indonesia 7.1 5.0 5.0 
Korea 9.8 5.5 4.8 
Malaysia 8.6 7.0 6.2 
Philippines 4.8 5.0 n.a. 
Singapore 10.5 6.0 5.5 
Thailand 8.7 4.5 4.0 
Taiwan 10.7 5.0 4.4 
Japan 6.2 2.7 2.0 
United States 4.3 3.7 3.4 
Source: Adapted from Citigroup, 2002. Asian Economic Outlook and Strategy: accounting for 
growth, Citigroup, Hong Kong, 28 March. 
Table 4.5 Citigroup estimates of long-term growth potential, selected Asian 
economies 
Young workers' 
share in total Share of aged Age dependency 
labour force (%) population (%) ratio 
China 
1990 60.3 9.0 0.5 
2010E 44.6 11.8 0.5 
India 
1990 61.4 8.0 0.8 
2010E 57.4 8.4 0.6 
Indonesia 
1990 62.1 6.3 0.7 
2010E 55.1 8.9 0.6 
Notes: Young workers are those aged between 15 and 39; the aged population includes those 
above 60. The age dependency ratio is the proportion of the population of under 15 and above 60 
to that aged 15-60. 
Source: World Bank, various. World Population Projections, World Bank, New York. 
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" Consumption will probably recover, as SARS is under control. But could 
household consumption become a major driver in the near term? Probably not. 
Over the past five years, growth in retail sales has fluctuated between 6-10 per 
cent, much lower than during the pre-1998 period (Figure 4.8). 
The reason consumers became more cautious in 1998 was that accelerated 
structural reforms, including reforms to the social welfare, education and medical 
insurance systems, significantly increased uncertainty. Although income growth 
was high, households saved more money in the bank in anticipation of reduced 
support from the state in coming years. This explains why bank deposits have 
grown at around 20 per cent year-on-year recently. 
This situation is unlikely to change before the social security system reform is 
completed, and will not happen soon. 
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Retail sales are growing faster in the cities than in the countryside. This supports 
our view that growth is generally stronger in high-income household spending than 
in low-income household spending. However, if we look more closely at high-income 
household expenditure, there is a strong concentration in a small number of goods, 
particularly housing, automobiles and tech products. This pattern will probably 
continue in the coming years. 
Mild monetary tightening possible but no change likely in 
exchange rate policy change 
There are some concerns that the economy is overheating. The producer price 
index (PPI) has stayed around 4 per cent year-on-year in recent months, compared 
with negative growth in 2002. The main increase, however, came from the PPls for 
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heavy industry (up 8-10 per cent year -on-year in February-April) and producer goods 
(up 5-7 per cent). This is probably related to the high prices for energy and basic 
materials. In fact, the PPI for light industry and consumer goods is still falling. 
But the acceleration of money supply (M2) growth in recent months is very clear 
(Figure 4.10). This probably reflects the PBOC's efforts to fight deflation since late 
2002. With the currency probably undervalued, the central bank should be able to 
expand its money supply significantly. Also, the CPI returned to positive territory in 
2003. 
Concerns about possible overheating may lead to some mild monetary tightening; 
and the central bank has indicated that it might raise the provision requirements for 
commercial banks. The central bank is likely to be very cautious, given that the 
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economy is newly out of deflation and the near-term outlook for the economy is not 
very clear. If there is any tightening in the near term, it is likely to be mild. 
Another issue that has drawn attention lately is exchange rate policy. Some analysts 
have even predicted that the currency will appreciate by 2.5 per cent within six 
months. 
Some flexibility will eventually be introduced to the exchange rate regime, but this 
probably will not occur any time soon. 
Two crucial conditions will need to be in place before Chinese policymakers begin 
to consider widening the band 
.. a stable outlook for the economy, including exports 
.. a significant ratcheting up of US pressure (lobbying by Japanese officials does 
not seem to carry much weight in 8eijing). 
US government officials have on various occasions recently mentioned a possible 
need forYuan revaluation, suggesting that US policymakers probably already have 
the issue in their sights. This does not yet appear to be a top policy priority for the 
United States in bilateral relations. 
More importantly, Chinese policymakers are still more concerned about the condition 
of the domestic economy. First, it is not yet clear whether the SARS outbreak will 
have any delayed effect on the economy, particularly on exports, in coming months. 
Second, the unemployment situation appears to have deteriorated lately, with at 
least one-third of new university graduates failing to find jobs. Finally, there are also 
concerns that CNY appreciation might lead to renewed downward pressure on wages 
and prices. 
It is unlikely that Yuan revaluation will happen in 2003. If all situations develop 
favourably, the earliest possible time for a policy change would be early 2004. Even 
then, a major effect on the foreign exchange market is not likely, as the new band 
will probably only be +/-3 per cent. 
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5 
Transforming the banking sector 
Yiping Huang 
MASSIVE BURDENS IN THE BANKS 
The health of the Chinese banking system has come under the spotlight since the 
beginning of the East Asian financial crisis in 1997. In early 1998, the People's 
Bank of China (PBOC) estimated the average proportion of the non-performing loans 
(NPLs) at 24 per cent in the four major state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs)-
the Bank of China (BOC), the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the 
Construction Bank of China (CBC) and the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC).1 This 
was much bigger than those of pre-crisis Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia and 
Malaysia (Huang and Yang 1998). But China maintained strong GDP growth in the 
following years without major financial instability.2 
China's entry to the WTO on 11 December 2002 revived anxieties about the 
sustainability of its banking system. China promised, within five years of joining the 
WTO, to grant foreign banks market access and to remove geographic and client 
restrictions. Two years after entry to the WTO, foreign banks will be allowed to do 
local currency business for Chinese firms, and after five years they will be able to 
do local retail business. The WTO agreements became effective on 1 February 
2002. 
Can Chinese banks survive the foreign competition? For some China watchers 
like Chang (2001), the answer is definitely negative. Others, however, take comfort 
in the belief that foreign banks will not be able to build branch networks as widespread 
as those of the domestic banks' within a short period. This is true. What is also true 
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is that the SOCBs generate 95 per cent of their profits from about half a dozen 
coastal cities, including Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Xiamen, Shanghai, Tianjin and 
Beijing. Unfortunately, these are the battlefields where the foreign banks will come 
and fight. 
There is concern that the banking sector's problems have grown during recent 
years. Official data, which are based on the recently implemented international loan 
classification system, show an average NPL ratio in the four SOCBs of around 24 
per cent in mid 2003.3 This ratio, however, still excludes the 1.4 trillion yuan already 
transferred to the four Asset Management Companies (AM Cs) affiliated to the four 
SOCBs. Therefore, the NPLs of the whole banking system actually still account for 
about 35 per cent of total outstanding loans. In 1998, the government injected 270 
billion yuan into the four major banks by issuing a special Treasury bond to raise their 
average capital adequacy ratio (CAR) from 4.6 per cent to above 8 per cent. By the 
end of 2001, however, the average CAR had come down to around 5 per cent again. 
Banking problems represent one of the biggest risks for the Chinese economy 
now that China has gained entry to the WTO. Whether or not China can escape a 
financial meltdown depends on how quickly the government can eliminate, or at 
least contain, the banking problems and improve competitiveness. 
BANK MELTDOWN UNLIKELY 
While pessimists often compare China's banking situation to those of pre-crisis 
countries like Thailand or Mexico, we believe that such comparison ignores some 
important institutional differences between China and those crisis-affected countries, 
especially in terms of capital account control and blanket guarantee of deposits. 
Given the problems of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and SOCBs, capital account 
control is a second-best policy. It reduces efficiency and welfare by restricting 
domestic enterprises and households' direct access the international capital market. 
But it also prevents the external speculative attacks that triggered financial crises 
in some countries. Even if there are problems with some banks, depositors still 
need to put money into other banks in the country because of restrictions on capital 
mobility. This ensures that local problems do not lead to systemic disasters. In fact, 
capital account control was a key factor that enabled China to ride out the storm of 
the Asian financial crisis in 1998-99 (Huang 2001). 
The entry of foreign banks may change the situation.4 In March 2002, several 
foreign bank branches were already receiving US dollar deposits from Chinese 
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residents. Of course, full competition from foreign banks is still four years away. In 
a way, the WTO commitments have served to accelerate banking reforms. In the 
forseeable future, foreign competition will be mainly in the form of taking wealthy 
and profitable clients away from local banks (Bonin and Huang 2002). Foreign banks 
are not likely to build matching networks any time soon. The experiences of other 
emerging markets suggest that too much foreign competition is not often the major 
problem. Instead, it is usually too difficult for foreign banks to expand their businesses 
in the new market. Despite the policy commitments, the Chinese authorities still 
have plenty of flexibility to restrict foreign competition if domestic banks are not yet 
ready. A recent example is the new rule introduced by the PBOC that foreign banks' 
total borrowing from local interbank market cannot exceed 40 per cent of their assets. 
This rule, while not in violation of the national treatment principle, severely limits 
Table 5.1 China committed to open up banking sector after WTO accession 
Scheduled time Expansion of foreign bank businesses 
On accession (effective 1 Feb 02) 
Two years after accession 
Five years after accession 
Foreign currency business with all companies 
Local currency business with foreign companies 
Local currency business with all companies 
Local currencies with all Chinese consumers 
No geographical restriction 
Source: Compiled by Citigroup. 
Table 5.2 Estimated contingent liabilities for China, 2002 
Accumulated public debts 
Special T-bonds in 1998 for recapitalisation 
Estimated costs for bank restructuring 
Estimated costs for social security funds 




















Note: This is an updated estimate based on new information available on both gaps in social 
security funds and municipal government contingent debts for which the central government is 
guarantor. These were estimated based on discussions with government economists. 
Source: Citigroup estimates. 
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foreign banks' potential in local currency business in the near term and thus shelters 
the domestic banks from competition pressure. 
Another factor that helps keep depositors with the banks is the blanket guarantee 
of deposits by the state. The guarantee could cause a moral hazard problem if 
depositors do not discriminate against bad banks. But it maintains the faith of 
depositors in the shaky state banks. Does the government really have the ability to 
sustain guarantees? We believe that it has both the fiscal and monetary means to 
settle bank runs. China's formal public debts accounted for only 17 per cent of GDP 
at the end of 2002. If we take into account the estimated costs for restructuring 
banking system and the potential expenditure to finance the pension fund, 47 per 
cent and 26 per cent of GDP respectively, the contingent liabilities are around 90 
per cent of GDP. 
This ratio is very high according to any international standards but still does not 
pose any immediate threat to fiscal sustainability. The Chinese economy has been 
growing at a remarkable rate, even after adjusting for exaggeration in the official 
data. Fiscal revenues have been increasing at 15-20 per cent per annum, and fiscal 
deficits have been kept below 3 per cent of GDP in recent years. But the share of 
fiscal revenue in GDP is still below 20 per cent and has the potential to rise further. 
Thus, it should not be difficult for China to absorb the existing contingent liabilities 
over an extended period. Moreover, the government can also print more money if 
extra cash is needed to restore confidence in the banking system. Printing money 
can have adverse macroeconomic impacts, but such impacts are likely to be minimal 
given the current low inflation. 
A COMPREHENSIVE REFORM AGENDA 
The pace of banking reforms accelerated in the wake of the East Asian financial 
crisis, especially as WTO entry drew closer. From early 2001, policymakers were 
divided into eight groups exploring various reform options in different areas. The 
Central Financial Works Conference was held in early February 2002 to put together 
a blueprint for reform of the financial sector. Although the outcomes of the policy 
conference were less ambitious than expected, the policy framework for banking 
reforms encompassing three key areas became clear. 
The first area is resolution of existing non-performing loans. The four AMCs will 
continue to deal with 1.4 trillion yuan of bad loans already transferred from the 
parent banks. We estimate the overall recovery rate to be 25 per cent at best (Bonin 
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and Huang 2001). More worrying are the 3 trillion yuan or more of NPLs still in the 
banks. The PBOC's current policy is that no more NPLs will be transferred to the 
AMCs and that the banks should aim to reduce their NPL ratios by 2-3 percentage 
pOints every year over the next five years in order to lower the average NPL ratio to 
below 15 per cent. 
The second area is financial supervision. One of the main decisions at the February 
policy conference was to create a relatively independent body in charge of financial 
supervision within the PBOC. This body is expected to introduce international standard 
bank supervision practices gradually. 
The third area is reform of the SOCBs through a three-step approach. Step one 
continues the reforms to improve internal management systems, including 
implementation of accounting, auditing and risk assessment systems. These will 
probably not bring about breakthrough changes but are necessary for the success 
of the later steps. Step two includes both corporatisation of the banks and introduction 
of strategic investors. The government intends to introduce a share-holding system 
in the major banks within two to three years, with the Ministry of Finance (MOF) as 
the sole owner initially. The MOF will then sell some equity to domestic and foreign 
strategic investors. Currently, foreign interests are capped at 25 per cent. Finally, 
step three aims at public listing of the large banks within about five years. The 
detailed forms of listing still need to be worked out case by case. 
Table 5.3 The new policy framework for banking reform 
Areas 
Resolving the non-performing 
loans (NPLs) 
Bank supervision 
Reform of the state-owned 
commercial banks (SOCBs) 
Source: Compiled by Citigroup. 
Key measures 
The Asset Management Companies (AMCs) continue to 
absorb the RMB1.4 trillion in NPLs transferred from the 
four SOCBs The SOCBs are called to lower their NPL 
ratios by 2-3 percentage points each year to reach an 
average of 15 per cent in 2005. 
The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) is 
separated out from the People's Bank of China (PBOC) to 
strengthen bank supervision and reform 
First step: continue reforms to improve the internal 
management system. Second step: implement the 
shareholding system and introduce foreign and 
domestic strategic investors. Third step: list the banks. 
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The dynamism of the reform, rather than the existing program itself, makes us 
reasonably confident that banking problems can be resolved. Five years ago, 
privatisation of the SOCBs would not have been acceptable to most policymakers. 
Today, however, it is already policy that the SOCBs will either be listed or sold soon 
to foreign strategic investors. China's practical reform approach, popularly 
characterised as 'crossing the river by groping for the stones', suggests that necessary 
reform measures will be adopted in order to improve the competitiveness of the 
banks. 
ARE RECENT DECLINES IN NPLs SUSTAINABLE? 
According to official statistics, the average NPl ratio of the four banks has been 
edging down for the past two years: from 32.9 per cent in December 2000 to 29.9 
per cent in December 2001, 28 per cent in June 2002 and 24 per cent in May 2003. 
This improvement has been impressive, given the extremely negative perceptions 
of outsiders. 
But is this process sustainable? Past successes were mainly attributable to the 
following factors 
.. writing off the NPls using bank profits 
.. controlling NPls in newly extended loans 
.. expanding the outstanding loan base. 
Many officials, particularly bank managers, appear to be confident that NPls 
should continue to decline for a number of reasons. First, the international standard 
five-category loan classification system has been implemented through the entire 
banking system, so bank managers now have a better means to monitor and control 
credit risks. 
Table 5.4 loan provisioning standards for Chinese banks 
Provision requirement 





Source: People's Bank of China. 
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Second, the PBOC system also devised the requirements for loan provisions and 
demanded that all banks achieve those requirements within three to five years. This 
system can effectively prevent further build-up of NPLs. 
Third, the PBOC granted autonomies to commercial banks that identified and 
wrote off NPLs. This gave banks almost the same treatment as the AMCs that have 
so far worked out about one-third of their NPLs with an average recovery rate of 18-
20 percent. 
Fourth, to improve the banks' financial position-and ability to further facilitate 
workout of the NPLs-the PBOC drafted 'management rules for service-based fee 
charging of commercial banks'. Currently, fees account for less than 10 per cent of 
revenues for most Chinese banks. In many other countries, this can be as high as 
30-40 per cent. 
Fifth, the banks will continue institutional reforms, particularly reform to their 
ownership structures through shareholding systems, strategiC investors or public 
listings. 
While we are encouraged by the past and current changes in the banking sector, 
we are still not fully convinced that these are sufficient. Banks made limited NPLs 
in recent years by investing in state-sponsored projects, treasury bonds, and 
mortgage and consumer loans rapidly. During the past five years, for instance, 
SOCBs extended about 2 trillion yuan loans to state-sponsored projects. This 
accounted for about half of the increased loans of that period. The banks also 
bought a huge amount of government/financial bonds, which now account for about 
7 per cent of these banks' total capital utilisation. This does not really represent an 
improvement in banks' credit culture. 
More worrying is the recent pace of credit expansion, at about 20 per cent. From 
mid 2002, many bank managers were encouraged to extend loans as a way of 
lowering the NPL ratios. IncreaSing proportions of the new loans went to the property 
and automobile industries, which were growing very rapidly. Unfortunately, both of 
these industries face serious risks of excess capacity. In fact, in mid June 2003, 
the central bank issued a new policy to restrict lending to the property sector. 
THE CASE FOR BREAKING UP THE LARGE BANKS 
We believe that breaking up some of the SOCBs might be a necessary step towards 
effective reform and transformation. Here we outline five reasons in more detail to 
support that argument. 
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To avoid the 'too big to fail' problem. Although China shares the East Asian 
characteristic of being 'over-banked' (total bank loans account for 130 per cent of 
GDP), the individual SOCBs are also too big relative to GDP. The total assets of the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), for instance, were equivalent to 
45.3 per cent of China's GDP in 2001. The proportions were slightly lower for the 
Bank of China (31.4 per cent), China Construction Bank (281 per cent) and the 
Agricultural Bank of China (25.9 per cent). They were all way above the equivalent 
proportions for global banks such as Citigroup (6.4 per cent) and Deutsche Bank 
(5.1 per cent). The relative size of the Chinese banks constitutes not only a financial 
risk but also a moral hazard ('too big to fail'). 
The breaking up of the SOCBs, at least the vulnerable ones, could help eliminate 
this problem. It would be much more feasible, politically and economically, to close 
down small, inefficient banks than to close a giant bank. More importantly, splitting 
the big banks into smaller ones could also break down monopolies and promote 
competition in the banking sector. 
To improve the effectiveness of reform. Smaller banks would also mean a shorter 
chain of information transmission and more effective implementation of policy 
changes. A counter-argument would be that large banks have the potential to achieve 
scale efficiencies. But we have already learned from the Chinese experience that 
scale efficiency does not automatically come with size. 
The SOCBs are among the world's largest banks. For instance, ICBC's assets 
are about half the size of Citigroup's, but its workforce (about half a million) is 
almost twice as big. The history of central planning has made it even more difficult 
for SOCBs to implement any policy changes consistently. Breaking up the banks 
could reduce the level of bureaucracy within them and improve the effectiveness of 
any reform measures. Increased competition pressure would certainly help promote 
swifter change. 
To help fight the 'liquidity trap'. The essence of China's current 'liquidity trap' is 
that the banks do not lend, particularly to small and medium-sized private companies. 
This is partly a reflection of ideological discrimination (bad loans made to the state 
sector are more justifiable than bad loans made to private companies) and partly 
due to banks' lack of pricing flexibility (banks cannot charge much higher interest 
rates for riskier loans extended to small private firms). One problem, however, is 
that the SOCBs are too big, and large banks across the world basically deal only 
with large clients. 
89 
Of course, China will need some large banks because it has some large companies. 
On the whole, however, private small and medium-sized enterprises will probably 
play a bigger role in China's economic growth in coming years. This is not compatible 
with the current banking structure, where the four SOCBs account for 70 per cent of 
total assets. Breaking up the banks would make it easier for them to deal with small 
and medium-sized companies and enhance financial intermediation. 
To help with signing up strategic investors and public listing. The decision to 
introduce strategic investors into the banks and to list the banks in stock markets 
was an important policy breakthrough in banking reform. But the feasibility of attracting 
investors to buy into the SOCBs may be affected by two factors. One, foreign 
interests are still capped at 25 per cent of equity. This will significantly reduce 
foreign investors' interest because they will only be minority shareholders. Two, 
given the size of SOCBs, not many institutions could afford to hold even a small 
proportion of their equity. The BOC's equity at the end of 2001 was US$26.3 billion, 
therefore a 10 per cent stake-a minority shareholding position-in the BOC would 
be US$2.6bn. While some analysts are encouraged by the recent surge of foreign 
investment in Chinese banks, such as the Bank of Shanghai, Pudong Development 
Bank and Shenzhen Development Bank, we believe it will be much more difficult to 
attract investors to the SOCBs in their current form. 
Breaking up the SOCBs could improve the banks' quality and affordability for 
investors, although the 25 per cent cap will remain a constraint. The size of the 
SOCBs will probably also pose difficulties for public listing, especially if the 
government aims at listing all the big four. 
To smooth the flow of contingent liabilities. The SOCBs have been the main 
source of China's contingent liabilities. Our estimate of the total cost of restructuring 
the banking sector is around 46 per cent of GDP-on top of the public debt at 16 per 
cent of GDP, local government bad debt at 7 per cent of GDP, and pension fund 
deficits estimated to range between 25-100 per cent of GDP. With a strongly growing 
economy and steadily rising fiscal revenues, the risk of fiscal crisis is muted as 
long as the flow of new bad debts is contained. 
If the government still attempts to introduce strategic investors to the SOCBs 
and list them without splitting, the Ministry of Finance will need to clean up the 
banks' books quickly and take over the bad debts. An instantaneous increase in the 
debt burden could result in rapid growth in interest payments and weaken investors' 
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confidence. Thus the probability of fiscal crisis would rise. If the banks are broken 
up, however, the government can clean up the banks' balance sheets step by step 
and streamline the absorption of the contingent liabilities. 
RECENT POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
After the leadership transition in late 2002 and early 2003, the government appeared 
to step up efforts to resolve the banking problems. 
The first move was the establishment of the new China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CB RC) at the 10th National People's Congress in March 2003, by 
separating the banking regulatory departments from the PBOC. A well-respected 
Chinese banker, Liu Mingkang, former president of the BOC, was appointed as the 
first chairman of the CBRC. 
The regulators continue to require the SOCBs to lower their NPL ratios by 2-3 
percentage pOints each year. Policymakers decided that there would be no further 
transfer of NPLs to the AMCs.lnstead, the regulators would grant necessary policy 
treatments to the banks in order to facilitate direct identification and writing off of 
NPLs by banks. 
While the commercial banks' aim is still to ve listed publicly at the earliest possible 
date, policymakers are now more inclined to design different strategies for individual 
banks. One such proposal is that the ICBC should prepare for listing wholly in the 
domestic stock market, the BOC should aim at listing wholly overseas, and the 
CBC and ABC should be split up according to either business lines or geographic 
blocks. 
The need for another round of capital injection to these SOCBs is widely recognised 
among policymakers; the disagreements lie in the size and timing of recapitalisation. 
Early in 2003, there was much speculation about an expected capital injection of 
US$40 billion, slightly greater than the 1998 capital injection (270 billion yuan). But 
opponents argued that hasty recapitalisation might cause serious moral hazard, 
based on experiences of bank restructuring in other countries. 
The banking sector is also expected to open the door wider to both foreign and 
private banks. There is currently a proposal to open five private banks in China, but 
so far it remains a non-government activity. Policymakers are instead focusing 
more on introducing foreign banks to the domestic system. The current policy 
restricting foreign interests in domestic banks to no more than 25 per cent (and 
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single investors to no more than 15 per cent) is under review. In other words, foreign 
investors may be able to acquire higher stakes in Chinese banks in the near future. 
This may help stimulate foreign investor interest. 
Finally, the PBOC is experimenting with interest rate reform in rural credit 
cooperatives in Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan and Zhejiang. Interest rates for 
household and enterprise deposits can be floated upward by a maximum of 50 per 
cent, while those for all kinds of loans can be floated upward by a maximum of 100 
per cent or downward by a maximum of 10 per cent. But the introduction of market-
based interest rates to the wider banking system will probably take years. 
NOTES 
1 'China central bank governor on financial situation', People's Daily, March 7, 1998, Beijing. 
2 There were several incidents of bank runs in the southwestern and northeastern provinces in 
1998 and 1999, but all of them were settled quickly. 
3 In our earlier analysis, we noted that the average NPL ratio of the three SOCBs, excluding the 
ABC, was 23 per cent in mid 2002 (Huang 2002). ABC recently reported its NPL data, which was 
still around 30 per cent in mid 2003. This brought up the average ratio for the four SOCBs. 
4 WTO agreements on entry of the foreign banks do not automatically require liberalisation of the 
capital account, but significant participation of foreign banks in the market does make it more 
difficult to maintain the control. 
REFERENCES 
Chang, G., 2001. The Coming Collapse of China, Random House, New York. 
Bonin, J.P. and Huang, Y, 2001. 'Dealing with the bad loans of the Chinese banks', 
Journal of Asian Economics, 12(2): 197-214. 
Bonin J.P. and Huang, Y, 2002. 'Foreign entry into Chinese banking: does WTO 
membership threaten domestic banks?', The World Economy, 25(8):1077-93. 
Sottelier, P., 2003. Managing China's transition debt: challenges for sustained 
development, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore (unpublished). 
Hanna, D. and Huang, Y, 2002. 'Bank restructuring in post-crisis Asia', Asian 
Economic Papers, 1 (1 ):3-42. 
Huang, Y, 2001. China's Last Steps Across the River: enterprise and bank reforms, 
Asia Pacific Press, Canberra. 
Huang, Y, 2002. 'Is meltdown of the Chinese banks inevitable?', China Economic 
Review, 13(4):382-7. 
92 
Huang, Y. and Yang, Y., 1998. 'China's financial fragility and policy responses', Asian-
Pacific Economic Uterature, 12(2):1-9. 
Li, w., 2000. Dealing with Problem Banks in the Context of Bank Restructuring in 
China, Master Thesis, National Centre for Development Studies, The Australian 
National University, Canberra. 
Lardy, N.R., 1998. China's Unfinished Economic Revolution, Brookings Institution 
Press, Washington, DC. 
Li, D., 2000. 'Beating the trap of financial repression in China', Cato Journal, 21 (1 ):77-
90. 
Woo, W. T., 2002. 'Some unorthodox thoughts on China's unorthodox financial sector', 
China Economic Review, 13(4):388-93. 
93 
6 
Financial opening and economic 
growth: a quantitative assessment 
Jordan Shan 
This chapter sheds further light on the much-debated question of whether financial 
development leads, in a Granger causality sense, to economic growth. This is an 
important question because it helps to evaluate the extent to which the financial 
deregulation that has occurred in many western countries has spurred economic 
growth. Further, it gives some guidance about whether financial sector development 
is necessary to increase growth rates in developing countries. 
These questions are particularly relevant in China, where swift change and reform 
in the financial sector-aimed at deregulating China's financial system further and 
opening up the domestic financial market-has brought about significant financial 
development. China's financial sector has been liberalised substantially with 
permission being granted for foreign entities to participate in the sector (Figure 6.1). 
Net credit is a one indicator of financial development. 1 There has a significant 
increase in net credit since early 1990s, along with strong real GDP growth and 
investment growth during the same period.2 However, investment as percentage in 
GDP has been stable despite a significant increase in the ratio of credit to GDP 
(Figure 6.2). This result diverges from the finance-led growth literature, which argues 
that financial development will promote investment and hence increase economic 
growth. 
Does financial growth promote economic development in China? This chapter 
contributes to the finance-growth debate by investigating the relationship between 
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financial opening and economic growth in China in a VAR econometric context 
(using the innovation accounting and Granger-causality methodology). This is the 
first attempt to use this methodology to investigate the hypothesis that financial 
development 'leads' economic growth in China. 
In the literature, the question of causality between financial development and 
economic growth has been addressed both theoretically and empirically. The recent 
focus has been on empirical analysis, where research has been equivocal regarding 
the hypothesis that financial development leads economic growth. King and Levine 
(1993) concluded that financial development leads economic growth, and Levine 
and Zervos (1998) found that stockmarket and banking development lead economic 
growth. In contrast, Arestis and Demetriades (1997), Shan and Morris (2002) and 
Shan, Sun and Morris (2001) found that the hypothesis was supported in only a few 
of the countries surveyed and, therefore, that no general conclusions could be 
drawn. 
The positive view of the finance-led growth hypothesis normally focuses on the 
role played by financial development in mobilising domestic savings and investment 
through a more open and liberalised financial system, and in promoting productivity 
through the creation of an efficient financial market. Ch en (2002), for example, has 
examined the causal relationship between interest rates, savings and income in the 
Chinese economy over the period 1952-99 using the cOintegration test and Bayesian 
vector autoregressions (BVAR) model. He argues that 'it is therefore important to 
establish well-developed financial institutions-particularly the independence of the 
Central Bank-interest rate liberalisation and sound financial intermediation, all of 
which are important for the efficient allocation of capital, which, in turn, can help to 
establish sustainable economic growth' (Chen 2002:59). 
Ansari (2002:72), who used a vector error correction model (VECM) to analyse 
the impact of financial development, money and public spending on Malaysian 
national income, argues that Malaysian experience has shown 'an unambiguous 
support for the supply-leading view of financial development, implying the importance 
of financial sector development'. Strong government ownership of banks, a typical 
phenomenon in countries such as China, is said to be one of the causes of slow 
economic growth around the world. La Porta et al. (2002) have assembled data on 
government ownership of banks around the world and concluded that 'higher 
government ownership of banks is associated with slower financial development 
and slower growth of per capita income and productivity' (La Porta et aI.2002:265). 
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In the cases of industrial economies, Schich and Pelgrin (2002) have applied 
panel data for 19 OECD countries from 1970 to 1997 to examine the relationship 
between financial development and investment levels. Their conclusion indicates 
that financial development is significantly linked to higher investment levels. Deidda 
and Fattouh (2002), who used a model allowing a non-linear and non-monotonic 
relationship between financial development and economic growth, have supported 
the hypothesis of King and Levine (1993). 
Nourzad (2002) has also used panel data from a stochastic production function to 
investigate the impact of financial development on productive efficiency and 
concludes that 'financial deepening reduces productive inefficiency in both developed 
and developing countries, although the effect is larger in the former' (2002: 138). 
Further, some literature suggests that financial sector development contributes to 
poverty reduction in developing economies (see, for example, Jalilian and Kirkpatrick 
2002). 
However, there is a large volume of literature which provides empirical evidence 
against the finance-led growth hypothesis. AI-Yousif (2002) has used both time series 
and panel data from 30 developing economies to examine the causal relationship 
between financial development and economic growth. He found that 'financial 
development and economic growth are mutually causal, that is, causality is bi-
directional. The findings here accord with the view of the World Bank and other 
empirical studies that the relationship between financial development and economic 
growth cannot be generalised across countries (AI-Yousif 2002:131). 
More empirical evidence is found for developing economies where no causal 
relationship exits from financial development to economic growth. Using the Granger 
causality and cOintegration approach for selected Arab countries, AI-Tamimi et al. 
(2001) found no clear evidence that financial development affects or is affected by 
economic growth. Cargill and Elliot (2001) discussed the dangers and consequences 
of financial liberalisation with reference to the experiences in Japan and provided a 
summary of lessons that China's reformers should learn from the recent financial 
experiences of their Asian neighbours. 
In the case of industrial economies, Luintel and Khan (1999) investigated the 
finance-growth nexus in a multivariate VAR model and found a bi-directional causality 
between financial development and economic growth in all the sample countries. 
Arestis (2002) demonstrated that financial liberalisation is a much more complex 
process than has been assumed by earlier literature and that its effects on economic 
97 
development are ambiguous. Arestis et al. (2001) suggested, after an econometric 
assessment, that the contribution of stockmarkets to economic growth may have 
been exaggerated by studies that utilise cross-country growth regressions. 
Finally, the East Asian financial crisis has cast further doubt on the hypothesis. 
The rapid economic growth of the 'Asian Tigers' has decreased (and in some cases, 
turned negative) following the East Asian 'meltdown', yet this slowing of growth was 
preceded by considerable, perhaps excessive, development of their financial sectors. 
In short, financial development appears to have led to reduced growth rates and, 
arguably, was partly responsible for the meltdown. 
Empirical studies adopt either of two general broad econometrics methodologies. 
Gelb (1989), King and Levine (1993), Fry (1995), Levine (1997, 1998), Levine and 
Zervos (1998) and Rajan and Zingales (1998) used a cross-sectional modelling 
approach, and their work tends to support the hypothesis. 
Others, including Sims (1972), Gupta (1984), Jung (1986), Demetriades and 
Hussein (1996), Demetriades and Luintel (1996), Arestis and Demetriades (1997), 
Arestis et al. (2001) and Shan, Sun and Morris (2001), and Shan and Morris (2002) 
have used time-series modelling to test the hypothesis. Arestis and Demetriades, 
in advocating time-series modelling, argued that a cross-sectional approach is based 
on the implicit assumption that countries have common economic structures and 
technologies. This, quite simply, is not true. The time-series studies have been 
equivocal in their conclusions regarding the hypothesis. Demetriades and Hussein 
observed that causality patterns differ between countries and it follows that any 
inferences drawn are about 'on average' causality across the sample.3 Shan et al. 
found that in most of their sample of nine OECD countries and China, financial 
development did not 'lead' economic growth except in a small minority of the countries 
studied. 
Cross-sectional studies have failed to address the possibility of reverse causality 
from economic growth to financial development. Levine (1998) and Levine and Zervos 
(1998) examined causality from the development of banking, the legal system and 
the stockmarket to economic growth. Both noted that a case could be made for 
reverse causality but did not test this empirically and concluded, instead, that banking 
development leads economic growth. Ahmed (1998) argued that, whilst the direction 
of causality is an important matter, cross-sectional studies are not capable of 
revealing the dynamic relationships necessary to establish it. 
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Gujarati (1995) and Shan and Sun (1998) noted that the neglect of reverse causality 
in either a cross-sectional or time-series modelling framework might introduce 
simultaneity bias. Earlier, Cole and Patrick (1986) had observed that the relationships 
between financial development and economic growth are complex and are likely to 
contain 'feedback interactions'. 
Perhaps the most serious shortcoming of cross-sectional analysis is that it is 
inherently incapable of examining lagged relationships and, therefore, is inappropriate 
for testing Granger causality. Notwithstanding the increasing globalisation of national 
economies, there appears to be sufficient diversity remaining to render invalid the 
implicit assumption of cross-sectional analysis that the same constant parameters 
apply to all countries in the sample. 
MODELLING FRAMEWORK 
This work uses a Vector Autoregression (VAR) modelling framework to capture the 
dynamics of the relationship between financial development and economic growth 
whilst avoiding the pitfalls of endogeneity and integration of the variables. It differs 
from previous Granger causality literature, however, in investigating the finance-
growth nexus by using the innovation accounting technique (impulse response 
function and variance decomposition) to investigate causality. 
Enders (1995) proposed that forecast error variance decomposition permits 
inferences to be drawn regarding the proportion of the movement in a particular 
time-series that is attributable to its own earlier 'shocks' and the proportion attributable 
to 'shocks' arising from other variables in the VAR. After estimating the VAR, the 
impact of a 'shock' in a particular variable is traced through the system of equations 
to determine the effect on all of the variables, including future values of the 'shocked' 
variable.4 The technique breaks down the variance of the forecast errors for each 
variable following a 'shock' to a particular variable. In this way, it is possible to 
identify which variables are strongly affected and which are not. If, for example, a 
'shock' in total credit leads subsequently to a large change in economic growth in 
the estimated VAR, but a 'shock' in economic growth has only a small effect on total 
credit, we would have support for the hypothesis that financial development leads 
economic growth.5 
Impulse response function analysis, on the other hand, traces out the time path 
of the effects of 'shocks' of other variables contained in the VAR on a particular 
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variable. In other words, this approach is designed to determine how each variable 
responds over time to an earlier 'shock' in that variable and to 'shocks' in other 
variables. Together, these two methods are termed innovation accounting and permit 
an intuitive insight into the dynamic relationships among the economic variables in 
aVAR. 
We use variance decomposition to break down the variance of the forecast errors 
for economic growth, GDP growth (EG), into components that can be attributed to 
each of the other variables including the measure of financial development, total 
credit (TC) .If total credit explains more of the variance amongst the forecast errors 
for economic growth than is explained by other variables, we would find support for 
the hypothesis that financial development Granger-causes economic growth. 
Similarly, we would find support for the hypothesis that economic growth Granger-
causes financial development if the economic growth variable explains more of the 
variance in the forecast errors for total credit. 
We use the impulse response function to trace how the economic growth variable 
responds over time to a 'shock' in total credit and compare this to responses to 
'shocks' from other variables. If the impulse response function shows a stronger 
and longer reaction of economic growth to a 'shock' in total credit than 'shocks' in 
other variables, we would find support for the hypothesis that financial development 
'leads' economic growth. Similarly, if the impulse response function shows a stronger 
and longer reaction of total credit to a 'shock' in economic growth than 'shocks' in 
other variables, we would find support for the hypothesis that economic growth 
'leads' financial development. 
The particularVAR model in which the innovation accounting technique is applied 
is motivated by Feder's two-sector model concerning exports and growth. This article 
proposes a dynamic framework based on the production function theory and consists 
of two-sectors (the financial sector and the real sector), and extends it by combining 
financial development, external openness and factor inputs. 
Therefore, the VAR model considers factor inputs such as labour and physical 
capital as well as trade sector and a monetary factor, for example, total credit, 
deriving from the theory of money in the production function. Similar treatment can 
be found in Wang (2000), Kang and Sawada (2000) and Evans, Green and Murinde 
(2002). 
From growth theory we define economic growth (EG) as the rate of change of real 
GDp, and investment (lNV'; as the rate of change of net investment. In accordance 
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with modern growth theory, we propose that openness to international trade may 
facilitate economic growth by enlarging the markets of domestic firms and by 
permitting them to purchase inputs at world prices. To capture openness, we use 
the rate of change of the trade ratio (TRADE), defined as the ratio of the sum of 
imports and exports to GDP. Further, because economic output depends on inputs, 
and labour in particular, we include the rate of change of the labour force (LAB) in 
the model. 
The literature suggests a considerable range of choice for measures of financial 
development. Sims (1972), King and Levine (1993) and Cole et al. (1995) have used 
monetary aggregates, such as M2 or M3 expressed as a percentage of GDP. Recently, 
Demetriades and Hussein (1996) and Levine and Zervos (1998) have raised doubts 
about the validity of the use of such a variable to test the hypothesis that financial 
development 'leads' economic growth because GDP is a component of both focus 
variables. 
Following Levine (1997) and the World Bank (1998) we use total credit to the 
economy (Te) as a measure of financial development. Credit is an appropriate 
measure of financial development because it is associated with mobilising savings 
to facilitate transactions, providing credit to producers and consumers, reducing 
transaction costs and fulfilling the medium of exchange function of money. In recent 
years, financial sectors have undergone rapid changes resulting from deregulation, 
technological innovation, new financial products (including widespread use of credit 
cards, telephone banking and internet banking). These changes, in particular the 
abandonment of credit rationing, seem likely to have facilitated greater volumes of 
credit being created by financial systems. 
Juttner (1994:11 0), in arguing against the use of monetary aggregates to measure 
financial development, noted that 'credit creation does not necessarily entail money 
creation and vice versa'. This suggests that M2IGDP and M3/GDP are not appropriate 
measures of financial development if the researcher is seeking to investigate how 
financial development might bring about economic growth. Levine and Zervos 
(1998:542) argued that M3!GDP only measures financial depth and 'does not measure 
whether the liabilities are those of banks, the central bank or other financial 
intermediaries, nor does this financial depth measure identify where the financial 
system allocates capital'. In other words, they suggest that increases in M3/GDP 
are not necessarily associated with increases in credit, and credit is clearly one of 
the aspects of financial development that might generate economic growth.6 
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Our arguments suggest that financial development is unlikely to be more than a 
contributing factor and probably not the most important in increasing economic 
growth rates. Our VAR framework also accommodates the hypothesis that rising 
levels of real income give rise to demands for financial services from both the 
household and business sectors. The so-called reverse causality hypothesis is that 
increases in the demand for financial services lead businesses in the financial 
sector to expand their activities and/or governments to ease restrictions on the 
financial sector. 
In view of the considerations outlined above, we establish a VAR system that 
takes the following form 
k 




are five by five matrices of coefficients and et is a vector of error terms. EGt 
= real GDP in logarithm, TC
j 
= total credit to the economy in logarithm, LABt = labor 
force in logarithm, INV
t 
= net investment in logarithm and TRADE
t 
= total trade as 
per cent of GDP in logarithm. 
We use annual data from China for 1978-2001 to constructVAR models to examine 
the causality hypotheses between financial development and economic growth. The 
data was obtained from the World Bank's World Tables through DX-Data, Australia. 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
It is important to note that restrictions need to be imposed on the VAR to identify 
the particular 'shocks' and account for correlations in innovations across equations 
and to decompose the forecast error variances to identify the impulse responses. 
We use Cholesky's decomposition method to impose identification restrictions since 
it precludes contemporaneous correlations between time-series in the system and 
ensures that the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals is block recursive and 
provides a minimal set of restrictions that identify the primitive model.7 
We first report the results of using Cholesky's method, which demonstrates how 
the forecast error variance of our focus variables can be broken down into components 
that can be attributed to each of the variables in the VAR.ln particular, we examine 
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the relationships between total credit and economic growth, compared to the 
contributions to GDP from investment, trade openness and labour. The forecast 
error variance decomposition of unrestrictedVAR(3) models were estimated over a 
three year forecast horizon (results are shown in Table 6.1). 
As expected, each time series explains the preponderance of its own past values: 
for example, GDP growth explains over 60 per cent of its forecast error variance, 
whereas total credit explains nearly 70 per cent of its forecast error variance. The 
fact that GDP growth is explained predominately by its past values suggests that 
current period economic growth influences future growth trends or that the 
phenomenon is due to a strong 'Iag effect' in the business cycle. 
For the purpose of our study, however, we are more interested in the contribution 
of total credit to GDP growth as compared to other variables such as TRADE, INV 
and LAB. It is interesting to note that labour input explains 15.5 per cent of the 
forecast error variance of GDP (EG
t
) and is thus the most important influence on 
economic growth. Total credit (TC
t
) comes second, explaining 12.2 per cent of forecast 
error variance of GDP, followed by trade openness (TRADE
t
,7.1 per cent) and 
investment (INVt' 4.8 per cent). 
Interestingly, we also found that trade openness had a larger effect on GDP growth 
(TRADE
t 
explains 7.1 per cent of forecast error variance of EG
t
) than investment 
(INVt explains only 4.8 per cent of forecast error variance of EG t). This clearly 
supports the hypothesis that economic openness promotes economic growth. 
Trade and investment both appear to have strong lagged effects and are, to a 
large extent, explained by their own past values (Table 6.1). 
The fact that labour contributes the most to GDP growth in China suggests that 
the Chinese economy is still a labour-intensive economy and that its primary source 
of growth comes from the extensive use of labour. At the same time, this study 
Table 6.1 Variance decomposition percentage of 36-month error variance 
Percentage of 
forecast error Typical shock in 
variance in Variables EGt TCt INVt LABt TRADEt 
GDP EGt 60.3 12.2 4.8 15.5 7.1 
Total credit TCt 14.6 65.1 10.4 3.7 6.5 
Investment INVt 15.7 8.9 67.2 3.0 5.3 
Labour LABt 12.6 2.8 3.2 80.5 1.1 
Trade openness TRADEt 16.2 2.0 4.1 10.3 78.5 
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suggests that financial development has indeed promoted GDP growth in China 
and the swift change in Chinese financial system has brought about significant 
credit inputs to the Chinese economy. The fact that total credit contributes more 
than net investment to GDP growth in China implies that its primary source of 
growth also comes from extensive use of credit/resources at the expense of 
productive net investment. 
To investigate further the impact of credit on GDP growth compared with other 
variables, we have used an impulse response function to trace the time paths of 
GDP in response to a one unit shock to variables such as credit, investment, labour 
and trade. An illustration of an impulse response function can provide an intuitive 
insight into dynamic relationships because it shows the response of a variable to a 
'shock' in itself or another variable over time. For example, it allows us to examine 
how GDP growth responds over time to a 'shock' in total credit and compare it with 
the effects on other variables. 
The responses of the variables can be judged by their strength and the length 
over time. If the response of economic growth to a 'shock' in total credit exhibits a 
larger and longer effect than the response of total credit to a 'shock' in economic 
growth, we would find support for the hypothesis that financial development 'leads' 
economic growth. 
Figure 6.3 depicts the time paths of the responses of GDP growth to 'shocks' in 
total credit, investment, trade and labour. Credit again ranked as the second most 
important input after labour-the response of GDP to a shock in labour has a longer 
and stronger effect than the response of GDP to total credit. The effect of labour on 
GDP lasts until the seventh year, whereas credit's impact on economic growth is 
smaller and 'dies out' quickly from the third year. 
After labour and credit, trade is the next most important factor in GDP. The impact 
of net investment on GDP is small and not dynamically longer. This is consistent 
with the earlier finding in this study. 
Therefore, we could argue financial development, as measured by total credit, 
does promote economic growth in China. However, two things are worth mentioning 
here: first, credit was only one of several sources of innovations in economic growth 
and was not the most important factor (setting aside past values of economic growth). 
The innovations in total credit were not the most important source of the variance of 
forecast errors for economic growth. Similarly, economic growth was found to have 
a greater impacts on investment (EG
t 




) than did total credit (TC
t 
explains 8.9 per cent of forecast error 
variance of INV
t
). This suggests that economic growth has a greater influence on 
investment behaviour than the availability of funds. 
Second, if one looks at the impact of GDP on credit, we can see that GDP growth 
also affects financial development; that is, total credit. GDP growth (EGt) explains 
about 14.6 per cent of forecast error variance of total credit, and is the most important 
influence on total credit over a three year forecast horizon (Table 6.1). Economic 
growth also affects financial development because the response of credit to a shock 
in GDP has a longer and stronger effect than to shocks in any other variables in the 
VAR system (Figure 6.4). The effect of GDP growth (EG
t
) on credit lasts until the 
ninth year whereas the impacts of investment, trade openness and labour on credit 
are smaller and 'die out' quickly from the second year. 
Therefore, the above findings suggest that the causality between GDP growth 
and financial development in bi-directional. In other words, the empirical evidence 
provided in this study supports the view in the literature that financial development 
and economic growth exhibit a two-way causality and hence is against the so-called 
'finance-led' growth hypothesis. However, it is also clear that the impact of GDP on 
credit is stronger than the reverse situation as suggested by the above impulse 
response function analysis. 
Figure 6.3 EG responses to a 'shock' in TC, LAB, INV and TRADE 
0.5+-~~--------------------------------------------~ 
o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
- TRADE- LAB Te ~ INV 
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To further verify this finding, we have conducted a Granger causality test, which 
is a modified Wald test proposed by Toda andYamamoto (1995). Financial development 
and GDP growth are mutually affected and this clearly suggests that one cannot 
overestimate the impact of financial development on economic growth in China 
(Table6.2) 
Financial development in China was found to be the second most important factor 
after labour affecting economic growth. Given this, swift reform and change in the 
Chinese financial system have brought significant credit resources to the economy 
and hence contributed to GDP growth in China. However, we also found that strong 
economic growth in the last 20 years has had a significant impact on financial 
development by providing a solid credit base (through rising personal income and 




o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
-+- INV- EG - TRADE ~ lAB 
Table 6.2 Granger causality test 
Variables P-values 
TC=> GDP 0.05* 
GDP=> TC 0.01** 
EG=> INV 0.05* 
INV=>EG 0.06** 
INV=> TC 0.04* 
TC=>INV 0.05** 
Note: => indicates the direction of causality. * significant at 5 per cent; ** significant at 1 per cent. 
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private and public resources) in China. This indicates a two-way causality between 
finance and growth in the context of the so-called 'finance-led growth' debate. 
We also found that trade promotes GDP growth in China but that credit growth 
has not helped increase the growth of net investment. Labour is the most important 
factor affecting economic growth in China. 
To a limited extent our findings suggest some support for the hypothesis that 
financial development 'leads' economic growth in China. It seems clear, however, 
that financial development is no more than a contributing, and almost certainly not 
the most important, factor in GDP growth. 
Whatever causality may exist, it is not uniform in direction or strength, and highlights 
the inappropriateness of cross-sectional analysis. The results provide evidence, 
from a different methodological perspective, that the hypothesis that financial 
development 'leads' economic growth is not generally supported by time-series 
analysis, at least not from the experience of China. 
NOTES 
1 The choice of using credit as the indicator of financial development will be discussed in the model 
building section. 
2 Investment is defined here as the net investment where gross investment minus fixed investment. 
3 Any significant 'on average' relationship across different countries is likely to be sensitive to the 
addition or deletion of a few observations in the sample. 
4 The Microfit program sets the 'shock' equal to one standard deviation of the particular time-series 
used to 'shock' the VAR system. 
S This is not a test of hypothesis in the manner of a Granger causality test that has well defined test 
statistics and critical values. 
6 Our measure is slightly different from Levine and Zervos (1998) who differentiate between credit 
to the public and private sectors. Because of data limitations, we use total credit. 
7 For details, see Lutkepohl (1991). 
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7 
Rural financial markets and institutions: 
new developments 
Enjiang Cheng 
Continuous declines in the growth rate of farmers' incomes and widening income 
gaps between urban and rural areas since the early 1990s have renewed interest in 
China's agricultural and rural development. Rural fiscal and taxation policies, including 
the massive debts owed by the township and village administrations, and rural 
financial policies have topped the agenda for further rural economic reforms in 2003. 
The Central government has been urged to reduce the ever-increasing burdens on 
farmers through fiscal and taxation reforms and to provide more credit for rural 
development by introducing new reforms to rural financial institutions and markets. 
China's rural financial market is dominated by formal rural financial institutions, 
especially in the savings markets, as the deposits of formal financial institutions 
are insured by the state. The formal financial market and its institutions are highly 
regulated, with government regulations on rates of interest, market entry and exit, 
financial products and lending methodologies. Like their counterparts in urban areas, 
China's rural financial institutions have for a long time been marred by poor financial 
performance and high proportions of non-performing loans. 
Rural financial institutions in China can be divided into formal and informal 
institutions. Formal rural financial institutions in China consist of the Agricultural 
Bank of China (ABC), the Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC), rural 
credit cooperatives (RCCs) and Rural Postal Savings (RPS). Of them, ADBC is a 
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policy bank in agriculture and RPS are savings-only financial institutions attached 
to Post Offices. Rural credit cooperatives are credit cooperatives based at township 
level, and township rural credit cooperatives are profit centres and legal persons. 
Informal finance in rural China, defined as the financial intermediaries and transactions 
unregulated by the People's Bank of China (PBOC), consists mainly of credit 
transactions among relatives and friends, by moneylenders, and informal financial 
mechanisms organised by rural households, such as revolving savings and credit 
associations, as well as institutional informal finance (Cheng and Xu 2003). 
Institutional informal finance includes rural credit foundations (RCFs) and other 
financial institutions organised by local governments, as well as donor-funded 
microfinance institutions (MFls).1 
This chapter focuses on the operation of formal rural financial institutions, mainly 
rural credit cooperatives, the ABC and formal financial markets in China. The major 
challenges to China's rural financial system since the middle 1990s and the attempts 
by the Chinese government and others to create an efficient rural financial system 
responsive to the demand from farmers and rural enterprises are reviewed in the 
chapter. 
THE CHALLENGES 
Declines in credit supply 
The outflow of funds from rural areas channelled through formal rural financial 
institutions and declines in the supply of rural credit have been identified as major 
obstacles to China's rural development (Zhang 2003). The shortage of rural formal 
credit has been blamed for the slow pace of rural structural adjustment in developed 
areas of China (Xinhua News Agency, 27 April 2002). Woo (2003) argued that the 
slowdown of TVE growth, which has contributed to a slower growth in China since 
1996, has been closely related to the operation of the rural financial system. The 
shortage in the supply of institutional credit has also been blamed for the problems 
in the major agricultural areas of China. For example, in a report submitted to the 
Monetary Policy Committee of the People's Bank of China, Wen (2001) argued that, 
in poor areas, a growing number of poor households have been trapped in a debt 
cycle and forced to provide labour to moneylenders to cover interest repayments. 
Using official statistics, we found that the actual supply of institutional credit as a 
proportion of rural deposits in rural China has declined significantly since the mid 
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1990s. This is despite continuous increases in year-end loans outstanding in rural 
financial institutions (Cheng and Xu 2003). In Table 7.1, we attempt to track the 
actual flows of rural credit funds by considering deposits from rural households to 
be rural deposits and the ABC's loans to agriculture and TVEs and all rural credit 
cooperative loans as rural lending. In Table 7.1, rural household deposits include 
deposits from the rural household sector to all formal financial institutions in China, 
including rural postal savings. We further assume that it is annual loan disbursements 
rather than year-end loans outstanding that affect the supply of institutional credit, 
and, second, that the ADBC loans should not be counted as rural lending because 
they are not provided to rural households and enterprises. 
As a proportion of total household deposits, the institutional lending in rural China 
has halved in the last decade (Table 7.1). The decline has been consistent over 
time, and the steeper declines in the ABC's agricultural lending have been offset to 
some extent by lending from rural credit cooperatives. As a consequence, over 70 
per cent of total rural institutional lending has been from rural credit cooperatives, 
which makes the ABC a relatively insignificant player in financing households and 
TVEs in rural China. Moreover, the decline in the ratio of rural lending to rural deposits 
Table 7.1 Changes in rural deposit savings and loans, 199'1-2001 
(Billion yuan at current prices) 
(1 ) (2) (4) ABC & RCC 
Total rural ABC annual (1 )/(2) RCCs annual (4)/(1) disbursement5 
Year deposits' disbursement> (per cent) disbursement4 (per cent) (per cent) 
1991 611 170.6 27.9 259.4 42.5 70.4 
1996 1848 317.2 17.2 794.3 43.0 60.1 
1997 2282 344.1 15.1 879.9 38.6 53.6 
1998 2660 270.7 10.2 796.5 29.9 40.1 
1999 3011 234.6 7.8 871.8 29.0 36.7 
2000 3428 179 5.2 952.4 27.8 33.0 
2001 4106 201.5 4.9 1087 26.5 31.4 
Notes: ' Total household deposits by all RFls in China. 2 Annual loan disbursement by the ABC for 
Agriculture and TVEs, including the poverty loans. 4 Annual RCC loan disbursement. 
5=(2+4)/1 *1 00. 
Sources: Calculated from Statistical Yearbooks of China's banking and Finance, People's Bank of 
China, 1992 to 2002. 
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would be more drastic if loan refinancing and rescheduling were taken into account. 
It is also important to note that the aggregate rural lending figures conceal regional 
variations and flows of funds from poorer to richer areas, a topic deserving further 
study. 
Financial performance and historical burdens 
Declines in the supply of institutional credit in rural China have been caused largely 
by the deteriorating financial performance of rural financial institutions and the 
pressure for commercialisation of the Agricultural Bank of China. According to rural 
credit cooperatives, most losses and non-performing loans have been caused by 
historical factors and other developments beyond their control. Hence, the cumulative 
financial losses and non-performing loans of rural credit cooperatives are called 
historical burdens. He (2001) reported that about half of all rural credit cooperatives 
in China have been operating at a financial loss. It was further estimated that the 
ratio of non-performing loans in the rural credit cooperative system has exceeded 
35 per cent (U 2000). The performance of rural financial institutions in poor and 
major agricultural areas was usually worse than the national average. Our field 
investigations show that the performance of many branches of the Agricultural Bank 
of China's, especially those in poor areas, is not necessarily better than that of the 
rural credit cooperatives in these areas. 
According to a study by the PBOC branch in Tongren Prefecture of Guizhou 
Province, the cumulative financial losses of rural credit cooperatives in the prefecture 
had reached 81 million yuan and the ratio of non-performing loans had reached 53.7 
per cent by the end of 2000. In Dejiang County of the prefecture, the ratio of non-
performing loans had reached 87.8 per cent. Cumulative financial losses had reached 
20.7 million and were increasing at a rate of 1 million per annum (Tongren PBOC 
2001). Our field investigations in China indicate that the rural credit cooperatives in 
Tongren could be regarded as representative of many rural credit cooperatives in 
the poor areas of China. We also found that, following the increases in non-performing 
loans and financial losses, many rural credit cooperatives have negative net worth 
and are technically bankrupt. 
Because the Agricultural Bank of China was a state-owned bank, the Central 
Government accepted responsibility for its historical burdens and shifted its bad 
loans to an asset management company. It is unclear, however, who will be 
responsible for the massive historical burden of the rural credit cooperatives. Owing 
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to problems with the definition of, and collection of information on, non-performing 
loans, no one knows the actual amount of uncollected loans and the true financial 
losses of rural credit cooperatives in China. It will be difficult for rural financial institutions 
to increase their rural lending if the so-called historical burdens are not resolved. 
Distortions in rural financial markets 
Since the early 1990s, the Chinese government has made progress in relaxing 
direct state control over interest rates and removing market distortions caused by 
negative real rates of interest. Real deposits and lending rates rose from 1989 to 
1998 and declined slightly thereafter (Table 7.2). Moreover, the difference between 
the rates for demand deposits and time deposits has narrowed consistently, and the 
term structure for deposit rates has become less skewed. Real lending rates for 
rural lending have also turned from negative to positive in the last decade. The 
major officially subsidised loans are poverty loans and the agricultural on-lending 
provided by rural credit cooperatives. The rate differential between one-year lending 
and deposits has increased over time, leaving a higher margin for rural financial 
institutions. These changes do suggest a process of financial deepening (McKinnon 
1973; Shaw 1973), which is thought to have contributed to the increases in savings 
deposits and resource allocation in rural China. 
Table 7.2 Changes in real institutional rates of interest, 1989-2002 (per cent) 
Feb 89 Apr 91 Jul 93 Jul 95 Jul 97 Jun 99 Feb 02 
Deposits 
Demand -12.7 -1.1 -8.9 -11.2 0.9 4.1 2.0 
6 month -7.5 2.4 -3.7 -8.2 3.3 5.3 3.2 
12 month -5.5 4.5 -2.0 -6.4 4.8 5.4 3.3 
3 years -4.0 5.2 -0.8 -5.7 5.4 5.9 3.9 
5 years -2.4 5.9 0.6 -5.1 5.8 6.1 4.1 
Loans 
6 months -5.5 5.1 -3.7 -4.1 6.8 8.8 6.4 
12 months -5.5 5.6 -2.0 -2.4 7.8 9.1 6.7 
Agriculturalprocurement -5.5 4.7 -2.8 -3.2 6.9 
Subsidised poverty loans -12.7 0.0 -9.1 -10.4 2.1 6.2 4.4 
Inflation (p) 17.8 2.9 13.2 14.8 0.8 -3 -1.3 
Notes: Real rates of interest are calculated using the formula: r = (i-p) / (1+p), where r = real 
interest rates, i = nominal rate of interest, p = annual increase in general retail prices. 
Sources: PBOC, 2002. Almanac of China's Finance and Banking, 1990-2002, People's Bank of 
China, Beijing. 
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Nevertheless, distortions in China's rural financial market remain, as institutional 
rates of interest are still determined administratively, with little regard for the costs 
and risks of lending. Real rural lending rates (Table 7.2), although raised over time, 
have been low compared with the market rate of interest, as reflected by rates in the 
informal financial markets (around 20-25 per cent nominal). Moreover, the rates 
have been lower in terms of the high costs and high risks for rural lending in China. 
I project sustainable lending rates for rural financial institutions of 8.8 per cent in 
coastal areas, 11.5 per cent in major agricultural areas and 16 per cent in poor 
areas of China, all of which are much higher than official lending rates. Clearly, 
institutional lending in rural China is generally not profitable under the current structure 
of institutional interest rates.2 In other words, the more rural financial institutions 
lend, the more losses they will incur. Low lending rates of interest have already 
contributed to financial losses in rural financial institutions, and these are 
accumulating over time. Moreover, low lending rates and low interest margins have 
limited the volume of operational funds available for rural financial institutions, leading 
in turn to rises in the proportion of non-performing loans and hence declines in the 
supply of rural funds for lending. On the assumption that rural financial institutions 
are responsive to interest rate signals, rural financial institutions will reduce their 
rural lending and shift the funds out of rural areas unless the government regulates 
their lending and use of funds. 
Ownership structure and corporate governance 
Soft budget constraints and implicit deposit insurance give rise to a moral hazard 
problem for rural financial institutions in China. Xie Ping (2001) argued that rural 
credit cooperatives are not real credit cooperatives. The ownership of rural credit 
cooperatives is further complicated by the fact that many have a negative equity. In 
other economies, where banks have a more clearly defined ownership structure, 
bankruptcy is a hard constraint for any financial institution. But rural credit 
cooperatives face soft budget constraints. Chinese regulators have been very 
cautious about closing rural credit cooperatives and have sometimes bailed individual 
cooperatives out when they have had a payment problem. 
Rural credit cooperatives in China face soft budget constraints for several reasons. 
First, given state regulation of the rate of interest and barriers to market entry, rural 
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credit cooperatives have become predominant in the supply of financial services to 
farmers following the gradual withdrawal of the Agricultural Bank of China from rural 
townships. Closure of poorly performing rural credit cooperatives could lead to the 
complete absence of formal financial services in some rural areas. Second, with 
the collapse of producers and marketing cooperatives and recent difficulties with 
agricultural extension services, rural credit cooperatives-as a link between the 
state and farmers-have become one of the major vehicles for the Central 
Government to carry out its agricultural support policies. Third, with large amounts 
of deposits from low income farmers and the absence of explicit deposit insurance 
from the government or any other body, closure of rural credit cooperatives could 
cause serious political and social unrest. Therefore, bankruptcy of rural credit 
cooperatives is socially and politically unpalatable (Xie Ping 2002). 
With soft budget constraints and deposit insurance implicitly provided by the 
state, rural credit cooperatives definitely face a moral hazard problem. Moral hazard 
has occurred at the following three levels. At the local level, local governments tend 
to adopt the strategy of levying high taxes and fees on rural credit cooperatives 
because they are aware that the Central Government will not let rural credit 
cooperatives go bankrupt. At the cooperative level, management and staff of rural 
credit cooperatives may not be concerned about performance and profitability and 
may extend risky loans. At the borrower level, borrowers, especially enterprise 
borrowers, find it easier to persuade loan officials to soften their loan terms. The 
possibility of collusion between RCC management and local governments and 
between the loan officials and their clients for mutual benefit, at the cost of the 
state, cannot be ruled out. 
The same moral hazard problem occurred with the Agricultural Bank of China. The 
Agricultural Bank of China has been trapped in a cycle of centralisation and 
decentralisation of lending decisions. Decentralisation, which allows institutions to 
process and use local information more effectively, gave rise to local government 
intervention on loan decisions and possible collusion between loan officials and clients. 
But centralisation makes the loan application process long and complicated, which 
discourages rural enterprises and households from applying. In addition to the interest 
rate distortions, the moral hazard problem is an important reason for the continuous 
decline in the Agricultural Bank of China's lending to rural enterprises and households.3 
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Lack of competition in rural financial markets 
Competition in China's rural financial markets is constrained by state regulation on 
the entry and exit of financial institutions. The Agricultural Bank of China, the 
Agricultural Development Bank of China and rural credit cooperatives are the only 
state-sanctioned legal rural financial institutions. Of them, the Agricultural Bank 
and the Agricultural Development Bank are government-owned financial institutions 
and rural credit cooperatives, albeit defined as cooperatives, are subject to PBOC 
regulation and management and have a corporate governance structure similar to 
those of state-owned financial institutions. Entry by new financial institutions is 
next to impossible.4 Moreover, there is no defined mechanism for individual loss-
making rural credit cooperatives with negative equities to exit the market. 5 Restrictions 
on competition and exit are expected to contribute to the moral hazard problems for 
rural financial institutions in China (Cheng and Xu 2003). 
It is difficult for the central authorities to tackle individually any of the challenges 
discussed above, as many problems are interrelated and the rural financial market 
is closely related to other markets in China. An immediate issue facing the Central 
Government is the historical burden of rural credit cooperatives. To mitigate moral 
hazard, it is necessary for the government to classify and remove these historical 
burdens. Otherwise, the rural credit cooperatives will pool the newly generated non-
performing loans and financial losses into historical burdens.6 
Due to problems with reporting, monitoring and auditing it is extremely difficult for 
the government to distinguish between non-performing loans and financial losses of 
rural credit cooperatives caused by policy factors, and those caused by 
mismanagement. Given the scale of the problem the government would have to 
issue more bonds to write off all the historical burdens of rural credit cooperatives.7 
Even if the government can write off all the bad loans by issuing more bonds, 
simply writing off the historical burdens of rural credit cooperatives will exacerbate 
the already serious moral hazard problem among rural financial institutions in China. 
In terms of the sustainable rate of interest, when the lending rate of interest is 
liberalised the rate charged by rural financial institutions will tend to jump higher in 
the less developed areas of China, precisely the areas where farmers can least 
afford it. Moreover, interest rate liberalisation alone can hardly improve the 
performance of rural financial institutions. Changes in corporate governance and 
the introduction of effective monitoring and supervision are required. 
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FINANCE FOR POVERTY ALLEVIATION: EXPERIMENTS IN 
MICROFINANCE 
Up to the mid to late 1990s, the reforms of China's rural financial system were 
characterised by institutional changes, with little change in financial prices and 
lending methodologies. The fundamental changes to financial prices and lending 
methodologies were initiated by donors with the introduction of the Grameen Model 
microfinance in China in the early and mid 1990s.8 As the central and local authorities 
in China have adopted a non-interventionalist policy towards donor-supported 
microfinance programs, these programs have been in a unique position to set higher 
lending rates and test new lending methodologies for rural loans in China.9 
Microfinance programs conducted experiments in new lending methodologies ahead 
of both the formal and informal financial institutions in China. The loans provided by 
rural financial institutions in China prior to the late 1990s were mainly term loans 
with low interest rates and relatively large loan sizes, and these loans were backed 
with neither collateral nor guarantees for loans. Other mechanisms for loan repayment, 
such as dynamic incentives and the targeting of women, were not in place. Loans 
provided by the microfinance programs in China (modified Grameen replicates) have 
been characterised by small loan sizes (about 500-3,000 RMB per loan), relatively 
high interest rates, frequent centre meetings and loan repayments, dynamic 
incentives and the targeting of women borrowers. Some programs have adopted 
group guarantees, deducting five per cent of the principal as a group fund deducted 
at the time of loan disbursement and initiating compulsory savings programs. 
Compulsory savings and group funds could be regarded as substitutes for collateral 
substitutes. Some new lending methodologies, such as dynamic incentives, the 
targeting of women and frequent loan repayment, have proved effective in raising 
loan repayment rates for small-size loans to rural households. These experiments 
also show that market mechanisms, such as market rates of interest, direct 
screening, peer selection and peer monitoring are useful means for delivering and 
collecting loans for poverty alleviation. 
Microfinance programs have also tested higher lending rates for poverty alleviation 
loans. Most donor-funded programs in China charge an effective rate of interest 
from 12-18 per cent per annum, which is much higher than the rate charged by rural 
financial institutions in China (3-8.5 per cent per annum). The experiments with 
microfinance show that the current lending rates of interest regulated by the People's 
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Bank of China are not able to cover the full costs for small scale rural financial 
institutions that provide small-size loans to the poor. The microfinance experiments 
in Henan and Hebei provinces of Central China undertaken by Funding the Poor 
Cooperatives (FPC) indicate that, in order to be viable, microfinance institutions in 
these areas need to charge an effective nominal lending rate of about 15 per cent. 10 
Moreover, microfinance institutions in China like the Funding the Poor Cooperative 
have no historical burdens or tax obligations, and the loan repayment rates of the 
Funding the Poor Cooperative's programs are much higher than those of the average 
rural credit cooperative in China (Cheng 2003). 
A significant but less evident contribution of the microfinance movement is the 
creation of new forms of institution and a new approach to poverty alleviation, 
social welfare and financial development in China. The conventional approach in 
China is that the provision of financial services, poverty reduction and social welfare 
are the responsibility of governments and their institutions. The development of the 
microfinance movement in China demonstrates that semi-official institutions and 
NGOs can be equally effective, and in some cases more effective and innovative, 
in delivering public benefits. 
The experiments in China's microfinance also show a number of constraints for 
financial development and poverty alleviation in rural China. First, it is difficult for 
any credit programs and institutions to be operationally and financially viable in the 
poor and remote mountainous areas of China's southwest and northwest, because 
they face very high transaction costs and a lack of income generation and investment 
opportunities in these areas. Second, China's microfinance experiments so far are 
largely program based rather than institution based, and many are run by temporary 
project management offices. In other words, the microfinance movement so far has 
failed to test a new form of institution based on a clearly identified ownership structure 
and good corporate governance, and committed to providing long-term sustainable 
financial services to the poor and others in rural China. Finally, there has not been 
effective external monitoring, supervision and auditing of microfinance programs 
and institutions, which makes the long-term development of the microfinance 
movement in China difficult. Good corporate governance and effective external 
monitoring and supervision are also two major obstacles to institutional development 
in China's rural financial markets. 
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REFORMS TO FORMAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Parallel to the development of microfinance a number of reforms to the formal financial 
markets have been undertaken. The overall objective of these reforms was to 
separate policy, cooperative and commercial finance in order to commercialise the 
operation of the Agricultural Bank of China, and hence to improve the operation of 
rural financial institutions in China. 11 In 1994, the Agricultural Development Bank of 
China was created and charged with the responsibility of managing policy loans, 
which at that time comprised of loans for agricultural procurement, storage and 
processing and integrated agricultural development and poverty alleviation (ADBC 
1994). The comprehensive financial reforms launched in 1996, which separated 
rural credit cooperatives from the Agricultural Bank of China, advanced the 
Agricultural Bank of China towards commercialisation. The management of rural 
credit cooperatives was shifted first to a newly established Inter-ministerial 
Coordination and Leading Group for Rural Financial Reforms in1996, which then 
joined the People's Bank of China in 1997 (Almanac of China's Finance and Banking 
1998). After the separation, rural credit cooperatives were supervised and managed 
by the People's Bank of China, however, after a marked deterioration in loan quality, 
the Agricultural Bank of China took back the management of subsidised poverty 
loans (an important part of Chinese agricultural policy) in 1998. 
To commercialise its operations the Agricultural Bank of China not only rationed 
credit supply in rural areas but also transferred its funds from relatively poor to 
richer areas. From 1995 to 2001, it reduced its staff by around 13 per cent and its 
branches and business offices by 34 per cent. Many of the closed branches and 
business offices were located in rural townships. By reducing its rural lending the 
Agricultural Bank of China has diversified its portfolios, shifted its lending focus to 
urban and coastal areas and developed its off balance sheet transactions. According 
to the President of the Agricultural Bank of China consumer loans have increased 
substantially since 1997 (Almanac of China's Banking and Finance 2002:30), 
including mortgage loans, automobile loans and loans for house renovations. The 
major losers of the Agricultural Bank of China's credit rationing are township and 
village enterprises and those rural households engaging in off-farm production and 
investment (Cheng and Xu 2003). 
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The Agricultural Bank of China was forced to take over the poverty loans from the 
Agricultural Development Bank of China in 1998, a setback on the institutional 
reforms initiated by the Central Government from the early 1990s. Since then, the 
Agricultural Bank of China has adopted a number of microfinance methods in some 
areas to reach the poor and raise repayment rates. These methods include providing 
small size loans for short terms (usually less than a year) and group guarantees. 
The overall repayment rate on Agricultural Bank of China's poverty loans is still 
very low, as it has insufficient staff and other resources at the township level to deal 
with thousands of individual borrowers. With a ceiling of three per cent per annum 
the Agricultural Bank of China is not allowed to raise the lending rate of poverty 
loans. 
Another major event in rural finance since the mid 1990s is the cloSing of rural 
credit foundations. 12 Since the financial reforms in the mid 1990s, there have been 
increasingly frequent reports of a payment crisis with rural credit foundations. In 
1999 the State Council ordered a nationwide termination of rural credit foundations. 
This was accompanied by a thorough auditing of rural credit foundation deposits 
and loans, which revealed serious problems with uses of the funds by the foundations 
in some parts of China. According to a study in Chongqing (Chen et al. 1999), of the 
total loan portfolio of rural credit foundations in the city (8.6 billion RMB), nearly 90 
per cent should be regarded as non-performing when measured according to the 
bank standard and RCF rules. The same study indicates that local governments in 
the city borrowed more than one billion RMB from rural credit foundations and used 
the funds to invest in rural infrastructure. A high proportion of these loans to local 
governments were non-performing. 
Nationwide, governments dealt with rural credit foundations in the following two 
ways. First, according to their financial position and loan quality: they merged the 
better-managed foundations with rural credit cooperatives, and the cooperatives 
took over all their loans and deposits. Second, they closed the other foundations 
and made local governments responsible for the repayment of deposits to small 
farmers. Because local governments have been forced to pay for the deposits of 
rural credit foundations, the closure of the foundations has had a large impact on 
local budget and local government debts, and, therefore, on the operation of local 
governments and government investment in rural infrastructure. Many local 
governments negotiated with the People's Bank of China and rural credit cooperatives 
and attempted to shift some of their financial burdens to the rural credit cooperatives. 
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Consequently, there has been enormous pressure from some local governments for 
rural credit cooperatives to take over both the loans and deposits of rural credit 
foundations. 
Since the early 1990s, the central authorities have also relaxed direct control over 
interest rates for rural financial institutions. The central piece of the reform allows 
financial institutions to adjust their lending rates. In 1992, state banks and financial 
institutions were allowed to float their lending rates around the base rate for working 
capital loans, with an upper band of 20 per cent and a lower band of 10 per cent. On 
1 June 1996, the state removed its control over the rates on the inter-bank money 
market rates (Dai Xianglong 1997:58). Then in 1998, they increased the interest 
band for the loans to SMEs from 10 to 20 per cent and the band for RCC lending 
from 40 to 50 per cent. 13 In 1999, all the financial institutions and their branches 
operating at or below the county levels were allowed to float their lending rate by a 
maximum of 30 per cent, and the band for loans to SMEs was also raised from 20 
to 30 per cent. As discussed above, despite the changes, the official lending rate 
was still far below the sustainable lending rate for rural financial institutions in many 
areas of China. 
These institutional and market changes had a large impact on rural credit 
cooperatives in China.14 First, the gradual withdrawal of the Agricultural Bank of 
China from rural areas and the closure of rural credit foundations made rural credit 
cooperatives the dominant supplier-and in many agricultural areas the sole 
supplier-of institutional credit in rural China. Second, the quality of loans in the 
rural credit cooperative system deteriorated further as some rural credit cooperatives 
were persuaded or forced by local governments to take over RCF loans and 
obligations. Rural credit cooperatives were also under pressure from the Ministry of 
Agriculture and local governments to provide more loans to increase rural incomes 
and output. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture (2002) proposed to raise the 
amount of agricultural lending by setting the minimum amount of agricultural loans 
to be disbursed by financial institutions and increasing the variety and quantity of 
policy loans for agriculture. It also proposed to extend the loan duration and reduce 
the loan rate (so as to reduce the costs to borrowers) for rural lending in China. 
Many rural credit cooperatives, especially those in poor and major agricultural 
areas of China, are struggling to survive. It is not possible for these rural credit 
cooperatives to increase their loans for agriculture. As a result, the People's Bank 
of China in 1998 had to introduce an agricultural on-lending program by providing 
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cheap loans to rural credit cooperatives (at 2 per cent per annum). The value of 
these on-lending funds grew from 15 billion in 1999 to 20 billion RMB in 2001. The 
People's Bank of China stipulates that the on-lending fund can only be used for 
micro-loans to rural households for income generation activities. To reduce their 
costs, the rural credit cooperative system had undergone similar changes to the 
Agricultural Bank of China. From the mid 1990s to 2000, the number of township 
level rural credit cooperatives in China fell by about a quarter (He 2001). 
REFORMS OF RURAL CREDIT COOPERATIVES-PILOTS 
In an effort to tackle the deeply rooted problems in China's rural credit cooperatives, 
the Central Government and the People's Bank of China have launched a number of 
experiments for rural credit cooperative reforms since 2000. These experiments 
include the Pilot Rural Credit Cooperative reforms in Jiangsu Province, partial interest 
liberalisation for rural credit cooperatives in a number of provinces and promotion of 
microfinance within the rural credit cooperative system. 15 
Pilot reforms in Jiangsu 
The pilot reforms in Jiangsu have three major objectives. First, to improve the 
corporate governance and management of rural credit cooperatives. Second, to 
eliminate the historical burdens and third, to make rural credit cooperative operations 
financially viable. The pilot reforms in Jiangsu Province, a relatively developed 
province in coastal China, include 
.. merging township level rural credit cooperatives into county rural credit 
cooperative unions and making rural credit cooperative unions the legal person 
and profit centre so as to expand the operational scale for rural credit cooperatives 
and reduce the tax burden 
.. in coastal areas of the province, turning the rural credit cooperative unions with 
good management and financial performance into rural commercial banks (RCBs) 
.. establishing the Provincial Rural Credit Cooperative Federation16 
.. providing interest free on-lending to the rural credit cooperatives in Jiangsu for 
five years to help reduce historical burdens. 
By merging individual rural credit cooperatives into the county Rural Credit 
Cooperative Union and establishing the provincial Rural Credit Cooperative 
Federation, the PBC would be able to transfer its management function to the Rural 
Credit Cooperative Union and the provincial federation. This would allow the PBC to 
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concentrate on monitoring and supervising rural credit cooperatives. By merging 
into rural credit cooperative unions, rural credit cooperatives would be able to allocate 
their funds in a county and achieve economies of scale in their operations. The 
experiment on the cooperative-to-stock conversion in the three counties (privatisation) 
was aimed at improving corporate governance and eliminating the moral hazards 
faced by rural credit cooperatives in rich areas of China. 
Pilot reforms were initiated in Jiangsu in 2000. By early 2003, all township rural 
credit cooperatives had been merged into rural credit cooperative unions and the 
provincial Rural Credit Cooperative Federation had been established and had begun 
to function. The rural credit cooperative unions of Chagshu, Jiangyin and Zhangjiagang 
counties have been converted into rural commercial banks.17 It was reported that, 
following the reforms, the deposits and loan portfolio in the province have grown and 
the proportion of non-performing loans was falling. The full impact of the pilot reform 
on rural credit cooperative efficiency, the operation of rural financial markets in 
Jiangsu and the suitability of the pilot for rural credit cooperatives in other parts of 
the country remain to be studied. 
Partial interest rate liberalisation 
At the beginning of 2002, the People's Bank of China selected eight counties in rural 
China for a pilot on partial interest rate liberalisation. In these pilot areas, rural credit 
cooperatives are allowed to float their deposit rate by up to 50 per cent around the 
official base rate and to float their lending rate by up to 100 per cent around the base 
lending rate. No financial institution in China is allowed to float the base deposit 
rate. Rural credit cooperatives are allowed to float their lending rate by 50 per cent 
only around the base lending rate. The major purpose of the experiment is for rural 
credit cooperatives to be able to retain rural funds in local areas for agricultural 
supports and to help rural credit cooperatives achieve financial viability. Following 
the reform, rural credit cooperatives should be able to organise more funds from 
local areas, expand their operations and push down the high rates of interest charged 
by moneylenders in these markets. This should reduce the cost of lending for farmers. 
By April 2003, the pilot reforms had been replicated in 92 counties across China 
(Cheng and Xu 2003). 
However, this reform has its own problems. The increase in deposit rate for rural 
credit cooperatives has shifted savings deposits from other financial institutions to 
rural credit cooperatives. But rural credit cooperatives are restricted to lending to 
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rural households and enterprises in their local townships. Some rural credit 
cooperatives, therefore, have difficulty lending out the high-cost funds profitably, as 
the increases in the lending rates of rural credit cooperatives are determined more 
by the competition on the local markets than the costs and risks of rural credit 
cooperative operations. In the townships where there is little competition from other 
formal financial institutions and informal sources of finance, rural credit cooperatives 
tend to raise their lending rate to the maximum 100 per cent over the base rate. 
Rural credit cooperatives have difficulties raising their rate to the maximum where 
they face extensive competition. Further research is needed to study the impacts 
of partial interest rate liberalisation on rural credit cooperatives, other financial 
institutions and the local economy. 
Microfinance 
With financial support from the Canadian International Development Agency, the 
People's Bank of China started its own microfinance experiment with rural credit 
cooperatives in Luoping County of Hebei Province. It also issued an official document 
to promote micro-credit-particularly group guarantees and repayment in 
instaliments-and the connection between savings and loans (People's Bank of 
China Document 2451999). Microfinance, as defined by the People's Bank of China, 
also includes the credit rating to individual households. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Since the mid 1990s, there has been a decline in the supply of institutional credit in 
rural China, caused by deterioration in loan quality, distortion in financial prices, a 
lack of competition in rural financial markets and problems associated with the 
ownership structure and corporate governance of rural financial institutions. Declines 
in the supply of institutional credit have had a negative impact on China's rural 
economic development, particularly on the development of TVEs and rural off farm-
production, which used to be supported by the Agricultural Bank of China. 
The microfinance movement initiated and funded by donors has tested lending 
methodologies and sustainable lending interest for microfinance programs in China. 
The main lessons are that 
.. 
.. 
the poor in many areas of China are bankable 
the current lending rates as regulated by the People's Bank of China are far 
below the sustainable rate for the operation of rural financial institutions in 
many areas of China 
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.. the mechanisms of microfinance, such as group guarantee, dynamic 
incentives and the targeting of women, help loan repayment in rural China. 
However, the experiment in microfinance has not been tested for long enough to 
be able to tell whether the new institutional form for delivering sustainable financial 
services to the poor will be successful in the long term. The movement has not 
been able to develop an external monitoring and auditing system to ensure the 
healthy development of the movement in the long term. 
Government-initiated rural financial reforms have focused on institutional changes: 
the separation of the Agricultural Development Bank of China and rural credit 
cooperatives from the Agricultural Bank of China, commercialisation of the latter's 
operations, relaxation of direct state control over lending rates and provision of 
agricultural support on-lending to rural credit cooperatives. The recent pilots for the 
reform of rural credit cooperatives aimed to resolve the problems associated with 
moral hazard for rural credit cooperatives, low lending rates and low margins for the 
operation of rural financial institutions, the separation of management from monitoring 
and supervision of rural credit cooperatives and historical burdens for rural credit 
cooperatives. It remains to be seen what effect the reforms in Jiangsu and other 
parts of the country will have, or indeed whether these reforms will be replicable 
elsewhere. 
NOTES 
1 Rural credit foundations emerged in mid 1985, with strong support from local governments. For 
more information about rural credit foundations, see Cheng, Findlay and Watson (1997). 
2 Park (1998:25) also found that lending is not profitable in rural China based on his field investigations 
in China. 
3 For more detailed analysis of problems with centralisation and decentralisation of the ABC and 
rural credit cooperatives, see Shen Minggao (2002). 
4 Rural credit foundations emerged in the mid 1980s with strong support-and billions of yuan in 
deposits-from the Ministry of Agriculture and local governments. They were not financial institutions 
and, by law, not allowed to raise deposits from the public. 
S Since the rural economic reforms, there have been no bankruptcy cases for rural financial 
institutions, including any of the township level rural credit cooperatives that are legal persons and 
profit centres. The only exception is the rural credit cooperatives and urban credit cooperatives in 
Enping City of Guangdong Province (see Cheng and Xu 2003). 
6 The Grain Bureau system did the same (see Cheng 1997). 
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7 Assuming 30 per cent of the current rural credit cooperative loans cannot be collected (a 
conservative estimate), the overall amount of loans that need to be written off for the rural credit 
cooperative system will be around RMB 360 billion (US$45 billion). 
8 For details on China's microfinance movement see Park and Ren (2001) and Cheng (1998; 2003). 
9 Donor-funded microfinance programs are not allowed to organise voluntary savings from the 
public. 
10 See CGAP 2000. Operational sustainability here refers to the incomes of microfinance institutions 
covering the operational costs, loan loss provisions and real fund costs (usually subsidised, not 
opportunity cost of capital). 
11 For the problems with the mixed policy and commercial operation of the Agricultural Bank of China 
see Cheng 1997. 
12 For the rural credit foundations and their collapse in the late 1990s see Cheng, Findlay and Watson 
2003. 
13 See PBOC Document 446, 1998. 
14 For detail on rural credit cooperatives and reforms see Watson 2003. 
15 For details on the Jiangsu pilot see Chu and Cheng 2003. 
16 In addition to Jiangsu, provincial rural credit cooperative federations were established in Beijing, 
Shanghai, Tianjin, Chonging and Ningxia on a pilot basis to separate bank monitoring and supervision 
from management. 
17 For rural commercial banks see Cheng and Chu 2003. 
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8 
Entry into the WTO: commitments and 
implementation 
GeoffRaby 
Accession to the WTO is a major undertaking for any country. As with all treaties, 
countries must adjust domestic laws and regulations to bring themselves into 
conformity with their international obligations. in most cases, this is a difficult exercise 
involving complex political choices. As in the general case of trade liberalisation, 
over time all will benefit from the welfare gains from WTO membership, but in the 
short to medium term, income redistribution between groups in society is likely to 
take place. In other words, during the adjustment period, there will be winners and 
losers. 
Managing the political economy of this process is difficult enough at the best of 
times. With the inevitably protracted negotiating process involved in WTO accession, 
this is all the more difficult to manage. Interest groups have plenty of lead time to 
work out what the implications of the proposed new obligations will mean for them 
and time to muster political support to head off unfavourable decisions. 
Add to this the unique and legally binding nature of the WTO agreements, and the 
fact that some 140 or so countries need to reach mutually satisfactory results with 
the aspiring member, and it thus becomes a marvel of modern multilateral diplomacy 
that these days anyone can manage to join the WTO at all. In a country of China's 
domestic political complexity, with an economy stili somewhere between plan and 
market, and with an international relations agenda that stresses China's independence 
from outside influence, China's accession to the WTO at the end of 2001 is a 
remarkable achievement for the international system. 
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In trying to understand the commitments that China has entered into and what 
implementation may mean-though it is far too early to judge this with any certainty-
it is necessary to know something of the negotiating history that led to the package 
of undertakings on which China's accession is based. The ebb and flow of the 
negotiations over so many years shaped the final balance of compromises made 
both by China and existing WTO members. 
A SKETCH OF THE NEGOTIATING HISTORY 
The full history of the negotiations is yet to be written, but it would be an endeavour 
well worth pursuing. It is a tale of the evolution of two systems and how their respective 
developments intersected at various points until they eventually meshed at the time 
of China's accession. 
China initially advised its intention to 'resume' its status as a 'Contracting Party' 
of the GATT in 1986. China had been one of the 23 original parties to the GATT in 
1948, but after the revolution the government in Taiwan withdrew China's membership. 
As Beijing had never recognised this act by Taipei, much of the earliest period of 
China's efforts to join the GATT was largely a political discussion about whether 
China was 'resuming' its membership or seeking to 'accede'. This was largely an 
argument between Beijing and Washington. Although, at one stage in the early 
years, Japan began to insist that if China intended to 'resume' its membership 
rather than accede anew, then Beijing should be required to pay all past membership 
fees owed since 1947. 
Over the subsequent 16 years of negotiations there may well have been times 
when officials in Beijing had wished they had been allowed simply to pay their past 
subscriptions and get on with their membership. In reality, that would have been 
neither a sufficient nor a desirable basis on which to decide on membership. This 
anecdote, however, does serve to underscore the confusion that often surrounded 
China's quest to enter the GATT and later the WTO. This confusion applied both to 
China's own approach as well as to the existing members trying to come to grips 
with an accession of China's size, especially in view of the fact that reform of the 
economic system was in its infancy and political commitment to the process was 
so uncertain. 
In China's accession negotiations three periods stand out. First is the period of 
ambivalence, from 1986 until the Tian An Men Square events. Second is the period of 
estrangement following Tian An Men Square and lasting until 1995, when China applied 
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to join the WTO. Third, the period of gradual mutual accommodation between China 
and existing WTO members, eventually leading to accession at the end of 2001. 
Characteristic of the period of ambivalence is the debate discussed above over 
whether China was resuming membership or acceding. Such political concerns are 
really irrelevant for accession, which involves negotiating a contractual basis for 
membership. The fact that these political discussions were so dominant at the time 
reflected the political uncertainty within China over GATT membership at such an 
early stage in its economic reforms. It also reflected the uncertainty among 
contracting parties as to China's intentions. It is likely that China's initial interest in 
joining the GATT was driven mainly by foreign policy concerns to normalise China's 
international relations. The same imperatives led China into the World Bank, IMF 
and other international bodies. To be a great power, China had to take its place in the 
major international institutions, including, at the time, the GATT. 
Nevertheless, during this period, useful work was done both in starting the long 
process of educating Chinese politicians and officials about the GATT system and 
in developing skills among China's negotiators. As early as 1986, under a bilateral 
aid program, Australia had placed an experienced trade lawyer in China's Ministry of 
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade MOFERT (forerunner of the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation) to provide technical training and help 
start the process of drafting China's first information submission on which subsequent 
negotiations were based. Such aid continued throughout the process. 
By the time of the Tian An Men Square massacre, little substantive progress had 
been made on China's accession to the GATT, despite continued substantial advance 
in China's domestic economic reforms and opening to the international economic 
system. The political turmoil of Tian An Men Square did not stem the domestic 
reforms or the ever deepening engagement with the international economy through 
increasing trade and investment flows. Meanwhile, the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations had been launched some months after China's GATT bid but was badly 
stalled by mid 1989. Ambivalence had turned to neglect on all sides. 
Prior to June 1989, China's accession was becoming dormant. With the events of 
June 1989, and the subsequent political reaction in China, political attitudes hardened 
towards China among many in the West. China's accession now attracted highly 
charged political interest both within China and from many outside. On one hand, 
accession became a test of the international legitimacy of the post-Tian An Men 
regime and, on the other, part of the international reaction to events in China. With 
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the rapid growth of China's exports during the early 1990s, particularly to high-
income markets, the issues of moral concern and trade protection became 
increasingly entwined. 
During this period of estrangement, China approached the negotiations largely as 
a test of its international weight and as a measure of its emergence as a major 
world power. Whereas negotiations for GATTIWTO membership required agreement 
to be reached, at least in principle, with all members individually, China seemed to 
approach the negotiations as a test of will mainly between it and Washington and to 
a lesser extent Brussels. The smaller players, including Australia, were essentially 
sidelined during this time. China's negotiating strategy was to cut a deal with the 
United States and the European Union and then expect all other members to sign 
up to it. While there will always be a substantial element in any GATTIWTO negotiation 
of the majors doing a deal and then presenting it to the rest, the views of other 
members do have to be taken into account. At this time, China politely met with the 
smaller players, bilaterally and as part of the regular visits to Geneva for Working 
Party meetings, but it was not engaging seriously with them. 
While China played superpower politics with its accession, the goal posts shifted. 
Not, as was often claimed, because the United States or other major negotiating 
partners had changed their positions unilaterally, although there was inevitably an 
element of this, but because the system China was seeking to join had itself changed 
fundamentally. With the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the GATT was replaced 
by the WTO in 1995. From early in the 1990s it was increasingly evident that acceding 
countries would have to take on a range of obligations in new and challenging areas 
that had not existed under the GATT. The negotiations for the Uruguay Round were 
completed in December 1993 and from that time on acceding to the WTO system 
would require much more from China than under the old GATT. 
With the formation of the WTO, whole new areas had to be negotiated covering 
services, intellectual property, agriculture, sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
and trade-related investment measures. At the same time, the negotiations had 
produced higher levels of commitments for liberalisation on a much wider range of 
products than ever before. A further significant complicating factor had also now 
entered the negotiations over China's (and everyone else's) accession and that was 
the new Dispute Settlement Body. This had far more power to enforce obligations 
and authorise retaliatory measures than under the old GATT. Henceforth, all 
negotiations took on a much more cautious, legalistic character for all parties. 
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China made one last bid for membership on political grounds. It sought to rally 
international support and sympathy for its becoming a founding member of the 
WTO in 1995. It garnered a great deal of political support and the pressure on 
members to cut a quick and dirty deal was immense. China's offer did not meet the 
commercial interests ofWTO members and, as with other deadlines before, China's 
accession was missed and the world was still the same the next morning. 
After this, China's approach to negotiating its accession shifted in steps towards 
serious engagement, not only with the majors but, importantly, with the multitude of 
smaller members as well. China set about accommodating itself to the WTO, and 
other members to China's eventual accession on mutually acceptable terms. By this 
time, China was also well versed in the functioning of the WTO and had assembled 
an impressive team of negotiators. The negotiations were still difficult and sometimes 
highly fraught up until the end. Eventually, incremental progress resulted in a package 
of commitments as the legal basis of China's accession to the WTO. 
COMMITMENTS 
Unlike negotiations during a multilateral round, such as the current Doha Round, 
accession negotiations are non-reciprocal. An aspiring entrant is required to adjust 
its levels of protection to match those that generally apply for existing members at 
similar levels of development. The reasoning is that existing members have already 
'paid' each other for the prevailing liberalisation extended to each other and new 
members are required to do the same. 
The emphasis on reciprocity in the GATT IWTO system is a major factor contributing 
to its stability and success but stands in sharp contrast to the economist's approach 
to liberalisation. Economists argue that countries liberalise because it is good for 
them to do so. With its voluntarism, APEC's approach to liberalisation is rather more 
like that of the economist than the trade negotiator. 
WTO accession negotiations fall into two broad parts. One involves market access 
negotiations. These are essentially bilateral negotiations with individual members, 
or groups of members with a specific shared market access interest. The other part 
deals essentially with the domestic regulatory adjustments that must be made by 
the acceding member to bring its trading and related practices into conformity with 
WTO rules, including on subsidies. 
Market access is the classic trade negotiation. It deals essentially with barriers at 
the border such as tariffs and tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) and non-tariff barriers. Since 
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the creation of the WTO, it also includes negotiations on services. These involve 
domestic regulatory reforms to increase access to the domestic market for foreign 
services suppliers. All members of the WTO share in the results on the basis of the 
most-favoured nation principle; that is, one member is not allowed to discriminate 
against other members in terms of access to its market. 
MARKET ACCESS 
While negotiations are conducted on an individual tariff line basis, these may be 
summarised as follows. 
In agriculture, China has agreed to average tariff cuts on most products from 23 
per cent to 15 per cent, to be phased in by 2004, albeit with considerable variation 
around the mean. All tariffs are bound. These cuts comprise a TRQ system for 
imports of bulk commodities, which is of particular value for products of interest to 
Australia, such as wool, sugar, wheat, rice, cotton and vegetable oils. The TRQ will 
provide guaranteed levels of increasing access at relatively low tariff levels. 
China has also agreed to an administrative system for its TRQs which should 
help preserve their value to potential exporters to China. This includes increasing 
the share of TRQs available to private traders. 
An additional commitment of major future value for agricultural exporters was 
agreement not to use export subsidies. Negotiations for this commitment were 
particularly tough. Whether or not China would at some stage have been in a position 
to subsidise agricultural exports is questionable, but the commitment is of important 
strategic and political, as well as commercial, advantage as efficient agriculture 
exporters seek to end all export subsidies. Similarly, China has agreed to limit trade-
distorting domestic support to less than that normally available to developing countries. 
For industrial products, average tariffs with few exceptions will be cut from 17 per 
cent to 8.9 per cent by 2005. All tariffs will be bound. Of course, there is considerable 
variation around this average as well, with industrial tariffs ranging from 0 per cent 
to 47 per cent. The remaining few quotas on industrial products will be eliminated by 
2005. China has also undertaken to eliminate all export subsidies for industrial 
products, which was a long-standing requirement under the GATT Subsidies Code, 
strengthened in the Uruguay Round. 
Services involved some of the most difficult negotiations of all, and this sector 
was the last to be settled. Much of the negotiation concentrated on four major 
areas: telecoms, banking and insurance, professional services, and distribution. 
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Telecoms negotiations were particularly sensitive in view of the government's 
perception of the critical political function played by its existing regulatory regime in 
this area. The commitments involve a gradual expansion of access up to 2005. In 
the first phase, foreign suppliers will be permitted to establish joint-venture enterprises 
without quantitative restrictions in several cities but with foreign equity restricted to 
25 per cent. Over the next three years, the areas open to foreign investment will 
gradually be expanded and equity limits raised to a maximum of 49 per cent. By 
2005 all geographic restrictions will be removed. 
On accession, foreign banks are to be permitted to provide foreign currency services 
without restrictions on clients. By 2004, foreign banks will be allowed to provide 
local currency services to Chinese enterprises. Within five years of accession, 
foreign financial institutions can extend this to all Chinese clients. Geographic 
restrictions will be phased out. 
Foreign non-life insurers will be permitted to establish joint ventures with 51 per 
cent foreign ownership and within two years following accession wholly foreign-
owned subsidiaries will be allowed. In the case of life insurers, on accession 50 per 
cent jOint-ventures will be permitted. Many other classes of insurers will be allowed 
to increase foreign equity from 50 per cent to 100 per cent over the next five years. 
Similarly, geographic restrictions will be phased out. 
In the distribution sector, China will liberalise wholesale and retailing services for 
most products, including imported products, throughout China within three years. 
Outside these sectors, geographic and numerical restrictions on foreign 
accountancy, legal and architecture service providers will be phased out. National 
treatment for foreign accountants will apply to those who have passed their Chinese 
CPA examinations. Foreign architect firms will be able to have majority ownership in 
joint ventures. 
SYSTEMIC COMMITMENTS 
While China's market access commitments are significant in every respect and will 
substantially increase China's integration into international markets, the commitments 
that touch on the fundamental structure of China's half-way house economic system 
promise to be the most profound aspect of its WTO accession. Advocates of 
economic reform in China have long argued for GATIIWTO membership as the 
surest way to lock in the reform process and to push it further into areas of deep 
political resistance. 
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Within three years of entry, all enterprises will have the right to import and export 
any goods and trade them throughout China with limited exceptions. 
China will retain state trading for a small range of products, including grains, 
cotton and sugar, but state trading enterprises will be required to act solely in accord 
with commercial considerations. For some products, private traders will be able to 
conduct an increasing share of imports. 
China will progressively eliminate designated trading restrictions for wool and 
steel over three years. 
Foreign exchange and trade balancing requirements, local content and export 
performance requirements will no longer apply to foreign or joint venture firms. 
China will eliminate dual pricing practices as well as differences in treatment 
accorded to goods produced for sale in China in comparison with those produced 
for export. Price controls will not be used to provide protection. 
China will reform its standards, technical barriers, conformity assessment 
procedures, and sanitary and phytosanitary regimes to conform with WTO 
requirements. 
China will enhance protection of intellectual property rights. 
THE ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS 
China's size in terms of share of world markets, especially in some products like 
textiles, and the structure of its economic system led to a number of additional and 
unique conditions being attached to China's accession. These conditions, because 
they were special, were politically difficult for China to accept. They had their origins 
deep in the negotiating history of China's accession, particularly the initial 
ambivalence of both China and members to its accession and the subsequent 
period of estrangement. 
A special Transitional Product-Specific Safeguard Mechanism will be available to 
WTO members for 12 years where imports from China cause or threaten disruption 
in the domestic market. A Textiles Safeguard will be available to WTO members to 
avoid market disruption until the end of 2008. WTO members will be able to continue 
to use non-market economy methodology to determine price comparability in anti-
dumping cases. 
China will increase transparency through publication of laws and regulations, 
establish impartial independent processes for review of administrative decisions, 
and uniformly administer the trade regime across China. 
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China will submit to an annual review by the WTO of its implementation for a 
period of eight years, with a final review in the tenth year. 
Implementation 
The accession package that China now has to implement represents the result of 
hard fought compromises. The final package is also based on strong commitment 
to the continuation of fundamental reform of the Chinese economy. Indeed, accession 
may not have been possible until China's reforms and economic development had 
reached their current stage and sufficient political will had coalesced around their 
extension. 
China has begun to take steps towards implementing its commitments and is 
preparing the way politically. China's accession to the WTO has been given almost 
as much national publicity and fanfare as its securing the right to host the 2008 
Olympic Games. A visitor to Beijing after late 2001 would have been struck by the 
billboards hailing China's WTO accession. It may be that a larger share of the Chinese 
population has heard of the WTO than would be the case in Australia. The political 
seriousness of Beijing's approach to membership at this stage is very encouraging. 
As with the negotiations, so it will be with implementation. Pressures are likely to 
arise domestically to trim and hedge on commitments. China at times is likely to 
disappoint other members in its implementation. At times this may be justified, at 
others not. Nothing in this would be unique to China's implementation of its 
commitments following accession. Other countries often struggle with their 
implementation following accession. China's sheer weight in a number of key sectors 
in international trade will, however, be likely to draw greater attention from trading 
partners than may occur for smaller members. The complexity of China's 
commitments, especially those involving systemic areas of reform, is also likely to 
lead to unrealistic expectations at times. This could increase dispute settlement 
actions and, unless restraint is shown, will place the still evolving Dispute Settlement 
Body under greater strain. Ultimately, China's continuing adherence to its economic 
reform policies will be the most sustainable guarantee of satisfactory implementation 
of its WTO commitments. 
China's implementation will be monitored closely by other members. The realisation 
of the expected benefits for existing members from China's accession will depend 
on how completely China meets its commitments. It will therefore be in members' 
interests to work closely with China on implementation, especially by providing 
technical support to help it deliver on its commitments. 
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SOME CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
China's accession to the WTO has been largely a result of its two-decade long 
persistence with reform of its economic system and the resulting growth in its level 
of development. As a consequence of accession to the WTO, the reform policies 
are now entrenched in binding, legally enforceable, international treaties. WTO 
accession will therefore help to sustain further reform. This outcome has been possible 
because China's accession was a high quality one as set down in its package of 
commitments. A quick and dirty political fix, if one had ever really been possible, 
could have harmed China's reform and would certainly have harmed the WTO. 
Nonetheless, over time, China's membership will also have profound implications 
for the character and functioning of the WTO itself. The evolving symbiotic relationship 
between China and the GAD IWTO system which began in 1986 has now entered a 
new and important phase. 
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9 
WTO commitment: further marketisation 
and trade liberalisation 
Jiadong Tong 
Since becoming a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 
2001, China has been carrying out the commitments included in the 'Protocol on 
the Accession of the People's Republic of China'. This has required major steps on 
unification and transparency of its trade system, and expanding market access. 
China's accession to the WTO has meant that rapid government reform has simplified 
rationalisation of government functions,liberalised trade and increased marketisation. 
Market forces have been increasingly important in resource allocation. Rapid 
development of the private economy is giving a new impetus to economic growth, 
but some difficulties concerning the modification of laws and regulations, and some 
tensions concerning other aspects of marketisation, remain. 
MARKET REFORM AND TRADE LIBERALISATION 
China has further advanced its marketisation and trade liberalisation according to 
the Protocol on the Accession since it entered the WTO. Two elements contained in 
the Protocol are liberalisation of foreign trade and continued marketisation. Progress 
has been made in both areas, showing the sincerity of China's commitment. 
On trade liberalisation, China produced many legal documents concerning 
unification and transparency of trade systems. This represents a legal guarantee of 
the unification and execution of its trade system. Over 30 departments affiliated 
141 
with the State Department revised related economic laws and regulations concerning 
foreign affairs. By 2002, China had nullified 830 laws and regulations and revised 
325. At the same time, central government required local government to reconsider 
all of its existing regulations. Local government sorted out over 190,000 laws and 
regulations. In order to meet the requirements of the WTO, China drafted a series of 
laws and regulations consistent with WTO rules, such as the new 'antidumping 
ordinance', 'anti-subsidy ordinance', 'safeguard measure ordinance' and so on. The 
sorting out and revision of these legal documents provides a legal guarantee for the 
unification of China's foreign trade management. 
Before 1978, China was a planned economy. Foreign trade policy and management 
was only a part of the government's economic planning management. The 
government's foreign trade management had to submit to economic planning needs. 
There was no effective foreign trade law that regulated trading activities. Foreign 
trade management, like other government functions, was subject to administrative 
command. China's accession to the WTO requires China to change the way in 
which government arranges and manages foreign trade, so that a uniform standard 
based on the law for foreign trade management can be established. 
After 1978, China gradually recognised that the only way to expedite economic 
growth was by opening to the outside world and making full use of its economic 
resources and markets. China also established four coastal areas as special 
economic zones. Central government granted corresponding rights and power to 
these regions, and implemented favourable policies concerning the introduction of 
foreign capital. As a result, variations in trade policy were created among different 
regions. 
Since accession to the WTO, special zones, such as Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen 
and Hainan provinces, lost their special privileges regarding foreign trade policy. 
They must carry out the same uniform foreign trade policy as other regions, and can 
no longer adopt more favourable policies to attract foreign capital. 
The second requirement of trade liberalisation is to enlarge market entry for foreign 
products. In the protocol for China's accession to WTO, China consented to eliminate 
trade barriers gradually and to make it convenient to import foreign goods. China 
affirmed a schedule of tariff and non-tarriff measures. Part of these tariff concessions 
was the reduction of custom duties for over 5,300 kinds of goods in 2002. As a 
result, China's average import tariff level decreased from 15.8 per cent in 2001 to 
12.1 per cent in 2002. In 2003, China will have an average import tariff level of 11.5 
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per cent. The downward trend will continue. The average tariff levels of industrial 
products and farm produce will be cut 7.2 per cent and 9.6 per cent respectively, 
and the import tariff of over 110 kinds of goods will drop to zero in 2003. Tariff 
concessions for some goods were more dramatic. For example, tariffs for cars were 
cut by nearly 100 per cent on the eve of China's accession to the WTO. 
As part its commitments to the WTO, China also reduced non-tariff barriers. During 
2001-2, China's annual import permits and quotas for over 800 kinds of goods were 
reduced or abolished. The list included open-tender management of eight kinds of 
important goods such as cereal, wool, cotton, chemical fertilisers, and so on, which, 
under the planned economy, were classed as primary products critical to the national 
economy and the people's livelihood. The government also limited the scope of 
state trading or government monopoly on specified products. 
To facilitate FDI, the government implemented the Interim Provisions on Guiding 
Foreign Investment Direction in 2002. At the same time, the new Catalogue for the 
Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries divided foreign investment projects into 
four groups: the encouraged, the allowed, the restricted and the prohibited. The 
amount of encouraged foreign investment projects increased from 186 to 262, and 
the amount of the restricted decreased from 112 to 75 in 2002. Commerce, banking 
and insurance, as well as foreign trade, tourism, telecommunications, transport, 
accounting, auditing and other industries were all opened up further. China will open 
these industries completely after some years of transition. 
China has gradually opened trade rights and distribution rights to the outside 
world. Sales of 22 foreign-owned retailing enterprises in 2002 were estimated to 
make 100.9 billion yuan and to constitute more than 40 per cent of gross sales 
among China's top 100 chain retailers. The total number of foreign-owned stores 
rose to 2,285, accounting for 13.4 per cent of the total number of stores of China's 
top 100 chain retailers. China authorised 60 foreign banks to operate foreign exchange 
business with no limit on region or clients. Fifty-three banks were authorised to 
conduct RMB business in nine cities, such as Shanghai and Shenzhen. China 
granted market access to six foreign insurance corporations in 2002. At present, 34 
insurance corporations from 12 countries and regions have established 54 business 
operation institutions in China. 
China has established legal safeguards for intellectual property. On the eve of 
accession to the WTO in 2001, China passed a series of laws and regulations 
concerning the protection of intellectual property, for example, the Copyright Law of 
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the People's Republic of China and the Trademark Law of the People's Republic of 
China, as well as regulations governing patent law and the protection of computer 
software. 
China was rigorous in keeping the new legal system for protection of intellectual 
property consistent with the related clauses of the WTO and to fulfil the commitments 
in the protocol on China's accession to WTO. As a result, the number of applications 
for patents increased by 24 per cent in 2002 over 2001. In 2002, the patent department 
received 252,thousand applications for patents-205 thousand domestic applications, 
accounting for 81.3 per cent of the total, and 47,236 foreign applications, accounting 
for the remaining 18.7 per cent. In the same period 132,401 patent warrants were 
issued,of which 112,088 were domestic and 20,313 foreign. The total amount of 
applications for trademarks in 2002 was 372,000, an increase of 37 per cent from 
2001. In the meantime, central and local government strengthened investigation 
into intellectual property right infringementsand intensified the penalties for such 
infringements. 
Collective, private and other non-state-owned economies have increased in China. 
Fixed asset investments from these now comprise over 40 per cent of the total in 
2002 and are increasing at 30 per cent per annum. The 16th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China endorsed the government policy of encouraging 
development of the private economy. During the initial stage of economic reform, 
the state sector accounted for more than 90 per cent of the total. If the production of 
the collective economy production is included, the share of the state sector would 
have been around 98 per cent at that time. The government has taken a gradual 
approach to privatising the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). China's accession to 
WTO will accelerate the process by promoting the role of the non-state sector in the 
national economy. 
In 2002, the non-state sector, including foreign firms, played an important role in 
China's foreign trade (Table 9.1). SOE exports made up less than one-third of total 
exports and imports made up slightly more than one-third of all imports. Imports 
and exports of foreign-owned enterprises made up about half each. The growth of 
foreign trade of private enterprises has grown the most rapidly, followed by that of 
foreign owned enterprises, although the weight of private enterprises in total imports 
and exports is still relatively small. The protocol on China's accession to WTO 
stipulates that foreign trade rights must be opened after three years of transition. 
There is no doubt that this will increase the proportion of foreign trade attributable to 
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foreign-owned and private enterprises as the government grants more and more 
trading rights to private firms. The system is also changing from the examination 
and approval system to a standard registration system for conducting foreign trade. 
To increase market competition, the government has started the process of 
breaking up state monopolies in some areas, for example, it has divided the telecom 
communication industry into northern and southern corporations. The north, the 
China Net Communication Group, is in charge of the telecom business of ten 
provinces in the north, while the former China Telecom is in charge of 21 provinces 
in the south. These two corporations compete with each other and have the right to 
do business in their counterpart's regions. China has also reconstructed the civil 
aviation industry, establishing three big airline companies-Air China, China Southern 
Airlines and China Eastern Airlines-in order to improve services and introduce 
competition. 
In the fields of retailing, insurance and other traditional competitive industries, 
increased competition has occurred because of the liberalisation of services trade, 
increased private sector participation, and the accelerated reform of SOEs. China 
has enacted related laws for improving the environment of market competition-for 
example, in 2002 over ten laws diminishing unfair-competition were legislated. 
The Chinese government now has less power to participate directly in the economy. 
According to institutional reform decided in the 16th National People's Congress of 
the People's Republic of China, China incorporated and reformed ministries and 
commissions to make them more compatible with the operation of the market system. 
Table 9.1 Imports and exports by different types of enterprise, 2002 
Exports Imports 
Year-an-year Year-an-year 
Nature of Value growth rate Value growth rate 
enterprise (US$100m) (per cent) (US$100m) (per cent) 
State-owned 1228.6 8.5 1144.9 10.6 
Foreign-owned 1699.4 27.6 1602.7 27.4 
Collective 188.6 32.6 94.8 18.5 
Private 137.8 159.5 95.6 180.9 
Others 1.3 -12.5 14.1 -49.7 
Total 3255.7 22.3 2952.0 21.2 
Source: China Customs Administration, 2002. China Customs Statistics, Beijing. 
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In particular, the State Assets Management Commission has been established to 
change the function of government from running SOEs to managing state-owned 
assets. The change will create the institutional condition for the government to 
retreat from microeconomic management of the economy. The State Planning 
Commission has been renamed the State Development and Reform Commission 
and its new responsibility is to reform economic management systems and to improve 
economic development. The government annulled the former State Economic and 
Trade Commission and Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, and 
established the Ministry of Commerce to unite domestic and foreign trade and manage 
the economy as its primary function. 
The adjustment of these ministries and commissions is not simply a change of 
names, but a significant reform by the government in the course of marketisation 
and liberalisation. It represents an important step towards development of market 
institutions and fundamental transformation of governmental functions. Following 
the central government's lead, local governments will also initiate institutional change 
and reform, laying an institutional foundation for China's marketisation 
China has focused its attention on the following areas in the course of marketisation 
• the privatisation of SOEs and enhancement of the private economy's role in 
national economy 
• the elimination of state monopoly and creation of a free competitive environment 
• the creation of a legal and regulatory system to protect property rights and 
support the market order 
" institutional reform 
" the transformation of government functions. When this process is finished 
China's transition from a non market economy to a market economy country 
will be complete. 
THE WTO AND CONTINUED REFORM 
Marketisation and liberalisation have been occurring since reform started in the late 
1970s. The process has been enhanced by China's efforts to become a member of 
the WTO. China has successively lowered its general tariff level since putting forward 
its application to the WTO (which was called re-entry into GATT) in 1986, and many 
tariffs were cut to a large extent (Table 9.2). 
China's gradual tariff reductions were implemented with GATTIWTO entry in mind, 
but at the same time, however, China also wished to benefit from an open economy 
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policy. Apart from tariff reductions, non-tariff barriers also decreased markedly. The 
main achievement was a decrease in quota and license management. From 1992 to 
2000, the number of goods subject to import licenses and quotas decreased by 
two-thirds, and the number of enterprises that had foreign trade rights increased 
from approximately 30,000 to more than 350,000. 
Liberalisation has been a driving force in China's economic growth and development. 
China's dependence on foreign trade increased from 5 per cent at the beginning of 
reform to 50 per cent in 2000. Authorities recognise that trade liberalisation in a non-
market economy should be based on domestic marketisation in order for the 
liberalisation program to be effective. 
China's accession to the WTO marked a new phase of marketisation and 
liberalisation in China, in which crucial parts of the reform program, such as 
government reform itself were carried out. The WTO not only exerts strong external 
pressure for reform, but also has restrictions on the content of marketisation and 
trade liberalisation, for example, its 'rewards and punishment' for compliance or 
Table 9.2 Selected Chinese tariff rates prior to WTO accession, 1987-2000 
(percent) 
1987 Dec 1992 Dec 1993 Apr1996 Dec 1997 
Average tariff rate 43.1 39.9 36.4 23.0 17.0 
Agriculture 37.7 34.5 34.4 27.2 17.2 
Mining and quarrying 22.0 20.2 20.4 6.0 3.4 
Consumption goods in manufacturing 65.8 63.9 60.5 35.5 25.3 
Capital goods manufacturing 29.5 36.2 32.9 21.6 17.2 
Intermediate input in manufacturing 28.8 21.7 29.0 17.1 15.1 
Petroleum refining products 17.6 16.0 13.9 8.1 7.6 
Raw chemical materials and 
chemical products 26.6 26.2 23.3 14.1 11.4 
Building materials and other nonmetal 
products 46.4 44.5 39.9 26.9 18.4 
Products of smelting and pressing 
of ferrous metals 13.3 14.1 14.3 9.6 9.1 
Products of smelting and pressing 
of nonferrous metals 16.2 16.2 15.4 10.0 7.8 
Metal products 43.0 42.8 38.5 20.4 13.5 
Source: Jin Xiangrong and Un Chengliang, 1999. 'Positive analysis of China's all previous tariff 
adjustments and their effective protection structure', World Economy, 26(1):28-34. 
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non- compliance. The protocol includes procedures to evaluate the process of China's 
market economy reform, supervise trade liberalisation and the transition on the part 
of marketisation. Under this system, China's economic reforms need to advance 
more quickly, especially in the area of reform and privatisation of SOEs, and in 
legislation and regulation. 
However, while the construction of the legal system has been advancing rapidly, 
China is confronted with the problem of implementing the new laws. In the past five 
years, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) of China 
has passed 113 laws, a large number in the history of China's legal system. But 
passing a law is only part of the process; implementation is critical. Under the 
planned economic system, the administration of government mainly relied on various 
kinds of administrative decrees or regulations, and law was not the main foundation 
for the behaviour of individuals, enterprises and the government. Government officials 
and law enforcement authorities are not used to changing their long-enduring habit 
of administrative control, and business entities and residents are not accustomed 
to appealing to laws to defend their rights. 
A second problem is that, in the course of implementation of the commitments in 
the protocol for China's accession to the WTO, some neglected links remain in 
terms of the functions and coordination of the government institutions which 
implement the commitments. The solution lies in strengthening the institutional reform. 
This was one of the key reform priorities put forward by the central government in 
2003. 
A third issue is that new trade protections may emerge to carry out China's 
commitments to the WTO, especially concerning efforts to normalise its trade 
protection measures. This could happen if China adopts transitional administrative 
measures that are not consistent with the basic principles of the WTO. Disputes 
may emerge as a result. 
China faces some other problems as its participation in economic globalisation 
grows. For example, China could face some potentially detrimental treatment from 
a non-market economy country. The protocol on China's accession stipulates that 
the a member can adopt special safeguard measures against China. This clause is 
valid for 12 years. Such a clause makes a provision for every member to take 
certain measures if faced with increasing imports from China. It would be a shame 
for China to suffer unduly from other countries protecting themselves because this 
could persuade the Chinese government to take corresponding measures to protect 
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its own industries. With an increasing degree of marketisation in China resulting 
from the reform and liberalisation, it would be advantageous to both Chinese and 
foreign firms when China is treated formally as a market-economy. 
PROSPECTS 
China's accession to the WTO has brought new opportunities for domestic reform 
and economic development. It provides favourable conditions for China and other 
countries in the world. 
China is committed to lowering its tariff barriers gradually to an average tariff level 
of 8.9 per cent and to abrogating non-tariff barriers that contravene the WTO principles. 
China will push its trade liberalisation further after the new round of multilateral 
trade negotiations. 
Besides multilateral commitments, China recently paid particular attention to the 
development of bilateral free trade cooperation in the hope that such a movement 
would further its China's liberalisation program. China has signed an agreement on 
the foundation of a free trade area with ASEAN, hoping to gain free trade between 
China and 10 countries of ASEAN within 10 years. 
China's accession to the WTO has resulted in a significant increase in the overall 
scale of China's foreign trade. However, this also highlights the fact that protection 
measures from its trading partners are highly likely. These measures will have a 
negative impact on China's foreign trade, dampening the growth of its exports. 
Trade disputes are not conducive to the interests of China or its trading partners. 
Trade liberalisation has had a significant effect on Chinese trade only after the 
achievement of a certain degree of marketisation in the Chinese economy. China 
has pinned its marketisation to trade liberalisation under the WTO. In the long run, 
the processes of marketisation and trade liberalisation will reinforce each other, 
bringing China closer to its goal of establishing a market system. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Since China's accession to WTO, China has reduced its import tariffs and abolished 
a series of non-tariff barriers. Elements of a private economy have emerged, and 
the state-owned sector has shrunk. China has reformed the government organisations 
and institutions to make them consistent with the requirements of the WTO. All 
these reforms have created the conditions necessary for the mechanism of market 
economy to operate successfully. 
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Accession to WTO is a landmark in China's marketisation and trade liberalisation. 
Reforms will continue now that China has acceded to the WTO. This will continue to 
be a gradual process, and there will be resistance and problems. But the transient 
pain of adjustment and transition are unavoidable if China is to feel the benefits of 
marketisation and trade liberalisation. 
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A changing role in world trade 
Ugang Song and Sizhong Sun 
The rapid growth of foreign trade during the past quarter century has fundamentally 
changed China's position in world trade. China is now a large, developing, and at the 
same time transitional, economy excelling in international economic activities through 
domestic reform and trade liberalisation. Relatively high export growth has been 
accompanied by a sustained process of GDP growth and rising per capita income 
at home. The combination of the size of the economy, sustained low production 
costs, and continued strong inflows of foreign direct investment means that China 
has had profound effects on regional and world production and consumption. China's 
changing role in world trade after its accession to the WTO in 2001 is much more 
than the increase in its share of world trade; its significance lies in the commensurate 
role it now has in promoting the multilateral trading system. A multilateral system 
provides the most appropriate framework for China to balance its domestic and 
international interests, and together with its trading partners, meet new challenges 
in globalisation. 
TRADE REFORM AND LIBERALISATION 
The domestic roots of the Chinese economy's remarkable international performance 
centre on the success of its domestic reform. On the macro level, successful 
economic reform has improved resource allocation, leading to rapid economic growth 
and rising income, causing both exports and imports to rise. On the micro level, 
continuing reforms have boosted the efficiency and productivity of domestic 
enterprises, which have been enhanced by foreign direct investment and the 
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participation of domestic private enterprises in production and trade. 
On the political level, decentralisation, enterprise and government system reform 
have produced domestic beneficiaries of open trade and who have pressured the 
government to lower the level of protection. In the regulatory area, legislation has 
been made to protect intellectual property rights and to ensure transparency in 
government policies and fair competition among firms. 
To facilitate domestic firms' participation in international competition, the old trading 
system simply had to be reformed. Trading system reform has been carried out 
parallel to other reform programs such as price, enterprise, and administration reform. 
Initially, reform centred on removing state control over foreign trade and granting 
companies more autonomy. After China formally applied to rejoin the WTO (then 
GATT) in 1986,1 reform tackled the allocation of foreign exchange by establishing a 
dual exchange rate system and abolishing export subsidies. 
Since the mid 1990s, the focus has been on reforming the granting of trading 
rights and setting up the rules for regulating trade. In 1994, the dual exchange rate 
system and the exchange retention system were abolished. The highly centralised 
foreign trading system has been replaced by a new system by which mandatory 
planning of imports and exports has been replaced by government guidance and 
indirect controls (Tseng et al. 1994; Song 2000). Controls over qualifications for 
participation in the foreign trade has been loosened, thus more and more domestic 
enterprises have been able to conduct trade directly with foreign counterparts. 
China has been committed to continuously and unilaterally reducing tariff protection 
(Figure 10.1). From 1992 to 1997, China carried out six rounds of tariff cuts, and the 
average import tariff rate decreased from 43 per cent in 1992 to 17 per cent in 1997. 
In 1999, the average tariff rate was further reduced to 16 per cent, covering 1,041 
items (15 per cent of the total) (MOFTEC Bulletin 1999). In 2001 , the average tariff 
rate was cut down to 15 per cent, with an average decrease of 6.6 per cent (Foreign 
Trade Practice 2001). 
In 2002, according to the commitments of the WTO accession, the average tariff 
rate was further reduced to 12 per cent, covering 5,300 items (75 per cent of the 
total), the average tariff rate for industrial manufactured goods was slightly below 12 
per cent, and the average tariff rate for primary products was 15 per cent (China 
Petroleum and Chemical Industry 2002, and Du 2002). In 2003, the average tariff 
has been reduced to 11 per cent, covering 3,000 items (International Business 
Daily online 2002. 
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Non-tariff barriers have also been reduced. In 1999, the number of import licenses 
was cut by 47 per cent (MOFTEC Bulletin: 1999). Overall, the coverage of non-tariff 
barriers fell from two thirds, to one third in 1996 and 22 per cent in 2001. Under WTO 
commitments, all non-tariff barriers will be phased out except for state trading, 
which is now subject to WTO rules, and is likely to cover less than 10 per cent of 
imports (Martin 2003). 
Trade reform and liberalisation have directly affected China's foreign trade through 
increased specialisation, increased market size, and technological advancement 
through investment especially foreign investment (Table 10.2). From 1980 to 2002, 
China's foreign trade grew at an average annual rate of 13 per cent, well above the 
world average. In 2002, the value of China's foreign trade amounted to US$499 
billion, comprising exports of US$283 billion and imports of US$216 billion. China's 
total trade reached US$451 billion in the first seven months in 2003, up by 38 per 
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Note: The figure for 2005 is based on China's WTO commitments on tariff reduction for 2005. 
Source: Made by using the data from International Business Daily online, 2002, People's Daily, 25 
January 2002, MOFTEC Bulletin, 1999, and Lu, R.Z, and Van, X.P., 2002. 'On the reform of 
China's tariff and nontariff barrier after WTO accession', Journal of Lujiang University, 10:34-39. 
153 
Table 10.1 Shifting patterns of export specialisation in selected industrial 
sectors, 1970-2000 (index of revealed comparative advantage: ReA) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Chemicals (SITC 51) 
China 0.5 0.6 1.0 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.8 
Japan 1.1 1.2 0.9 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.0 
NIEs 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.7 
ASEAN 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 
United States 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 
World 1 
Textiles (SITC 65) 
China 4.1 4.3 4.8 4.5 3.7 3.1 2.6 
Japan 2.2 1.7 1.4 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.6 
NIEs 2.8 3.7 3.5 2.7 2.8 3.2 3.0 
ASEAN 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 
United States 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 
World 1 
Iron and steel (SITC 67) 
China 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.6 1.2 0.8 
Japan 2.8 3.5 3.2 2.1 1.3 1.2 1.3 
NIEs 0.3 0.4 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.4 
ASEAN 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 
United States 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 
World 1 
Metals (SITC 69) 
China 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.6 
Japan 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.7 
NIEs 1.0 1.2 2.0 2.3 1.7 1.8 1.5 
ASEAN 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 
United States 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 
World 1 
Machinery (SITC 71) 
China 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.7 
Japan 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.5 
NIEs 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.4 
ASEAN 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.4 
United States 1.6 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.3 1.4 1.4 
World 1 
Elec. Machinery (SITC 72) 
China 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.9 1.1 
Japan 2.1 1.9 2.5 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.6 
NIEs 1.8 2.0 2.3 1.8 2.0 2.0 1.8 
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ASEAN 0.2 0.6 1.2 1.3 1.8 2.0 2.1 
United States 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 
World 1 
Transport equipment (SITC 73) 
China 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.3 
Japan 1.7 2.5 3.0 2.4 2.0 1.8 1.8 
NIEs 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.8 
ASEAN 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 
United States 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 
World 
Travel goods (SITC 83) 
China 2.8 3.2 3.4 8.2 3.1 8.6 7.9 
Japan 2.0 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 
NIEs 8.9 14.9 16.2 9.7 6.5 2.1 0.8 
ASEAN 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.3 1.2 1.1 1.2 
United States 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 
World 
Clothing (SITC 84) 
China 2.0 2.4 4.7 5.2 4.9 5.1 4.6 
Japan 1.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 
NIEs 13.3 14.2 10.1 6.8 4.2 2.1 1.7 
ASEAN 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.8 1.4 1.2 
United States 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 
World 
Footwear (SITC 85) 
China 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.6 3.8 6.1 6.4 
Japan 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NIEs 3.6 6.2 7.8 6.5 5.1 1.1 0.3 
ASEAN 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 1.3 2.1 1.1 
United States 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
World 
Manufactures (total) 
China 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.1 
Japan 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 
NIEs 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 
ASEAN 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.0 
United States 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.1 
World 
Note: ASEAN includes Singapore; NIEs excludes Singapore; World is used as the reference area. 
Source: Calculated using UN COMTRADE data, International Economic Databank, The Australian 
National University. 
155 
Table 10.2 Foreign direct investments in China, 1980-2002 (US$ million) 
Number of contracts Amount contracted Amount used 
Year (US$ million) (US$ million) 
1979-82 920 4,958 1,769 
1983 638 1,917 916 
1984 2,166 2,875 1,419 
1985 3,073 6,333 1,956 
1986 1,498 3,330 2,244 
1987 2,233 3,709 2,314 
1988 5,945 5,297 3,194 
1989 5,779 5,600 3,393 
1990 7,273 6,596 3,487 
1991 12,978 11,977 4,366 
1992 48,764 58,124 11,008 
1993 83,437 111,436 27,515 
1994 47,549 82,680 33,767 
1995 37,011 91,282 37,521 
1996 24,556 73,276 41,726 
1997 21,001 51,003 45,257 
1998 19,799 52,102 45,463 
1999 16,918 41,223 40,319 
2000 22,347 62,380 40,715 
2001 26,140 69,195 46,878 
2002 34,171 82,768 52,743 
2003 (1-7) 22,245 59,924 34,252 
Total 446441 887,985 482,222 
Source: MOFTEC, 2002. MOFTEC Bulletin, 2002. Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation, Beijing. 
cent compared with the same period in 2002. Exports were up by 33 per cent, and 
imports 43 per cent.2 China's share of world trade was about 0.7 per cent in 1986, 
but this rose to 5 per cent in 2002 when China became the fifth largest trading 
country (the fourth largest in terms of export) in the world (Figure 10.2). 
DIRECTiON OF TRADE AND MARKET SHARES 
The effect of China's export growth becomes even more significant when direction 
of trade and changing market shares of its exports are considered. Increased 
openness of the Chinese economy has significantly changed China's business 
relationship with its major trading partners. China's exports focus heavily on the 
156 
markets of the United States, the Asian newly industrialised economies (NIEs), 
Japan, the European Union, ASEAN, and to a much lesser extent, Australia, Canada, 
and Russia (Figure 10.3). 
The proportion of exports to the US market has increased steadily, up from 5 per 
cent in 1980 to 24 per cent in 2002 (Figure 10.4). The Japanese market also takes 
a large proportion, but with a slight downward trend since the mid 1990s. Market 
shares of NIEs for China's exports have changed more dramatically. From 1980 to 
1991, the relative importance of these markets grew sharply at about 51 per cent, 
falling to 24 per cent in 2002. 
Rapidly falling market shares of China's exports to NIEs during the period under 
study largely reflect NIEs shift of their labour-intensive industries to China for labour 
cost advantages and the upgrade of their own industries towards producing more 
value-added products. High increases in China's trade with those industrialised 
countries is to a great extent due to the low costs of production in China. 
China's imports mainly come from the United States, Japan, the European Union, 
NIEs, ASEAN, Australia, Canada, and Russia (Figure 10.5). China's imports from 
these countries appear to have fluctuated a great deal from 1980 to 1993, indicating 
a dramatic adjustment in China's import sources during that time (Figure 10.6). 
After 1993, the trend became much more stable, suggesting a relatively long-term 
restructure of import sources. ASEAN as a source of China's import sources has 
been steadily increasing, especially since the early 1990s. The steadily increasing 
trend in ASEAN's exports to China is promising as it shows that ASEAN can benefit 
in the long term from the closer integration with China. 
The proportion of US imports into China peaked in 1982 at a level of 22 per cent 
(exports were 24 per cent in 2002), and then decreased steadily. The gap reflects 
the degree to which trade imbalances exist between China and the United States. 
Japan remains China's most important import source. For the European Union, the 
trend of imports into China runs smoothly, indicating a stable trading relationship 
between China and the European Union. For NIEs, from 1980 to 1991, the proportion 
increased sharply, and peaked at 33 per cent in 1991. After that, the trend declines, 
but ASEAN remains an important source of imports for China. 
China's emerging trade relations with its major trading partners in East Asia, 
North America and Europe have strengthened interdependence between China and 
these economies. Geographic closeness is an important factor, contributing to the 
formation of increasingly closed economic integration between China and other 
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Figure 10.2 Major countries' share in world trade, 2002 (per cent) 
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Source: Authors' calculation using data from IMF Direction of Trade (DOTS), International 
Economic Databank,The Australian National University. 
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East Asian economies such as Japan, NIEs and ASEAN. The relatively high share 
of exports from NIEs to China and the falling shares of exports from China to NIEs 
is an indication of China's close engagement with the process of industrial 
restructuring in East Asia since the 1980s. China's relationship with Japan and 
ASEAN has also been evolving in response to rapid increases in industrialisation 
levels and rapid structural change within China. 
COMPOSITION OF TRADE 
China has changed from being largely an exporter of primary products to largely an 
exporter of manufactured goods (SITC 5-8). Figure 10.7 shows that from 1965 to 
1975, China had to rely primarily on the exports of primary products, such as 
agricultural products, petroleum, and petroleum products, to earn much needed 
foreign exchange as the share of exports of primary products was larger than that of 
manufactured goods. But the gap was quickly narrowing. Exports of primary goods 
and manufactured goods were roughly the same during the early period of reform 
from 1975 to 1985. After 1985, exports of primary products declined sharply, and 










, , .' 
. . 
.' .. . \ . 
, . , 
\ 
- - ASEAN (excluding Singapore) 
- - - - Australia 
--EU-15 
- .. - . - . Japan 
- NICs (including Singapore) 
- United States 
. '. 
.,---~ ----'.&f~ _ _ --------~ ~~~~------------------
1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 
Source: Authors' calculation using the data from IMF, Direction of Trade, International Economic 
Databank, The Australian National University. 
160 
exports of manufactured goods increased rapidly. The widening gap reflects the 
extent to which structural changes in export trade have been taking place, according 
to China's comparative advantage. 
This changing pattern has become more evident since the mid 1980s. In 2000, 
China's exports of primary products (SITC 0-4) accounted for about 7 per cent of 
total exports, but exports of machines and transport equipment (SITC 7) and labour-
intensive manufactured products (SITC 8) accounted for 31 and 45 per cent of the 
total exports respectively (Figure 10.8). 
Table 10.1 reports the international comparison of shifting patterns of export 
specialisation in ten selected industrial sectors (1970-2000) using the indices of 
revealed comparative advantage (RCA). 3 The results show that by 2000 the products 
on which China had a strong comparative advantage ranked as follows: travel goods 
(7.9), footwear (6.4), clothing (4.6), and textiles (2.6). In comparison, China had less 
comparative advantage in machinery and transport equipment, although it had gained 
some ground in electronic machinery by the end of 1990s. This pattern of export 
specialisation is mirrored in China's composition of imports. 
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China's imports initially focused on manufactured products, (especially SITC 7) 
as China needed manufactured products to meet both producer and consumer 
demand (Figure 10.9). Socialist legacies (heavy industry-oriented strategies) left a 
huge gap in both production and consumption (economic shortages), which had to 
be filled by imports. Figure 10.10 illustrates the composition of China's imports over 
time and shows that imports of manufactured products (SITC 5-8) were increasing 
while that of primary products (SITC 0-4) were falling. From the mid 1980s, the 
imports of manufactured goods were an average of more than five times the imports 
of primary products. China had become less dependent on world markets for both 
exporting and importing primary products. Manufactured products have become 
dominant in China's foreign trade reflecting increased levels of industralisation in 
China. 
Reflecting changes in the level of industrialisation in China, China's export shares 
of labour-intensive products have undergone important changes (Figure 10.11). The 
export shares of labour-intensive products in total exports reached a peak in mid 
1994 and have fallen since then, although the absolute shares were still much 
higher than for all other East Asian economies. The declining trend of labour-intensive 
Figure 10.8 Composition of exports, 2000 (per cent) 
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Source: Authors' calculation uSing UN COMTRADE, International Economic Databank, The 
Australian National University. 
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products in China's total exports reflects China's efforts to change the composition 
of its exports towards more value-added products such as capital-intensive products. 
This trend does not necessarily mean that China will lose ground for exporting 
labour-intensive products in the future. 
EXPORT SPECIALISATION AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
To study the export specialisation and structural dynamics of China's exports, we 
follow the approaches adopted in Amin Gutierrez de Pineres and Ferrantino (1997) 
by first calculating a cumulative export experience function for each commodity 
following the formula: 
"\:"'t 
£"'i=1 eil 
c. = 0 1I LII 
e· i=IO It 
(10.1 ) 
where e it stands for export and to and t1 represent the initial and terminal periods 
of the sample: 1965-2000. The variable Cit has properties similar to that of a 
cumulative distribution function; it takes on values at or near 0 at the beginning of 
the sample period and rises to 1 in the final year. If values of cit for two different 
industries were plotted together, an industry whose export experience was 
concentrated earlier in the period (a 'traditional' industry) would be differentiated 
from an industry whose export experience was concentrated later in the period (a 
'non-traditional' industry) in that its export experience function would shift to the left. 
Figure 10.12 presents cumulative distribution functions for eight of the most 
important Chinese export industries over the period under study. In general, the 
more rapidly real exports have grown in a given industry, the more the graph of cit 
will shift to the right. 
Figure 10.12 shows that the most traditional industries are textile fibres and live 
animals whose cumulative distribution functions are positioned to the left, indicating 
that a large proportion of the exports occurred relatively early in the sample period, 
and real exports are relatively constant over the period. For all other (non-traditional) 
industries, the functions shifted to the right, indicating more export experience in 
recent years. For example, the real export of clothing together with iron and steel 
experienced a rapid growth in more recent years. 
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The second measure, CSX, is a measure of the change in export composition 
taking place in a single year. 
61 
CSX = Lmin(Si,tSi,t-l) (10.2) 
i=1 
where sit = eit / LiE(I,61) eit , the share of industry t's exports in national exports in 
year t. CSX takes on a maximum value of 1 if there is no change in export composition 
while it takes on a minimum value of 0 if a country exports a bundle of products, 
none of which were exported in the previous year. High values of CSX indicate 
short-run stability in export composition (Amin Gutierrez de Pineres and Ferrantino 
1997). 
A static measure of specialisation, SPECL, can be calculated as 
61 
SPECLt = L(Si,t)2 
i=1 
(10.3) 
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A score approaching 1 implies reliance on a single export (a high degree of 
specialisation) while a score approaching 0 implies a high degree of export 
diversification. 
The results for both CSX and SPECL are plotted in Figure 10.13. On average, 
China maintained relatively high values of CSX throughout the period under study, 
although falls in the values can be observed for particular years. The results indicate 
that there has been an overall stability in the composition of China's exports although 
short-term fluctuations occurred over the period under study. 
The value for 2000 marked a sharp fall from the normal level that had been more or 
less maintained in the 1990s. The fall may indicate that substantial change in structural 
adjustment with more export diversification occurred towards the end of 1990s. 
The curve for SPECL shows the behaviour of the Chinese specialisation index 
overtime (Figure 10.13). There are two periods in which a high degree of specialisation 
occurred: from the 1970s to the early 1980s, and from the mid 1980s to the end of 
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1990s. The high degree of specialisation during the first period might be due to the 
distorted structure of trade caused by central planning. After the implementation of 
reform and trade liberalisation, a convergence of the pattern of trade and resource 
endowment occurred, generating trade expansion (Song 1996). The trend of the 
second period shows that trade expansion has been based primarily on a high 
degree of trade specialisation, namely its reliance on a few export items such as 
labour-intensive products. 
This finding, together with the results shown in Figure 10.7, suggest that China 
has made great progress in restructuring its pattern of trade in terms of increasing 
the share of manufacturing products (SITC5-8) and reducing the share of primary 
products (SITCO-4) during the last quarter century. However, China had not achieved 
a high degree of export diversification manufacturing trade by the end of the 1990s. 
This can be seen from the increasing shares of China in world total labour-intensive 
manufactured exports from 1970 to 2000 (Figure 10. i 4), although the share of labour-
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intensive products in total exports began to fall after mid 1994 (Figure 10.11). 
Faced with increasing pressure to ease tension with its trading partners over 
exports of labour-intensive products, the government has made efforts to diversify 
its exports by encouraging investment in high-tech areas and supporting the upgrading 
of eXisting industries. In doing so it increases the capital and technology content of 
its trade. The latest figures show that export values for high-tech products reached 
US$44 billion during the first half of 2003, up by 54 per cent compared with the 
same period in 2002, and accounting for 23 per cent of China's total exports. The 
growth rate was 21 percentage points higher than the average growth rate of the 
total exports in the same period.4 
It is, therefore, predicted that the curve for SPECL in Figure 10.13 will soon reach 
a peak and then begin a sustained decline reflecting ongoing structural adjustment 
in exporting industries, leading to an increased degree of export diversification. 
Figure 10.14 Changing share of some East Asian economies in total labour-
intensive manufactured exports, 1970-2000 (per cent) 
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CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
China's emerging role in world trade has proved once again that outward-looking 
strategies have been successful. However, China faces challenges regarding the 
structural change and adjustment. Domestically, there are substantial weaknesses 
in China's agricultural and financial sectors. Unemployment has been exacerbated 
by the continuing reform of SOEs, and increased labour surpluses in rural areas 
result from a slowdown of township and village enterprises (TVEs). There has been 
an unequal distribution of benefits and costs of greater openness as far as regional 
economies are concerned. Macroeconomic stability has become a major concern 
with persistent domestic price deflation and oversupply of manufactured products. 
Under these circumstances, in fulfilling its WTO commitments, which in essence 
require more profound structural changes in the economy, the government's autonomy 
to decide the pace and depth of its reform has been diminished (Song 2003). 
Regionally, competition between China and other Asian countries is likely to 
increase as China's relatively cheap and productive workforce provides it with 
comparative advantages on world markets across a range of labour-intensive 
products. China has an important place in the sale of many labour-intensive products 
in world markets, which are similar to those produced in ASEAN (Xu and Song 
2000). Membership of the WTO makes China a more attractive place for FDI causing 
some diversion of capital flows away from ASEAN and other Asian economies. 
China's rising trade has also forced NIEs to move more quickly in developing their 
capital intensive and technology intensive-industries in order to sustain a rapid growth 
of exports. 
If they fail to respond adequately, they will suffer from lower competitiveness. China may not be 
content to attract lower levels of technology from them but may seek to challenge them directly 
in the most complex activities and functions. There is practically no activity in which China 
cannot build up a competitive edge; all evidence suggests that it is already doing so with amazing 
rapidity (Lall and Albaladejo 2002:106). 
Globally, the increasing trade dependence makes the economy prone to various 
kinds of external shocks, which may complicate or interrupt the process of structural 
adjustments in the economy. Protectionism against the products in which China 
has comparative advantages such as textile and clothing increased especially in 
developed countries, which blame the cheap imports from China for loss of jobs in 
those traditional industries and more recently for causing deflation. The level of 
protection of labour intensive industries in those industrialised countries continues 
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to be an important factor influencing the growth of exports from China although 
China is shifting quickly to diversify its exports in favour of more capital and 
technology-intensive industries. 
China's accession to the WTO does not provide much relief in this regard as in 
two important areas-safeguards and antidumping-China was pressed to accept 
discriminatory treatment, that is, it is subject to WTO-plus requirements which were 
more onerous than those accepted by any other member of the WTO (Lardy 2002:80). 
After becoming a member of the WTO, China faces more cases of anti-dumping 
against its exports. Since 1979, China's exports have encountered more than 450 
anti-dumping lawsuits with a total loss up to US$10 billion (Wu 2002). Chinese 
enterprises have also begun resorting to anti-dumping measures against some foreign 
producers. The MOFTEC Bulletin shows that more firms have filed anti-dumping 
investigation applications against the imported goods after China joined the WTO.1t 
is likely that increasing use of anti-dumping measures by both Chinese and foreign 
enterprises will negatively affect trade flows between China and its trading partners. 
After a further surge in China's exports in 2002 and the first half of 2003 and the 
weakening of the US dollar, debate on whether China should revalue its currency 
have intensified. China has resisted the pressure to revalue its currency because of 
potentially detrimental effects on its export sector. China already devalued its currency 
substantially when it moved from a multiple exchange rate system where the official 
rate was 576.1 yuan to the dollar in 1993, to a unified rate of 861.8 yuan to the dollar 
by 1994. The exchange rate appreciated slightly after that and since the Asian 
financial crisis has been fixed at around 8.28 yuan to the dollar. Currency depreciation 
played a role in boosting China's exports (Song 2000), but increasing trade from 
China is attributable to many other factors, especially to labour cost advantages, 
increased productivity resulting from domestic reform, and the role of FDI. 
But given China's increasing share in world trade and the rapid increases in its 
foreign exchange reserves in recent years (US$356.5 billion by July 2003)5 it may 
be time for China to consider introducing exchange rate flexibility. A flexible exchange 
rate system would facilitate structural reforms and safeguard financial stability as 
the existing pegged regime is unlikely to cope with the mounting pressures of trade 
and capital account liberalisation (Hu 2003). Such a system would determine what 
the appropriate level of RMB would be, but more importantly, it would be a symbol of 
China's participation in the process of global adjustment, commensurate with China's 
increasing weight in the world economy. 
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Meeting the challenges of accommodating China into the world economy will 
require effort by both China and its trading partners. China can best answer these 
challenges through unequivocal commitment to reform, to the eventual goal of free 
trade for China itself and the international community, and to the application of the 
rules of the international system (Garnaut and Huang 2000). 
There is much more that needs to be done to strengthen reform in China. For 
example, it is argued that even after two decades of substantial reform, the trade 
and foreign investment regimes are still far from being transparent (Branstetter and 
Feenstra 2002), and price liberalisation is also far from being complete (Pomfret 
1997). China needs to do more to honour international copyright and trademark laws 
(Behar 2000; Branstetter and Feenstra 2002). The role of government should also 
be changed for it to become more compatible with an open trade regime. Government's 
administrative capacity should be improved, and relevant legislation should be 
established or revised (Xu 2001), as market mechanisms and open trade require a 
more transparent trading regime and efficient administration. 
With the economy increasingly dependent on a high degree of trade, it is no 
longer in China's best interest to try to protect its industries by limiting imports. 
Keeping imports out reduces the effective demand for, and consequently the price of, foreign 
exchange relative to the domestic costs of labour, capital, intermediate inputs, and so on that 
producers of export products must pay. Since exporters sell in foreign markets at this less 
favourable 'real' exchange rate, they are caught in a profit squeeze, which reduces traditional 
exports and blocks new export development-particularly of manufactures (McKinnon 
1973;134). 
Domestic reform conforming with WTO requirements will further improve China's 
trading system, and help facilitate the expansion of trade through increased 
transparency and efficiency. One challenge is that prior to its accession to the 
WTO, the state provided support in many forms, such as export subsidies and easy 
credit to enhance the international competitiveness of domestic firms. Because of 
the WTO, the scope of such support will be limited and some, such as export 
subsidies, will have to be eliminated, with government procurement made in a more 
transparent way. The requirement of national treatment means that all firms, including 
both state and non-state firms, will be competing on an equal footing. It is therefore 
a matter of urgency to quicken the pace of reform of SOEs.6 
Market-oriented reform in other areas, such as releasing controls over labour 
migration, the levelling of playing fields, privatising SOEs and enhancing regional 
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growth by reducing cross-provincial barriers to trade, will have significant 
improvements in the overall efficiency of the Chinese economy, and thereby will 
further improve its export performance. 
China can best maintain the balance between its domestic and international 
interests by pursuing a trade strategy within the multilateral framework and deepening 
market-oriented reform. China's remarkable performance in world trade so far has 
been achieved largely by following multilateral principles in the form of unilateral 
trade liberalisation in its attempt to become the member of the WTO. China's 
accession to the WTO has helped to facilitate structural change, implementing 
required changes in its institutions, increasing market competition through further 
deregulation and reform, attracting more FDls into the economy, and by opening 
foreign markets increasingly to China's exports. 
When existing protective tariffs and quota restrictions on imports have been further 
reduced or eliminated according to WTO commitments, China will be in an excellent 
position to champion a multilateral course for further trade liberalisation. There are 
other approaches towards liberalisation, such as regional (subregional) and bilateral, 
but there are high costs associated with these approaches unless they follow the 
principles of multilateral arrangements such as non-discrimination. It would be 
counterproductive to emphasise reciprocity and appeal to bilateral negotiations (Uno 
1991 :29). 
The potential impact of structural adjustment aimed at export diversification will 
be more profound than that achieved by export specialisation in that it will widen the 
scope of, and increase the intensities, of China's integration with the world economy. 
China's position in world trade will provide new opportunities for China's trading 
partners. Structural adjustment will be required to accommodate increased 
competition. There is room to raise capital and technology contents of the products 
within the existing labour-intensive industries such as clothing and consumer 
electronics. There is huge potential in developing intra-industry trade among regional 
economies through mutual investing (Lall and Albaladejo 2002: 1 06). 
CONCLUSIONS 
As a result of the implementation of domestic reform and trade liberalisation (largely 
in the form of unilateral trade liberalisation) China has become an important player 
in world trade. China's increasing trade is a reflection of her progress with continuing 
structural change. A key force behind structural change is the working of China's 
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comparative advantage of labour-intensive and, more recently, capital-intensive 
industries, supported by market-oriented reform and liberalisation. In the process, 
government's role in directing economic and trading activities has increasingly given 
way to market forces in guiding resource allocation, production and trade. 
Prospects for further expansion of Chinese trade hinge on the success of continued 
structural adjustment in China and its trading partners. China needs further 
deregulation over control of labour movement, regional development, and privatisation 
of SOEs to increase the competitiveness and efficiency of Chinese enterprises. 
China will maintain its comparative advantage in labour-intensive industries for a 
long time to come. The matching of increased technological capability with labour 
cost-advantages will enlarge the scope for expansion of Chinese trade as it will 
contribute to producing a wider variety of products for exports. 
The magnitude of the effects of China's integration with regional and world economy 
is reflected in the changing structure and pattern of China's trade. 
Export diversification will, to a certain degree, ease trade tensions between China 
and those countries of a similar level of development, such as ASEAN economies, 
who are competing with each other in third markets for similar products, particularly 
labour-intensive products. A long-term solution would be to widen the scope of 
China's integration with the regional and the world economy so as to increase China's 
imports from and its investment flows to these economies. 
China's changing role in world trade cannot be defined by mere increases in its 
weight, but by its role in championing open trade and promoting trading arrangements 
through the multilateral trading system. This system provides the most appropriate 
framework in which China can best balance its domestic and international interests 
and, together with its trading partners, meet the new challenges in globalisation for 
them to be able to continue to benefit from open trade. 
NOTES 
1 The General Agreements on Trade and Tariffs. 
2 See People's Daily (Overseas Edition), 11 August 2003. 
3 ReA. = r;~ / Ti~V 
lk T k / Tt, where T stands for exports, i is country and w represents world, k is 
ww ww 
commodity. ReA> 1 implies that a country tends to specialise in or has comparative advantage 
over the commodity concerned. 
4 See People's Daily (Overseas Edition), 24 July 2003. 
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5 Reuters, Beijing, 26 August 2003. 
6 See the Press release by Ministry of Commerce, People's Daily (Overseas Edition), 28 August 
2003. 
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China in the world economy: the FTA 
stategy 
Christopher Findlay 
China made a huge international and domestic effort in multilateral trade liberalisation 
in the years leading up to its accession to the WTO in 2001. It is therefore at first 
surprising that China is now engaged in a vigorous strategy of using Free Trade 
Agreements. The sharp turnaround is in response to perceptions in the Chinese 
leadership that other Asia Pacific economies were moving away from most favoured 
nation commitments. 
At the end of 2001, China and ASEAN reached an agreement on a framework to 
establish a free trade area and have agreed on a tariff elimination program which 
includes agriculture products in the early harvest component and which could begin 
as early as 2003 . 
In June 2003, China and Hong Kong signed a Closer Economic Partnership 
Agreement which gives Hong Kong manufacturers duty free access in a large number 
of tariff lines in China and gives Hong Kong-incorporated services producers levels 
of access which exceed China's WTO commitments. 1 2 
China joined the WTO at the end of 2001. China's strong growth over the last few 
years has been attributed in part to accession, to the liberalisation associated with 
it, and to its contribution to attracting foreign capital to China. 
What extra does China hope to gain from the FTA route to reform? Political 
considerations may have influenced thinking among the Chinese leadership about 
the change in their trade policy portfolio. 
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Drysdale (2002) suggests that the ASEAN economies feared being crowded out 
by China's growth, a fear which could have been exaggerated by accession to the 
WTO. In the face of these uncertainties, China offered the FTA as way of providing 
some reassurance and as a vehicle for cooperation. Whether it does help resolve 
the uncertainties perceived in ASEAN is a question examined later. 
The possibility of gains from preferential access by Chinese manufacturers into 
ASEAN markets may have been another motivation. From an ASEAN point of view, 
access to China's markets for raw materials or energy as well as manufactures 
could have been attractive. A free trade agreement involving all these economies, 
Zhang (2003) suggests, would also make the whole region more attractive to foreign 
investors-ASEAN members had been concerned about the effect of China's WTO 
entry on patterns of FDI flows. 
According to some views, the reform program in ASEAN would also benefit from 
an FTA with China. The argument is that an agreement with China would accelerate 
ASEAN's own integration (the mechanism for this process is discussed in more 
detail below). 
Zhang (2003) suggests that an agreement between China and ASEAN would 
hasten the efforts by Japan and Korea to form their own bilateral agreements with 
ASEAN, and push China, Korea and Japan themselves to make further progress on 
their own arrangements. A China-ASEAN FTA would therefore contribute to the 
building of agreements which can contribute to region wide cooperation. This process 
is similar to that of 'competitive liberalisation' promoted by US officials. 
Zhang (2003) explains that a new interest in building regional cooperation emerged 
after the East Asian financial crisis. Drysdale (2002), in a similar vein, notes that 
another influence maybe the region's reaction to the role played by the United States 
in response to the crisis. Other factors he stresses that were driving new interest in 
smaller group regional cooperation in East Asia were the loss of faith in APEC's 
capacity to deal with the problems of that time and the failure to launch a new round 
of trade negotiations in the WTO at the Ministerial Meeting in Seattle. 
Zhan"g (2003) attributes the first 'ASEAN plus three' meeting to this interest. Zhang 
stresses what he calls the vulnerability of market-based integration. He argues that 
the interest in a more formal institutional arrangement follows rationally from this 
concern but also from their emergence in Europe and the Americas. 
The ASEAN plus three arrangement 'provides a framework for demonstrating East 
Asian leadership and influence on regional and international affairs' (Drysdale 
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2002: 141). Zhang (2003) is more specific. He refers to the ASEAN plus three agenda 
as, in addition to the establishment of an East Asian Free Trade Area, cooperation 
on macroeconomic policy and financial market strengthening, jOint action on the 
provision of regional public goods. He refers to common challenges such as drug 
trafficking, piracy, illegal migration, environmental disasters, money laundering, 
international terrorism and other trans-boundary issues. Beyond these topics, there 
might be interaction in relation to defence and military affairs but that cooperation 
involves an even longer time horizon. 
The FTA strategy is designed, from this perspective, to contribute to China's 
capacity to 'form at some point a counter power comparable to the United States 
and Europe by unifying Asian countries'. It is interpreted as part of an attempt by 
China to build a 'strategic partnership' with ASEAN which could be used to 'work 
closely on regional and international issues'. 3 Whether the FTA component is actually 
required to achieve this goal is a question of interest. 
Zhang (2003) also notes that other tensions within East Asia and other 
commitments in relation to security would inhibit the institutional integration process. 
He stresses that it is too early for China to consider a full East Asian arrangement, 
given that China is, in his view, not ready to negotiate an agreement with Japan or 
Korea, and given that the region cannot confront the issues that would arise from 
the treatment of Taiwan in a larger arrangement. So the agenda in the immediate 
term is actually a sub-regional one, with the focus on China and ASEAN. Whether 
an agreement of that scope contributes to East Asian regional interests is a further 
question of interest. 
The trade and investment policy related components of the arrangements are 
seen as complementary to the interest in cooperation in the other fields. Cooperation 
starts in the economic area and spreads to other areas in this model. Zhang (2003: 11) 
refers also to 'competitive regional cooperation' in which smaller groups of members 
in the region sign agreements which then 'help set up the legal foundation for regional 
institutional building'. These remarks highlight the view that a new legal and 
institutional framework is required to avoid the uncertainties of market-based 
integration. 
What are the economic issues associated with the use of the FTA option, including 
its feedback onto the progress of the Doha Round? Does an FTA help resolve the 
uncertainties perceived in ASEAN about the emergence of China? Is an FTA 
component required to build institutions for cooperation on the provision of regional 
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public goods? What are the interests of China's trading partners in the Western 
Pacific in China's own strategic choices? These and other questions of interest are 
discussed in this chapter. 
ISSUES 
Two sets of issues are reviewed-one related to the structure of trade and the other 
the analysis of the dynamics of the competitive use of Free Trade Agreements. 
Production networks 
Garnaut and Findlay (2003), drawing on the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council's 
Pacific Economic Outlook (PEO) report,4 note that East Asia is again becoming 
increasingly interdependent in trade and growth. It was affected less by the 
international economic slowdown of 2001-02 than other world regions, with both 
exports and imports growing reasonably strongly in 2002. The period from mid 1980s 
through to the mid 1990s was characterised by increasing levels of regional integration. 
This period of growth in East Asian interdependence was driven by economic growth 
and structural change in Japan, supported by mutually reinforcing economic growth 
and trade liberalisation throughout the Western Pacific. The trend towards integration 
was broken temporarily by booming US markets in the mid and late 1990s. But now 
that earlier trend has been reinstated and is being driven by China's reform and growth. 
There has been considerable relocation of the increment in production capacity to 
China from other economies which are losing competitiveness in labour-intensive 
manufacturing processes. This has created rapid growth in intermediate as well as 
final product exports to China. 
Complex supply chains are likely to continue to change their character. New 
suppliers emerge to take over the positions vacated when established suppliers 
lose competitiveness in their original production and move to new niches. The transition 
of market shares supports the competitiveness of the region as a whole. The process 
of industrial restructuring associated with growth and changes in comparative 
advantage is a familiar theme in the literature on East Asian development.s 
The risk is that the introduction of bilateral FTAs will retard the adjustment process. 
Sourcing may be diverted to institutionally preferred and away from commercially 
efficient partners. New suppliers may not have the opportunity to establish their 
market shares for either domestic market sales or re-export. 6 This could be a special 
problem for the new members of ASEAN. 
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Another interpretation of the growth of intra-regional trade is that East Asia is now 
more 'self reliant'. This is used as a further argument in favour of regional and preferential 
free trade arrangements (since the risk of diversion is smaller if trading relationships 
are already intense). Athukorala (2003) also notes the growth of regional trade but 
separates out the contribution of component trade from that associated with the demand 
for final products. He stresses that the fragmentation of the supply chain leads to 
growth in trade of components. He concludes that the data he examines show that 
in a context where fragmentation based trade is expanding rapidly, the standard trade flows 
analysis can lead to misleading inferences regarding the ongoing process of economic 
integration through trade. When data on assembly trade are excluded from trade flows, our 
estimates suggest that extra-regional trade is much more important than intra-regional trade 
for continued growth dynamism of East Asia, both including and excluding Japan. Thus, the 
ongoing process of product fragmentation seems to have strengthened the case for a global, 
rather than a regional, approach to trade and investment policy making (Athukorala 2003:n.p.). 
Athukorala (2003) also reports data which reinforce earlier observations about the 
importance of world markets for China's growth and, by extension, continuing reform. 
He reports that exports to North America and the European Union accounted for 
about 41 per cent of China's manufactured exports in 2000, up from 34 per cent five 
years earlier. China's share of exports to East Asia fell over that period. Access to 
markets in the rest of the world continue, therefore, to be a priority goal for China. 
These data support the observation made by Drysdale that over time, while China 
will most likely become more important to its East Asian neighbours as a destination 
for exports, they will become less important to China as it 'extends its global reach' 
(2002: 143). like Athukorala, Drysdale takes the point from this observation that 'the 
protection of the WTO framework, and open regional arrangements, will assume far 
greater importance to China's partners in East Asia .. .' (2002:143). 
The diversionary effects of free trade agreements are also important in markets 
for services. A free trade agreement has the effect of applying a particular sequence 
to the entry into markets for services. The first entrants may not be the world's most 
competitive suppliers but, once they are established, it becomes difficult to force 
them to exit the market, even if market access is made available on a non-preferential 
basis. This is because of the advantages of incumbency in services markets. The 
competitiveness of the rest of the economy suffers because of this effect of using 
FTAs to manage the sequence of entry. 
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Another feature of China's position in regional production networks is the value of 
China's WTO commitments leading to bench marking of bureaucratic processes 
against global standards. As a result of accession, China has rewritten large amounts 
of legal and regulatory documents to match expectations of other WTO members. 
Areas covered include customs procedures, quarantine, regulation affecting the 
service sector and government procurement. To add another layer of complexity to 
this new structure would be to discard one of the most important benefits of accession. 
The extra layer of rules required to implement preferential arrangements would add 
to the potential for bureaucratic discretion. Greater degrees of complexity and higher 
risks associated with bureaucratic discretion are not outcomes that international 
business wants in China. 
Dynamics of the competitive use of FTAs 
The other major trading partners of ASEAN have taken their own initiatives for 
regional cooperation. Japan has stepped up its expressions of interest in agreements 
with ASEAN members. Findlay et al. (2003) note that Japan appears to be giving 
higher priority to bilateral free trade agreements with individual ASEAN countries. In 
the APEC meetings in Los Cabos in 2002, President Bush announced the Enterprise 
for ASEAN initiative. India is also currently negotiating a framework agreement for a 
free trade area with ASEAN along the same lines as China, although the sectoral 
coverage is not expected to be as comprehensive. The European Union has 
approached ASEAN on the possibility of regional cooperation, although it is not 
clear what form it will take. 
Individual ASEAN members are also negotiating bilaterally with trading partners. 
The more extensive interest in this effort in East Asia has been led by the shift in 
attitude in Japan and Singapore and to their Economic Partnership Agreement. 
Singapore's agreement with New Zealand was also an important prompt for action 
by others. Australia too is an active participant, and has just concluded an FTA with 
Singapore. Thailand is following Singapore's lead and is aggressively pursuing a 
parallel bilateral approach including separate negotiations with China, Japan and 
Australia. Malaysia, in a significant shift in policy, has started talks with Japan. 
The dynamic process of the independent use of FTAs is well underway. While no 
agreements of economic significance have been signed as yet, China's participation 
adds to the range of activity and the intensity of effort. 
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How might that process evolve? Is it automatic that the agreements made 
separately between members of a region will be sufficiently consistent to build to a 
region-wide arrangement? There are risks that this will not happen. The sectoral 
coverage of agreements is not likely to be consistent, given the variation in the 
sensitivity of various sectors. Rules of origin are likely to vary between agreements. 
Agreement up-front on consistency of rules is difficult to achieve in small group 
negotiations where the stakes are low. 
The political economy effects are also complicated (Findlay et al. (2003) discuss 
these factors in more detail). The construction of regional agreements creates new 
interest groups that gain from preferential access to foreign markets. These groups 
may resist the extension of concessions to other economies, either in new FTAs or 
via the WTO negotiations. The dynamic effects within the FTA model are in other 
words uncertain and may undermine the political economy processes which are 
vital to success in the WTO process. 
ASEAN responses? 
Findlay et al. (2003) ask whether the extensive use of FTAs is a threat or opportunity 
for ASEAN. If ASEAN capitalises on this situation and becomes the hub of this set 
of agreements, it might be able to go even further and consolidate the regional 
agreements into one and so lead the response in the Western Pacific to any FTA 
development in the other hemisphere. 
The problem is that ASEAN members may instead become the spokes rather 
than ASEAN as a whole being the hub. This can happen because of differences in 
sectoral coverage of agreements and differences in rules of origin. China (the hub) 
is a better choice of location for foreign investors than the spokes, since market 
access and sourcing is guaranteed with each spoke. Being located in a spoke 
provides less coverage. So one of the ASEAN's original motivations for stepping 
into this process with China would not be met, and China's relative competitiveness 
as a host for FDI might actually be even higher! 
ASEAN is working on the specification of a new ASEAN Economic Community 
(AEC). The AEC can be seen as an attempt to maintain a coordinated approach to 
reform in the face of the risks posed by the hub and spoke structure with China. 
This is an example of the mechanism by which the agreement with China actually 
accelerates reform in ASEAN as a whole. Further assessment of the likelihood of 
that outcome will be possible after the Bali Summit of ASEAN Leaders later in 
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2003. In the meantime, the vigorous and independent pursuit of trade agreements 
with China by individual members suggests that the risks remain high. 
What are the implications of lack of cohesion for ASEAN as a whole and its 
capacity to deal with the other issues on its agenda, including the provision of 
regional public goods? 
The provision of goods or services in which all members of a region have a 
common interest involves cooperation between those affected, but usually hinges 
on a leadership role being played by one or a sub-group of members. They do so 
because they reap a larger share of the benefits and, according to this assessment, 
they are willing to bear a larger share of the costs. Economies taking that decision 
are more likely to contribute in this way if they understand that in other closely 
related matters they will have the opportunity to ride on the contributions of others. 
The right agenda of activities supports the contribution of the package of activities, 
whereas the isolated treatment of anyone issue may fail to yield a result. 
Success in cooperation on these issues depends on a common understanding of 
the scope of the relevant agenda, and on a continuing discussion to refine that 
agenda. It also depends on the expectation that on different occasions various 
members will step into the leadership role so that over time, for anyone member of 
the group, the benefits are more likely to exceed the costs of membership. It depends 
in other words on the development of trust in this behaviour by others. That trust is 
the basis of a grand bargain on regional economic cooperation. 
ASEAN may not be exactly the right membership for anyone issue of this type. 
Some may be dealt with effectively by smaller groups. Others require wider 
participation. But the proximity of ASEAN members, as well as common use of sea 
and air space, suggest that for many issues the membership is relevant. 
A group like ASEAN is more likely to maintain its cohesion for these purposes 
when members commit not to take independent actions as a result of which other 
members incur a cost. The willingness of anyone member to consider such an 
action could also lead others to question the commitment of that economy to the 
'grand bargain'. 
The FTA approach has been incorporated into this agenda of economic policy 
cooperation in the region. It mayor may not generate benefits for the two parties 
involved, but it challenges the conditions for successful regional cooperation involving 
a larger group. The uncoordinated use of FTAs diverts trade and investment from 
non-members. It is not adding value from all members' points of view but instead 
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imposes a cost on others. The willingness to adopt an independent approach to 
trade and investment policy may also affect the perceptions of members of the 
group about their ability to work together on other issues. It is not clear, therefore, 
that the FTA agenda will contribute to the capacity of the group to continue to 
commit to the agenda of cooperation. 
Benefits from cooperation among the ASEAN economies are not confined to 
those economies. Work on piracy or terrorism or public health for example benefits 
others trading partners, including China. While China may have some other short 
term economic interests in fragmentation in ASEAN, as noted above, China too 
may also lose from a diminished capacity of ASEAN to continue to produce regional 
public goods. 
Reactions by other economies 
China and ASEAN are not the only relevant players in the FTA game. How will 
others react and how will their reactions affect the cooperation within ASEAN and 
feedback on the structure of agreements between China and ASEAN? Others will 
certainly react to the actions of such a big and growing economy, to avoid the risk 
of economic loss through the price effects of the diversion of trade. They may also 
be concerned about how to respond to the implications for them of any change in 
the political relationships between China and each of the ASEAN partners. Will the 
reactions of others take a form which offsets the challenges to ASEAN cohesion? 
Findlay et al. (2003) note that the big economies in the Western Pacific could 
tussle to become the lead hub in the region. China would be the favourite to win that 
particular race. Japan currently has less to offer in terms of long-term market growth 
potential or as a host for FDI from relocating industry. The United States, indeed, 
may rank above Japan as a partner for ASEAN, particular as some members have 
established security ties with the United States. As Zhang (2003) notes, the 
development of a more specific institutional form of cooperation in East Asia may 
be constrained by these commitments with the United States. 
Both the United States and Japan have taken their own FTA-related initiatives in 
East Asia, not with China, but with individual ASEAN countries. As noted above, 
Japan appears to be seeking a series of bilateral agreements that will give it the 
capacity to isolate its own sensitive sectors from the agreements. 
In the Enterprise for ASEAN initiative, the United States and individual ASEAN 
members will together determine if they are ready to launch FTA negotiations. The 
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United States expects potential FTA partners to be members of the WTO already 
(which excludes Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) and to have concluded a Trade and 
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the United States (already in place 
for Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei and Thailand). On 19 November 2002, the 
United States reached agreement with Singapore. 
Japan and the United States therefore appear set to react to China's initiative, but 
to do so by signing separate agreements with individual ASEAN members. Apparently 
their actions are not a force for consolidation in ASEAN. 
TWO PATHS 
As noted, the downside risks in the scenarios examined here are largest with ASEAN. 
There are however also some risks for China in the fragmentation of the trading 
system, which in the short term means lack of progress in the Doha Round. There 
are also challenges for other economies with economic and political interests in the 
region, Japan in particular but also the United States. 
Leadership by either ASEAN or China, not just with respect to agreements between 
them but with others in East Asia, could help solve the problem. However the dilemma 
is that the FTA strategy itself has weakened the capacity of ASEAN members to 
cooperate to avoid the risks that it poses. The weight of expectation is therefore 
placed more firmly on China but it too faces constraints on playing that role. 
There are two tracks to resolving these issues, one within the institutional approach 
to regional cooperation and other involving a rediscovery of the market based 
approach. 
The option which maintains the focus on formal institution building would be to 
strengthen the rules. This could involve seeking to specify what is meant by a 'good' 
FTA-that is, what constitutes a well-designed regional arrangement which would 
maximise the benefits and minimise downside risks already outlined. This framework 
would then be used for all negotiations. Likely features would be comprehensive 
coverage, a clear and bold tariff reduction program, a commitment to apply (according 
to some timetable) the tariff cuts on a non-discriminatory basis, standard, liberal rules 
of origin, recognition of the importance of non-tariff barriers, and inclusion of the 
normally sensitive agriculture sector (even if not immediately but according to schedule). 
The problem is that it is not clear that the political economy of small group 
negotiations supports the maintenance of a tight set of rules. The actual outcome 
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will more likely involve a hub and spoke structure, a series of agreements which do 
not mesh together, and a structure in which accession of new members stalls while 
interest in the WTO wanes. An 'ideal' agreement, including one with open accession, 
could be specified. Whether it can be implemented is not clear. 
The alternative, even now that the FTA game is well underway, is to try to rediscover 
market-based integration. The key to that approach is an immediate commitment to 
apply any reductions in protection to all trading partners. An MFN application of 
reductions in tariffs would also remove the need to negotiate on rules of origin, 
compliance with which is likely to be the major source of higher transaction costs in 
the regional trading system. Coverage is also less of an issue (though on efficiency 
grounds a top-down approach is desirable). APEC principles of liberalisation are 
based on this approach. 
This strategy is equivalent to a return to a market-based approach to regional 
integration. Commitments to reform under this approach are made at a global level 
in the WTO process. The relevant institutional structures for institutionalised 
cooperation on trade and investment policy lie in the WTO. New institutions at the 
regional level are not required for these purposes. Regional cooperation, both in 
APEC and at the level of smaller groups, is then designed to complement efforts at 
the globalleve!. Issues are allocated to the best forum for consideration. 
Meanwhile, patterns of trade and investment are worked out in market processes 
at the regionalleve!. Business decisionmaking in a non-discriminatory rather than a 
preferential environment determines the patterns of trade and investment. 
The expectations of leadership are greater on China. China could take such a 
position by confirming its interest in applying its tariff reduction schedule with ASEAN 
on an MFN basis. Application of cuts in all forms of protection as a result of regional 
arrangements on which basis is the best way to avoid the risks just described. 
The market-based approach to cooperation on trade and investment does not rule 
out institutionalised cooperation on other matters. Those institutions may be specific 
to issues (for example, public health or the environment) or they may be established 
to run across a range of issues. The institution of 'ASEAN plus three' continues to 
play a role of projecting an East Asian position on current issues, especially with 
respect to cooperation on financial market development. 
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CONCLUSION 
These issues are not just matters of concern for China and ASEAN but for all the 
Western Pacific economies, because of the intensity of the trading relationships 
between them and because of the features of the supply chain in which they are all 
connected. 
The the weight of leadership on these issues is expected to lie with China. At the 
same time, there are constraints on the capacity of China to take that role, given its 
stage of development and, as Zhang (2003) notes, its position in relation to other 
economies in the region. The political constraints faced by China in combination 
with the common economic interests in a regional approach to managing the risks 
associated with the FTA route to reform all suggest cooperation among a wider 
group of economies. Drysdale (2002) explains the value of APEC to China in that 
context. 
The immediate focus of that cooperation could be work in the Doha Round. This 
could include a willingness to work on common positions on issues of interest to 
other WTO members, investment for example. But most importantly it means that 
the application of any reductions in protection negotiated at a regional level would 
be made part of a package of MFN measures whichwould later be bound in the 
Doha Round. Work on the scope and detail of this agenda is the priority for cooperation 
in the rejuvenation of the market based approach to regional economic integration. 
NOTES 
1 More detail on this agreement including the rules of origin applied to the services exports are 
available at www.tid.gov.hklenglish.cepa 
2 The Australian press made much of the Australian Prime Minister's statement on a visit to China in 
July. 2003, that the Chinese government had agreed to examine the merits of discussions on an 
Australia-China Free Trade Agreement. However, there has been no public reference to this matter 
by a Chinese official or in the Chinese media. 
3 Naoko Munakata from the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) in Tokyo, 
quoted in the Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 July 2003, p. 29. 
4 For more information on the PE~, see www.pacificeconomicoutlook.com 
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5 Findlay (2001) provides information on changes in the patterns of China's participation in world 
markets for labour-, capital- and technology-intensive products. 
6 The significance of this effect also depends on the use of rebate schemes applied to intermediate 
products imported for re-export. 
7 This section is based on Findlay, Haflah and Pangestu (2003). 
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Location determinants and provincial 
distribution of FDI 
Chen Chunlai 
Foreign direct investment into China has been one of the most important aspects of 
the overall economic reform program launched in China 25 years ago. The gradual 
but active liberalisation of the FDI regime and improvements in the investment 
environment greatly increased the confidence of foreign investors to do business in 
China. Consequently, FDI inflows into China increased rapidly after 1979 and 
particularly during the 1990s. In 2002, with its accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), China surpassed the United States in becoming the largest 
FDI recipient in the world. 
The eastern provinces account for nearly 90 per cent of the total. What are the 
causes of the uneven provincial distribution of FDI inflows into China, the provincial 
characteristics that determine FDllocation decisions within China, and the relative 
attractiveness to FDI of mainland China's 31 provinces given their specific provincial 
characteristics? 
FDI INFLOWS INTO CHINA. 1979-2002 
Though China first started to attract FDI in late 1979, massive FDI inflows began 
after 1992. Table 12.1 and Figure 12.1 present data on FDI inflows into China from 
1979 to 2002, a period characterised by two distinct phases: 1979-91 and 1992-
2002. 
In the initial period of the first phase, following the establishment of the four Special 
Economic Zones (SEZS)1 with their special incentives for FDI, inflows into China 
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Table 12.1 Actual FDI inflows into China, 1979-2002 
(US$ million, current prices) 
Year FDI inflow Year FDI inflow 
1979 109 1992 11,007 
1980 195 1993 27,515 
1981 375 1994 33,767 
1982 440 1995 37,521 
1983 636 1996 41,725 
1984 1,258 1997 45,257 
1985 1,661 1998 45,463 
1986 1,874 1999 40,398 
1987 2,314 2000 40,715' 
1988 3,194 2001 46,878 
1989 3,392 2002 52,743 
1990 3,487 1979-2002 405,982 
1991 4,366 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, various issues, 1986-2002. Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian [China 
Statistical Yearbook], Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, Beijing. 
Figure 12.1 Actual FDI inflows into China, 1979-2002 (current prices) 
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were highly concentrated in Guangdong and Fujian provinces, and particularly in 
the four SEZs. The Chinese government was very cautious about introducing FDI 
into its domestic economy and foreign investors were also cautious about making 
investments in China in the initial stages of China's opening up to the outside world, 
so that initial FDI inflows were relatively small. 
In 1984, Hainan Island and 14 coastal cities across ten provinces2 opened to FDI. 
Special economic policies were introduced in these open coastal cities. In 1984, 
inflows of FDI into China were double those of 1983. Major efforts were made over 
the next 7 years to attract FDI inflows. More and more areas and regions were 
opened to FDI, including the Yangzi River delta, the Pearl River delta, the Min Nan 
region, the Shanghai Pudong New Development Area and the entire coastal region. 
A series of new laws and regulations was introduced to encourage FDI, with 
considerable success. 
In the Spring of 1992, Deng Xiaoping made a tour to the economically open areas 
and SEZs on China's southern coast. His aims were to push China's overall economic 
reform process forward, and to increase foreign investors' confidence in China's 
open-door policy and market-oriented economic reform. Deng praised the FDI-driven 
economic development in the economically open areas and SEZs, and called for 
acceleration of liberalisation. Deng's visit, which turned out to be a landmark, set 
the scene for China's move away from the uneven regional priority system towards 
nationwide implementation of open policies for FDI. The Chinese government then 
adopted and implemented a series of new policies and regulations to encourage 
FDI inflows. The response was astounding. From 1992, inflows of FDI into China 
increased dramatically, reaching US$45 billion in 1998. 
In 1999, mainly because of the impact of the East Asian financial crisis, FDI 
inflows into China dropped for the first time since 1979. When China acceded to the 
WTO in 2001 the situation changed dramatically: FDI inflows into China rose to 
US$47 billion, an increase of 13 per cent over 2000. In 2002, FDI inflows increased 
by another 11 per cent from 2001, reaching US$53 billion. In 2002, China surpassed 
the United States to become the largest FDI recipient in the world. 
PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF FDI INFLOWS 
To facilitate the analysis of the regional and provincial distribution of FDI inflows 
into China, we group China's 31 mainland provinces into three regions-East, Central 
andWest.3 
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Tables 12.2-12.3 and Figures 12.2-12.3 provide basic statistics on the distribution 
of FDI among China's 31 mainland provinces and three regions from 1983-2002. 
Several important features can be made out here. First, as Table 12.2 shows, FDI 
inflows into China in the 1980s were overwhelmingly concentrated in the four special 
economic zones (SEZs) and the two municipalities of Beijing and Shanghai. The 
combined shares of Guangdong, Fujian, Beijing and Shanghai accounted for about 
70 per cent of the national total from 1983 to 1991. 
With the development of overall economic reform and the nationwide implementation 
of open policies for FDI in the 1990s, FDI inflows into China gradually spread to 
other provinces. Increasingly, the most important areas for hosting FDI have been 
the Yangzi River Delta, including Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, and the Bohai 
Gulf, including Shandong, Hebei, Tianjin, and Uaoning. Several central provinces 
(Jilin, Heilongjiang, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan) and two western provinces 
(Sichuan and Shaanxi) also witnessed relatively large increases in FDI inflows from 
1992 to 2002. Thus, since the early 1990s, FDI inflows have diffused from the 
initially concentrated southern coastal areas towards the southeastern and eastern 
coastal areas as well as inland. 
Second, for the East region provinces, FDI inflows have increased steadily and 
remarkably quickly, particularly during the periods 1992-1998 and 2001-2002 (Figure 
12.2). 
Third, the East region has overwhelmingly dominated the other two province groups 
in stocks of FDI (Table 12.3 and Figure 12.3). The percentage shares of accumulated 
FDI stocks were 88 per cent for the East, 9 per cent for the Central region, and only 
3 per cent for the West. 
Guangdong's accumulated FDI stock from 1983 to 2002 was 28 per cent of the 
national total, far exceeding the secopnd, third and fourth provinces (Jiangsu, Fujian 
and Shanghai). However, Guangdong's dominance in attracting FDI inflows has 
declined gradually over the past two decades. Its share of China's FDI stock fell 
from 46 per cent in the 1980s to 27 per cent in the 1990s. In contrast, the shares of 
other coastal provinces, notably Jiangsu, Fujian, Zhejiang, Shandong, Tianjin and 
Hebei, have increased steadily. 
The share of the Central provinces in national accumulated FDI stocks has 
increased gradually, from 5 per cent during the 1980s to 9 per cent during the 1990s. 
The main contributors are Henan, Hubei, and Hunan; from the 1980s to the 1990s 
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Table 12.2 Actual FDI inflows into China's provinces, 1983-2002 
(millions of US dollars at 1995 prices) 
Province 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Beijing 116 52 126 208 142 648 393 325 274 
Tianjin 7 15 79 71 179 79 39 43 148 
Hebei 2 7 12 16 14 25 54 52 64 
Shanxi 1 7 8 12 4 4 
Inner Mongolia 5 4 10 7 8 5 12 2 
Liaoning 11 11 36 67 122 168 155 300 405 
Jilin 7 34 10 12 12 21 35 
Heilongjiang 2 6 34 19 89 71 33 23 
Shanghai 16 62 154 207 287 300 519 203 162 
Jiangsu 14 30 47 47 116 162 156 156 245 
Zhejiang 4 12 38 34 49 56 66 57 103 
Anhui 4 49 4 36 11 16 12 
Fujian 25 74 168 87 74 187 428 373 527 
Jiangxi 0 10 15 13 7 12 11 9 22 
Shandong 4 7 51 91 87 116 200 217 242 
Henan 12 15 18 83 57 13 43 
Hubei 11 17 35 29 35 37 52 
Hunan 3 4 39 14 4 17 29 17 29 
Guangdong 612 953 922 1199 988 1,611 1,626 1845 2,174 
Guangxi 10 33 44 68 60 27 65 42 36 
Hainan 151 117 120 198 
Chongqing 72 
Sichuan 29 12 41 44. 33 52 16 28 18 
Guizhou 14 17 13 15 12 16 
Yunnan 2 5 9 11 10 8 4 
Tibet 
Shaanxi 4 10 22 52 98 144 119 55 36 
Gansu 20 2 3 2 5 
Qinghai 4 
Ningxia 
Xinjiang 3 16 20 24 7 6 
East region 820 1256 1,677 2,095. 2,118 3,530 3,818 3,733 4,578 
Central region 10 15 98 185 110 294 243 161 222 
West region 53 27 96 139 163 233 163 113 152 
National total 882 1299 1870 2420 2391 4056 4224 4007 4,951 
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Table 12.2 Actual FDI inflows into China's provinces, 1983-2002 (continued) 
Province 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Beijing 380 703 1410 1,080 1,508 1,512 
Tianjin 117 552 1044 1,521 1,948 2,385 
Hebei 123 418 538 547 802 1,045 
Shanxi 59 91 33 64 134 253 
Inner Mongolia 6 90 41 58 70 70 
Liaoning 561 1349 1481 1,425 1,687 2,093 
Jilin 82 290 249 408 438 382 
Heilongjiang 78 245 357 517 532 698 
Shanghai 536 3332 2543 2,893 3,826 4,012 
Jiangsu 1589 2998 3869 5,191 5,058 5,161 
Zhejiang 260 1088 1183 1,258 1,476 1,428 
Anhui 60 272 380 483 492 413 
Fujian 1546 3031 3818 4,044 3,966 3,985 
Jiangxi 108 220 269 289 292 454 
Shandong 1090 1976 2625 2,689 2,515 2,367 
Henan 58 322 398 479 508 657 
Hubei 221 570 619 625 660 750 
Hunan 144 461 341 508 683 871 
Guangdong 4019 7966 9730 10,260 11,285 11,119 
Guangxi 198 933 860 673 637 835 
Hainan 491 746 944 1,062 766 670 
Chongqing 31 209 418 259 212 365 
Sichuan 91 394 530 283 219 236 
Guizhou 22 45 65 57 31 47 
Yunnan 31 102 67 98 64 157 
Tibet 
Shaanxi 49 247 246 324 316 596 
Gansu 13 90 64 87 39 
Qinghai 1 3 3 2 1 2 
Ningxia 4 13 8 4 5 6 
Xinjiang 56 50 55 62 24 
East Region 10,909 25,090 30,043 32,641 35,474 36,612 
Central Region 814 2,560 2,686 3,429 3,810 4,546 
West Region 229 1,082 1,475 1,145 996 1,474 
National Total 11,953 28,731 34,205 37,216 40,280 42,631 
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Table 12.2 Actual FDI inflows into China's provinces, 1983-2002 (continued) 
Province 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Beijing 2,026 1,881 1,490 1,544 1,474 
Tianjin 1,975 1,680 1,032 1,863 1,352 
Hebei 1,335 992 601 585 669 
Shanxi 229 373 199 204 181 
Inner Mongolia 85 62 94 94 151 
Liaoning 2,047 1,011 1,809 2,198 2,916 
Jilin 382 287 298 295 209 
Heilongjiang 492 303 266 298 304 
Shanghai 3,3656 2,702 2,797 3,748 3,652 
Jiangsu 6,198 5,788 5,686 6,039 8,709 
Zhejiang 1,232 1,174 1,427 1,932 2,629 
Anhui 259 249 282 294 328 
Fujian 3,937 3,832 3,037 3,422 3,281 
Jiangxi 435 306 201 346 925 
Shandong 2,059 2,151 2,629 3,075 4,046 
Henan 576 497 499 400 346 
Hubei 909 871 835 1,038 1,220 
Hunan 765 623 600 708 769 
Guangdong 11,234 11,102 9,983 10,421 9,687 
Guangxi 828 605 464 336 357 
Hainan 670 461 381 408 438 
Chongqing 403 228 216 224 167 
Sichuan 471 325 387 508 475 
Guizhou 42 39 22 25 33 
Yunnan 136 147 113 56 96 
Tibet 
Shaanxi 281 231 255 307 308 
Gansu 36 39 55 65 52 
Qinghai 4 32 40 
Ningxia 17 49 15 15 19 
Xinjiang 20 23 17 18 16 
East Region 36,907 33,381 31,337 35,570 39,209 
Central Region 4,131 3,569 3,274 3,675 4,432 
West Region 1,407 1,084 1,081 1,250 1,206 
National Total 42,444 38,033 35,693 40,495 44,847 
Sources: Data for 1983-91 are calculated from the State Statistical Bureau, 1992. Zhongguo 
Duiwai Jingji Tongji Daquan 1979-1991 [China Foreign Economic Statistics 1979-1991], China 
Statistical Information & Consultancy Service Centre, Beijing. Data for 1992-2002 are calculated 
from the State Statistical Bureau, 1986-2002. Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian [China Statistical 
Yearbook], Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, Beijing. 
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Table 12.3 Accumulated FDI stock in China's provinces, 1983-2002 
(1995 constant US$ prices) 
1983-1991 1992-2002 1983-2002 
FDI stock Share FDI stock Share FDI stock Share 
Province (US$ mn) (%) (US$ mn) (%) (US$ mn) (%) 
Beijing 2,284 8.75 15,009 3.79 17,293 4.09 
Tianjin 660 2.53 15,469 3.90 16,128 3.82 
Hebei 244 0.93 7,655 1.93 7,899 1.87 
Shanxi 36 0.14 1,818 0.46 1,854 0.44 
Inner Mongolia 54 0.21 819 0.21 872.39 0.21 
Liaoning 1,276 4.89 18,576 4.68 19,852 4.70 
Jilin 131 0.50 3,321 0.84 3,452 0.82 
Heilongjiang 278 1.06 4,091 1.03 4,368 1.03 
Shanghai 1,911 7.32 33,405 8.42 35,316 8.36 
Jiangsu 973 3.73 56,287 14.19 57,259 13.55 
Zhejiang 419 1.61 15,086 3.80 15,506 3.67 
Anhui 132 0.51 3,510 0.89 3,642 0.86 
Fujian 1,943 7.45 37,897 9.56 39,840 9.43 
Jiangxi 98 0.38 3,843 0.97 3,941 0.93 
Shandong 1,014 3.89 27,221 6.86 28,236 6.68 
Henan 240 0.92 4,738 1.19 4,978 1.18 
Hubei 217 0.83 8,318 2.10 8,535 2.02 
Hunan 153 0.59 6,472 1.63 6,625 1.57 
Guangdong 11,930 45.71 106,807 26.93 118,737 28.09 
Guangxi 385 1.47 6,725 1.70 7,109 1.68 
Hainan 586 2.24 7,037 1.77 7,623 1.80 
Chongqing 72 0.28 2,731 0.69 2,804 0.66 
Sichuan 273 1.04 3,918 0.99 4,191 0.99 
Guizhou 88 0.34 428 0.11 516 0.12 
Yunnan 49 0.19 1,067 0.27 1,116 0.26 
Tibet 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Shaanxi 539 2.06 3,159 0.80 3,698 0.88 
Gansu 32 0.12 542 0.14 574 0.14 
Qinghai 5 0.02 88 0.02 93 0.02 
Ningxia 3 0.01 155 0.04 158 0.04 
Xinjiang 76 0.29 340 0.09 416 0.10 
East Region 23,624 90.52 347,174 87.55 370,797 87.74 
Central Region 1,338 5.13 36,927 9.31 38,266 9.05 
West Region 1,137 4.35 12,428 3.14 13,565 3.21 
Total 26,099 100 396,528 100 422,627 100 
Sources: As for Table 12.2. 
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Figure 12.2 FDI inflows into China, by region, 1984-2002 
(1995 constant US$ prices) 
40000 US$ million 
30000 - East Region 
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Figure 12.3 FDI stocks in China, by region, 1983-2002 






their shares of accumulated FDI in the national total doubled. This situation suggests 
that the provincial distribution of FDI inflows has spread from the opened coastal 
provinces to the inland provinces. 
The less developed western provinces received little FDI. Their share in national 
accumulated FDI stocks declined from 4 per cent in the 1980s to 3 per cent in the 
1990s. Sichuan and Shaanxi, however, attracted more FDI inflows than other western 
provinces. 
LOCATION DETERMINANTS OF FDI DISTRIBUTION WITHIN 
CHINA: THE HYPOTHESES 
The theoretical framework adopted in this study is Dunning's 'OU' explanation of 
FDI (Dunning 1993). According to the 'OU' framework, for a firm to conduct FDI it 
must possess certain kinds of firm-specific ownership advantage. A firm's ownership 
advantage could be a product or a production process to which other firms do not 
have access, such as a patent or blueprint. It gives the firm valuable market power 
or cost advantage that outweighs the disadvantages of doing business abroad. In 
addition, the foreign market must offer a location advantage that makes it profitable 
for a firm to produce the product there rather than meeting demand from production 
at home. Location advantages include resource endowments and such economic 
and social factors as market size and structure, prospects for market growth and 
the cultural, legal, political and institutional environment, and government legislation 
and policies. Finally, the multinational enterprise must have an internalisation 
advantage. If a company owns a proprietary product or production process and it is 
advantageous for it to supply a foreign market through production in that market, it 
is still not obvious that the company should set up a foreign subsidiary. One alternative 
is to license a foreign firm to produce the product or use the production process. 
However, the product or process is exploited internally rather than at arm's length 
through markets because of failures in the transaction of such intangible assets. 
This is what is referred to as an internalisation advantage. 
On the basis of Dunning's 'OU' paradigm, the determinants of FDI can be classified 
into two groups-source-side and host-side factors. The source-side factors are 
ownership advantages and internalisation advantages and the host-side factors are 
location advantages. Empirically, scholars have tested the two sets of determinants 
either together or separately (Dunning 1993:148-79). Some empirical studies of 
host-side factors have shown that location determinants are very important in 
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affecting the distribution of FDI inflows into host countries (Scaperlanda and Mauer 
1969; Riedel 1975; Um 1983; Nigh 1985; Torrisi 1985; Hultman and McGee 1988; 
Coughlin et al. 1991; Wheeler and Mody 1992; Balasubramanyam and Greenaway 
1994; Milner and Pentecost 1994; Zhang Leyin 1994; Wei Shangjin 1995; Chen Chien-
Hsun 1996; Chen Chunlai 1997a, 1997b; Broadman and Sun 1997). Using the same 
methodology, this study will focus upon host-side factors to explore the location 
determinants of FDI inflows into each province. 
The FDI literature suggests the general hypothesis that, facing the same set of 
sources of FDI in the world, provincial differences in FDI inflows are caused by 
differences in location factors. In this study, we examine five groups of location 
factors that affect FDI inflows into each of China's host provinces. 
Economic factors 
Economic factors include market size, level of economic development, growth rate 
of the economy, labour cost and productivity, openness of economy to the outside 
world, and past performance in attracting FDI inflows. 
Market size of host province. We may hypothesise that FDI inflows will be greater 
where the market of the host province is larger. Numerous studies of FDI location 
determinants suggest that larger economies attract more FDI because of their greater 
potential market demand. However, this use of provincial market size as a location 
factor in the provincial distribution of FDI inflows within China needs to be qualified 
in that provincial market size can be seen to be important for both export-oriented 
FDI and FDI aimed at serving the whole national market. This is because larger 
economies can provide more opportunities for industries and enterprises to benefit 
from external economies of scale and spill-over effects. In these circumstances, 
the influence of provincial market size will still be positive on the inward FDI to host 
provinces. In addition, because of the increasing importance of FDI in service sectors, 
local market size is also a very important location determinant. The measure of 
market size used in this study is the gross domestic product (GDP) of the host 
province. 
Level of economic development of host province. A province's economic 
development level is a comprehensive indicator of its economic and social conditions. 
A higher economic development level not only indicates good overall economic 
performance and higher purchasing power but also implies higher productivity 
associated with good labour quality and advanced technology, better local 
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infrastructure, and an overall better investment environment. Because the economic 
development levels of China's provinces vary greatly, we expect that a higher 
provincial economic development level will have a positive impact on FDI inflows 
into a province. In this study, per capita GDP, denoted as PGDp, is used as a proxy 
for the provincial economic development level. 
Economic growth rate of host A high rate of economic growth is an 
indicator of development potential. Clearly, markets that are expected to grow faster 
will tend to attract higher levels of inward FDI. Therefore, we hypothesise that there 
is a positive relationship between inward FDI and economic growth in the host 
province. In this study, the real growth rate, denoted by GR, is used as the measure 
of economic growth in the host province. 
Labour costs and in host ~~~ ... , •• ~~ In the FDlliterature, the most 
important factor cost in the determination of FDI flows is the wage rate, especially 
when FDI is export-oriented. Therefore, we take the relevant factor cost in the decision 
to locate FDI in the host province as that of labour costs. In particular, we expect 
lower labour costs to imply higher levels of FDI inflows, especially for export-oriented 
FDI. However, a lower wage rate may also be accompanied by lower productivity, 
meaning the efficiency wage may not be low. The best measure of labour costs 
would therefore be the 'efficiency wage' rather than the absolute wage rate. In this 
study, we use the efficiency wage as a measure of labour costs in each host province. 
The efficiency wage as a measure of labour costs has the advantage of being unit 
free. It is expected to be negatively related to the level of FDI inflows. 





where E~ is the average efficiency wage in host province j, ~ is the average wage 
rate of all employees in host province j, and IT is the overall labour productivity in 
J 
host province j. The provincial overall labour productivity is measured as total value-
added (approximated by GDP) over total employees in each province. 
Openness of provinces to the outside world. The level of openness of an economy 
indicates the intensity of economic interactions between it and the rest of the world. 
A higher level of openness represents a higher level of international exposure of an 
economy. Through trade, international business generally lays the ground for inward 
FDI and the international production that serves to substitute for or complement 
trade (UNCTAD 2002). In this study, we use two indicators for the openness of an 
200 
economy-the trade to GDP ratio (TGDP) and the export to GDP ratio (EGDP). We 
expect the level of provincial openness have a positive impact on FDI inflows. 
The level of accumulated FDI. Previous studies have found the level of accumulated 
FDI stock to be an important factor explanator of current FDI inflows (Chen Chunlai, 
1997a, 1997b; Petri 1995; Dobson 1993; Mody and Shrinivasan 1991). On the basis 
of these previous studies, we argue that the level of accumulated FDI stock may 
have certain demonstration effects on the investment location decision of foreign 
investors. Consequently, our hypothesis is that a higher level of accumulated FDI 
stock indicates an overall better investment environment, which may generate 
demonstration effects and induce higher levels of FDI inflows. Thus, we expect the 
level of accumulated FDI stock to have a positive effect on attracting new FDI 
inflows. A province's accumulated FDI, denoted as FDIS, is its FDI inflows 
accumulated since 1983 at 1995 US dollar prices. 
Infrastructure and energy supply 
of transport infrastructure in host province. The level of transport 
infrastructure in each host province might be another important consideration for 
foreign investors. We expect relative length of highways, more railways and interior 
transport waterways to be positively related to FDI inflows. The proxy for the intensity 
of transport infrastructure used in this study is the ratio of the sum of the length of 
highways, railways and interior transport waterways divided by the size of the 
corresponding host province, denoted as TI. The unit of the intensity of transport 
infrastructure is kilometres per 100 square kilometres of the host province's land 
area. 
level of telecommunications of host province. Another important infrastructure 
variable might be level of telecommunications. Higher levels of telecommunications 
save time and reduce the costs of communication and information gathering, thus 
facilitating business activities. Therefore, we expect a province's level of 
telecommunications to be positively related to its FDI inflows. The level of 
telecommunications, denoted as TELCOM, is measured by the number of telephone 
sets per 100 persons in each province. 
Energy supply of host province. Energy supply is an important input in many 
production activities. Therefore, it is expected that energy supply will be positively 
related to FDI inflows, particularly for manufacturing and efficiency-seeking FDl.ln 
this study, we use electricity production, denoted as EL, as a proxy for energy 
supply. It is measured by kWh per capita. 
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Human resource endowment and labour quality 
labour' quality in host province. Since labour quality is directly related to labour 
productivity, it may be another important labour market variable affecting foreign 
investors' location decisions. In this study we use two measures for labour quality. 
One is the percentage of the population 15 years or older who are illiterate and 
semi-literate; the other is the percentage of the total population who are enrolled as 
university students. We expect the illiterate and semi-literate rate, denoted as 
NOREAD, to be negatively related to FDI inflows, and the university students 
enrolment rate, denoted as UNI, to be positively related to FDI inflows. 
Geographical location 
China is a large country with a very wide geographical distribution of provinces. 
Therefore, geographical location might also be an important factor affecting FDI 
inflows. As mentioned above, based on geographical location, China's 31 mainland 
provinces can be grouped into East (coastal), Central and West regions. The East 
coastal provinces are closest to the economic centres of the outside world. Therefore, 
we use a dummy variable, denoted as COAST, to test the impact of geographical 
location on FDI inflows. We give a value of one for the 12 provinces along the 
coastal line and a value of zero for the other provinces.4 We expect this dummy 
variable to have a positive impact on FDI inflows. 
Policy factors 
Since China adopted the open door policy more than two decades ago, increasing 
numbers of cities and areas have gradually opened up to attract FDI and an evolving 
series of policies towards FDI has been implemented. Have these policies had any 
significant impact on provincial distribution of FDI inflow? In this study we do not 
intend to test all policies implemented during the study period. The FDI policies we 
do test are the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) policies, the uneven regional open 
policies, and the nationwide FDI promotion policies implemented since the 1990s. 
The uneven regional open policies for FDI were implemented from the establishment 
of the four SEZs in 1979, to the opening up the 14 coastal cities in 1984, and the 
expansion of open policies to the eleven coastal provinces in 1988. Not until the 
early 1990s did the Chinese government gradually move towards a more even national 
implementation of open policies for FDI. The policy change in the early 1990s removed 
the unfair competition for FDI between the coastal and inland regions, but also 
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offered more preferential treatment to foreign investors generally. Preferential policies 
gradually shifted from favouring some locations to accommodating national and 
local industrial development policies. Now, any FDI project, as long as it is in line 
with state or local industrial policy and involves high or new technology, is entitled 
to preferential treatment, regardless of its location. Second, 52 cities, including all 
the inland provincial capitals (except Lhasa in Tibet and Urumqi in Xinjiang) and the 
areas along the Yangzi River,were granted the same preferential policies given to 
the 14 coastal cities. Third, more than 15 border cities and counties in the southwest, 
northwest, north and northeast of China were declared open border cities. Fourth, 
FDI was allowed in certain service industries, such as aviation, telecommunication, 
banking, insurance and retail trade. Fifth, in order to further develop foreign trade 
and processing industries in the coastal areas, more duty free bonded zones were 
planned. Sixth, the government allowed foreign business people, both those intending 
to set up FDI firms at a later stage and land developers, to buy land use rights for 
building infrastructure, including residential, commercial, industrial and recreational 
real estate (Liu Xiangdong et al. 1993; United Nations 1994; Wei Jia 1994). 
Since 1997, to reduce the negative impact of the East Asian financial crisis, the 
Chinese government introduced a series of FDI promotion policies, including the 
extension of import duty-free treatment of imported equipment for foreign investors, 
more preferential taxation and other financial policies to encourage foreign investors 
to invest in targeted industries and the West region further loosened restrictions on 
FDI in service sectors. The aim was not only to attract more FDI inflows into China 
but also to encourage foreign investors to invest in certain industries and regions in 
accordance with China's national economic development strategy (MOFTEC 1997, 
1999). 
China has made substantial commitments in trade and investment liberalisation 
with its accession to the WTO, which will have a positive impact on FDI inflows into 
China's economy. 
Three dummy variables, denoted as SEZ, ROP and P, for the Special Economic 
Zone policy, the regional open policy and FDI promotion policies implemented since 
the 1990s, are tested for their impact on the inflow of FDI. For the dummy variable 
SEZ, we give a value of one for Guangdong, Fujian, Hainan and Shanghai, and a 
value of zero for other provinces. For the dummy variable ROp, we give a value of 
one for the 12 eastern provinces from 1986 to 2002, and values of zero from 1986 
to 1991 and one from 1992 to 2002 for other provinces. For the dummy variable P, 
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we give a value of zero for the years from 1986 to 1991 and a value of one for the 
years from 1992 to 2002 for all provinces. 
LOCATION DETERMINANTS OF FDI DISTRIBUTION WITHIN 
CHINA-AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Variable specification and the model 
The relationship between inflows of FDI and location variables in China's provinces 
is investigated over time and across provinces. The Kmenta Model, an approach 
(Pool) designed especially for pooled time-series and cross-section data in the 
SHAZAM econometrics computer program is used. As this method applies the 
Generalised Least Square (GLS) technique to pooled data, taking time-wise 
autocorrelation and cross-sectional heteroskedasticity into account, it will produce 
a more efficient regression estimation than other methods. Furthermore, with the 
pooled data, the observations are much larger than would be the case if just time-
series or cross-sectional data were employed. Consequently, the reliability of the 
estimates of the regression parameters can be greatly increased. 
Data on 29 provinces for the period 1986-2002 are included.5 In this study, the 
dependent variable, denoted as FDtj,t' is the aggregate inflow of actual FDI from all 
source countries and economies into China's host province j in year t. The value of 
FDI is at constant 1995 US dollar prices. There are 16 independent variables, as 
summarised in Table 12.4. 
We establish the following equation to test the location determinants of the provincial 
distribution of FDI inflows into China. 
InFDl.j" = bo + b1InGDPj,'.k + b,lnPGDPj.,.k + b3InGRj"." + b4InEWj"." bslnTGDPj"." + b6InEGDPj"." 
+ b7InFDISj"." + balnTlj"." + bglnTELCOMj"." + b10InELj"." + b11 InUNlj"." 
+ b12InNOREADj"." + b13COASTj + b14SEZj + b1SROPj" + b16P, + ej" 
where ej,t is stochastic disturbance, the bs are the regression parameters to be 
estimated, and the variables are as defined above. The estimated coefficients of all 
variables except the dummy variables will be elasticities. 
The independent variables, except for the dummy variables, are lagged kyears. 
This model assumes that the effect of the independent variables at time t-k appears 
only within period t and is fully completed within that period. The relationship shown 
in the above equation will be examined for k=1, the most likely appropriate lag. 
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Specification of variables Expected impact 
on FDI inflow 
Aggregate FDI inflows from all source countries 
into province j in year t. Million US dollars at 1995 
constant prices. 
GDP of province j in year t. Renminbi million yuan 
at 1995 constant prices. 
Per capita GDP of province j in year t. Renminbi 
yuan per capita at 1995 constant prices, 
Real growth rate of GDP of province j in year t. 
Efficiency wage of province j in year t. 
Total trade to GDP ratio of province j in year t. 
Export to GDP ratio of province j in year t. 
Accumulated FDI stocks of province j at the end 
of year t. Million US dollars at 1995 constant prices. 
Transport intensity index of province j in year t. 
Kilometres per 100 square kilometres. 
Level of telecommunications of province j in year t. 
Number of telephone sets per 100 persons. 
Level of electricity supply of province j in year t. 
kWh per capita. 
University students enrolment rate of province 
j in year t. 
Illiterate and semi-literate rate of population 15 
years or older of province j in year t. 
Geographical location dummy variable. One for 
the 12 provinces located along the coastline, and 
zero for other provinces. 
Special Economic Zone dummy variable. One for 
Guangdong, Fujian, Hainan and Shanghai, zero for 
other provinces. 
Regional open policy dummy variable. One for the 12 
coastal economically opened provinces. Zero from 
1986 to 1991 and one from 1992 to 2002 for other 
provinces. 
Policy dummy variable. Zero for the years 1986 to 

















Note: All the variables are calculated from the State Statistical Bureau, 1986-2002. Zhongguo 
TongjiNianjian, [China Statistical Yearbook]. 
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Regression results and explanations 
Table 12.5 shows the regression results of the provincial aggregate FDI inflow 
equation with the explanatory variables, except for the dummy variables, lagged 1 
year (k=1) for 29 provinces for the period 1986-2002. 
Since there are 16 independent variables, before running the regression, we 
conducted a correlation test for the independent variables. We found the correlation 
coefficients between some of the independent variables to be very high. The high 
correlation between these independent variables may incur high multicolinearity 
problems if we enter all the independent variables into the same regression equation. 
Therefore, we split the original equation into two independent models. The result is 
shown in Table 12.5 (model 1 and model 2). By using the Chow test, the F-statistic 
is equal to 1.390, which is less than the critical value (5.89 at 5 per cent level). 
Thus, we accept the Ho: the decomposition of the equation is reasonable. Furthermore, 
we split the original model into five independent models. By using a similar method, 
the F-statistic to be equal to 1.936, which is less than the critical value (18.5 at 5 
per cent level). Thus, we accept the Ho: the decomposition of the equation is valid. 6 
Therefore, we ran seven separate regressions each with a different set of 
explanatory variables. The seven models performed well. All regressions have 
relatively high explanatory power and all the independent variables have the expected 
signs and are statistically significant. 
The regression results show that provincial differences in FDI inflows can be 
explained by differences in provincial location factors. The provincial market size 
(GDP), the level of economic development (PGDP), the growth rate of provincial 
economy (GR), the trade and export to GDP ratios (TGDP and EGDP), the level of 
accumulated FDI stock (FDIS), the intensity of transport infrastructure (TI), the 
level of telecommunications (TELCOM), the level of energy supply (EL) and the 
university student enrolment rate (UNI) are positive and statistically significant location 
determinants of the provincial distribution of FDI. Meanwhile, the provincial efficiency 
wage (EW), the proxy for labour costs adjusted for productivity, and the provincial 
illiterate and semi-literate rates are negative and statistically significant location 
determinants affecting FDI inflows. The geographical location (COAST), the Special 
Economic Zone policies (SEZ), and the regional differentiation in the timing of 
implementing the open policies (ROP) for FDI have had a strong impact on the 
provincial distribution of FDI inflows into China. This indicates that, apart from 
economic factors, FDI inflows into the East region were enhanced by the geographical 
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location advantage, the special policies to the SEZs, and the implementation of the 
uneven regional open policies for FDI during the 1980s. The gradual but obvious 
diffusion of FDI inflows into the inland provinces after 1992 is also partly due to the 
nationwide implementation of open policies for FDI since the early 1990s. Finally, 
the series of FDI promotion policies (P) implemented in the early 1990s had strong 
positive effects on inflows of FDI into China across all provinces. Therefore, the 
sharp increase in the inflows of FDI into China since 1992 can be explained partly 
by the major favourable policy towards FDI made in the early 1990s and the trade 
and investment liberalisation that continued throughout the 1990s. 
INWARD FDI ATTRACTIVENESS INDEX OF CHINA'S 
PROVINCES 
With the empirical test results, we can construct the inward FDI attractiveness 
index for China's provinces using the provincial location factors affecting FDI inflows. 
We adopt the same method used by UNCTAD (2002).7 The provincial inward FDI 
attractiveness index is the average of the scores on fifteen variables (including 
three dummy variables) for each province. The scores for each variable, except the 
dummy variables are derived from using the following formula 
Score = (VI - V min) / (V max - V min) 
where Vi = the value of a variable for the province i 
V min = the lowest value of the variable among the provinces 
V max = the highest value of the variable among the provinces. 
According to the above formula, for each variable the province with the lowest 
value is given a score of zero and the province with the highest value is given a 
score of one. For dummy variables, the province with the value of zero is given a 
score of zero and the province with the value of one is given a score of one. 
The variables used in the calculation of the provincial inward FDI attractiveness 
index include provincial GDP, per capita GDp, real economic growth rate, cost 
adjusted productivity (the inverse of the efficiency wage), trade to GDP ratio, export 
to GDP ratio, accumulated FDI stock, level of transportation infrastructure, level of 
telecommunications, electricity supply, university student enrolment rate, literacy 
rate (the opposite of the illiteracy rate), and three dummy variables, that is, the 
location dummy variable of COAST, the special economic zone policy dummy variable 
of SEZ and the dummy variable of P representing the trade and FDI liberalisation 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The provincial inward FDI attractiveness index is calculated for the four periods, 
1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99 and 2000-02 (Table 12.6). The interesting results of 
the calculation can be summarised as follows. First, index values among China's 31 
mainland provinces differ greatly and are consistent with the provincial distribution 
of FDI inflows into China. 
Second, for all four periods, Shanghai, Guangdong, Beijing and Tianjin have 
remained the top four provinces with the highest index values, while Tibet, Guizhou, 
Gansu, Yunnan and Qinghai have remained the bottom five provinces with the lowest 
index values. 
Third, in terms of the inward FDI attractiveness index values, for all four periods, 
the top ten provinces are all located in the East region, while of the bottom ten 
provinces two are located in the Central region and eight in the West region. As a 
result, the East region has the highest index values, around two and two and a half 
times higher respectively than those in the Central and West regions. 
Fourth, over time, the index values for all three regions and provinces have 
increased, indicating that for the last two decades or so, the investment environment 
for FDI has steadily improved across China. Among the provinces, the largest lifts 
in the ranks of the inward FDI attractiveness index are by Jiangsu and Zhejiang in 
the East region and Hubei in the Central region. 
Finally, compared with the East region, although there has been some improvement 
in the investment environment for FOI, the Central and particularly the West regions 
still have very low FDI attractiveness in terms of location factors. On a comparable 
basis, the attractiveness to FDI of the Central and West regions lag 10-15 years 
behind that of the East region. Because the inward FDI attractiveness index values 
are largely based on structural economic factors that tend to change slowly over 
time, it is unrealistic to expect that the Central region and particularly the West 
region will attract large FDI inflows in the near future. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has investigated empirically the provincial distribution of FDI inflows into 
China during the reform period, particularly since the late 1980s. The provincial 
distribution has been very uneven. The East region provinces received the 
overwhelming share, while the Central and West regions received only around 10 
per cent of total FDI inflows into China during the period 1983-2002. The causes of 
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Table 12.6 Provincial FDI attractiveness index (minimum = 0, maximum = 1) 
Province 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-02 
Value Rank Value Value Rank Rank Value Rank 
East region 0.40 1 0.48 1 0.51 1 0.52 1 
Beijing 0.53 3 0.58 3 0.60 3 0.62 3 
Tianjin 0.45 4 0.49 4 0.57 4 0.61 4 
Hebei 0.28 10 0.33 11 0.38 10 0.37 11 
Liaoning 0.42 5 0.43 8 0.44 8 0.45 8 
Shanghai 0.65 0.76 0.81 1 0.83 
Jiangsu 0.37 7 0.43 7 0.50 6 0.53 5 
Zhejiang 0.32 9 0.41 9 0.45 7 0.48 7 
Fujian 0.38 6 0.49 5 0.54 5 0.51 6 
Shandong 0.32 8 0.40 10 0.43 9 0.45 9 
Guangdong 0.61 2 0.71 2 0.72 2 0.73 2 
Guangxi 0.21 15 0.29 12 0.29 14 0.27 16 
Hainan 0.25 11 0.45 6 0.38 11 0.40 10 
Central region 0.18 2 0.24 2 0.27 2 0.27 2 
Shanxi 0.17 19 0.24 17 0.27 16 0.27 15 
Inner Mongolia 0.17 21 0.22 20 0.24 20 0.27 17 
Jilin 0.22 12 0.27 14 0.28 15 0.30 14 
Heilongjiang 0.22 13 0.28 13 0.31 13 0.30 13 
Anhui 0.15 25 0.21 23 0.25 19 0.23 24 
Jiangxi 0.16 24 0.21 22 0.24 21 0.23 26 
Henan 0.18 17 0.23 18 0.27 17 0.27 18 
Hubei 0.21 14 0.27 15 0.31 12 0.30 12 
Hunan 0.18 18 0.22 19 0.26 18 0.25 20 
West region 0.13 3 0.18 3 0.20 3 0.21 3 
Chongqing 0.23 25 
Sichuan 0.16 23 0.21 21 0.23 25 0.23 27 
Guizhou 0.09 29 0.14 29 0.17 29 0.18 29 
Yunnan 0.13 27 0.17 26 0.20 26 0.18 30 
Tibet 0.01 30 0.09 30 0.14 30 0.14 31 
Shaanxi 0.18 16 0.20 24 0.23 24 0.24 22 
Gansu 0.13 26 0.15 28 0.18 27 0.19 28 
Qinghai 0.11 28 0.16 27 0.18 28 0.23 23 
Ningxia 0.16 22 0.20 25 0.23 23 0.26 19 
Xinjiang 0.17 20 0.24 16 0.24 22 0.25 21 
Source: Author's calculation. 
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this uneven provincial distribution were made the subject of theoretical explanation 
and empirical investigation. 
Using Dunning's 'OLl' explanation of the causes of FDI with a focus on location 
advantages, our empirical analysis has shown that given the ownership advantages 
of source countries and the incentives for their multinational enterprises (MNEs) to 
internalise their ownership advantages in order to reduce transaction costs, the 
location advantages or determinants of host provinces are crucial in attracting FDI 
inflows. In other words, given the same set of source countries, provincial differences 
in FDI inflows are determined by differences in the location advantages of host 
provinces. Therefore, the uneven provincial distribution of FDI inflows into China is 
caused by the differences in provincial location factors. 
Strong support for the hypotheses set out in the fourth section of this chapter was 
provided by the empirical regression analysis. To summarise, the provinces with 
larger GDP, higher per capita income, higher rate of economic growth, higher level of 
openness represented by trade and export to GDP ratios, higher level of accumulated 
FDI stock, more intensive transport infrastructure, higher level of telecommunications, 
higher level of electricity supply, higher level of labour quality and R&D potential 
represented by higher ratio of university student enrolment, and coastal location 
attracted greater FDI inflows. Meanwhile, higher labour costs approximated by 
efficiency wages and lower labour quality approximated by illiterate and semi-literate 
ratios deterred FDI inflows. In addition, the SEZ policies and regional differentiation 
in the timing of implementation of the open policies for FDI had a strong impact on 
the provincial distribution of FDI inflows. Finally, the implementation of a series of 
trade and FDlliberalisation policies in the 1990s had a very strong positive effect on 
FDI inflows into China across all provinces. 
Based on the empirical analysis, we constructed the provincial inward FDI 
attractiveness index for mainland China's 31 provinces. There are large differences 
among China's 31 mainland provinces in the attractiveness to FDi inflows. The 
most attractive provinces are the East region provinces, particularly Shanghai, 
Guangdong, Beijing, Tianjin, Jiangsu, Fujian, Zhejiang and Shandong.Although there 
have been some improvements in their investment environments, the Central region 
provinces, and particularly the West region provinces, remain less attractive to FDI 
than the East. The East region will continue to attract most of the FDI inflows into 
China, and uneven regional distribution of FDI inflows into China will persist. 
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Two important implications for the provincial distribution of FDI in China can be 
drawn from this study. First, it is essential for each of the provinces to boost economic 
growth, to increase per capita income, to increase interaction with the world economy, 
to enhance education and labour training, to raise labour productivity, and to improve 
basic infrastructure in order to attract more FDI inflows. Though this will not be easy 
for all of the provinces, especially not for economically backward provinces in the 
West region, it is crucial if they are to attract more FDI to accelerate economic 
development. Second, since China launched the overall economic reform in the late 
1979, the economic growth rates of the East region provinces, which benefited from 
regionally biased special policies, have been much faster than those of the less 
developed inland and West region provinces. This unbalanced economic growth 
between the coastal and the inland and western provinces has led to uneven 
economic development and the widening of the income gap between them. Though 
pOlicies open to FDI have been followed throughout China since 1992, differences 
between the East region provinces and the Central and West region provinces 
resulting from time lag of policy implementation will not be eliminated in the near 
future. To hasten the economic development of inland provinces, particularly the 
less developed western areas, China should 
" shift the preferential policies for FDI from regional priority to industrial priority, 
in order to support those FDI projects engaged in export-oriented, technologically 
advanced, transportation, communication, energy and raw materials industries 
• adjust its regional development strategy by offering special economic and 
industrial development policies to the Central and West regions (the launch of 
the 'West Region Development Strategy' in 1998 was an important step in the 
right direction) 
.. encourage coastal areas to transfer managerial skills and technology 
accumulated and obtained from attracting and utilising FDI to the inland regions 
in order to benefit fully from FDI nationwide. 
NOTES 
1 Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou in Guangdong Province, and Xiamen in Fujian Province. 
2 Liaoning, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong and Guangxi. 
3 The East region includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan. The Central region includes Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, 
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Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan. The West region includes Chongqing, 
Sichuan, Guizhou, Vunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang. 
4 The twelve coastal provinces are Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan. 
5 Tibet and Chongqing are excluded from the test because of insufficient data. Tibet attracted only 
US$20,OOO FDI inflow in 1988 and Chongqing was separated from Sichuan in 1997. 
6 I would like to thank Mr Sheng Vu for his help in conducting the tests. 
7 Though UNCTAD names it the 'inward FDI potential index', I prefer to call it the 'inward FDI 
attractiveness index'. 
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With only 0.3 hectares of arable land per farmer, China's agriculture has successfully 
fed its 1.2 billion people. Economic reform during the 1980s accelerated agricultural 
growth and lifted farmers' incomes. Growth of farmers' incomes was, however, far 
slower than the rapid growth of the whole economy and urban income growth, 
especially in the 1990s, which resulted in larger rural-urban income disparities. 
Meanwhile, the rural population and labour force continued to account for the major 
part of China's total population and labour force, while the share of agricultural 
product in GDP fell. 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND RURAL-URBAN INCOME 
DISPARITY IN CHINA 
The agricultural sector (including farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fisheries) 
has experienced relatively fast growth since 1978, as compared with the pre-reform 
period: 4.8 per cent versus 2.7 per cent in terms of the average growth rate of value-
added (Table 13.1 ).In the reform period, development of the agricultural sector has 
solved the long-term problem of food shortages, rural incomes have increased 
substantially, and rural poverty has been reduced significantly. 
In spite of the significant improvement in agricultural production, the agricultural 
sector's dominant role in the economy has been lost to the industrial and service 
sectors, due to rapid industrialisation during the past half century. The share of the 
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agricultural sector in GDP declined from 51 per cent to only 14 per cent over the 
period 1952-2002. Meanwhile, because of its large share, and the continued growth 
of the rural population, the employment structure of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors has changed far more slowly than the output structure. Agricultural 
employment accounted for 84 per cent of total employment in 1952, and 50 per cent 
in 2002. Over the same period, agricultural employment increased from 173 to 369 
million. During the past half century, the share of the rural population in the national 
total has declined even more slowly: from 85 per cent in 1953 to 61 per cent in 2002 
(Table 13.2).1 
Agriculture remains the most important source of rural incomes (that is, as 
compared with the rural industrial sector, the services sector, and remittances of 
rural-urban migrants), but its importance has declined due to the significant changes 
in the production structure of the economy. Within agriculture, the share of farm 
Table 13.1 Growth of the agricultural sector and rural population in the pre-
reform and reform periods, 1952, 1978 and 2002 
Agricultural value-added Agricultural worker Rural population 
(billion Yuan)' (million persons) (million persons) 
1952 34 173 505" 
1978 68 283 790 
2002 209 369 782 
Growth 1953-78 2.7per cent 1.9 per cent 1.8 per cent 
Growth 1979-2002 4.8 per cent 1.1 per cent 0.0 per cent 
Notes: *In 1952 constant prices, deflated by the Price Index of Agricultural Products. For the few 
years when the index is unavailable, the rural CPI is used instead. **1953 data. 
Source: Calculated from National Bureau of Statistics, various years. Statistical Yearbook of China, 
Statistics Press, Beijing. 
Table 13.2 Agricultural sector, share of GDp, employment and population, 
















Source: Calculated from Table 13. 1 and National Bureau of Statistics, various years. Statistical 
Yearbook of China, Statistics Press, Beijing. 
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income has also fallen (Table 13.3). Grain production remains the major farming 
activity, especially in less developed regions, although it is gradually being replaced 
by other farming activities. 
During the pre-reform period-from the 1950s to the mid 1970s-movement of 
the agricultural population to non-agricultural sectors was hampered by the restrictive 
migration policies. However, rural industrialisation and urbanisation have increased 
since the adoption of market-oriented reforms. Such developments have provided 
close to 200 million additional non-agricultural jobs to rural workers in rural and 
urban areas over the past 24 years. Despite this, the number of farmers has increased, 
and there appears to be more surplus agricultural labour than ever. 
Table 13.4 shows the changes in annual income per capita in rural and urban 
areas in the three regions (East, Centre and West) from 1980 to 2000. Rural income 
per capita was 47 per cent of urban income per capita in 1980. By 2000, this ratio 
had fallen to 35 per cent. The rural-urban income disparity increased in all three 
regions, but most seriously in the least-developed West region, where the rural-
urban income ratio fell from 45 to 30 per cent over this period. In 2000, the average 
rural income per capita in the West region was 1713Yuan (or US$207), whereas the 
urban income in the region was 5642Yuan. 
THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC POLICIES AND 
INTERNATIONALISATION ON AGRICULTURE AND RURAL 
INCOMES 
Agricultural reform, begun in the late 1970s, broke the long-term stagnation in rural 
development and turned food shortages into surpluses. Grain production was initially 
stimulated by increases in state purchasing prices in 1979, and subsequently fuelled 
by the introduction of the Household Responsibility System in the early 1980s, 
which converted the collective-based production system into a household-based 
system. Between 1978 and 1984, grain output increased nearly 50 per cent. 
However, grain production was never fully liberalised. It was subject to three prices 
at that time-the state quota and above-quota prices, and the market price. Market 
prices only played a role at the margin while the volume of state purchases remained 
large. Because of the rigidity of the controlled prices, the real prices of major grains 
fell significantly in the late 1980s, a period of high inflation (Wang 2001). As a 
result, output growth stagnated in the mid and late 1980s.ln the early 1990s, however, 
grain output reached 440 million tons (compared with 400 million tons in the late 
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Table 13.3 Agriculture as a source of rural income, 1990-2002 (per cent) 
Agr. share (rural income=100 per cent) 










Source: NBS (National Bureau of Statistics), 2003. Statistical Abstract of China, Statistics Press, 
Beijing. 
Table 13.4 Rural-urban income disparity, 1980 and 2000 
(Chinese Yuan in current prices) 
1980 2000 
Urban Rural Rural/urban Urban Rural Rural/urban 
(per cent) (per cent) 
East 452 246 54.4 7940 3429 43.2 
Center 386 191 49.5 5217 2091 40.1 
West 383 172 44.9 5642 1713 30.4 
China 413 193 46.7 6635 2301 34.7 
Note: incomes are calculated by the authors as weighted averages from urban disposable income 
and rural pure income at the provincial level. 
Source: NBS (National Bureau of Statistics), 2000a, 2001. Statistical Yearbook of China, Statistics 
Press, Beijing. 
1980s), probably because above-quota prices had become more flexible and moved 
closer to market prices. 
The government attempted to liberalise the quota control system in grain production 
in 1993, but the policy was abandoned due to the sudden increase in market prices 
and supply shortages resulting from hoarding behaviour due to expectations of 
price increases. In place of the price liberalisation, the government increased the 
quota prices substantially between 1994-97 and also introduced a 'provincial governor 
responsibility system' to ensure local self-sufficiency of grain supply. 
Stimulated by these measures, grain output increased by 15 per cent between 
1994-98 and reached a historical high of 512 million tons in 1998. This level exceeded 
domestic demand and resulted in falls in market prices. From 1996 to 2000, the 
market prices of rice, wheat, corn and soybeans fell by 39-44 per cent, and remained 
low in 2001-02. Analysis has shown that the inflexibility of the government pricing 
system has caused serious price and output instability in grain markets (Wang 
2001). 
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Low grain prices had a seriously negative impact on farmers' incomes, especially 
the incomes of tamers who relied heavily on grain production. Faced with this problem, 
the government decided in 1998 to purchase all traded grains at above-market 
prices. To limit the government subsidy, it was also decided that the retail price 
should not be lower than the support price. To ensure this, grain markets were 
monopolised and private businesses were prohibited from purchasing grain from 
farmers. 
This policy failed to protect farmers' incomes for several reasons. Most importantly, 
it was impossible to monopolise the already partially liberalised grain markets; 
therefore there was downward pressure on the purchase prices. Second, the role of 
policy executants given to the state grain companies conflicted with their role as 
profit makers. To make profits or avoid losses, they tended to undergrade the quality 
of the grain they were purchasing to avoid paying anything more than market prices. 
This system also resulted in rent-seeking behaviour by the state grain agents. Finally, 
even if consumer prices could be monopolised, demand for grain cannot be controlled 
by the state and any surplus grain could not be sold. As a result, either the state or 
farmers had to bear the ensuing huge losses. 
As a result of these problems, grain markets were re-opened in eight east coast 
provinces in 2001-02. In 2003, the central government conducted an experiment in 
some areas, paying the margin between the market price and the support price 
directly to farmers as a lump sum, and liberalised the local grain market at the same 
time. However, the support price system remains in a number of provinces. This 
policy is in conflict with the liberalisation of imports resulting from China's accession 
totheWTO. 
China entered the WTO in 2001 and made a commitment to open its food markets 
substantially. The average tariff rate for all agricultural products was reduced from 
22 per cent to 17.5 per cent. Export subsidies on agricultural products were eliminated, 
and China accepted a tariff rate quota (TRQ) for imports of major grains at a tariff rate 
of 1 per cent. The quota was set at 18 million tons for 2002, increasing to 22 million 
tons by 2004. Any unused quota of the state trading companies is to be transferred to 
non-state trading companies. This means that once domestic prices exceed 
international prices, the quota will be usedautomatically, which will reduce price levels. 
The tariff rate for soybeans is only 3 per cent and there is no quota (WTO 2001). 
The import quota is large compared with the historical level of imports. In the 
1990s, the average annual level of grain imports was nine million tons. Given that 
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half of all grain output is consumed by farmers and does not enter the formal market, 
the size of the domestic grain market is about half of the total output. Therefore, the 
2004 TRQ accounts for 11.9 per cent of the domestic grain market. It is estimated 
that full utilisation of the TRQ in the short run-that is, without the full working 
through of the adjustment to any price changes-could mean the loss of nine million 
farming jobs; or alternatively, it implies a significant decline in grain farmers' incomes 
(Wang 2002). 
In 2001 and 2002, grain imports (including soybeans) totalled 17.4 and 14.2 million 
tons. These large imports prevented domestic grain prices from recovering their 
previous levels. Grain output fell from the 1999 level of 508 million tons to 462 and 
453 million tons in 2001 and 2002 respectively. Clearly, without adjustments in the 
agricultural sector, increased grain imports will adversely affect farmers' incomes 
and widen the rural-urban income gap. 
The WTO accession commitments provide great opportunities for reforming China's 
agricultural sector, which could lead to positive long-run impacts on farmers' incomes. 
The liberalisation should push agricultural activity towards China's comparative 
advantages, leading to higher efficiency. For example, in 2002 the area sown to 
grain fell by 2 per cent but grain output increased by 1 per cent. New breeds of 
soybean with higher quality and higher oil content were introduced (CCTV 2003). 
Output of other agricultural products increased significantly. Sugarcane and beetroots 
together increased by 16 million tons in 2002, a 19 per cent increase over the 2001 
level. Tea and fruit production increased by 6 per cent and 4 per cent respectively. 
These developments indicate that further increases in efficiency in agricultural 
production are possible in response to the WTO challenge. 
Although grain market deregulation and structural adjustment in the agricultural 
sector are important, more is needed to reduce the rural-urban income disparity 
significantly. Given the huge labour surplus in the agricultural sector, further policy 
adjustments are needed in order to accelerate the transfer of the redundant agricultural 
labour force to non-agricultural rural and urban sectors. 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN RURAL INDUSTRIALISATION 
AND URBANISATION AND RURAL INCOMES 
During the economic reform period, particularly in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
dramatic developments occurred in the rural industrial sector (the township and 
village enterprise (TVE) sector) that made a major contribution to China's rapid 
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economic growth (see World Bank 1996; Cai et al. 2000; Wang 2000). Employment 
in the TVE sector increased from 28 million to 135 million during 1978-96, accounting 
for more than one-quarter of the total rural labour force. TVEs produce at least one-
quarter of total industrial output. In the earlier period, most TVEs were collectively 
owned. Most TVEs have been privatised since the 1990s. 
Development of the rural industrial and services sectors also made a great 
contribution to increases in farmers' incomes. Nearly half of all rural household 
income now comes from the industrial and services sectors. Figure 13.1 shows 
clearly that the level of rural income per capita in China's 31 provinces is closely 
related to provincial achievements in rural industrialisation (as indicated by the share 
ofTVE employment in the rural labour force). 
Rural industries experienced substantial growth in the 1980s, partly because the 
rural reform created a better market environment while the urban economy was still 
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Note: Rural industrialisation is indicated by the share of TVE employment in rural labour, and rural 
income is defined as per capita rural pure income (yuan). 
Source: Calculated from NBS (2000a, 2001). 
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heavily subject to central control. Government policies also had an important 
influence during this period, encouraging development of TVEs in rural areas and 
discouraging rural-urban migration. 
Development of rural industries slowed in the late 1990s, mainly due to sharper 
market competition, the unfavourable location of rural enterprises, difficulties in 
accessing external finance, and lack of infrastructure facilities, technical inputs, 
and human resources. Meanwhile, urbanisation accelerated. Large numbers of rural 
labourers migrated to urban areas in search of jobs. In 2001, the urbanisation rate 
(the ratio of urban to total population) in China reached 38 per cent, compared to 26 
per cent in 1990 and 19 per cent in 1980. Increased availability of rural finance 
would help the development of rural industries. Nevertheless, the importance of 
rural industrialisation in the economy is likely to be replaced by urbanisation. 
In spite of the acceleration of urban development, the urbanisation rate in China is 
on average 10-20 percentage pOints lower than in other countries at a similar income 
level (Wang and Xia 1999). In particular, there are relatively few medium and large 
cities given China's large population. In 2000, 121 million people, only 9.6 per cent 
of the national population, lived in cities of more than 0.5 million people. In the less-
developed West region, only 5.6 per cent of the population lived in cities of that size. 
If China had an urbanisation rate similar to that of other countries at the same income 
level, an additional 120-240 million people would be living in urban areas.2 This 
number may also be thought of as the excess supply of people in the rural economy. 
The urbanisation rate and rural income of China's 31 provinces in 2000 suggests 
a positive relationship between rural income and urbanisation: provinces with a 
higher urbanisation rate have a higher rural income (Figure 13.2). This relationship 
may imply that urbanisation helps to liberate redundant rural labour from arable land 
and therefore increase agricultural productivity. Considering that half the Chinese 
labour force is still engaged in agricultural labour, further urbanisation is likely to 
have a significant impact on agricultural productivity. 
A CAUSALITY TEST ON THE IMPACT OF URBANISATION AND 
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Urbanisation need not be the only explanation for the relationship (Figure 13.2); both 
urbanisation and higher rural incomes can be an outcome of economic growth. In 
the following, we introduce a growth model to test the causality between urbanisation 
and regional economic growth. This model has its origins in neoclassical growth 
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models and endogenous growth models (see, for example, Solow 1956; Lucas 1988) 
but includes additional variables representing urbanisation. 
(13.1 ) 
where Y";t' Kn, Hit' D;t and L;t are growth rates of GDP, capital stock, human resources 
(indicated by workers' average years of schooling), cultivated land area and total 
employment, respectively, of the ith province in year t. Un.1 is the urbanisation rate 
with a one-year lag (the urbanisation rate used is the ratio of urban employment to 
provincial total employment). DU;!t'1) is the difference in U;between years t-1 and t-
2. J1 is the error term. 
Lagged variables of U and DU are used for the causality test between urbanisation 
and economic growth. This specification identifies the effect of urbanisation on 
growth if either Un.1 or DUn.1 is positive and significant. Both Uit•1 and DUn.1 are 
included in the model to distinguish between the possible growth effect (long-run 





indicates a continuing effect of urbanisation on growth (meaning that a higher 
urbanisation rate brings about higher productivity growth), whereas a significant 
estimate of DUn.1 indicates an impact from changes in the urbanisation rate on 
growth, which is a short-run effect. 
To impose the restriction of constant returns to scale (a3=:1-a1-a2), both sides of 
Equation 13.1 were divided by L;t" 
(13.1 ') 
where y, k, hand dare Y, K, Hand D divided by L, respectively. 
To see the possible differences in the urbanisation effect at the different levels of 
economic development, U;(t'1) is replaced by three urbanisation variables for the 
East, Central and West regions in version 2 of the model. The East region is the 
most developed while the West region is the least developed of the three regions. 
Similarly, replacements are made to DU;!t.1)" 
Panel data for 25 provinces covering the 20 years from 1979 to 1998 were used. 
The other six provinces were excluded due to incomplete data. Data were provided 
by Fang Cai and Dewen Wang (forthcoming) and the National Bureau of Statistics 
(Statistical Yearbook of China (various years) and 1999b). Capital stock was calculated 
from the historical data for capital formation in each province. 
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Both fixed effects and random effects models were estimated. Hausman's test 
rejects the hypothesis that the random effects model is appropriate, therefore the 
results of the fixed eeffects model are reported in Table 13.5. 
The two versions of the model produce similar results. Most coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. According to version (13.1 '), the 
elasticities of capital, human resources, employment and land with respect to 
economic growth are 0.348, 0.431, 0.205 and 0.016 respectively, all in reasonable 
ranges. The elasticity of land is minor and insignificant, which is not surprising 
because the farming sector now contributes such a small share of total GDP and 
increased yields account for all of China's growth in agricultural output. The estimates 
of urbanisation (U) are positive and Significant. This result indicates that each 
percentage point increase in the urbanisation rate accelerates provincial economic 
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Note: The urbanisation rate used in this figure is the proportion of urban to total employment in 
each province. Symbols of provinces-BJ: Beijing, TJ: Tianjin, HB: Hebei, SX: Shanxi, NM: 
Neimenggu, LN: Liaoning, JL: Jilin, HLJ: Heilongjiang, SH: Shanghai, JS: Jiangsu, ZJ: Zhejiang, AH: 
Anhui, FJ: Fujian, JX: Jiangxi, SO: Shandong, HeN: Henan, HuB: Hubei, HuN: Hunan, GO: 
Guangdong, GX: Guangxi, HaN: Nainan, CO: Chongqing, SC: Sichuan, GZ: Ouizhou, YN: Yunnan, 
XZ: Xizang, SnX: Shannxi, GS: Gansu, OH: Oinghai, NX: Ningxia, XJ: Xinjiang 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2001. Statistical Yearbook of China, Statistics Press, Beijing. 
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growth by 0.37 percentage points over the already high 7-10 per cent growth rate. 
DUis omitted from the model due to insignificant estimates in previous regressions. 
These results suggest that urbanisation has a long-run impact on economic growth. 
For version 2, the results suggest a significant effect of urbanisation on economic 
growth in both the East and Central regions, but the effect is minor and insignificant 
for the less-developed West region. There may be two possible reasons for the latter 
result: the rate of urbanisation in the West has been low, and the urban economy in 
the West provinces, unlike the other regions, has not experienced much restructuring, 
and is therefore less market-oriented and less efficient. 
In general, the results identify a contribution of urbanisation to economic growth 
via productivity changes. This implies that reallocating resources from rural to urban 
economies can result in higher growth rates in the productivity of the resources 
being reallocated. In addition, because this reallocation reduces the surplus labour 
in the rural sector, it can increase the productivity of the remaining rural labour and 
reduce the rural-urban income gap. Theoretically, this result would follow from an 
assumption of diminishing marginal product of labour in the rural sector. 
The fact that urbanisation in China lags so far behind other countries is mainly a 
result of earlier central government policies restricting rural-urban migration and the 
growth of cities. Some of these restrictions have been removed over the past decade, 
but rural-urban migration is still partially restricted by the urban household registration 




























Dependent var. y 
R2 0.3726 
Note: t ratios with * and ** are significant at the 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
Source: Estimation result. Original data are from NBS (2001, 1999b). 
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system, job entry barriers, and non-access or harder access to services such as 
housing, schooling, health care benefits, and public security protection for rural 
migrants. The low level, or lack of, rural education, job training, and employment 
information services are also barriers to rural-urban migration. Policy changes to 
remove these restrictions, to improve rural education, and to provide government 
services in job training and employment information services are essential for 
accelerating urbanisation. 
The current urban economies provide limited opportunities for rural migrants 
because the number of cities is limited, and their average size small. Expansion of 
the urban economy will provide more employment opportunities, especially in China's 
underdeveloped services sector, which accounts for a significantly higher percentage 
of GDP in the urban sector than the rural sector. It is the government's responsibility 
to improve urban planning and to provide urban infrastructure and public utilities in 
order to promote urban development. With these changes, many small cities and 
towns can be expected to become large or medium sized cities. 
CONCLUSION 
While China has experienced rapid economic growth in the reform period, rural 
incomes have grown slowly in recent years and the rural-urban income gap is 
growing. This outcome has been partly due to the non-market-oriented agricultural 
policies of the 1990s. WTO accession commitments have added new challenges 
for the rural economy and for agricultural policymaking. Reforms to liberalise the 
agricultural pricing system and promote market-oriented adjustment of the agricultural 
structure are essential, although they are not sufficient to yield significant reductions 
of the rural-urban income disparity. 
The agricultural sector in China is seen as being labour-redundant, largely as the 
result of policies restricting the development of urban areas. These policies are also 
seen as a major reason for China's large and growing rural-urban income gap. 
The urbanisation rate in China is far lower than in other countries at a similar level 
of GDP per capita. Our findings indicate that urbanisation has positive and significant 
effects on rural incomes and regional economic growth. Therefore, we recommend 
that urbanisation should be accelerated by deregulating rural-urban migration, 
developing urban infrastructure, improving rural education, job training, and enhancing 
the provision of employment information services. 
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1 Data used in this paper are from the National Bureau of Statistics (various years) unless otherwise 
noted. 
2 These calculations take into account estimates of the so-called 'floating population' that is living in 
urban areas but is still registered as rural. 
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14 
Trade reform, acroeconomic policy 
and sectoral labour movement 
Jennifer Chang and Rod Tyers 
Although the Chinese economy continues to grow rapidly, since the late 1990s 
there has been evidence of a slow down in per capita rural income growth. One 
explanation for this is that the relocation of labour from agriculture to manufacturing 
and services, essential in any growing developing economy, has been retarded. 
This could be due to policy disincentives designed to control urban congestion, 
such as the household registration or hukou system (Ianchovichina and Martin 
2002) or information asymmetries and transaction/infrastructural costs (Sicular and 
Zhao 2002). An alternative explanation is that comparatively poor performance in 
China's rural sector is due to economic reforms, and in particular to trade reform 
commitments made in the lead-up to the WTO accession (Anderson et al. 2002). 
It is the central hypothesis of this chapter that this comparative decline in rural 
performance is due, at least in part, to a combination of China's adherence to a de 
facto fixed exchange rate regime and shocks that have tended to depreciate its real 
exchange rate. Most significant among these shocks was the surge of (largely 
illegal) outflows on the capital account and the associated private investment 
slowdown during the Asian financial crisis (Yang and Tyers 2001). Since then, however, 
numerous trade reforms have been implemented, all of which have tended to 
encourage Chinese consumption to shift towards foreign goods, thus reducing the 
price of home goods relative to pre-tariff prices of foreign goods and hence further 
depreciating the real exchange rate (Rees and Tyers 2002). 
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By definition, a real depreciation must be accompanied either by a nominal 
depreciation, a domestic deflation, or a combination of both. The de facto peg to the 
US dollar has therefore necessitated China's deflation. When prices are falling there 
is downward pressure on wages. Even if wages fall only slightly more slowly than 
prices, however, other things being equal, employment growth in the wage sectors 
of the economy can be expected to decline. 1 In the Chinese case this appears as 
high real wage growth but reduced labour demand growth in the modern sector and 
hence a 'bottling up' of workers in the rural sector and reduced rural income per 
capita. 
This chapter examines the relevance of this story to China's comparatively poor 
recent per capita rural income growth performance using short and long-run 
comparative static analysis. The shocks considered are China's WTO accession 
commitments and the model used is a development of that introduced by Yang and 
Tyers (2000) and applied more recently by Rees and Tyers (2002). It is a multi-
sector, multi-country comparative static macro model, the microeconomic 
components of which have their origins in GTAp'2 As in the application by Rees and 
Tyers, all countries have open capital accounts and forward-looking investor behaviour 
is represented in the short run via expectations formed from long-run simulations. 
The focus here, however, is on labour relocation and the short-fun consequences of 
trade reform shocks for the uptake of labour in the manufacturing and services 
sectors.3 We examine the pace of such labour relocation historically and compare 
this with simulated changes in labour demand following WTO accession. 
We observe a reversal in the rate of relocation of workers from agriculture to 
manufacturing after 1998 and a glut of workers in the rural sector (Dolven 2003). Our 
simulations confirm that the relocation slowdown has been been enhanced by China's 
broader macroeconomic policy regime. Indeed, the exchange rate regime, combined 
with capital controls, appears to have restricted the flow of workers into manufacturing 
and services by at least a full one per cent per year and into services by at least two 
per cent per year. 
Urban-rural inequality and worker relocation 
The pace of rural per capita income growth depends on the rate at which surplus 
labour is generated by agricultural change and the corresponding rate at which surplus 
workers in agriculture are absorbed into the manufacturing and services sectors. It 
is a common view that the economic reform of the early 1980s, which brought de-
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collectivisation and the household responsibility system, along with associated 
increases in agricultural labour productivity, created a substantial rural labour surplus.4 
Moreover, prior to that reform, wages were not market determined and there is 
evidence of considerable underemployment. This was due, in part, to the seasonal 
nature of agricultural activity, which meant that many workers were left idle in the 
off-peak parts of the agricultural cycle and yet were unable to take employment 
elsewhere (Banister and Taylor 1989). 
An exacerbating factor on the supply side was rapid rural population growth in the 
pre-reform period. Even though rural population growth slowed in the 1970s and 
1980s, the rural labour supply continued to grow strongly in the aftermath of the 
'baby boom' periods of the 1950s and 1960s.5 On the demand side, China's pre-
reform economic strategy promoted relatively capital-intensive heavy industries. 
These two effects tended to raise underemployment in the rural sector, where, 
although rural communes were disbanded, all workers were still technically employed.6 
The post-reform period therefore carried considerable potential for worker relocation 
from agriculture into other sectors. The subsequent volume of internal migration 
would depend, then, on economic incentives in the form of urban-rural income 
inequality and on both policy-induced and natural barriers to migration. 
Urban-rural inequality 
There is income inequality in China between urban and rural residents as well as 
within both urban and rural areas. Inequality also has a strong regional pattern, 
particularly between inland and coastal provinces. Of overall income inequality, 
Lozada (2002) estimates that 75-80 per cent is due to the urban-rural divide. Official 
estimates of the trends of rural and urban household incomes indicate a general 
upward trend in income for both areas while urban income has experienced 
comparatively sharp increases in the 1990s (Figure 14.1). The corresponding 
proportional difference between urban and rural household income is plotted in Figure 
14.2. In the early 19805, rural incomes grew relatively rapidly and there was a decline 
in urban-rural inequality. Since then, however, urban incomes have grown much 
more rapidly, most prominently since the early to mid 1990s.7 
Internal migration 
Were there no costs or barriers to internal migration, workers would be expected to 
respond to the widening income gap between rural and urban areas by migrating 
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until wages were much closer. Although the estimated number of internal migrants 
has grown (by 100 million since the 1980s) these relocations have been insufficient 
to stem the growing inequality (Dolven 2003). Some of this apparent growth in 
inequality is due to a rise in skilled employment in urban areas, while some is due 
to reduced urban labour demand associated with real wage growth and to official 
migration barriers. Together, these factors appear to have left an expanding labour 
supply 'bottled up' in the rural sector. The key official barrier has been the Household 
Registration System (HRS). 
Introduced in major cities in 1951 and extended to rural areas in 1955, the HRS 
was intended to deal with the escalating urban influxes of rural migrants at the time 
of the Great Famine of 1959-61 (Chan and Zhang 1999). The associated food 
shortages continued into the 1970s, only ending in the 1980s (Zhao 2000). The HRS 
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Press, Beijing. 
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requires all citizens to register in their place of regular residence, often their birthplace. 
Moving from rural to urban areas requires a complex and costly application for a 
transfer to a local hukou. Prior to the reform in the 1980s this was a huge barrier, as 
without a proper hukou one would not qualify for government job assignment. Workers 
who ignored this requirement were denied social security benefits such as housing 
and other necessities, even food. 
Decollectivisation in rural areas allowed income inequality to soften a little and 
non-farm rural industries to develop. This, and the household responsibility system 
that accompanied it, led to increased productivity in the agricultural sector. Thus, 
while rural incomes grew, so too did the proportion of workers considered redundant. 8 
The government began rewarding collective farms and cooperatives for production 
rather than quantified labour, so excess workers could be free to look for other jobs 
(Seeborg et al. 2000). The marketisation of food also meant that migrants were no 
longer restrained entirely by the need to obtain a local hukouto survive. Combined 
with the development of special economic zones and the increase in urban private 
and informal sectors, these conditions put the cities on a path of rapid development 
with growing demand for labour. Yet the HRS created ambiguous incentives for 
migrants. On the one hand it constrained people with access to land from migrating, 
since each was now responsible for his or her own land, which most saw as a form 
of social security (Chan 2000). On the other hand, individuals who had little or no 
access to land or who had specialised in what were to become low productivity rural 
activities were now less constrained. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the HRS was gradually weakened by policy 
reforms and less stringent enforcement. Previously prohibited 'spontaneous' migration 
to jobs in urban centres was taCitly facilitated and tolerated, conditionally opening 
urban residency to rural workers and relaxing some of the strict controls. There has 
therefore been an increase in temporary urban migrants-workers going to cities 
and towns without official residential status, known as the 'floating population'. From 
the late 1980s onwards, transients made up over one-fifth of the population of such 
major cities as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou (Immigration and Refugee Board, 
Canada 2002). Many official restrictions remained, however, including the link between 
hukou status and welfare eligibility, the denial of education for migrant children and 
state job availability. In 1995, to re-assert control over internal migration, Zhao (2000) 
notes that tighter controls were imposed over the legality of urban residency and 
housing subsidies.9 
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As part of China's urbanisation strategy for the Tenth Five-Year Plan, Central 
Party Document No.11 of November 2000 allows a person and his or her immediate 
family to obtain urban hukous if he or she has fixed accommodation, stable work (in 
a job for more than one year) in the urban area. Urban hukou was also offered to 
those who would purchase a local commercial housing unit (to attract outside 
investment) and to holders of graduate degrees (attracting professionals). The focus 
of these reforms was still mainly small urban towns and small cities. Nonetheless, 
according to China's Committee to Restructure the Economy (SCORES), during 
2001 about 600,000 rural residents acquired urban hukouin these small urban centres. 
More recently stili, a State Council directive indicated that rural migrants have a 
legal right to work in cities. This directive prohibits job discrimination based on 
residency and orders that urban residency documents are to be provided to any 
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workers who find employment. A further recent directive indicates that businesses 
should stop delaying wage payments to workers. This is a significant improvement 
for migrant workers as they often find that they are taken advantage of due to their 
uncertain legal status. 
Official barriers to migration therefore appear to have had an ever diminishing 
effect in China, and least effect in the period since the Asian crisis of 1997. Other 
things being equal, then, we would expect an acceleration in the relocation of workers 
into jobs in the modern sector in that period. However, the evidence does not suggest 
that this has happened. 
Sectoral relocation of workers 
The early 1990s was a period of rapid industrial expansion during which workers 
relocated from the rural sector to the industrial and services sectors (Figure 14.3). 
Significantly, while the expected long-term rise in the share of services in total 
employment is borne out, industrial employment fell substantially during the Asian 
crisis period and failed to expand thereafter. Indeed, the farming and forestry sector 
shows annual declines in employment that peaked in 1993 and continued until 1996. 
In this period the Chinese economy grew at its highest rate ever. During the Asian 
crisis and in the period thereafter, however, relative declines in the growth rates of 
activity in manufacturing and services appear to have driven workers back to the 
rural sector. This back-flow appears to have continued in the post-crisis period. 
AGGREGATE PERFORMANCE SINCE THE ASIAN CRISIS 
In 1995, good weather and improved farming incentives brought a resurgence of the 
rural economy and the reform of state-owned industrial enterprises (SOEs) was 
accelerated, precipitating substantial lay-offs (Meng 1998). These changed saving 
incentives, leading to a sudden increase in the private saving rate (Yang and Tyers 
2000,2001). The contractionary effects of these internal shocks were then worsened 
by the East Asian financial crisis, which saw the mostly illegal flight of a substantial 
part of China's additional private savings from the country, leading to a fall in private 
investment. At the same time, slowdowns and currency depreciations in other Asian 
economies made their exports relatively competitive, so that the dollar value of 
China's exports grew more slowly than in 1990-96 (Yang 1998). 
Our macroeconomic policy story begins with the crisis and China's reaction to it. 
The shocks of that period-the rise in the domestic saving rate, the increased 
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outflow on the capital account and the adverse change in the terms of trade-
depreciated the real exchange rate. This can be seen from the following definition of 
the real bilateral exchange rate, for region iwith region j, as the common currency 
ratio of the price of a basket of region Is goods and the price of a corresponding 
basket of region Js goods: 
(14.1 ) 
where Eij is Is nominal exchange rate with j, measured as foreign currency units per 
local unit, and the price index used is the GDP price, pY.10 This depreciates when 
the price of the basket of home goods falls relative to the corresponding basket of 
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foreign goods. The real depreciation during the crisis period, combined with the 
fixed nominal exchange rate, necessitated a monetary policy sufficiently restrictive 
to bring about a decline in the home price level relative to that in the United States-
a deflation. This was the first in a series of deflations in the crisis and post-crisis 
periods. 
Shocks that cause real depreciations also include other elements of China's 
domestic reforms. By raising productivity, these factors reduce domestic costs 
relative to foreign costs and hence tend to reduce relative domestic prices. Similarly, 
trade reforms divert domestic demand away from home-produced goods towards 
imports and so they also tend to reduce the prices of domestic goods relative to the 
import prices of foreign goods. In the period 1997-2001, China embarked on 
substantial trade liberalisations, including the introduction of a duty drawback system 
on the imported inputs of export firms (Rees and Tyers 2002). Real depreciations 
due to such shocks would have occurred irrespective of China's exchange rate 
regime. But it is that regime which distributes the nominal effects of the real 
depreciations between falls in the home price level, or deflations, on the one hand 
and depreciations of the nominal exchange rate on the other. 
The declines in China's prices indicate that, other things being equal, such deflations 
are contractionary (Table 14.1).11 This is because, even in the most flexible of 
industries, wage rates are renegotiated more rarely than product prices are adjusted. 
Lags in wage adjustment mean that deflation applies a profit squeeze that retards 
both employment growth and investment in the private sector. Consequently, real 
wage growth in China's modern sector has been extraordinarily high since 1996, 
(Figure 14.5) suggesting some deterrence of labour demand and overall growth in 
this sector. Weaker overall performance of the Chinese economy is indicated by its 
official GDP growth rates (Figure 14.4). These bottomed out in the crisis period at 
between seven and eight per cent per year, but have not recovered since. 
Since 2001 China has embarked on a still more dramatic set of trade reforms as 
part of its WTO accession commitments. By themselves, these reforms will cause 
further real depreciations. Should there be no change in macroeconomic policy, 
growth and the relocation of workers into China's modern sector will continue to be 
retarded by deflation. In the remainder of the chapter we investigate the relationship 
between growth, labour relocation and macroeconomic pOlicies in the aftermath of 
the WTO accession reforms. 
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Beijing. 
MODELLING EFFECTS OF TRADE POLICY REFORMS 
Here we complement the work of Rees and Tyers (2002) by simulating the short-run 
effects of trade reforms in China while accounting for the implications of services 
trade commitments as well as productivity changes associated with these reforms. 
As in Rees and Tyers (2002) and lanchovichina and Martin (2002), we make allowance 
for idiosyncratic trade policies, such as the duty drawbacks on imports used in the 
manufacture of exported goods. As befits a short-run analysis, we also allow for 
labour market rigidity and associated departures from full employment. 
FollowingYang and Tyers (2000), we use a comparative static global macroeconomic 
model, within which the microeconomic (supply) side is adapted from GTAP,12 a 
multi-region comparative static model in real variables with price-taking households 
and all industries comprising identical competitive firms. To this microeconomic 
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Figure 14.5 Official growth rate of the average real manufacturing wage, 1996-
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Table 14.1 Official price level changes since the Asian crisis 
Consumer prices Retail prices Ex-factory prices GDP deflator 
1997 2.8 0.8 -0.3 0.9 
1998 -0.8 -2.6 -4.1 -2.6 
1999 -1.4 -3.0 -2.4 -2.4 
2000 0.4 -1.5 2.8 1.0 
2001 0.7 -0.8 -1.3 0.0 
Source: Source: National Statistical Bureau, 2002. China Statistical Yearbook, 2002, China 
Statistics Press, Beijing: Tables 3-3 and 9-1. 
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base are added independent representations of governments' fiscal regimes, with 
both direct and indirect taxation, as well as separate assets in each region (currency 
and bonds) and monetary policies with a range of alternative targets. 
The model 
The microeconomic side of the model is a modified version of that created by Hertel 
(1997). It offers the following useful properties 
.. a capital goods sector in each region to service investment 
.. explicit savings in each region, combined with open regional capital accounts 
that permit savings in one region to finance investment in others 
.. multiple trading regions, goods and primary factors 
.. product differentiation by country of origin 
.. empirically based differences in tastes and technology across regions 
.. non-homothetic preferences 
.. explicit transportation costs and indirect taxes on trade, production and 
consumption. 
All individual goods and services entering final and intermediate demand are 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) blends of home products and imports. In 
turn, imports are CES composites of the products of all regions, the contents of 
which depend on regional trading prices. Savings are pooled globally and investment 
is then allocated between regions from the global pool. Within regions, investment 
places demands on the domestic capital goods sector, which is also a CES composite 
of home-produced goods, services and imports in the manner of government 
spending. 
To expand the model for macroeconomic analysis, the standard code is modified 
to make regional governments financially independent, thus enabling explicit 
treatment of fiscal policy. Direct taxes are incorporated at the observed average 
income tax rates for each region. Marginal tax rates are therefore assumed constant 
(say at t). Regional households then receive regional factor income, Yp and from 
this they pay direct tax tYp ' The disposable income that remains is then divided 
between private consumption and private saving. Government saving, or the 
government surplus, SG = T - G, is then simply revenue from direct taxes, tYF, and 
from the many indirect taxes already incorporated in the microeconomic part of the 
modej13, T" less government spending, G, which could be exogenous or fixed as a 
proportion of GDP. Thus, SG = T, + tY
F 
- G. The private saving and consumption 
decision is represented by a reduced form exponential consumption equation with 
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wealth effects included via the dependence of consumption (and hence savings) on 
the interest rate. Each region then contributes its total domestic (private plus 
government) saving, So=Sp + SG' to the global pool from which investment is derived.14 
For each region, the above relations imply the balance of payments identity, which 
sets the current account surplus equal to the capital account deficit: X-M = Sp+ 
SG _1.15 From the pool of global savings, investment is allocated across regions and 
places demands on capital goods sectors in each region. In the short run however, 
investment does not add to the installed capital stock. Also at this length of run, 
nominal wages are sticky in some regions (the industrialised regions of the United 
States, the European Union, Canada and Australia, and those developing countries 
with heavily regulated labour markets: China and Vietnam) but flexible elsewhere. In 
the spirit of comparative statics, although price levels do change in response to 
shocks, agents represented in the model do not expect any continuous inflation and 
so there is no distinction between the real and nominal interest rates. 
In allocating the global savings pool as investment across regions, we have opted 
for the most flexible approach, implying a high level of global 'capital' mobility.16 
Where controls exist on international capital flows we introduce these explicitly. In 
the absence of capital controls, the allocation to region j (net investment in that 
region) depends positively on the expected long-run change in the average rate of 
return on installed capital, re, which, in turn, rises when the marginal product of 
J 
physical capital is expected to increase.17 Net investment falls when the opportunity 
cost of financing capital expenditure, the region's real interest rate, 0, rises. This 
rate depends, in turn, on a global capital market clearing interest rate, /""', calculated 
such that global savings equals global investment :I.So = IJ(re, (.l. Here I. is real 
J J J J J I J 
gross investment in region ps The region's home interest rate is then 0 = /""'(1 +p) 
where P
j 
is a region-specific interest premium, thought to be driven by risk factors 
not incorporated in this analysis. The investment demand equation for region jthen 
takes the form: 
(14.2) 
where IS is the (exogenous) base year installed capital stock, dj is the regional 
depreciation rate, b
j 
is a positive constant and e
j 
is a positive elasticity. Critically, 
investment in any region responds positively to changes that are expected to raise 
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the sectoral average of a region's marginal product of physical capital and hence 
the regional average return on installed capital. 19 Other things being equal, 
improvements in trans-sectoral efficiency, such as might stem from a trade reform, 
are thought to raise capital returns permanently and hence they raise 0e. If such a 
shock also causes the rate of unemployment to fall, this raises total labour use and 
hence the current return on installed physical capital. When the shock is a trade 
reform, such employment effects are also considered permanent and so they add 
positively to the expected future return on installed capital, re. 
I 
Investment decisions are made by forward-looking agents with access to a long-
run version of the model. Thus, the expected change in the (long-run) rate of return 
on installed capital in each region, re, is exogenous in short-run simulations. It is 
I 
calculated by first simulating the effects of the same shock but under long-run 
closure assumptions. These differ from the short-run closure in the following ways 
.. there are no nominal rigidities (no rigidity of nominal wages) 
.. larger production and consumption elasticities are used to reflect the additional 
time for adjustment 
.. physical capital is no longer sector specific; it moves across sectors to equalise 
rates of return 
" capital controls are ignored 
.. in China, irrespective of short-run fiscal policy assumptions, in the long run 
any loss of government revenue associated with tariff changes is assumed not 
to be made up via direct (income) tax, with the result that the fiscal deficit 
expands; thus, the ratios of government revenue and expenditure to GDP are 
endogenous while the average direct tax rate is exogenous. 
Note that the short-run comparative static analysis does not require the global 
economy to be in a steady state. When shocks are imposed, any change in the 
counterfactual return on installed capital, 0e, need not be the same as the 
corresponding change in the opportunity cost of capital expenditure, 0. Most often, 
short-run shocks change income and savings and, therefore, expected returns in 
directions that differ from corresponding short-run changes in the global interest 
rate, particularly considering that physical capital is fixed in quantity and sectoral 
distribution at this length of run. Even in long-run simulations, the global distribution 
of physical capital at the outset does not equalise rates of return across regions, 
and redistribution through the regional allocation of one year's global savings is 
insufficient to redress such imbalances. 
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To include asset markets, region-specific money and nominal bonds are introduced. 
Even though there is no interregional ownership of installed capital in the initial 
database, regional bonds are traded internationally, making it possible for savers in 
one region to finance investment in another.20 Cash constraints cause households 
to maintain portfolios including both bonds and non-yielding money and the resulting 
demand for real money balances has the usual reduced form dependence on GDP 
(transactions demand) and the interest rate. This is equated with the region's real 
money supply, where purchasing power is measured in terms of its GDP deflator, 
pY. Since all domestic transactions are assumed to use the home region's money, 
international transactions require currency exchange. For this purpose, a nominal 
exchange rate, S, is defined for each region. A single key region is identified (here 
the United States), relative to whose currency these nominal rates are defined. For 
the United States, then, E= 1 and S is the number of US dollars per unit of region js 
currency. In essence, we are adding to the real model one new equation per region 
(the LM curve linking the real money supply to GDP and the interest rate) and one 
new (usually endogenous) variable per region, E.21 The bilateral rate between region 
J 
i and region j is then simply the quotient of the two exchange rates with the United 
States, Eij, = E/S' Quotients such as this appear in all international transactions. 
Without nominal rigidities the model always exhibits money neutrality, both at the 
regional and global levels. Firms in the model respond to changes in nominal product, 
input and factor prices but a real producer wage is calculated for labour as the 
quotient of the nominal wage and the GDP deflator, so that w=W/pY. Money shocks 
always maintain constant w when nominal rigidities are absent. To make possible 
some rigidity in the setting of the nominal wage, W, a parameter, AE (0,1) is inserted, 
such that 
(14.3) 
where Wo is the initial value of the nominal wage, Poc is the corresponding initial 
value of the consumer price index (CPI) and A is a constant. Whenever A is exogenous 
and set at unity, the nominal wage carries this relationship to the CPI and the labour 
market will not clear except in the unlikely event that Equation 14.3 happens to 
yield a market-clearing real wage. The case where the labour market is fully flexible 
is represented by setting }. as an endogenous slack variable and thereby rendering 
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Equation 14.3 ineffective. At the same time, labour demand is forced to equate with 
exogenous labour supply to reflect the clearing market. 
The representation of capital controls. Savings are assumed to be perfectly mobile 
between regions. The allocation of investment between them depends on region-
specific interest premia and, if they are present, capital controls. In the absence of 
capital controls, a region's domestic capital market might be represented as in 
Figure 14.6. Net inflows on the capital account (KA), which comprise the net inflow 
of private foreign savings, less the net outflow associated with the accumulation of 
official foreign reserves, .1R, depend on the domestic bond rate, which deviates 
from a global capital market clearing interest rate by the risk premium factor 1+1C.22 
The KA curve slopes upward slightly in spite of the assumed perfect capital mobility 
because larger net inflows to the focus region drive up the global market-clearing 
interest rate. 
The actual scale of net inflows depends on the net demand for foreign investment, 
NFI=I-SD, where the relationship between NFI and r is shifted to the right by an 
increase in the expected future return on installed capital, re, via Equation 14.2, or 
by an increase in government spending, G, via its effect on domestic saving. It is 
shifted to the left by an increase in GDP (y), via its effect on consumption and tax 
revenue and hence on domestic savings, SD' In the figure, net outflows on the 
capital account are determined by the intersection of the two curves shown. For a 
balance of payments, these outflows must then equate to net inflows on the current 
account, CA, and prices, and therefore real exchange rates, adjust to ensure that 
this is the case. 
In this analYSiS, capital controls take the form of a rigid ceiling on net outflows on 
the capital account (Figure 14.7), severing the link between the home and global 
interest rates unless net foreign investment rises sufficiently for the controls no 
longer to be binding. To capture this in model simulations, the interest premium, It, 
is made endogenous while net flows on the capital account, KA, or, equivalently, on 
the current account, CA (where BoP=KA+CA=O), are set as exogenous. 
Data and parameters. The regions, primary factors and sectors identified in our 
analysis are listed in Table 14.2. Considering regions first, we draw on the now well-
known GTAP Version 5 global database for 1997, which divides the world into 66 
countries and regions. Although this database separates mainland China from Taiwan, 
it amalgamates Hong Kong with the mainland.23 Our further aggregation of mainland 
China with Taiwan overlooks effects that are internal to these regions, but such 
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Table 14.2 Model structure 
Regions 
1 . China, including Hong Kong and Taiwan 
2. Vietnam 




7. United States 
8. European Union" 
9. Rest of world 
Primary factors 
1. Agricultural land 
2. Natural resources 
3. Skill 
4. Labour 
5. Physical capital 
Sectorsb 
1. Paddy rice 
2. Beverages (product 8 OCR, 'crops nec') 
3. Other crops (wheat, other cereal grains, vegetables, fruits, nuts, oil seeds, sugar cane and 
sugar beet, plant-based fibres and forestry) 
4. Livestock products (cattle, sheep, goats, horses, wool, silk-worm cocoons, raw milk, other 
animal products) 
5. Fish (marine products) 
6. Energy (coal, oil, gas) 
7. Minerals 
8. Processed food (meat of cattle, sheep, goats and horses, other meat products, vegetable oils 
and fats, dairy products, processed rice, processed sugar, processed beverages and tobacco 
products) 
9. Light manufacturing (textiles, wearing apparel, leather products and wood products) 
10. Other manufacturing (paper products and publishing, petroleum and coal products, chemicals, 
rubber and plastic products, other mineral products, ferrous metals, other metals, metal products, 
motor vehicles and parts, other transport equipment, electronic equipment, other machinery and 
equipment, other manufactures) 
11. Transport (sea transport, air transport and other transport) 
12. Infrastructure services (electricity, gas manufacturing and distribution, and water) 
13. Construction and dwellings 
14. Other services (retail and wholesale trade, communications, insurance, other financial 
services, other business services, recreation, other private services, public administration, 
defence, health and education) 
Notes: "The European Union of 15. b These are aggregates of the 57-sector GTAP Version 5 
database. 
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Figure 14.6 The domestic capital market without capital controls 
NFI(r"o' Yo,GJ = 




Figure 14.7 The domestic capital market with capital controls 
NFI(r"o' Yo,Gj = 







effects are not our focus. Instead, we seek to illustrate the strong interaction between 
trade reforms and macroeconomic policies, and, particularly, foreign exchange 
regimes. These interactions are important for all the economies of East Asia and 
particularly for those with regulated foreign exchange regimes. China is the largest 
developing economy to maintain, at least de facto, fixed US dollar parity and, in this 
respect, the macroeconomic policy regimes of Hong Kong (and to a much lesser 
extent) Taiwan have been compatible with that of the mainland. 
Turning to primary factors, skill is separated from raw labour on occupational 
grounds, with the 'profeSSional' categories of the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) classification included as skilled.24 The structure of factor demand has skill 
and physical capital as complements. This enables the model to represent the links 
between skill availability, capital returns and investment that are important in China, 
which has large skilled and unskilled labour forces that are increasingly mobile 
between sectors.25 Finally, the sectoral breakdown we have chosen aggregates the 
57 sectors in the database to our more manageable 14, offering the most detail in 
agricultural and marine products. This is because, amongst China's merchandise 
trade commitments for WTO accession, a key liberalisation is in the processed food 
sector, to which these commodities are inputs. 
Because the length of run is short, the real part of the short-run model incorporates 
smaller-than-standard elasticities of substitution in both demand and supply. These 
are set on the basis of a short-run calibration exercise on the East Asian crisis, 
described in Yang and Tyers (2000). For further details of the model, its parameters 
and its structure, see Yang and Tyers (2000) and Tyers and Yang (2000, 2001). 
Representing post-crisis trade policies and reforms 
A key change since 1997 is the introduction of duty drawbacks offered to firms on 
the component of their imports that is used for export production. The approach 
taken is detailed in Tyers and Rees (2002). Table 14.3 presents the pattern of 
equivalent trade taxes and subsidies as of 2001 and as anticipated post-accession. 
To obtain the rates in Table 14.3, the industry classification used in the WTO list of 
tariff concessions was concorded with the cruder subdivision used in our model and 
average rates constructed for each sector. The information contained in the database 
was supplemented by details of the accession tariff rates provided by lanchovichina 
and Martin (2001). To represent the behavioural impacts of the changes in equivalent 
tariff rates as accurately as possible, emphasis was placed on preserving changes 
249 
in the 'powers of the tariffs' rather than in the rates themselves.26 
The equivalent Chinese tariff rates of the 1990s vary by country of origin. This 
means that the application of the same shock to the powers of these equivalent 
tariffs might have led to negative post-accession rates for some trading partners. 
The accession shocks to the equivalent bilateral tariff rates were therefore calculated 
so as to harmonise the post-shock tariff rates across countries of origin. The 
proportional changes in 'powers of equivalent tariffs' are the same as those implied 
by the changes in rates detailed in lanchovichina and Martin (2002). For our present 
purpose, these shocks are the same for both the long run and the short run. As 
indicated in the WTO database, China is committed to undertaking many of the 
tariff concessions immediately on accessionP 
Table 14.3 Chinese equivalent import tariff and export tax ratesa 
Equivalent import tariff 
(per cent) Equivalent export taxb 
Pre-accession Post-accession (per cent) 
Rice 0.04 0.04 -0.13 
Beverages 11.00 11.00 -0.11 
Other crops 22.00 16.00 -0.25 
Livestock 5.00 4.00 -0.02 
Food 16.00 6.00 -0.13 
Fish 8.00 8.00 -0.19 
Minerals 0.40 0.40 -0.32 
Energy 3.00 3.00 -0.32 
Light manufacturing 14.00 8.00 2.63 
Heavy manufacturing 8.00 4.00 -1.01 
Notes: a All tariff and tax equivalents are ad valorem. They are intended to encompass both tariff 
and non-tariff barriers, though the accounting for non-tariff barriers is incomplete. Services 
distortions are not generally included in the database. See text of a discussion of their 
representation in the analysis. b Negative export tax rates indicate export subsidies. These 
incorporate the export subsidy equivalents of the duty drawbacks available on imported inputs by 
exporting firms, calculated as explained in the text. 
Sources: The original 1997 numbers are aggregated from the 57 commodity categories in the 
GTAP Version 5 global database (as published in 2000). They are then modified using model 
simulations, as described in the text and based on the work of lanchovichina and Martin (2002), 
to obtain pre-accession estimates for 2001. Finally, the post-accession rates are based on the 
protocol for China's accession, as obtained from the WTO website at http://www.wto.org. 
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SIMULATED EFFECTS OF ACCESSION POLICY REFORMS 
The reasons for examining long-run implications first are twofold. First, the long-run 
results are useful in their own right, given that they may then be compared with the 
many other simulations of China's WTO accession reforms. Second, the long-run 
outlook is required in order that the expectations of investors can be formulated for 
short-run analysis. Recall that investors are assumed to take into account changes 
in long-run returns on installed capital in determining short-run changes in their 
investment behaviour. 
Recapping the key elements of long-run closure 
.. there are no nominal rigidities (no rigidity of nominal wages) 
.. production and consumption elasticities of substitution are chosen at long-run 
levels to reflect the additional time for adjustment in the long run over the short 
run 
.. physical capital is no longer sector specific; it redistributes across sectors to 
equalise rates of return 
.. capital controls are ignored, and 
ID in China, irrespective of short-run fiscal policy assumptions, in the long run 
any loss of government revenue associated with tariff changes is assumed to 
not be made up via direct (income) tax, with the result that the fiscal deficit 
expands. 
The key point of difference between our long-run analysis and that of Rees and 
Tyers (2002) is that we represent the effects of trade reforms on productivity. There 
is a substantial literature identifying this association (Ch and et al. 1998; Chand 
1999; Stoeckel et al. 1999). These studies use Australian data on the long-run effects 
of trade reforms to identify elasticities of total factor productivity to protection level 
by industry. We applied these elasticities to China's intended reforms, albeit with 
discounts for China's lower starting protection levels in some industries and 
adjustments to account for services sector reforms (Dee and Hanslow 2000; Verikios 
and Zhang 2001), to yield the one-off long-run productivity shocks listed in Table 
14.4. Although these shocks are applied only in the long run, they are important for 
short-run behaviour (our object here) because they raise the return on installed 
capital and hence stimulate investment. 
The results from the long-run simulation are provided in Table 14.5. They show the 
expected allocative efficiency gains, reflected here in a rise in GDp, aided by 
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increased returns on installed physical capital that induce greater investment and 
therefore larger net inflows on the capital account in the long run. As home 
consumption switches away from home-produced goods, the relative prices of home-
produced goods fall yielding the predicted real depreciation. The principal downside 
of the reforms is the long-run shift of activity out of agriculture into manufacturing 
and services and the associated decline in land rents. Associated with this shift, 
further substantial relocation of workers from agriculture to the modern sector will 
therefore be required. 
Although the trade policy regime of 2001 advantaged food processing, 'other crops', 
fisheries and light manufacturing, it is the manufacturing sectors that are the robust 
beneficiaries of the unilateral trade liberalisation. This is surprising given that the 












Infrastructural services (electricity, gas, water) 
Construction and dwellings 
Other (including financial and communications) 
Long-run total 
factor productivity 














Short-run effect of 
reduced services 






Notes: a These are supplementary exogenous shocks applied, where indicated, along with the 
tariff reductions. They incorporate the findings of other research, particularly on the effects of 
services reform. b Estimates based on the results from research by Chand et al. (1998), Chand 
(1999) and Stoeckel et al. (1999). C Estimated one-year effect, based on the results from research 
by Oee and Hanslow (2000) and Verikios and Zhang (2001). 
Sources: As specified in the notes above. 
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Table 14.5 Simulated long-run effects of a unilateral liberalisation of China's 
2001 trade policy regimea 
Change in 
Terms of trade (per cent) 
Real effective exchange rate, et (per cent) 
Real exchange rate against USA, et (per cent) 
Global interest rate, r'" (per cent) 
Investment premium factor, (1+/1.) (per cent) 
Home interest rate, r (per cent) 
Return on installed capital, r" (per cent)e 
Real domestic investment, I (per cent) 
Balance of trade, X-M = - KA = -(I-SJ (US$ bn) 













Construction and dwellings 
Other services 
Real GDp, Y 
Unskilled wage and employment (per cent) 
Nominal (unskilled) wage, W 
Production real wage, w=W/py 
Employment, LO 
Unit factor rewards CPI deflated (per cent) 
Land 




No ancillary effects With ancillary effects 
on productivity or on productivity and 

































Notes: a All results in table are based on the assumption that government spending is held 
constant as a share of GDP; revenue lost from tariff reform is not made up in other taxes, so the 
fiscal deficit expands. Key exogenous variables are highlighted as per the long-run closure 
discussed in the text. b For these additional shocks, see Table 14.4. 
Source: Model simulations described in the text. 
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protection of the manufacturing sectors is also set to decline. It is because both 
manufacturing sectors commit approximately half their total costs to inputs in the 
same product category and about 10-15 per cent of those committed to imports. 
Competing imports, even though they are from the same sector, are differentiated 
from home products (Rees and Tyers 2002). Under these conditions, the tariff 
reductions on imported intermediates have a direct effect on home industry total 
cost. Reductions to tariffs on competing, but differentiated, imports have only an 
indirect effect, the magnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution 
between the two. Indeed, for manufacturing, it turns out that the effect of tariff 
reductions on input costs is considerably greater than that of the loss of protection 
against competing imports. Cost reductions of similar origin are the reason for similar 
gains accruing to the domestic transport services sector. 
The reforms cause the most substantial reductions in protection to China's food 
processing sector and therefore lead to long-run contractions in that sector and in 
the local supply of its inputs (especially rice and 'other crops'). The more income 
elastic and lightly protected agricultural sectors, the 'beverages' group and livestock, 
actually expand. Labour is assumed to be perfectly mobile between sectors, so that 
our results indicate the labour movement needed in order to achieve the maximum 
gain from the reforms. In the long run, employment in food processing falls by seven 
per cent, in rice production by four per cent and in 'other crops' by two per cent. 
Workers lost from these sectors are re-employed primarily in manufacturing and 
services. 
When reform-driven productivity improvements are included in the long-run analysis, 
even though the assumed productivity changes are one-off and modest, the economic 
effects of the reforms are greatly amplified. The GDP increase is almost ten times 
larger, while domestic investment is four times larger, as is the return on installed 
capital, which will drive short-term investment. Increases in sectoral expansions 
are largest in manufacturing and services, the productivity of services having 
widespread effects through their role as intermediates. The overall contraction in the 
agricultural sector is much reduced, with the beverages, livestock and fisheries 
sectors now showing robust expansions. 
Simulated short-run effects 
In the short run, for all the regions represented, the standard closure is as indicated 
in Table 14.6. Monetary authorities in China, Vietnam and the rest of the world are 
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assumed to maintain fixed exchange rates against the US dollar. The other regions 
identified adopt price level (CPI) targeting. Capital controls are assumed to be rigid 
in China and Vietnam, but non-existent in the other regions. In the labour markets of 
China and Vietnam nominal wages are assumed to be 'sticky'. Full short-run rigidity 
is assumed in the industrial countries, while nominal wages are assumed to be fully 
flexible elsewhere in Asia and the developing world. As to fiscal policies (not shown 
in Table 14.6), government spending in all regions is assumed to absorb a fixed 
proportion of GDP and the rates of direct and indirect tax are assumed to be constant, 
so that government deficits do vary in response to shocks. 
As indicated earlier, three alternative macroeconomic policy regimes are 
considered. 
Table 14.6 Short-run closurea 
Labour market Capital controls: 
closure: nominal capital account 
Region Monetary policy targetb wagecO net inflow I-SOd 
China (1) Nominal exchange rate, E Sticky (1=0.5) Rigid 
China (2) Nominal exchange rate, E Sticky (1=0.5) Flexible 
China (3) GDP price, pY Sticky (1=0.5) Flexible 
Vietnam Nominal exchange rate, E Sticky (1=0.5) Rigid 
Other ASEAN Consumer price level, pc Flexible (1=1) Flexible 
Japan Consumer price level, pc Sticky (1=0.5) Flexible 
Korea Consumer price level, pc Flexible (1=1) Flexible 
Australia Consumer price level, pc Sticky (1=0.5) Flexible 
United States Consumer price level, pc Sticky (1=0.5) Flexible 
Europe (EU) Consumer price level, pc Rigid (1=0) Flexible 
Rest of world Nominal exchange rate, E Flexible (1=1) Flexible 
Notes: a The expected future return on installed capital is exogenous in the short run, determined 
in a separate long-run solution. There are three macroeconomic policy regimes for China, with (1) 
the most restrictive and (3) the most expansionary. b The nominal money supply is endogenous in 
each case, the corresponding exogenous variable being the listed target. C When the nominal 
wage is assumed flexible it is endogenous and the corresponding exogenous variable is the 
employment level. When it is sticky or rigid, Equation 14.2 is activated and the employment level is 
endogenous. d Capital controls are assumed to maintain a rigid net inflow of foreign investment on 
the capital account. When KA = I-So is made exogenous to represent this, an interest premium 
opens between the domestic and international capital markets. This premium becomes 
endogenous. Effectively, the home and foreign capital markets are separated and clear at different 
interest rates. Where the capital account is flexible (open), this implies that private flows on the 
capital account are permitted at any level. KA = I-So is then endogenous and the home interest 
premium is exogenous (unchanged by any shock). This means that the home interest rate then 
moves in proportion to the rate that clears the global savings-investment market. 
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" The 'standard'-rigid capital controls with a fixed exchange rate. 
I> No capital controls and a fixed exchange rate. 
.. No capital controls, a floating exchange rate and monetary policy targeting the 
GDP price. 
In addition, two alternative assumptions are made about investment and the 
services capital stock. In a pessimistic alternative, investors do not see the long-
run benefits of productivity gains that would accompany trade reform, and there is 
no immediate effect from reforms in services trade. In an optimistic counterpart, 
investors are motivated by the long-run return on installed capital listed in the second 
column of Table 14.5. Moreover, drawing on the conclusions from studies by Dee 
and Hanslow (2000) and Verikios and Zhang (2001), service trade reforms are 
assumed to result in the short run bolstering of the capital stock in finance and 
communications indicated in Table 14.4. Not surprisingly, the short-fun effects of 
China's WTO commitments prove to be heavily dependent on her macroeconomic 
policy regime and the associated productivity and capital stock changes. Indeed, 
the effects range from the contraction alluded to in the introduction through to a 
substantial short-fun expansion. 
The effects of capital controls and the choice of monetary policy 
target 
The broad behaviour of the model in the short run with rigid capital controls retained 
can be represented as in Figure 14.8. The upper diagram represents the domestic 
capital market and the lower diagram the domestic market for foreign products. 
These markets are linked by the requirement that, for a balance of payments, net 
flows on the capital account must mirror those on the current account. Net demand 
for foreign products (the downward sloping line in the lower diagram, NM=M-X) 
depends on the relative price of foreign goods. For this purpose, we define the real 
exchange rate (Equation 14.1) as the common currency ratio of the price of home 
goods to the price of foreign goods. Net imports depend positively on this real 
exchange rate and negatively on its inverse (the common-currency foreign to home 
product price ratio). This excess demand curve is shifted to the right by an increase 
in GDP, Y, or a reduction in protection, r. The real exchange rate is then determined 
by the balance of payments requirement that net inflows on the capital account 
must equal net outflows on the current account, KA=-CA=NM=M-X. 28 
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The trade liberalisation reduces r and shifts NM to the right. With tight capital 
controls, the current account balance cannot change. The shock therefore raises 
the relative price of foreign goods in the home market and thus depreciates the real 
exchange rate. If the nominal exchange rate is the target of monetary policy and the 
home economy is small by comparison with its trading partners (P* is unaffected) 
then, from Equation 14.4, a fall in pY (a deflation) is required. This must be brought 
about by a monetary contraction in defence of the exchange rate. To the extent that 
wages adjust more sluggishly than product prices, the deflation causes the real 
wage to rise. Were the real depreciation the only consequence of the liberalisation 
shock, its effects would therefore be contractionary. Fortunately, this need not be 
the case. The trade reform brings gains in allocative efficiency.29 
When capital controls remain rigid and the exchange rate fixed, however, in the 
Chinese case these allocative gains are insufficient to offset the contractionary 
effects of the deflation. This can be seen from the first column of Table 14.7. The 
real depreciation is substantial and the deflation required is of the order of two per 
cent per year. The production real wage rises by half this and employment falls. In 
Figure 14.8, investment demand responds to the expectation of higher real returns 
to installed capital in the future by shifting outward. The loss of tariff revenue drives 
the government deficit higher, reducing domestic saving, further reinforcing the 
outward shift of the net foreign investment (NFI) demand curve. But the rigidity of 
the capital controls causes this to simply push up the domestic interest rate and so 
real private investment actually falls. Output falls in all sectors except beverages, 
energy, manufacturing and transport. Manufacturing gains in the short run for the 
same reasons it gains in the long run-cheaper imported inputs. Under these policy 
circumstances, then, the overall net gains from trade reform are not robust in the 
short run, at least when pessimistic assumptions are made about productivity effects 
and services reform. 
If the capital controls are removed, the corresponding liberalisation shock is as 
depicted in Figure 14.9 and the results are shown in column 2 onable 14.7. Here, 
reduced protection also yields a gain in allocative efficiency, but this time the increase 
is large enough to generate a net gain in GDp, reinforcing the rightward shift in the 
net imports curve in the lower diagram. In this case, however, the absence of capital 
controls allows investment to flow in, responding to the increase in the expected 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































relaxes the balance of payments constraint in the lower diagram and allows a shift 
toward net imports. The net effect on the real exchange rate depends on whether 
the capital account shift, which raises the net supply of foreign goods, is larger or 
smaller than the increase in net demand for them due to the tariff reduction and the 
rise in domestic income. In the case of China, the rise in net demand is dominant 
and the real exchange rate still depreciates, albeit to a lesser extent than in the 
presence of capital controls. Thus, when capital controls are weak or nonexistent, 
the trade liberalisation is seen to attract increased inflows on the capital account 
and hence to mitigate the real depreciation and associated GDP price deflation that 
are its inevitable consequences. 
In the third column ofTable 14.7 the target of monetary policy is the GDP price, 
so that the nominal exchange rate is allowed to depreciate. This removes the deflation 
that must accompany a fixed exchange rate and hence reduces the rise in the 
production real wage due to the reforms. The GDP gain is therefore almost doubled 
and now only the processed food sector contracts in the short run. Interestingly, the 
additional investment and greater employment generated with the policy regimes of 
columns 2 and 3 ensure that real land rents actually rise in the short run. 
Fina"y, the three right-hand columns ofTable 14.7 indicate the short-run effects of 
the WTO accession reforms under the same three Chinese policy regimes but with 
the more optimistic ancillary effects of those reforms (Table 14.4) included. There 
are two key differences. First, investors are motivated by the effects of increased 
productivity in response to the reforms in the long run and, second, services reforms 
see a short-run increment to the capital stocks in the financial and communications 
sectors. These changes cause substantial rises in investment and, together, they 
cause larger net inflows on the capital account, boost the construction sector and 
reduce the cost of service inputs to other sectors. Overall expansions are therefore 
conSistently larger in these cases, as is the demand for the sectoral relocation of 
workers. These are due, in part, to rises in overall employment which occur because 
of sticky nominal wages. The upward movement in nominal wages is slower than that 
in labour productivity, expanding aggregate labour demand by up to two per cent. 
Short-run sectorai impacts 
The key determinants of the sectoral mix of changes in the economy are the tariff 
reductions themselves, which reduce product prices in affected sectors, and the 
size of the resulting short-run real depreciation, which reduces non-traded (largely 
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services) prices relative to traded goods prices. When capital controls are tight, the 
real depreciation is comparatively large. Traded sectors, such as light manufacturing, 
are advantaged, while non-traded services sectors, such as construction and 
dwellings, are disadvantaged. When capital controls are ineffective, manufacturing 
gains are smaller and the non-traded services sectors gain. Processed food suffers 
because of the decline in its protection, and other agricultural industries contract as 
that sector demands fewer local inputs. When the macroeconomic policy regime is 
expansionary, however, only the processed food sector contracts. If the optimistic 
ancillary effects are included the decline in the processed food sector becomes 
trivially small, ensuring gains to the agricultural sector as a Whole. This result is 
quite important since, sensing losses due to reduced protection, the farm sector 
opposes the reforms. Yet if the reforms were embraced along with expansionary 
macroeconomic policy, the farm sector would be a net gainer, at least in the short 
run. 
Worker relocation demand in the short run 
The sectors defined forthe purpose of our simulations (Table 14.2) are here aggregated 
for ease of comparison with the classification of employment by China's National 
Bureau of Statistics. The result is the seven sectoral groupings in Table 14.8. Also 
listed are the maximum and average annual changes in employment by sector, 
drawn from official statistics since 1978. The detailed official record of annual changes 
in employment by sector is provided in the Appendix. Some of these changes are of 
extraordinary magnitude, especially the growth in service sector employment in 
1984. We discount these as due to changes in measurement in that year. There 
have also, however, been some extraordinary employment growth periods since 
then, including the service employment expansions of 1993 and 1994. Of course, 
the services sectors were considerably smaller then than they are now, and so the 
numbers of workers relocated to achieve those employment growth numbers were 
smaller than would now be required. Even so, these statistics suggest that China's 
capacity for the rapid sectoral relocation of workers has been considerable. 
In the same table we show the range of simulated short-run worker relocation 
demands associated with China's WTO accession reforms. In interpreting these, it 
must be borne in mind that overall employment in China is endogenous in these 
simulations. From Table 14.7, depending on the macroeconomic policy settings, it 
either contracts by one-quarter of one per cent or expands by almost two per cent. 
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Figure 14.8 Trade reform with capital controls 
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Figure 14.9 Trade reform without capital controls 
NFI(YM r ') ___ 
~e ___ 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This opens the possibility that, at least in the short run, rural activity can expand at 
a sufficient pace to retain its workers. When we combine the most expansionary 
policy scenario with the ancillary effects of productivity and services reform (Table 
14.4), the overall expansion permits employment in each sector to increase, as 
indicated in the final column of Table 14.8. Of course, there remains considerable 
redistribution of employment in these results, since the service sectors expand 
their labour use much more rapidly than does agriculture. Also, since we focus on 
the short run, we take no explicit account here of technical change in Chinese 
agriculture. In other countries at the same stage of development this change has 
been in labour saving, enabling the agricultural sector to shed workers more quickly 
(Anderson et al. 2003). 
Our contention that the macroeconomic policy environment is important in 
determining the pace of worker relocation demand is borne out in these results. In 
all sectors there is a stark contrast between employment growth under tight capital 
controls and a fixed exchange rate regime on the one hand and an investment 
policy that renders the capital controls ineffective combined with a flexible exchange 
rate on the other. When the ancillary shocks to productivity and services capital are 
included, this gulf widens further. In the case of this most optimistic of scenarios, 
employment growth exceeds the average since 1990 in all but two sectors and the 
excess is largest in construction and dwellings and transport services. These strong 
worker relocation demands nonetheless fall short of the maxima achieved in a single 
year in all sectors, even since 1990. 
Yet the WTO accession reforms are but a small part of the pantheon of China's 
overall reform program, the bulk of which is growth-enhancing. Not only do we exclude 
the trend of technology and associated organisational changes, as mentioned 
previously, but we take no direct account of the ongoing financial sector reforms 
and the continuing transformation of urban activity from the public to the private 
sector. Even in the case of China's WTO accession, we ignore commitments by 
China's trading partners to reduce protection against her labour-intensive exports. 
These changes will improve China's terms of trade and further stimulate its growth. 
Considering such omissions, worker relocation demand in a more expansionary 
policy environment could well approach, or even exceed, the high rates of change 
observed in the early 1990s. 
Finally, our simulations rest on the assumption that production and skilled workers 
in one sector are perfectly transformable into corresponding workers in other sectors. 
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Because some workers have narrowly sector-specific education and training and 
because sectoral relocation attaches high transaction costs, particularly for rural 
families, the actual transformability of production workers will remain imperfect 
(Sicular and Zhao 2002). Our results therefore place upper bounds on the overall 
economic performance results from the WTO accession reforms and, more 
importantly for our purpose, upper bounds on worker relocation demands in the 
short run. 
CONCLUSION 
Our chronicle of changes in economic performance, income distribution and internal 
migration in China suggests a recent slowing of employment growth in the modern 
sector and the 'bottling up' of labour in rural activities, widening the income gap 
between urban and rural workers. This has happened in spite of what our review 
suggests is a considerable relaxation of the worker registration, or hukou, system 
which has constrained internal migration in the past. 
To examine the hypothesis that the slowdown in overall growth, and the pace of 
worker relocation in particular, is due at least in part to a restrictive macroeconomic 
policy regime, we adapt a comparative static multi-product, multi-region 
macroeconomic model. We use the model to compare the economic effects of a 
key element of China's current economic reform program, namely its commitments 
associated with its accession to the WTO, under a variety of alternative 
macroeconomic policy regimes. These range from very restrictive capital controls 
combined with a fixed exchange rate to a regime with no capital controls (or the 
equivalent in FDI flexibility) and a flexible exchange rate. The results suggest these 
regimes make a difference of at least one per cent per year in overall GDP growth 
and at least two per cent per year in employment growth in the economy's modern 
sector. They therefore support our hypothesis, at least to the extent that the 
macroeconomic policy regime has contributed to a slowdown in the pace of expansion 
and worker relocation. Indeed, with an expansionary macroeconomic policy and 
optimistiC assumptions about productivity effects associated with the WTO accession 
reforms and intersectoral worker transformability, simulated worker relocation 
demands from these reforms alone could exceed the average of China's recent 
experience. 
While we are confident about our conclusion that China's macroeconomic policy 
regime has reduced economic performance relative to its theoretical potential, it 
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does not follow that we advocate the immediate elimination of capital controls and 
the adoption of a floating exchange rate. The latter has been advocated recently by 
government representatives in Japan and the United States, including such significant 
players as the Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve.30 We are more inclined 
to caution on the issue of the exchange rate, recognising that a float would be 
premature conSidering China's underdeveloped financial sector, its partially reformed 
banking industry and its still-vulnerable state-owned enterprises.31 The fact that 
more flexibility would enhance China's growth should be taken as indicating the 
need for acceleration of the financial sector reforms that are required before a floating 
rate regime can be implemented.32 
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NOTES 
1 The contractionary effects of deflation do not end there. See Bordo and Redish (2003). 
2 See Hertel (1997) for the original specification. 
3 lanchovichina and Martin (2001, 2002) also examine the effects of WTO accession on labour 
relocation demand, and they offer an explicit analysis of the HRS. Their analysis, however, is 
strictly long run and ignores the short-run contractionary effects of macroeconomic policy 
emphasised here. 
4 See Banister and Taylor (1989); Chai and Chai (1997); Hui (1989); Seeborg et al. (2000); and 
Multinational Monitor. 
5 See Banister and Taylor (1989); Hui (1989); Seeborg, Jin and Zhu (2000). 
6 See Banister and Taylor (1989); Hong Kong Liaison Office (IHLO). China's unemployment 
statistics measure only the urban unemployed. 
7 Interestingly, just prior to the crisis (1995-96), the disparity actually narrowed. A grain shortage in 
1994 had allowed a rise in prices for agricultural products relative to manufactures and hence a 
temporary improvement in the rural terms of trade. The effects of this on rural incomes were then 
bolstered by a return to good weather in 1995-96. 
8 In 1984, it was estimated that about 40 per cent of workers in the countryside were redundant 
(Chai and Chai 1997). 
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9 These restrictions tended to leave marginal urban residents underqualified for their jobs and 
migrants from rural areas overqualified. Meng and Zhang (2001) estimate these rates of under 
and over-qualification at 22 per cent for urban residents and 6 per cent for migrants from rural 
areas. 
10 Often quoted is the real effective exchange rate, which is a weighted average of bilateral real 
R " (pY ]( X .. + M ) 
rates: ei = "7 Eij ;: ~~ + M ~ ,where Xi and Mi are region is total values of exports and 
imports, respectively. 
11 The analysis by Yang and Tyers (2000, 2001) suggests that the magnitudes of China's crisis 
period deflation might be understated by official statistics. 
12 A detailed description of the original model is provided by Hertel (1997). 
13 T, includes revenue from taxes on production, consumption, factor use and trade, all of which 
are accounted for in the original GTAP model and database. 
14 Private saving is derived as the difference between disposable income (Y-7) and consumption 
expenditure, where real consumption is determined in a Keynesian reduced form equation that 
takes the form: C = r rO [Y - Tt , where r is the real interest rate. 
15 Note that there is no allowance for interregional capital ownership in the starting equilibrium. At 
the outset, therefore, there are no factor service flows and the current account is the same as 
the balance of trade. 
16 By which it is meant that households can direct their savings to any region in the world without 
impediment. Installed physical capital, however, remains immobile even between sectors. 
17 0e is the expected rental rate on physical capital (which, when physical capital is sector-specific, 
varies across sectors and thus is averaged), adjusted for depreciation and divided by the price 
of capital goods to yield a unitless net rate of return. 
18 Before adding to the global pool, savings in each region is deflated using the regional capital 
goods price index and then converted into US dollars at the initial exchange rate. The global 
investment allocation process is then made in real volume terms. 
19 This investment relation is similar to Tobin's Q in the sense that the numerator depends on 
expected future returns and the denominator indicates the current cost of capital replacement. 
aJ Since the initial database (GTAP Version 5) incorporates no 'net income' or factor service 
component in its current account, the initial equilibria must do likewise. This implies the assumption 
that, although there are no interregional bond holdings initially, the shocks implemented cause 
interregional exchanges of bonds and hence a non-zero net income flow in future current 
accounts not represented. 
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21 More precisely, since for the US E=1, there is one less (usually endogenous) variable. Where 
nominal exchange rates are to be endogenous and nominal money supplies exogenous, one 
additional variable must be made endogenous. This could, for example, be balanced by making 
one price level exogenous, such as by having US monetary policy target the change in the US 
CPI,fX. 
22 The scope of monetary policy includes alterations in the rate at which official foreign reserves 
are accumulated. When there are no capital controls, however, the perfect capital mobility 
assumption implies that changes in reserves have no effect on net capital account flows. Where 
they are important is in the case where capital controls are effective. Because the manipulation 
of reserves offers only a short-term approach to exchange rate management that is only available 
if reserves are sufficient in the first place, DR is held exogenous throughout the analysis in this 
chapter. 
Z3 Detailed descriptions of the GTAP database's content and sources as they relate to China are 
available in Gehlhar (2002), which describes the integration of the data for Hong Kong with that 
of the mainland and discusses the entrepot nature of some of Hong Kong's trade, Un et al. 
(2002) for Taiwan and Wang et al. (2002) for the mainland. 
24 See Liu et al. (1998) for the method adopted. 
2; For further discussion of the role and representation of skill-capital complementarity, see Tyers 
and Yang (2000). 
Z3 Consequently, the rates in Table 14.3 tend to reflect the proportional changes in powers of 
tariffs implied by lanchovichina and Martin (2001) and the magnitudes as detailed in the protocol. 
'B To the extent that some of the tariff reductions may in fact be phased in over several years, our 
analysis will tend to overstate the economic impacts in the short run. 
Z3 The net factor income component of the current account is zero at the outset because that is 
the assumption embodied in the construction of the original database. 
Z3 To see these at least partially offsetting gains in allocative efficiency it is necessary to use a 
mUlti-commodity general equilibrium framework such as that used in this chapter. 
3J Interestingly, this pressure has tended to be for a revaluation of the RMB, which would benefit 
both Japan and the US in the short run. The shocks we examine, however, yield real depreciations. 
Were these shocks dominant, we believe the fundamentals would be more likely to support a 
devaluation of the RMB. A revaluation would be justified only in the event of Chinese investment 
demand taking on 'bubble' characteristics, capital controls notwithstanding. 
31 See the discussion on this point by Edwards (2003). 
" See both Roberts and Tyers (2003) and Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2003). 
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A BRiEF HISTORY 
Internet use in mainland China has accelerated in recent years, reaching 68 million 
users by 30 June 2003,1 in sharp contrast to the slowdown in some of the industrialised 
economies. The latest survey conducted in Taiwan (31 December 2002) shows that 
the internet penetration rate on the island has reached 38 per cent, or 8.6 million 
users. A similar survey conducted by the City University of Hong Kong at the end of 
2002 indicates that internet users in the Hong Kong number 2.8 million or 45 per 
cent of the Hong Kong population aged from 6 to 84, according to the China Internet 
Network Information Centre (CNNIC) definition, or 2.4 million according to the WIP 
(World Internet Project) definition or 49 per cent of the population aged from 18 to 
74. This chapter focuses on internet development in mainland China, with additional 
discussions of the situation in Hong Kong and Taiwan when relevant. 
Internet development has been dramatic all over the world. Its brief history in 
China is even more dramatic because of the particular political and social factors. 
On 20 September 1987, Professor Qian Tianbai, then in charge of the internet 
project of China Academic Network (CAN ET) initiated by the Beijing Municipal 
Computer Application Research Institute with collaboration with Karlsruhe University 
in West Germany, sent the first electronic mail, entitled 'Crossing the Great Wall to 
the World'. This email went through the PAD set up in Beijing by the Italian ATAPAC, 
routed by the German DATEX· P, at the speed of 300 bytes per second. It was slow 
and small but historic. Over a year later, in December 1988, Tsinghua University 
campus network in Beijing adopted the X400 Protocol, an email software package 
brought back by Professor Hu Daoyuan from the University of British Columbia 
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(UBC), Canada, to connect to the UBC campus through the X.25 network. In the 
same year, the institute of High Energy Physics in the Academia Sinica in Beijing 
enacted its DECnet as an extension of the central DECnet in Western Europe through 
X.25, realising international computer networking and email communications with 
Europe and North America. 
In May 1989, the China Research Network (CRN) was connected to the German 
Research Network (DFN) through the pilot X.25 net built by the then Ministry of 
Posts and Telecommunications. By that time, the CRN members comprised only a 
handful of research institutes and universities in Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, 
Shijiazhuang and Nanjing. Nevertheless, the CRN could provide services such as 
email, file transmission based on File-Transfer Access and Management (FTAM) 
standard, catalogue based on X.500 standard, and access to the Internet through 
the DFN. In April 1990, the State Planning Commission organised bidding for a 
project to build a pilot network of education and research (NCFC) in the Zhongguancun 
area in Beijing (now China's hi-tech computing centre), with loans from the World 
Bank and jointly supported by the State Planning Commission, State Science 
Commission, Academia Sinica, National Natural Science Foundation and State 
Education Commission.The project aimed to build a high-speed interconnected 
network connecting Academia Sinica, Peking University and Tsinghua University 
with a super-computing centre. World Bank loans played a positive role in the 
development process. 
In October 1990, Professor Qian Tianbai, representing China, officially registered 
China's top domain name as CN in the Defense Data Network Network Information 
Center (DDN-NIC) of ARPANET (US Department of Defense) which was then in 
charge of allocation of global internet domain names and internet provider (IP) 
addresses before the Internet's Information Center (INTERNIC) was established. 
International email service using CN domain name started from that time. Since 
China was not yet formally connected to the internet, Karlsruhe University was 
commissioned to run the CN domain name server. At the international Networking 
(INET) Conference in June 1992 in Kobe, Japan, Qian Hualin, a research fellow at 
Academia Sinica, met the person in charge of the international network of the US 
National Science Foundation to discuss the issue of China's official connection to 
the internet. He was informed, however, that there were political hurdles because 
many US government organisations were connected to the Internet. Nevertheless, 
that year saw the completion of the National Computing and Networking Facility 
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(NCFC) college and institute network project, the CASNET, connecting dozens of 
research institutes of Academia Sinica and its headquarters, the TUNET of the 
Tsinghua University campus and the PUNET of the Peking University campus. 
On 2 March 1993, the Institute of High Energy Physics, Academia Sinica leased 
a 64K dedicated line from AT&T's international satellite channel to connect to the 
Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC). But it was only permitted a US Energy 
network because the US government still excluded 'socialist countries' since there 
was too much sensitive information about science and technology on the internet. 
Nevertheless, it was China's first dedicated line with partial access to the internet, 
so the China State Fund Commission strongly supported this initiative and allocated 
300,000 RMB Yuan to enable a" leaders of key research projects from various 
fields to access this line through dialing. Hundreds of scientists in China benefited, 
and email use within China in general was established. Ten days later, the then 
Deputy Premier Zhu Rongji put forward a proposal to establish the National Public 
Economic Information Network-the Golden Bridge Project. Next month the Computer 
Network Information Center of Academia Sinica brought together some of the network 
experts in Beijing to determine a framework for the China domain name system, 
after examining the domain name systems of other countries. In June 1993, NCFC 
specialists reiterated China's request to be linked to the internet at various possible 
occasions during the INET'93 conference and won the support of most participants 
from the international internet community. Qian Hualin discussed China's internet 
connection at the CCIRN conference and gained majority support. 
On 27 August 1993, the then Premier Li Peng approved the use of US$3 million of 
the Premier Reserve Fund to activate the Golden Bridge Project. The following 
month Deputy Premier Zou Jiahua established the National Joint Conference on 
Economy Informationalisation.ln December, NCFC backbone network construction 
was completed with high-speed optical fibre wires and routers connecting the three 
networks of CASNET, TUNET and PUNET. At the beginning of 1994, before the 
China-America Network Symposium (CANS), US NSF agreed with the request of 
NCFC to connect to the internet officially. In March 1994, a 64Kbps dedicated line 
was tested and opened to the public. 
In April, the Sino-American Federation of Scientific and Technological Cooperation 
met in Washington, DC, and Hu Qiheng, the then Vice President of Academia Sinica, 
reiterated China's request to be linked to the internet. NSF agreed. On 20 April 1994, 
the NCFC project leased and opened a dedicated 64K line through SPRINT Co. of 
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the United States to connect China with the internet. This represented official 
international recognition of China's internet access. 
Young people now take internet access for granted but establishing links for China 
was a complicated process. The Chinese media ranked the country's full access to 
the internet among the top ten science and technology news items in 1994, and the 
State Statistics Bulletin ranked it among the major science and technology 
achievements in the same year. 
On 15 May 1994, Academia Sinica's Institute of High Energy Physics set up the 
first web server with a set of web pages in China. The contents included exhibitions 
of China's hi-tech development and a window called 'Tour of China', which later 
extended to include graphics plus information on news, economy, culture, trade and 
so on, and was renamed as 'Window of China'. This development path is similar to 
the European integration process, which also began with collaborations in physics 
research. Soon after, Academia Sinica's Computer Network Information Center 
completed the installation of China's top domain name server (CN). This was a 
historic moment. 
In June 1994, the General Office of the State Council issued a notice to all 
provinces and municipalities to start the 'Three Golden Projects'. In September, 
China Telecom signed an agreement with US Chamber of Commerce to establish 
international internet links between China and the United States specifying that 
China Telecom would open two 64K dedicated lines provided by the US Sprint 
Corporation, one line in Beijing and the other in Shanghai. Construction of China's 
public computer network (CHINANET) started. The following month the State Planning 
Commission invested in the China Education and Research Network (CERNET), 
supervised by the State Education Commission. This was a national infrastructure 
for education and research linking most colleges and middle schools for campus 
network interconnection and information resources. This was also the first year of 
the APNG (Asia Pacific Networking Group) Annual Meeting in Tsinghua University, 
the first international meeting in China on the internet. 
In January 1995, China Telecom opened the two 64K lines to the United States 
provided by the Sprint Corporation and started to offer internet service to the general 
public through telephone lines, DON and X.25 network. CERNET then put the journal 
'Shen Zhou Scholar' (Chisacm) published by the State Education Commission on 
the internet. This was the first Chinese language e-journal. Soon after, CERNET 
opened a 128K dedicated line into the United States. In August 1995, CERNET 
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opened the Tsinghua 'ShuiMu'(water-wood) the first internet bulletin board system 
(BBS) on mainland China. 
In January 1996, China Telecom completed the national backbone network of 
CHINANET and opened nationwide internet access. Soon after, the State Council 
issued Decree 195 on 'Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on 
the Management of International Interconnection of Computer Information Network'. 
In September 1996, the China Golden Bridge Information Network (CHINAGBN) 
opened its 256K dedicated line with the United States and announced provision of 
internet access, mainly for group users through dedicated circuits and for individuals 
through telephone lines. In November, CERNET opened its 2M international 
communication channel. In December, China Public Multimedia Communication 
Network (169 Net) began full operations, with the opening of its first group of web sites, 
including Guangdong Shilington, Tianfu Online (Sichuan) and Shanghai Online. 
The State Council held a Nationallnformationalisation Workshop from 18-21 April 
1997 in Shenzhen. This meeting defined the national information system framework, 
determined the essential factors, missions and guidelines, working principles, 
objectives and major tasks of such systems, and passed the 'National 
informationalisation 95 Planning and Vision Goals of 2000' .It also categorised the 
internet into the construction agenda of national information infrastructure facilities 
and proposed the establishment of the National Internet Information Centre and the 
Internet Exchange Centre. On 20 May 1997, the State Council revised the Provisional 
Regulations on Internet Management. Ten days later, the Office of Informationalisation 
Leading Team of the State Council issued the Decree on 'Provisional Regulations of 
China Internet Domain Name Registration', commissioning Academia Sinica to 
establish and manage the CNNIC, and the China Education and Research Computer 
Network Center to contract with the CNNIC for management of the secondary domain 
names '.edu.cn'. 
In November 1997, the CNNIC published its first Statistical Report on Internet 
Development in China. On 30 December 1997, the Ministry of Public Security issued 
'Security Protection Management Regulations of International Interconnection of 
Computer Information Network', approved by the State Council. In 1997, connection 
between CHINANET, CSTNET (China Science and Technology Network), CENET 
(China Economics Network) and CHINAGSN networks was established. Early the 
following year, the National People's Congress merged several ministries to form 
the Ministry of Information Industries (MII), which would oversee nation-wide 
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manufacturing of electronic and information technology products, telecommunications 
sector and software industry to advance the knowledge of the national economy 
and social services. 
CERNET opened a satellite network and two satellite systems of CSTNET in 
January 1991, replacing the IP/X.25 and connecting more than 40 cities in China 
with high-speed satellite channels. Network speed was significantly improved. In 
February 1999, they launched the China National Information Security Testing 
Evaluation Centre (CNISTEC). Then MU cut various charges on internet access 
service by as much as 50 per cent and cancelled certain charges. China also 
opened its first ethnic minority website, the Tongyuan Xizhang (Tibet), on the platform 
of Western Space in Gansu Province in western China. Development of the internet 
in China was even more rapid after 2000. 
CNNiC started to publish statistical reports on internet development in China in 
October 1997. This survey adopted international conventions by using a combination 
of networked computer search methods, user questionnaires and so on. The sampling 
and statistical methods and results are widely cited in China and internationally. It is 
one of the most reliable and authoritative surveys in China and has published results 
every January and July since 1998. A summary of the major findings from this 
series of reports follows.2 
First, networked computers and international bandwidth have increased 
exponentially in mainland China during this period, about 80 and 732 times the 
October 1997 levels, respectively (Table 15.1). The slight decrease of international 
bandwidth in late 2002 and early 2003 was mainly due to the reduction of bandwidth 
by CHINANET and CNCNET (China Netcom Corporation Ltd.) (Table 15.2) although 
UNINET and CMNET expanded their bandwidth to a different extent. The reason 
was probably due to market fluctuations reflected in network use, since UNINET 
and CMNET represented the fast development of mobile telecommunications in 
China. The decrease of bandwidth gaps among the major service providers, 
particularly the telecoms, could mean more effective competition in this market. 
Business application (com) under 'CN' is still the main trend although it was stagnant 
in 2001-02 due to the burst of the internet bubble in global financial markets (Table 
15.3). It should be noted that electronic government is rapidly becoming more 
common. Investment in e-government in 2002 was about RMB 40 billion and is 
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Table 15.1 Growth of networked computers ('000) 
Total Dedicated line Dial-up International 
bandwidth(M) 
October 1997 299 49 250 25.4 
July 1998 542 82 460 84.6 
January 1999 747 117 630 143.2 
July 1999 1,460 250 1,210 241.0 
January 2000 3,500 410 3,090 351.0 
July 2000 6,500 1,010 5,490 1,234.0 
January 2001 8,920 1,410 7,510 2,799.0 
July 2001 10,020 1,630 8,390 3,257.0 
January 2002 12,540 2,340 10,200 7,597.5 
July 2002 16,130 3,070 12,000+1,060 10576.5 
in other ways 
Jan. 2003 20,830 4,030 14,800+2,000 9380 
in other ways 
July 2003 25,720 5,150 17,390+3,180 18599 
in other ways 
Source: CNNIC Survey 
Table 15.2 International bandwidth distribution (million yuan) 
July 2002 January 2003 July 2003 
CSTNET 55 55 55 
CHINANET 6452 5147 10959 
CERNET 257.5 259 324 
UNINET (China Unicom) 693 1093 1435 
CNCNET (China NetCom) 2870 2469 2112 
CHINA169 
(broadband by China Netcom) n.a n.a. 3465 
CIETNET 
(China International Economy and Trade Net) 2 2 2 
CMNET (China Mobile) 247 355 247 
CGWNET (China Great Wall Net) (under construction) (under construction) 
CSNET (China Satellite Group Net) (under construction) (under construction) 
Source: CNNIC Survey 
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expected to reach RMB 50 billion in 2003. The number of websites has risen from 
approximately 1 ,500 in October 1997 to 15,153 in January 2000, 371 ,600 in January 
2003 and 473,900 in July 2003. The geographic distribution of websites and domain 
names registered under 'CN' has been reasonably stable during all surveys since 
1997. The North (mainly Beijing), East and South parts of China have accounted for 
some 85 per cent or even more of the total, while the Northeast, Southwest and 
Northwest parts of China are still far behind. This pattern reflects disparities in 
economic development and also in the application of information technology between 
these regions. 
The growth of online users is even more impressive, with rates in double digits in 
all the years, reaching 68 million in July 2003 (see Table 15.4). In July 2003, it was 
more than 110 times October 1997 and stands at the position of no. 2 internationally, 
only just behind the United States.3 On the other hand, online users account for 
merely 5.3 per cent of the population (1.3 billion in China), which indicates a huge 
potential in future growth. Further, it should be noted that dialing-up access maintains 
the main connection way for the majority of networked computers and also for 
online users. Broadband is only a recent phenomenon although its growth seems 
fast. Other economies, from the United States to Europe, and from Japan to South 
Korea, have put high priority on the development of broadband internet. The case of 
South Korea is particularly interesting (Tang 2002). The successful penetration of 
Table 15.3 Distribution of domain names under 'CN' 
COM EDU GOV NET ORG others Total 
October 1997. 2131 325 323 370 99 818 4066 
July 1998 6559 414 561 657 229 995 9415 
January 1999 13913 531 982 1223 409 1338 18396 
July 1999 22220 615 1663 2221 649 1677 29045 
January 2000 38776 731 2479 3753 940 2016 48695 
July 2000 78878 812 3665 10719 1912 3748 99734 
January 2001 96221 1127 4615 13291 2596 4249 122099 
July 2001 99922 1239 5181 15055 2864 4101 128362 
January 2002 99123 1354 5864 14045 2943 3990 127319 
July 2002 98835 1482 6686 12248 3031 3864 126146 
January 2003 133796 1629 7796 20234 9587 6502 179544 
July 203 341753 n.a 7876 60408 26292 35196 473900 
Source: CNNIC Survey 
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broadband use has dramatically changed the way of life and business there. China 
should pay more attention in this strategically important area. Another worth 
mentioning is the growth of internet access from equipment other than computer, 
including mobile devices and home appliances, with users increasing from 200,000 
in January 2000 to 1.53 million in January 2003 and to 1.8 million in July 2003. 
These figures represent a 9 times increase within three and a half years. 
Clearly, the pattern of demographic distribution of online users has shifted from a 
mainly male activity to a more even one (Table 15.5). Male online users still count 
as 20 per cent more than female ones, but female users have been steadily increasing 
and have stabilised at about 40 per cent. The disparity has decreased from 7:1 in 
October 1997, to about 3:2 in 2003. Male users number 40.87 million in July 2003, 
a 16.6 per cent increase from the previous six months and close to 75 times the 
number in October 1997. Female users number about 27.13 million, a smaller increase 
of 12.8 per cent but still 358 times the number in October 1997. Nevertheless, male 
users account for 6.2 per cent of the male population in China and female users 
only 4.4 per cent of the female population, indicating a much lower Internet penetration 
rate in females than males in China. 
Married people seem to have less time for such a novel hobby, reflected in the 
stable gap of 20 per cent fewer than unmarried users, although this gap may be 
narrowing. Clearly usage is linked to the fact that the internet appeals to people 
Table 15.4 Growth of online users ('000) 
Total Dedicated line Dial-up Both ways 
October 1997 620 155 465 n.a. 
July 1998 1,175 325 850 n.a. 
January 1999 2,100 400 1,490 210 
July 1999 4,000 760 2,560 680 
January 2000 8,900 1,090 6,660 1,150 
July 2000 16,900 2,580 11,760 2,560 
January 2001 22,500 3,640 15,430 3,430 
July 2001 26,500 4,540 17,930 4,030 
January 2002 33,700 6,720 21,330 5,650 
ISDN Broadband 
July 2002 45,800 16,060 33,420 3,150 2,000 
Jan. 2003 59,100 20,230 48,000 4,320 6,600 
July 2003 68,000 23,420 45,010 4,900 9,800 
Source: CNNIC Survey 
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under 35. Married internet users reached 27.4 million by July 2003, or 3.4 per cent 
of the married population, while there were 40.6 million unmarried users, or 8.6 per 
cent of the unmarried population. Age seems to be the most important factor 
determining internet use so far, with the 18-24 year olds being most active, making 
up 40 per cent of all internet users. The proportion of 25-30 year olds has decreased 
sharply in the past three years, from 30.8 per cent in January 2000 to 17 per cent in 
January 2003, while users under 18 have risen rapidly, from 2.4 per cent to 17.6 per 
cent during the same period. This change has mainly to do with the recent trend of 
middle school students going online. The proportion of internet users over 35 has 
been fluctuating by about 2 per cent though generally increasing steadily, numbering 
11.08 million in July 2003. The overall pattern seems to indicate that online activities 
are still more for information and fun than for business. 
Table 15.6 summarises the educational level of online users from July 1998, 
when this aspect was first surveyed. Obviously, the high school, professional school 
and three-year college level again account for the majority in recent years, although 
university-educated people were the main pioneers to use the internet. More specifically, 
by January 2003, high school and professional school education levels accounted 
for 30.9 per cent while three year college (Da Zhuan) level accounted for 27.1 per 
cent. The growth at undergraduate education level or above stood at 6.3 per cent or 
1.14 million during the same period. The increasing supply and diversity of online 
content and lower costs of access services have surely contributed to this change. 
Table 15.5 Demographics of online users (per cent) 
Male Female Below 35 Above 35 Married Unmarried 
October 1997 87.7 12.3 84.1 15.9 n.a. n.a. 
July 1998 92.8 7.2 91.1 8.9 n.a. n.a. 
January 1999 86.0 14.0 89.8 10.2 36 64 
July 1999 85.0 15.0 88.9 11.1 37 63 
January 2000 79.0 21.0 88.2 11.8 36 64 
July 2000 74.7 25.3 87.6 12.4 33.4 66.5 
January 2001 69.6 30.4 83.8 16.2 37.0 62.9 
July 2001 61.3 38.7 79.8 20.2 41.5 58.5 
January 2002 69.0 40.0 79.9 20.1 43.1 56.9 
July 2002 60.9 39.1 82.0 18.0 41.1 58.9 
January 2003 59.3 40.7 82.1 17.9 42.2 57.8 
July 2003 60.1 39.9 83.7 16.3 40.3 59.7 
Source: CNNIC Survey 
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Another useful category would be according to occupations or industries. 
Unfortunately, CNNIC surveys used different industry names or occupation titles at 
various stages so it is not feasible to summarise them in tables as above. In the 
latest surveys, January and July 2003, one can see that students account for 28 
and 30.1 per cent of on line users, more than the technical and professional people 
at 15.7 and 15.9 per cent. The third ranked are clerks, assistants, commerce and 
service people at 10.3 and 9.1 per cent, while the agriculture, forestry, cattle-raising 
and fishing personnel and the military personnel make up only 1, 0.9 and 0.8 per 
cent respectively of online users. Students are generally more open to novelty and 
the significant improvement in campus network infrastructure has certainly helped 
this trend. By January and July 2003, student online users account for 7.4 and 9 per 
cent of the total student population (including primary to postgraduate students), a 
2 per cent increase during six months if one takes into account the vast base of 
student population in the enormous size of China. 
By industry categorisation, personnel from public management and social 
organisations account for 12.5 per cent among online users, followed by wholesale 
and retailing personnel (11.8 per cent), manufacturing personnel (11.1 per cent), 
education and scientific researchers (10.6 per cent), IT personnel (10.3 per cent), 
financial industry personnel (6.1 per cent), warehousing and transportation workers 
(4.7 per cent), health, social security and welfare personnel (3 per cent) and so on. 
Table 15.6 Education level of online users (per cent) 
Below College! 
high school University Undergraduate Postgraduate 
July 1998 6.9 34.2 49.6 9.3 
July 1999 2.0 39.0 48.0 11.0 
January 2000 3.0 45.0 45.0 7.0 
July 2000 2.5 45.6 45.9 5.9 
January 2001 6.4 52.4 38.8 2.3 
July 2001 8.7 55.5 33.6 2.2 
January 2002 10.2 56.9 30.4 2.5 
July 2002 11.5 56.8 29.2 2.5 
January 2003 12.9 56.7 27.6 2.8 
July 2003 13.9 58 25.5 2.6 
Source: CNNIC Survey 
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Internet use growth is highest among the health, social security and welfare personnel 
(83.2 per cent or 0.99 million during 6 months) followed by education personnel 
(39.8 per cent or 1.67 million) and manufacturing personnel (38.3 per cent during six 
months). Online user population becomes more and more diverse by occupations 
or industries, a healthy trend for Internet development in China. The fast growth of 
online users in manufacturing is interesting, since this sector is increasingly important 
in the Chinese economy, which is dominated by manufacturing. Increasing familiarity 
with internet use and e-commerce will enhance the competitiveness and productivity 
of its workforce and the whole sector. 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou areas clearly dominated Internet use in the 
early years and still are the most important parts (Table 15.7). But other regions are 
catching up fast, especially the Northeast and Southwest regions. It would be 
interesting to make a comparison of users in the East and Northwest, the two ends 
of the spectrum. According to the CNNIC survey in January 2003, male Internet 
users account for 58 per cent in the East and female 38 per cent, but 67.5 per cent 
versus 32.5 per cent in the Northwest - 51.9 per cent are unmarried users in the 
East and 45.3 per cent in the Northwest. The patterns are qualitatively different with 
sex ratio and marriage status reversed in these two regions. On the other hand, age 
distribution does not seem to differ between these two regions. Internet users at 
different age intervals in the East and Northwest were 19.5 per cent versus 19.6 per 
Table 15.7 Geographic distribution of online users 
North Northeast East South Southwest Northwest 
October 1997 41.0 5.2 27.1 29.5 4.3 1.9 
July 1998 31.6 9.6 29.3 22.6 4.2 2.7 
January 1999 28.7 6.7 24.0 30.5 5.9 4.0 
July 1999 26.7 6.6 32.0 21.2 7.9 4.7 
January 2000 28.0 7.4 31.6 23.6 6.0 3.2 
July 2000 25.1 6.4 35.0 22.9 6.2 4.3 
January 2001 19.9 9.5 34.4 21.8 9.3 4.9 
January 2002 17.7 8.4 36.0 24.3 9.0 4.6 
July 2002 
January 2003 21.9 11.0 26.4 25.0 10.3 5.4 
July 2003 
Note: CNNIC survey began to report by provinces. The author computed according to the 
traditional regional names (South includes South China and Middle China here). 
Source: CNNIC Survey 
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Table 15.8 Methods of financing online access 
Public Private Both ways 
July 1998 35.0 44.0 21.0 
January 1999 26.0 45.0 29.0 
July 1999 28.0 46.0 26.0 
January 2000 21.0 59.0 20.0 
July 2000 17.5 56.3 26.1 
January 2001 14.1 63.3 22.4 
July 2001 12.6 7004 17.9 
January 2002 10.7 73.7 15.6 
July 2002 10.1 77.1 12.8 
January 2003 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
July 2003 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source: CNNIC Survey 
cent for below 18, 31.3 per cent versus 23.4 per cent for 18-24, 18.9 versus 18.1 per 
cent for 25-30, 10.8 versus 17.5 for 31-35,8.2 per cent versus 11.9 for 36-40,6.9 
per cent versus 6.5 per cent for 41-50,3.5 per cent versus 1,8 per cent for 51-60, 
and 1 per cent versus 1.2 per cent for above 60. Internet users in the East were 
younger, 69.7 per cent below 31 while it is 61.1 per cent in the Northwest, not a 
qualitatively significant difference. 
The distribution of educational levels among online users and online timing each 
day are also similar in these two regions. The frequency of internet use, however, is 
much higher in the East (11.3 hours and 3.6 days per week on average) than in the 
Northwest (8.4 hours and 3 days per week on the average) and consistently with 
this average, Eastern users spent more for internet connection than their non-Western 
counterparts. This pattern is also consistent with the economic development level 
in these two regions. 
The' proportion of non-users in the Northwest who wished to go online within a 
year was higher than in the East. Easterners went online more for information and 
for fun, while their Northwest counterparts more for education and making friends. 
The geographic remoteness of the Northwest is probably the contributing factor. 
Ways of financing online access have changed dramatically, as reflected in table 
15.8. People have mainly spent their own money for internet access in recent years, 
and the CNNIC survey has stopped even collecting such data since 2003. It is not 
surprising, because internet access infrastructure becomes increasingly better and 
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cheaper. When we consider that recently, private cars in China exceeded 10 million, 
it is clear that increasing numbers of people will also finance internet access. 
In recent years, the CNNIC surveys started to collect information on the income 
distribution of internet users, an important improvement. See Table 15.9 for the 
years 2002 to 2003. Obviously, low income or even no income groups are the main 
users, thus online retailing in China still has a long to go, except for a few items 
such as books or online game services. In addition, the average spending on internet 
access is also rather low, mostly below 100 yuan per month, thus even ISPs must 
seriously think about their business models for sustainability facing such types of 
users (students and other young people without regular income). Fortunately, the 
growth rate of relatively high-income users (above 2000 yuan per month) seems 
higher than the low-income groups recently-i6.6 per cent (from 9.2 per cent, an 
increase of 10.7 million from January to July 2003), versus 14.8 per cent (from 49.9 
million to 57.3 million)-indicating a medium to long run market. 
Online activities and behaviour of Chinese internet users has evolved significantly, 
as in most other regions in the world. In the survey of October 1997, there were 10.3 
per cent users who went online less than an hour per week, 43.3 per cent between 
one to five hours, 26.3 per cent five to 10 hours and 20.1 per cent above 10 hours. 
The distribution changed to 7.1 per cent, 25.3 per cent, 26.7 per cent and 40.9 per 
cent, respectively, in the survey of July 1998, and 4 per cent, 31 per cent, 29 per 
cent, and 36 per cent in January 1999. Heavy users increased sharply from about 
20 per cent to over 40 per cent in a mere nine months, while the user population was 
exponentially rising. In the multiple choices of October 1997 survey, 80.4 per cent 
users wanted science and technology information, 42 per cent looking for social 
news, 39.6 per cent for commercial information, 32.8 per cent for financial information, 
and 24.8 per cent for leisure information. Clearly, most users were looking for science 
and technology information, probably due to the fact that 54.7 per cent users that 
year were professionals in research, education and IT industry and students, while 
the proportion of consumption-type users was relatively small. The situation changed 
dramatically nine months later, with 63.3 per cent users looking for leisure, 
entertainment and sports information, 67.2 per cent for science and technology, 
45.1 per cent for economical and political news, 43.7 per cent for commercial 
information, 26.1 per cent for financial and securities information, and, interestingly, 
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15.2 per cent interested in advertisements. This must be a good time for web portals 
with an advertisement-based business model. 
Common complaints of users were the slow speed online (49.1 per cent in 1997 
and 88.9 per cent in 1998), high connection charges (36.2 per cent in 1997 and 61.2 
per cent in 1998), and too little information in Chinese language (7.3 per cent in 
1997 and 45.5 per cent in 1998). In addition, users began to examine the service 
quality of ISPs as reflected in the 1998 survey, with 38.4 per cent users regarding 
the service providers as very good (patient with customers about problem solving 
and training), 55 per cent feeling so-so (nice at the beginning when attracting users 
but impatient later) and 6.6 per cent finding the ISPs very bad (no attempt at improving 
service quality). 
Table 15.9 Monthly income distribution of online users (RMB, per cent) 
January 2002 
Below 500 501-1,000 1,001-1,500 1,501-2,000 2,001-2,500 2,501-3,000 
23.6 25.3 16.5 8.8 4.4 3.4 
3,001-4,000 4,001-5,000 5,001-6,000 6,001-10,000 Above 10,000 No income 
2.3 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.8 12.3 
July 2002 
Below 500 501-1,000 1,001-1,500 1,501-2,000 2,001-2,500 2,501-3,000 
24.8 24.1 16.5 8.2 4.6 2.6 
3,001-4,000 4,001-5,000 5,001-6,000 6,001-10,000 Above 10,000 No income 
2.7 1.3 0.7 0.6 0.9 13.0 
January 2003 
Below 500 501-1,000 1,001-1,500 1,501-2,000 2,001-2,500 2,501-3,000 
23.5 20.9 15.4 8.2 5.1 3.8 
3,001-4,000 4,001-5,000 5,001-6,000 6,001-10,000 Above 10,000 No income 
3.1 1.3 0.7 0.7 0.8 16.5 
July 2003 
Below 500 501-1,000 1,001-1,500 1,501-2,000 2,001-2,500 2,501-3,000 
20.8 18.3 15.9 9.8 4.6 3.7 
3,001-4,000 4,001-5,000 5,001-6,000 6,001-10,000 Above 10,000 No income 
2.4 2.0 0.7 1.0 1.1 19.5 
Source: CNNIC SUNey 
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Since January 1999, surveys have collected information about where people go 
online (Table 15.10). The clear trend is that people are going online mainly in homes. 
Schools and Internet cafes have become important places for on line access in 
recent years. This pattern corresponds to the increasing penetration of personal 
computers into Chinese homes, significant improvement in connection infrastructure 
both in schools and residential areas and a sharp reduction in connection charges. 
The broadband power and popularity in Internet cafes have been particularly attractive 
to young users. 
The time people spent online exhibited an interesting pattern, dropping from a 
high 17 hours per week on average in early 2000 to 8.3 hours in mid 2002, but 
increasing sharply to 13 hours by July 2003 (Figure 15.1). The latest rise is attributed 
to the impact of SARS. 
Survey data on the usual time people go online is shown in Table 15.11 in hour 
blocks (24 hour clock). 
Figures 15.2a-15.2b show the survey results in January and July 2003, from 
which one can see that the curve fluctuates a good deal but the pattern has been 
quite similar from the known surveys in the past years. Fewest people go on line 
between midnight to 7 am, and more activities start from 8 am. Predictably, the 
most active period is in the evening, with about 30-40 per cent of users going online 
during this time. 
The hardware used to go on line is constantly changing, and notebook computers 
are increasing rapidly (see Table 15.12). Even novel hardware such as mobile devices 
and info home appliances are becoming more acceptable to internet users (see 
Figure 15.3). 
The main reasons users go on line have also been surveyed (see Table 15.13). 
Clearly, the dominant purpose is to obtain information, followed by leisure and 
entertainment, then making friends. The internet has provided another channel for 
the traditionally conservative Chinese communities for more openness in personal 
lifestyles, although phenomena like one-night stands resulting from chat rooms are 
judged immoral by older generations. The fact that needs to be faced and researched 
is the profound changes accompanying the fast development in the economy and 
the widespread use of the internet, especially among the younger generation. The 
temporary setback in the stock trading online had much to do with the problems in 
the stock markets in China these years, rather than problems associated with the 
internet. 
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Table 15.10 Main location of going online (per cent) 
Year Home Work Schools Internet Other Public Mobile 
units cafes library 
January 1999 44.0 50.0 n.a. 3.0 3.0 
July 1999 44.0 47.0 n.a. 4.0 5.0 
January 2000 50.0 37.0 n.a 11.0 2.0 
July 2000' 58.8 43.0 n.a. 20.9 8.8 
January 2001 * 60.3 43.9 19.7 20.6 4.1 
July 2001* 61.0 45.1 18.3 15.2 0.2 
January2002* 61.3 45.7 19.7 15.4 0.7 
July 2002* 62.1 43.3 21.8 17.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
January 2003* 62.6 42.5 20.2 19.4 0.4 0.6 0.5 
July 2003 65.9 43.0 22.6 18.1 0.7 0.4 0.5 
Note: 'Multiple choices possible. 
Source: CNNIC Survey 
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Table 15.11 Time of usual online use (multiple choice) (per cent) 
Time 0-1 am 2-3 am 
July 2000 24 11.05 
January 2001 10.58 2.9 
July 2001 14.1 4.1 
January 2002 14.9 5.0 
July 2002 15.2 6.4 
Time 8-9 am 10-11 am 
July 2000 43.1 37.3 
38.77 
January 2001 17.4 22.0 
July 2001 24.4 30.8 
January2002 16.9 21.2 
July 2002 20.4 21.2 
Time 4-5 pm 6-7 pm 
July 2000 32.94 42.96 
January 2001 28.49 33.56 
July 2001 35.9 39.5 
January 2002 29.7 40.0 
July 2002 33.6 48.5 
Source: CNNIC Survey 
Table 15.12 Hardware used to go online (per cent) 
Year Desktop Notebook 
computer computer 
July 2002 97.4 4.5 
January 2003 95.2 10.1 
July 2003 n.a. n.a. 
Note: * Including mobile devices and info home appliances. 
Source: CNNIC Survey 
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Table 15.13 Main purpose for going online (per cent) 
Year Information Study Work Leisure Emotional Making 
needs friends 
July 2001 42.9 4.3 5.8 34.4 
January 2002 46.1 4.3 6.2 31.1 
July 2002 47.6 6.6 1.6 18.9 1.2 14.9 
January 2003 53.1 4.8 2.0 24.6 1.1 7.0 
July 2003 46.9 7.2 0.8 28.6 0.1 7.5 
Year Obtain Commun- Stock Online Fashion, 
free things' ications" trading shopping curiosity Others 
July 2001 3.1 4.1 4.1 0.3 0.5 0.5 
January 2002 3.3 4.9 2.5 0.4 0.6 0.6 
July 2002 1.2 4.4 0.9 0.3 0.3 2.1 
January 2003 1.9 3.8 1.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 
July 2003 1.7 3.2 2.1 0.2 06 1.1 
Notes: a Including free business activities abd academic research. b Such as free email, personal 
homepage space, resources down loading, etc. C Such as sending and receiving emails, short 
messages, faxes, etc. 
Source: CNNIC Survey 












Jan-OO Jul-OO Jan-01 Jul-01 Jan-02 Jul-02 Jan-03 
295 
Language is obviously an issue in China, where most people do not speak any 
foreign language. It is thus not surprising to see that most people seek information, 
mostly domestic, in Chinese (see Table 15.14). 
The overall picture of internet use in China indicates that business to consumer 
electronic commerce still has a long way to go, due to the youth and low incomes of 
most users. Nevertheless, it is still important to examine this aspect in more detail. 
Table 15.15 summarises people's view of online transaction problems. The internet 
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Table 15.15 User perception of important problems of on line transactions 
(percent) 
Price not Online 
Incon- Product Delivery attractive info. not Other 
Security venience quality' delay enough reliable factors 
July 1999 30.0 22.0 34.0 6.0 8.0 n.a. n.a 
January 2000 36.5 17.68 27.6 9.2 7.78 n.a. 1.1 
July 2000 31.7 13.3 28.33 10.1 7.7 7.28 1.4 
January 2001 31.2 12.59 32.0 9.8 7.39 5.9 1.0 
July 2001 33.4 11.5 33.0 8.7 6.6 6.0 0.8 
January 2002 31.0 11.8 30.2 13.9 6.3 6.3 0.5 
July 2002 22.1 13.0 36.9 10.2 11.1 5.9 0.8 
January 2003 23.4 10.8 39.3 8.6 10.8 6.4 0.7 
July 2003 25.1 9.9 40.0 7.1 10.3 7.0 0.6 
Notes: 'Product quality, after-sales service and merchant trustworthiness without guarantee. 
Source: CNNIC Survey 
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security issue is universal so it is not surprising to see it in China. But people seem 
to worry less about this issue in recent years, and more (nearly 40 per cent) worry 
about quality control. This may be a result of fraud issues in the Chinese business 
environment. The credibility problem in the Chinese business world is so severe 
that this is more a business problem than a technological problem. Inconvenience 
of payment methods and unattractive pricing is also contributing to the online retailing 
stagnation. 
A good sign of progress, if slow, is reflected in Table 15.16. Almost one third of 
Internet users had purchased goods or services online by January 2003. During the 
period of SARS in China, even more people (as reflected by the clear growth in the 
July 2003 survey) have switched to online shopping and found it satisfactory, to 
their surprise. Newspapers had reported people saying that they would not want to 
go to the crowded shopping malls after they had experienced pleasant shopping 
processes online, even for big-ticket items such as refrigerators. Ironically, the 
outbreak of SARS has given a good push for e-commerce development in China. 
The change of shopping habits will have a profound impact in China's retailing, 
although it may take some time. 
The variety of goods and services purchased online is summarised in Table 15.17. 
One can see that books, music products and computer-related products are the 
major items, although computer-related products are declining. It is natural to search 
for computer-related products on line, since online users will be more familiar with 
computers. The other two categories are small-ticket items, occupying a small portion 
of their respective markets. Internet market for consumer goods in China is still far 
behind other regions such as the United States and South Korea. 
Table 15.16 Goods or services purchased online (per cent) 
Yes No 
January 2000 8.8 91.2 
July 2000 16.3 83.7 
January 2001 31.7 68.3 
July 2001 31.9 68.1 
January 2002 31.6 68.4 
July 2002 31.2 68.8 
January 2003 33.8 66.2 
July 2003 40.7 59.3 
Source: CNNIC Survey 
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Table 15.17 Proportion of users who purchased (multiple choice) (per cent) 
Year Books and Computer Camera Telecom Music, Home 
Magazines & related & related & related image, etc. electronics 
July 2000 45.1 37.2 7.5 17.1 15.6 9.4 
January 2001 58.3 37.5 4.9 19.9 29.1 8.4 
July 2001 58.7 35.5 4.8 18.0 29.5 7.4 
January 2002 58.0 33.7 3.6 15.5 34.4 5.6 
July 2002 69.0 33.2 4.3 11.6 38.3 7.3 
January 2003 67.7 29.9 6.2 12.5 34.9 7.1 
July 2003* 63.8 30.7 7.7 12.5 31.4 8.0 
Living, Medical, 
Sport residence & health & Gifts & 
Clothing items services services services 
July 2000 7.68 6.96 12.11 4.91 11.23 
January 2001 6.92 6.91 14.29 4.44 16.41 
July 2001 5.9 6.1 11.8 3.8 13.8 
January 2002 4.4 4.4 11.6 3.1 14.7 
July 2002 5.0 5.4 11.6 3.0 12.1 
January 2003 5.5 4.7 11.0 2.7 12.7 
July 2003' 7.8 5.4 13.5 3.7 11.8 
Education Hotel 
Financial, & study Ticketing reservation 
insurance services services service Others 
July 2000 4.64 10.15 9.62 n.a. 11.13 
January 2001 3.76 13.13 8.45 n.a. 9.04 
July 2001 3.3 12.9 8.3 n.a. 4.1 
Jan. 2002 2.6 11.8 9.7 n.a. 3.1 
July 2002 2.5 9.5 7.9 5.2 1.8 
January 2003 2.1 9.8 7.7 4.3 2.3 
July 2003' 2.3 9.6 4.6' 3.8 2.0 
Note: * SARS period. 
Source: CNNIC Survey 
Tang and Liu (2003) have a detailed case study of the online book market in 
China, the results of which will not be repeated here. Briefly, even the most developed 
part of the on line markets in China (books) is immature. 
THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON CHINESE MARKETS 
Internet development in China started far behind other countries and progressed 
slowly in the early years, mainly due to the political hurdles imposed by the United 
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States. From mid 1990s however, it has started to fly, even during the period when 
the internet bubble burst in the financial markets in other regions of the world. 
However, people in China still mainly use Internet for information and leisure 
activities, rather than for business or governmental activities. Business-to-business 
electronic commerce in China is far behind other regions, not only because of 
technological problems, but also because of management and social culture issues. 
Ironically, the outbreak of SARS has pushed e-commerce and Internet development 
in China, since overseas visitors were unwilling to come so an alternative approach 
had to be in place for orders and transactions. The Chinese government has been 
very supportive of internet development and heavily financed e-government programs. 
From this perspective, the market potential in this vast country is enormous, although 
it would only show up in the medium to long run. The profound impact of Internet 
development will gradually, and in some cases dramatically, be felt in Chinese 
society, on its social system, culture and human relationships. 
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NOTES 
1 According to the authoritative surveys by China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), 
www.cnnic.org.cn. 
2 Details in the 12 survey reports are available on www.cnnic.org.cn. 
3 Online users number about 655 million globally by the end of 2002, according to the report from the 
UN Trade and Development Conference. 
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Accession to WTO and foreign 




China is now one of the largest pharmaceuticals producers in the world. During the 
reform period in the late 1970s, when Chinese authorities began economic reforms, 
the Chinese pharmaceutical industry has grown rapidly. The ouput of chemical raw 
medicines rose from 40.7 thousand tonnes in 1978 to 762.2 thousand tonnes in 
2001 (Figure 16.1). The output of lactams and vitamins accounts for about 30 per 
cent of the total world output. China has become the second largest producer of 
chemical raw medicines in the world. Over the same period, the ouput of traditional 
Chinese medicines increased sharply from 87 thousand tonnes to 655.9 thousand 
tonnes (Figure 16.1). 
China's pharmaceutical industry is made up of five sub-sectors (Table 16.1)-
It chemical raw medicines 
.. chemical pharmaceutical preparations 
.. traditional Chinese medicine and medicinal materials 
.. animal medicines 
It biological products. 
The role of the pharmaceutical industry in the Chinese economy has been growing. 
In 2001, the value of its output reached 204 billion yuan. From 1978-2001, the 
output value of the industry increased at an annual rate of 16.7 per cent-well 
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above the total of all industries, at 11.4 per cent. This industry's profitability was 
also higher than that of total industry (Figure 16.2). 
Chinese authorities permitted Sino-foreign equity joint ventures from 1979, wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises from 1986, and Sino-foreign contractual joint ventures 
since 1988. Since the first foreign-funded pharmacy enterprise was set up in 1980, 
568 foreign-funded enterprises with sales revenue over 5 million yuan have entered 
the market. Fifty multinational pharmaceutical firms with advanced productive 
capacity have established foreign-funded enterprises in China. At present, sales 
from foreign-funded enterprises account for 22.2 per cent of the total in the Chinese 
domestic market. By 2001, the accumulated foreign capital invested in the industry 
reached a total of 9.5 billion yuan with capital from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan 
reaching 4.8 billion yuan, and contributed 11.7 per cent and 6.0 per cent respectively 
to the total capital investment in the industry. Direct investment from foreign countries 
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Figure 16.2 Growth rates of net asset profits and output value, pharmaceutical 
and total industry, 1991-2001 
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Sources: China State Statistical Bureau, various years, China Statistical Yearbook and China 
Industrial Economy Statistical Yearbook, China Statistical Publishing House, Beijing. 
including Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan have played an important role in the 
development of the Chinese pharmaceutical industry. 
Official statistics show that since 1992 exports have exceeded imports of Chinese 
medicines continuously, and China has become a net exporter of medicines (Figure 
16.3). During 1992-95, the export value of medicines rose sharply, growing at an 
annual average rate of 20.1 per cent. In contrast, the import value of medicines fell 
by 14.4 per cent. Since 1997, however, the import value of medicines has increased 
rapidly, growing at an annual average rate of 38.5 per cent. 
Although the Chinese pharmaceutical industry as a whole has been growing rapidly, 
small-scale industries that are widely dispersed are the main characteristics of 
Chinese pharmaceutical enterprises. At present, there are 3,488 pharmaceutical 
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Table 16.1 Structure of the Chinese pharmaceutical industry in 2000 
SUb-sector sub-sectoral Sub-sectoral 
output value! sales revenue! 
Output total output Sales total sales 
Number of value value revenue revenue 
enterprises (RMB bn yuan) (per cent) (RMB bn yuan) (per cent) 
Chemical raw medicine 685 50.7 28.4 49.5 30.4 
Chemical pharmaceutical 
preparation 934 57.0 32.0 50.5 31.0 
Traditional Chinese medicine 
and medicinal material 1180 53.3 29.9 48.2 29.6 
Animal medicine 231 3.5 1.9 3.2 1.9 
Biological product 271 13.5 7.6 11.2 6.8 
Total 3301 178.1 100 162.7 100 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, 2000. China Industry Statistical Yearbook 2000, China Statistical 
Publishing House, Beijing 
producers, with only 820 (23 per cent) are classified as large or medium-sized. The 
sales value by the biggest 60 pharmaceutical enterprises contributes only 35.7 per 
cent to total sales of this industry. In contrast, the sales value by the biggest 20 
multinational pharmaceutical firms in the world produced more than 60 per cent of 
total sales in the international pharmaceutical market. This comparison shows that 
the market concentration of Chinese pharmaceutical enterprises is very low. 
Duplicated production and lack of autonomic patented products are further 
characteristics of the industry. For example, generic drugs, gentamycin, vitamin 
81, p-acetaminophemol (paracetanol) and metronidazole are being reproduced in 
hundreds of factories. New pharmaceuticals, levofloxacin and clarithromyin are also 
being reproduced in over 30 pharmaceutical factories. Numerous pharmaceutical 
enterprises are pursuing exorbitant short-term profits rather than long-term interests. 
Only half of the large and medium-sized pharmaceutical enterprises have established 
their own institutes of research and development, and many medium and small-
sized pharmacy enterprises have not established their own institutes. It is difficult 
for institutes and universities to find industrialised cooperative partners to turn their 
research achievements, patents and inventions into production. 
Expenditures for research and development have been below 3 per cent of total 
sales revenue per year, and less than 7 per cent of all employees in large and 
medium-sized pharmaceutical enterprises have been engaged in research (Table 
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Figure 16.3 Imports and exports of Chinese medicines 
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Source: State Statistical Bureau, various years. China Statistical Yearbook, China Statistical 
Publishing House, Beijing. 
16.2}. The financial and human resources for research and development are 
inadequate. Over 1995-2000, Chinese authorities granted new pharmaceutical 
licenses to 5,043 products, of which 108 were regarded as first class. Even though 
they were qualified as innovative products, not one was capable of entering the 
international market. In the field of biological products, over 30 varieties of genetic 
pharmaceuticals have been permitted by Chinese authorities into the market, of 
which only Interferon A 1 b is a Chinese invention. 
In the field of traditional Chinese medicine, the 'Gingko pill' and 'Salvia miltiorrhiza 
pill' have passed the US Federal Drug Administration's (FDA) antecedent 
examination, and are now in the clinical test stage. The export value of traditional 
Chinese medicines from China accounted for only 3 per cent of the total sales 
revenue generated by Chinese medicines on the international market. In the field of 
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Table 16.2 Research and development expenditures, of large and medium-sized 
pharmaceutical enterprises 
No. of Researchers/ R&D expenditures/ 
No. of enterprises employees total sales revenue 
enterprises with own institutes (per cent) (per cent) 
1996 678 466 3.9 1.7 
1997 708 408 5.8 1.6 
1998 726 406 6.3 1.7 
1999 711 418 6.1 1.7 
2000 728 411 6.8 2.4 
2001 820 410 6.9 2.5 
Sources: Calculated from original data obtained from China State Statistical Bureau and Ministry of 
Science and Technology (eds), 2000. China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology, 
1997-2002, China Statistical Publishing House, Beijing. 
chemical medicine, Chinese pharmaceutical enterprises mainly produce cheap 
imitations. In recent years, 97.4 per cent of the 873 varieties of chemical raw 
medicines produced by pharmaceutical enterprises were imitations. Chinese 
pharmaceutical enterprises have limited capabilities in the preparation of 
pharmaceuticals. In general, they can only prepare three kinds of dosage forms of 
chemical raw medicine, and the quality of medicaments is unstable. The management 
structure of Chinese pharmaceutical enterprises is outdated compared with 
multinational pharmaceutical firms. 
INTERNATIONAL TRADING COMPETITIVENESS 
Measuring international trading competitiveness 
The trading competitiveness of pharmaceutical products can be measured using 
the international trading competitive index and the price index. The international 
trading competitiveness index can be calculated using the following formula and 
definition 
International trading competitiveness index = (export value - import value)/ 
(export value + import value) 
International trading competitiveness scores close to 1 indicate high trading 
competitiveness, and scores closer to zero indicate low trading competitiveness. 
Where the total international trading competitiveness index of overall products in 
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particular industry is negative, this industry has a lack of international trading 
competitiveness, and a deficit of foreign trade occurs. 
The price index has the following calculation formula and definition, 
Price index = (export value/export volume) / (import value/import volume) 
The price index reflects the unit parity of a product in the international market. For 
a lower cost product, a high price index indicates a higher international trading profit 
margin and a price competitive advantage for that product. The exporter of this 
product can reduce the export/import unit parity of the product to support the 
international trading competitiveness of the product. In other words, an exporter 
with the lower cost product can sacrifice his price advantage to gain strong 
international trading competitiveness. When the international trading competitive 
index and the price index of a product drop continuously at the same time, this 
means that the international trading competitiveness of the product is weakening 
continuously. Both the international trading competitiveness index and the price 
index can be used to reveal the international trading competitiveness of a certain 
kind of product or industry. 
In the chemical raw medicines category, hormones, derivatives and steroids used 
primarily as hormones (HS No. 2937), vegetable alkaloids and their salts, ethers, 
esters and other derivatives (HS No.2938), glycosides and their salts, ethers, esters 
and other derivatives (HS No.2939), chemically pure sugars (except sucrose, lactose, 
maltose, glucose and fructose), sugar ethers, sugar esters and their salts (HS 
No.2940) have relatively high international trading competitiveness indices of 0.83-
0.95 (Tables 16.3 and 16.4). The results reveal that these chemical raw medicines 
have strong international trading competitiveness. Nucleic acids and their salts; 
other heterocyclic compounds (HS No.2934), sulfonamides (HS No.2935), provitamins 
and vitamins used primarily as vitamins (HS No.2936) and antibiotics (HS No.2941) 
have international trading competitive indices of 0.47-0,70. These indices have 
dropped year by year, which shows that these chemical raw medicines have had a 
certain degree of international trading competitiveness, but this has weakened over 
time. The international trading competitiveness index of pharmaceutical products 
(HS No.30) has also fallen over time-pharmaceutical products are gradually losing 
competitiveness on the international market. 
Analysis of the price index reveals that chemical raw medicines that have high 
international trading competitiveness indices, such as HS No. 2937,2938,2939, 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































strong international trading competitiveness of chemical raw medicines is being 
supported at the expense of their price advantage. Chemical raw medicines such 
as HS No. 2934, 2935, 2936, 2941, have also experienced falling price indices, 
which reflects diminishing price advantages as well as declining international trading 
competitiveness. Pharmaceutical products (HS No.30) have been losing both 
international trading competitiveness and price advantage. So far, the total price 
index of chemical raw medicines and pharmaceutical products is still higher than 1, 
though it has dropped year by year. If the international trading competitiveness 
indices are compared with the price indices, the following conclusion can be drawn: 
the Chinese pharmaceutical industry's competitive advantage in international trade 
is gradually weakening. 
POTENTIAL TRADING COMPETITIVENESS 
Potential trading competitiveness depends mainly on an industry's innovative ability. 
The number of patents is a crucial indicator of the innovation of the pharmaceutical 
industry. According to International Patent Classification (IPC), patents related to 
the pharmaceutical industry are mainly in the categories of Medicine A61 K and its 
subgroups-Chemical Medicine A61 K31, Traditional Chinese Medicine A61 K35 and 
Pharmaceuticals A61 K9. Table 16.5 is an analysis of medicine patent applications, 
and Figure 16.4 presents the ratio of patents for Chinese medicine applications 
granted to Chinese and to foreign applicants. 
In traditional Chinese medicine, the proportion of patents granted to foreign 
applicants reached its highest level in 1994 (10 per cent). Since then th proportion 
has been very low (Table 16.5 and Figure 16.4). In 1999 and 2000, the proportions 
granted to foreign applicants for traditional Chinese medicine was only 0.8 per cent 
and 0.5 per cent respectively. China has a strong innovative ability in traditional 
Chinese medicines. In chemical medicines, foreign applicants dominate, not only in 
amount of applications but also in the proportion granted. Although the proportion 
granted dropped after 1992, it remained at about 60 per cent from 1997 to 2000. In 
the field of chemical medicines, Chinese producers have lower capability for 
innovation compared with foreign producers. In recent years, 97.4 per cent of chemical 
raw medicines produced by Chinese pharmaceutical enterprises have been imitations 
of foreign products. 
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BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES FOR FOREIGN 
PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS IN CHINA 
O1errical rredicine 
1998 2000 
What factors bring business opportunities to foreign pharmaceutical firms in China? 
How do these factors affect such opportunities? 
Chinese authorities' commitments and administrative measures 
China became a member of the WTO on 11 December 2001. According to the WTO 
Agreement, Chinese authorities made commitments about national treatment, market 
access and the most-favoured nation tariffs as follows. 
.. Within three years of China's accession to the WTO, foreign services suppliers 
will be permitted to engage in the distribution of pharmaceuticals (see Annex 
9-Schedule of Specific Commitments on Service of Protocol on the Accession 
of the People's Republic of China). 
.. Within three years of China's accession to the WTO, the applied average tariff 
rate of imported pharmaceuticals will be reduced by 5-6 per cent (see Annex 
8-Schedule CLlI" of the Protocol on Accession). 
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Table 16.5 Number of patent applications in the field of medicine, 1990-2000 
IPC Group Content Total Domestic applicants Foreign applicants 
Number Per cent of Number Per cent of 
total total 
A61K35 Traditional Chinese medicine 10850 10631 97.98 219 2.02 
A61K31 Chemical medicine 2703 829 30.67 1874 69.33 
A61K9 Pharmaceuticals 1000 367 36.70 633 63.30 
Source: State Intellectual Property Office, 2000. Annual Report 2000, Intellectual Property 
Publishing House, Beijing. 
After accession to the WTO, Chinese authorities were to adopt a number of 
administrative measures. 
.. Pharmaceuticals subject to state pricing covered HS numbers 30011000 to 
30066000, including substances of human or animal origin, heparin and its 
salts, antisera, other blood fractions and modified immunological products, 
vaccines, toxins, human and animal blood products, penicillins, cephamycines, 
insulins, adrenal cortical hormones, quinine or its salts, alkaloids or their 
derivatives, vitamins, sulpha drugs, biphenyl dicarbxybte, contraceptives, and 
traditional Chinese medicines. 
.. Based on the principles of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS 
Agreement) and national treatment, Chinese authorities can implement 
registration of initial imports of pharmaceuticals according to the Pharmaceutical 
Management Law of the People's Republic of China. The authorities may also 
implement GMP and GSP certification for foreign funded pharmacy firms and 
business distributors according to Chinese GMP and GSP regulations. 
In addition, China became a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
in 1980, and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property in 1985. 
Chinese authorities revised their Patent Law in1992 and 2000 to fulfil the requirements 
of the TRIPS (Trade-related Intellectual Property) Agreement. Since the enforcement 
of the first amendment of Patent Law in 1993, pharmaceutical patents granted by 
members of the Paris Convention from 1986 to 1992 were provided administrative 
protection with conditionality. Since accession to the WTO, Chinese authorities must 
implement the new conditions of patent law in full compliance with the TRIPS 
Agreement, and Chinese pharmaceutical enterprises will no longer be allowed to 
replicate patented pharmaceuticals while they are still under the protection of foreign 
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patents. This will have detrimental effects not only on pharmaceutical enterprises 
that were producing imitations of patented pharmaceuticals, but also on business 
opportunities for foreign pharmaceutical firms in China. 
Consumer demand for pharmaceutical products 
Consumer demand for pharmaceuticals in China is very large. It is estimated that 
consumer demand for pharmaceuticals will reach 336 billion yuan by 2005, 1.7 
times more than in 2001. 
A series of factors underlie such a huge increase in demand. 
.. China has the largest population in the world. The population will reach 1.33 
billion by 2005. 
• The pace of urbanisation is accelerating. In 2001 , China had an urban population 
of 0.48 billion. Since 1995 the annual growth rate of the urban population has 
remained at around 5.3 per cent, indicating that the urban population will rise to 
0.59 billion by 2005. The demand of an urban person for pharmaceuticals is 
seven times higher than that of a rural person. The rapid expansion of the urban 
population therefore promotes the demand for pharmaceuticals 
• the Chinese population is aging rapidly. Based on the census statistics, the 
population over 65 was 8.8 million in 2000, accounting for 7 per cent of the total 
population. It is estimated that the annual growth rate of people over 65 will be 
3 per cent in the foreseeable future, and the aged population will be over 0.1 
billion by 2005. The sharp growth of the aged population will raise consumer 
demand for pharmaceuticals. 
Factors promoting business opportunities 
The main factors opening up business opportunities for foreign pharmaceutical firms 
in China are 
.. a vast consumer demand for pharmaceuticals 
.. the fiscal decentralisation being implemented by the Chinese authorities under 
the control of the central government. Such a regime enables local governments 
to share more of the tax revenue. Granting local governments a bigger stake in 
the prosperity of the local economy provides an impetus to stimulate the growth 
of the local economy. Local governments are to establish special economic 
zones and adopt preferential policies and flexible measures that are attractive 
to overseas investors. 
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.. relatively low labour costs. The average worker earns only one-thirtieth to one-
fortieth of the average wage in industrial countries 
.. commitments by the Chinese authorities to reduce the average applied tariff 
rate on imported pharmaceuticals by 5-6 per cent within three years of accession 
to the WTO. Under this commitment, foreign service suppliers will also be 
permitted to engage in the distribution of pharmaceuticals 
.. suspension of the replication of patented pharmaceuticals by traditional 
pharmaceutical enterprises, in accordance with China's intellectual property 
protection commitments. A vast market will be opened for foreign pharmaceutical 
firms holding autonomic patented pharmaceuticals 
.. the structure of Chinese pharmaceutical enterprises. Chinese pharmaceutical 
enterprises are characteristically small scale and have scattered layout, poor 
preparation capability, outdated management structure, low market concentration 
and a lack of autonomic patented products. Competitive pressure on state-
owned pharmacy enterprises is pushing many of them towards bankruptcy. 
Currently, privatisation of state-owned enterprises is accelerating. Most await 
purchase, merger or restructure 
.. the diminishing trade competitiveness of the Chinese pharmaceutical industry. 
Although the industry has a certain degree of competitive advantage in price, 
its international trading competitiveness is seriously diminishing. 
Business opportunities 
Foreign pharmaceutical manufacturers can capture good business opportunities by 
establishing wholly foreign-owned pharmaceutical factories and producing 
pharmaceuticals with autonomic patent rights. However, this requires a large initial 
investment and further costs to open up the market. Another way is to purchase and 
merge existing pharmaceutical enterprises, and to produce autonomic patented 
pharmaceuticals. At present, local governments are selling and auctioning state-
owned enterprises within their jurisdiction. Depending on foreign enterprises' 
bargaining power with local governments, merger and acquisitions could be a lower-
cost strategy for entering the market. 
Setting up a wholly foreign-owned pharmaceutical company or a distributing network 
is an efficient way to enter the market. This strategy, however, requires large 
investments, bears a high cost for the developing market and has certain risks. 
There are still uncertainties about permission for foreign service suppliers to engage 
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in distribution of pharmaceuticals. To purchase and merge existing pharmaceutical 
companies and restructure them with an advanced management structure would be 
another low cost way to enter the pharmaceutical market. 
Profitable fields 
What would be a profitable field for a foreign pharmaceutical firm to invest in? 
Currently there are shortages of special intermediates for preparing pharmaceuticals, 
such as 6-aminopenlcilianic acid (6-APA), 7-aminocephalosporianic acid (7-ACA), 
7-aminodeacetoxycefanoic acid (7-ADCA), isophytol and trimethylhydroquinone. The 
production of these intermediates would be profitable. 
The current technologies associated with fermentation, separation and extraction 
of special intermediates for preparing ~-Iactams, vitamins, aminoglycosides and 
macrolides are outdated, so another profitable strategy would be to use DNA 
recombination or protoplasm hybridisation to breed new species of fungi to improve 
intermediate fermentation, and use the advanced technologies of ultracritical 
extraction, macroaperture resin separation and membrane separation to improve 
intermediate extraction and separation. 
Current technologies for pharmaceutical preparation are also outdated. The 
production of new sustained-release and controlled-release medicaments, as well 
as targeting and transdermal delivery of medicaments, would also be profitable. 
The production of biopharmaceuticals is just beginning, so the biopharmaceutical 
production of antisera, other blood fractions and modified immunological products, 
vaccines, toxins prepared for diagnostiCS, prophylactics, therapeutics for malignant 
tumours and for cardiovascular and cerebrovascular diseases, diseases of the central 
nervous system, respiratory system, digestive system, and for AIDS and other 
immunodeficiency diseases would be highly profitable. 
China has abundant resources for preparing natural pharmaceuticals. There are 
12,807 species of plants, minerals and animals. However, the techniques for preparing 
natural pharmaceuticals are primitive. Using the advanced techniques of extraction, 
purification and separation to produce natural pharmaceuticals would be very profitable. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Accession to the WTO has further integrated the Chinese economy into the global 
economic system, with an accelerated pace of industrial restructuring and increased 
business opportunities for foreign pharmaceutical firms now appearing in China. In 
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order to explore and capture these opportunities, and to enter more profitable fields, 
foreign firms need to pay attention in number of factors. 
.. Although China has formally become a member of WTO, the administrative 
measures adopted by governments are still not fully transparent. This will create 
uncertainties for foreign firms intending to capture business opportunities in 
the pharmaceutical industry. 
.. Even after accession, Chinese authorities have retained pricing control over 
imported pharmaceuticals, and many have adopted administrative measures 
that do not accord with the principles of the SPS Agreement and national 
treatment. Such measures may increase the risks for investment. 
.. The Chinese market remains an imperfect one. Its operation mechanisms are 
still very different from the western type of market mechanism. Various interest 
groups exist, including the lower level of local governments, professional 
supervisory agencies and industrial groups. For this reason, the pharmaceutical 
industry and market still retain barriers and distortions for foreign investors. 
Hope lies in strict implementation of China's WTO commitments-opening up 
China's market and creating an environment in which both domestic and foreign 
firms can compete on an equal footing. 
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17 
Political capital and wealth 
accumulation 
Meng Xin 
The economic-well being of individuals during old age, unemployment and sickness 
is closely related to their private wealth, especially in an economy where government 
has little ability or desire to redistribute income or provide adequate social insurance. 
China is in the process of moving from state provision of all social welfare towards 
a new system that will rely heavily on individual's responsibilities. In this new 
economic environment, the accumulation and distribution of personal wealth will 
play an important role. This study investigates changes in private wealth 
accumulation in urban China. In particular, we are interested in examining the effect 
of political status in the process of wealth accumulation. 
BACKGROUND 
In the pre-reform era in urban China, three important factors discouraged individual 
households from accumulating personal wealth: 1. a low income level, 2. a well-
provided social welfare system, and 3. the lack of financial, housing and other 
important durable goods markets. These three factors have gradually changed with 
progress in economic reform. Over the last twenty or so years incomes of urban 
population increased from 343 yuan in 1978 to 5854 yuan in 1999, an annual 
increase of 14.5 per cent (NSB, 2000). In addition, business opportunities have 
flourished. In 1999, the proportion of urban workers working in the private sector 
increased to 51 per cent while this ratio was 0.2 per cent in 1978 (NSB 2000). More 
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importantly, since the late 1980s, economic reform gradually swept away almost 
all aspects of the old social security system at the same time as state-owned 
enterprises started to layoff large numbers of workers. All these factors have 
significantly increased households savings. This, in turn, has generated a significant 
increase in wealth accumulation in urban China. 
In addition to the speed of wealth accumulation, the process of wealth accumulation 
and distribution in urban China has special features. One important feature is the 
role of political power in the acquisition of wealth. Even though political power has 
always benefited high-level government and party officials, economic reform has 
commercialised this power through the distribution of labour and non-labour income 
(Morduch and Sicular 2000) and the distribution of housing. For example, in the old 
system, the size and quality of housing was determined by individuals' political 
power and occupational status. Housing reform introduced'in the early 1990s allowed 
those who were renting government housing to buy their dwellings at a heavily 
subsidised price. The subsidy was positively related to the seniority and political 
pOSitions of household members. Thus, the acquisition of housing, which accounted 
for more than half of the average household wealth in 1999, is affected by political 
factors on two accounts-the initial allocation of better housing and larger purchase 
price discounts. Another example of the influence of political power is the importance 
of networking in establishing a private business. Those with political power or those 
well connected to political power find it easier to establish and succeed in private 
enterprises. Furthermore, widespread corruption during the process of marketisation 
gives people with political power an extra means to gain non-labour income. 
Another unique feature in personal wealth accumulation and distribution in urban 
China is the way in which inheritance takes place. The lack of wealth among the 
older generation means that inheritance is not important. Children of important 
government or party officials, however, can easily inherit business networks and 
political connections. In addition, in the pre-reform era, children of individuals with 
political power were normally able to acquire better housing which subsequently 
could be purchased at highly subsidised prices. 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
To study wealth accumulation, the specifications used in Carroll and Samwick 
(1997) and Shamsuddin and DeVoretz (1998) are used as a base model: 
(17.1) 
317 
where ~ is wealth, '0 is variance of household income, and P; is an estimate of 
permanent income, which is defined as weighted average of past incomes. Party; is 
a dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual is a party member or not, 
and ><; is a vector of other exogenous variables. 
In this specification '0 indicates the effect of precautionary saving, Party; captures 
the effect of political power. The vector of endogenous variables ><; controls for life 
cycle and bequest effects of wealth accumulation. The variables included in ><; are 
age, number of children, household size, whether the household has unemployed 
member(s), and household location of residence. The variable 'permanent income', 
Pi' normally captures differences in saving behaviour and in wealth acquired from 
non-saving sources among households with different levels of expected lifetime 
income. In the West, non-saving wealth accumulation is mainly through inheritance 
or lotteries. In urban China during the period we are studying, inheritance and lotteries 
are not important. Rather, direct transfers from state to individuals, such as highly 
subsidised housing or other forms of non-saving wealth, such as gifts, or even 
bribes, may form the main part of the non-saving wealth. 
One important issue in estimating Equation 17.1 is the possible endogeneity of 
the variables 'permanent income' and 'the variance of household income'. To 
endogenise these two variables, a vector of instruments is used. These instruments 
should be important determinants of permanent income and variance of income but 
have no predictive power on wealth over and above their effect on these two variables. 
We include years of schooling for household head and spouse, industry and ownership 
affiliations of household heads in the vector of the instruments. 
The data used in this study are from two Urban Household Income Distribution 
Surveys (UHIDS) conducted by the Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences for the years 1995 and 1999. The surveys include 6930, and 4493 
households for the two years, respectively. The 1995 survey covers 11 provinces, 
whereas the 1999 survey covers 6 of the 11 provinces included in the previous 
surveys. To ensure the consistency of the comparison, only observations from the 
6 provinces which are surveyed in both years are included. Excluding missing values, 
the number of households included in this study vary from 3626 to 3748 for 1995 
survey and from 4296 to 4363 for the 1999 survey depending on the group of variables 
used in each estimation. 
Table 17.1 reports summary statistics and measures of inequality of household 
income, permanent income and different types of wealth for the two survey years. 
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Over the 4 year period, real permanent household income increased by 16 per cent 
per annum and real net wealth increased by 24 per cent per annum. The fact that 
real wealth growth is much faster than real income growth suggests that either the 
saving propensity has increased significantly or a large proportion of the wealth 
accumulation is coming from non-saving sources, or both. Among the total wealth, 
housing wealth has grown the fastest, at a rate of 42 per cent per annum. This is 
mainly due to the faster pace of housing reform during this period. Table 17.2 shows 
that in 1988, hardly any household owned its own house. By 1995, 26 per cent of 
the households had bought their own house, while this ratio increased to 58 per cent 
Table 17.1 Summary statistics and inequality measures of real income and 
wealth, 1995 and 1999 
Permanent Net total Financial Net housing 
income wealth wealth wealth 
1995 (1995=100) 
Mean 6261.24 32047.90 11673.86 10920.41 
Std. Dev. 2987.42 40436.34 23097.01 26322.86 
Coefficient of variation 0.48 1.26 1.98 2.41 
Standard deviation of logs 0.52 1.07 1.17 1.03 
Gini coefficient 0.25 0.50 0.58 0.84 
1999 (1995=100) 
Mean 11426.31 75515.01 22574.62 44171.64 
Std. Dev. 6626.07 85256.71 34380.20 65768.57 
Coefficient of variation 0.58 1.13 1.52 1.49 
Standard deviation of logs 0.55 1.28 1.28 0.91 
Gini coefficient 0.29 0.52 0.63 0.65 
Annual growth rate 1995-99 
(per cent) 16.2 23.90 17.92 41.82 
Table 17.2 Effect of housing reform on housing ownership, 1988-99 
1988 1995 1999 
Public housing 3577 85.11 2436 63.31 1621 36.17 
Old self housing 611 14.54 419 10.89 258 5.76 
Bought after reform 15 0.36 993 25.81 2602 58.07 
4203 3848 4481 
Sources: Household Income Distribution Surveys, 1988, 1995, and 1999, Institute of Economics, 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 
319 
in 1999. The majority of houses purchased during the housing reform period were 
bought at highly subsidised prices, and may account for a large part of the non-
saving wealth accumulation. Nevertheless, the rate of increase in financial wealth 
(17 per cent per annum) is also faster than the increase in real income, indicating 
possible non-savings accumulation of financial wealth as well. 
Another interesting issue is the difference in the speed of asset accumulation 
between the rich and the poor. To investigate this issue, we rank household permanent 
income into percentiles and calculate for each percentile average net household 
total wealth for 1995 and 1999. Figure 17.1 presents the results as well as the 
growth rate for each percentile. Over this period net household total wealth increased 
for households in all percentile of income, but the rate of increase is much higher for 
the above average rich households than for the poor. 
To further investigate the determinants of wealth and wealth distribution, Equation 
17.1 is estimated using the 1995 and 1999 UHIDS data. The results using IV 
estimation for the net total wealth, financial wealth, and net housing wealth are 
reported in Tables 17.3, 17.4, and 17.5, respectively. In each of these tables, the 
first column presents the results using the 1995 data while the second and the third 
columns provide results using the 1999 data. Note that in the third column a variable 
indicating whether the father of the household head is a party member or not is 
included. Even though important, this variable is not available from the 1995 data. 
To make it comparable between the two years, we estimated Equation 17.1 with 
and without this variable for 1999 data. 
The first important finding is the difference in the effect of permanent income on 
wealth between the two years. With regard to net total wealth, the income elasticity 
of wealth is less than one in 1995 but increased to 1.6 in 1999. The fast change in 
the elasticity during this period may imply one of three things. First, relative to the 
poor the rich have been saving much more during this period providing that all 
wealth is accumulated from savings. However, given the significant increase in 
wealth during such a short period it is unlikely that all wealth is accumulated through 
personal savings. Second, the rich may have been given much more wealth than 
the poor. This wealth may be given in the form of direct wealth, such as housing, or 
in the form of income, such as gifts or even monetary bribes. If it is in the form of 
income, our finding suggests that the rich in the sample are under-reporting their 
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Figure 17.1 Lorenz curves of wealth 
Panel A: Net total assets, 1995 and 1999 
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income. Either way, this is an important indication that the rich have been able to 
accumulate wealth via non-economic means. To provide some evidence, we 
calculated for each income percentile its annual growth rate in income and saving 
rate. The net total asset level in 1999 is then projected assuming that net assets are 
accumulated only through saving. Figure 17.3 shows the result. It clearly indicates 
that projected wealth is lower than actual wealth for households in all income 
percentiles. However, the amount of non-saving wealth is much higher for the 
households with above-average income level, than for the poor. For example, 
households below the 50th percentile income level on average acquire 39 per cent 
of their accumulated wealth from non-saving component, while this ratio for those 
above the 50th percentile is 50 per cent. The third possibility is that the existing 
wealth has appreciated at a very high rate. This, however, is unlikely to explain a 
large part of the difference. The type of wealth which is most likely to have appreciated 
is housing. According to the China Statistical Yearbook (2002), the commercial 
housing prices (per square metre) increased by 29 per cent from 1995 to 1999. 
Taking into account that net housing wealth accounted for 41 per cent of net total 
wealth in 1999 in our sample, 1 we projected the effect of housing price appreciation 
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Table 17,3 Determinants of net total wealth, 1995 and 1999 (IV estimates) 
1995 1999 
without father with father 
Lntass Coet. Std, Err, Coef, Std, Err, Coef. Std, Err. 
Constant 2.50 2.99 -5.66" 2.56 -5.75" 2.56 
Log permanent income 0.79' 0.41 1.62'" 0.31 1.62'" 0.31 
Variance of household 
income/107 -0.20 0.18 0.05' 0.03 0.05' 0.03 
HH being party member 0.27"" 0.08 0.20~ 0.09 0.19" 0.08 
Father of HH being ply member 0.08 0.08 
No. of unemployed -0.09 0.10 -0.23'" 0.10 -0.23'" 0.10 
HH age 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
HH age squared/100 -0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.03 
Gender of the HH 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.08 
Family size 0.15 0.10 -0.21' 0.11 -0.21' 0.11 
No. of children -0.18 0.12 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.13 
Proportion of elderly members -0.45 0.71 0.02 0.64 0.00 0.64 
Proportion of elderly members2 0.56 0.74 0.44 0.66 0.47 0.66 
Liaoning -0.37 0.23 1.01'" 0.17 1.00'" 0.17 
Jiangsui -0.26 0.24 1.05'" 0.15 1.05'" 0.15 
Henan -0.19 0.22 0.87""' 0.18 0.86'" 0.18 
Sichuan -1.40'" 0.21 0.95'" 0.17 0.95'" 0.17 
Gansu -1.34'" 0.28 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.20 
No. of observations 3748 4296 4296 
R2 0.070 0.098 0.099 
on net total wealth, It is also plotted in Figure 17,3 (the thicker line), The predicted 
net total wealth level, taking into account the appreciation in 1999, is still much 
lower than the actual level for the middle and high income households, 
The second important finding is the change in the effect of the variance in household 
income on wealth accumulation, In 1995, this variable played no role, A positive 
effect, however, is observed in 1999, indicating that households which have 
experienced large income variation over the 5 years prior to the survey year saved 
more than households which have had more stable incomes. This finding accords 
well with the reality, The radical state sector reform and social welfare reform during 
the second half of the 1990s has significantly increased household saving propensity 
due to the expected increase in unemployment and individual contribution in the 
areas of medical services, pension, children's education, and housing. In order to 
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Table 17.4 Determinants of financial wealth, 1995 and 1999 (IV estimates) 
1995 1999 
without father with father 
Lfass Coel. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Constant ·12.47 3.70 ·22.87"" 3.84 ·23.07'" 3,84 
Log permanent income 2.49'" 0.51 3.32'" 0.46 3.3T 0.47 
Variance of household income/107 ·0.32 0.21 0.08' 0.04 0.08' 0.04 
HH being party member 0.42'" 0.11 0.29" 0.13 0.2T' 0.13 
Father of HH being pty member 0.17 0.12 
No. of unemployed ·0.21 0.14 ·0.03 0.13 ·0.03 0.13 
HH age 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04 
HH age squared/100 -0.05 0.05 ·0.10" 0.04 ·0.10" 0.04 
Gender of the HH ·0.03 0.11 0.31"" 0.12 0.31'" 0.12 
Family size ·0.20 0.14 ·0.93'" 0.18 ·0.92'" 0.18 
No. of children ·0.04 0.16 0.62'" 0.20 0.62'" 0.20 
Proportion of elderly members 0.38 0.89 1.14 1.01 1.08 1.01 
Proportion of elderly members2 ·0.04 0.97 ·0.12 1.04 ·0.07 1.04 
Liaoning ·0.65" 0.30 1.90'" 0.26 1.88'" 0.26 
Jiangsui ·0.55" 0.29 2.28'" 0.20 2.2T' 0.20 
Henan ·0.58'" 0.29 1.69'" 0.26 1.67"" 0.26 
Sichuan ·1.90'" 0.26 0.75'" 0.25 0.74'" 0.25 
Gansu ·2.03'" 0.33 0.76'" 0.27 0.75'" 0.27 
No. of obseNations 3748 4296 4296 
R2 0.092 0.1426 0.1436 
get access to the similar amount of services previously provided by the government, 
households have to accumulate personal wealth, Thus, the precautionary saving 
motive among urban households has become more and more important during this 
period. 
Another interesting finding is the effect of unemployment on wealth accumulation. 
In 1995 households with unemployed members accumulate less wealth than 
households without unemployed members, but such differences are not statistically 
significant. By 1999, a 23 per cent reduction in wealth is observed for this group of 
households. The reason for this difference may be related to the increase in the 
duration of unemployment. This is because the large-scale state sector layoffs did 
not occur until 1994 to 1995. The survey in 1995 may only include individuals with 
very short spells of unemployment. By 1999, however, some layoff workers might 
have been unemployed for sometime and hence may have started the process of 
dissaving. Note also that the result presented here is from the IV estimates, which 
324 
Table 17.5 Determinants of net housing wealth, 1995 and 1999 (IV estimates) 
1995 1999 
Without father pty With father pty 
Lnmvhs Coet. Std. Err. Coet. Std. Err. Coet. Std. Err. 
Constant 1S.54'" S.12 -16.74'" S.36 -17.01"" S.36 
Log permanent income -2.64'" 0.71 1.70'" 0.6S 1.6T' 0.66 
Variance of household income!107 0.10 0.28 0.18'" 0.06 0.17""" 0.06 
HH being party member 0.60'" 0.17 0.79'" 0.19 0.76'" 0.19 
Father of HH being ply member O.4S" 0.19 
No. of unemployed -0.42'" 0.20 -0.16 0.18 -0.16 0.18 
HH age 0.26'" 0.06 0.14" 0.06 O.1S'" 0.06 
HH age squared!100 -0.2T' 0.06 -0.14" 0.06 -O.1S'" 0.06 
Gender of the HH 0.76'" 0.16 0.36" 0.18 0.3T 0.18 
Family size 1.0S'" 0.20 -0.18 0.22 -O.1S 0.23 
No. of children -0.74'" 0.22 -0.23 0.27 -0.24 0.27 
Proportion of elderly members 0.08 1.31 2.18 1.41 2.0S 1.41 
Proportion of elderly members2 -0.42 1.39 -1.47 1.44 -1.36 1.44 
Liaoning -0.14 0.42 3.4S'" 0.37 3.39'" 0.37 
Jiangsui 1.98'" 0.42 4.20'" 0.33 4.17""" 0.33 
Henan 2.7T 0.43 S.20'" 0.36 S.16'" 0.36 
Sichuan 1.6S'" 0.36 S.S1'" 0.33 S.49'" 0.33 
Gansu 1.39'" 0.48 4.36'" 0.36 4.31''' 0.36 
No. of observations 3748 4296 4296 
R2 0.087 0.099 0.100 
Table 17.6 Direct and indirect effects of unemployment and party membership 
on wealth, 1995 and 1999 
1995 1999 1999 
with father party 
Net total wealth Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect 
Unemployment -0.09 -0.07 -0.23 -0.27 -0.23 -0.26 
HH party member 0.27 0.02 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.17 
Father party member 0.08 0.06 
Financial wealth 
Unemployment -0.21 -0.21 -0.03 -0.S4 -0.03 -0.S4 
HH party member 0.42 0.08 0.29 0.3S 0.27 0.34 
Father party member 0.17 0.13 
Net housing wealth 
Unemployment -0.42 0.23 -0.16 -0.28 -0.16 -0.27 
HH party member 0.60 -0.08 0.79 0.18 0.76 0.17 
Father party member O.4S 0.07 
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suggests that there are both direct and indirect effect of unemployment on wealth 
accumulation. The indirect effect is through its effect on household income. Table 
17.6 reports the direct and indirect effects. It shows that a higher proportion of 
unemployed members has a negative effect on household permanent income in 
both 1995 and 1999, but the effect is twice as big in 1999 as in 1995. Taking into 
account that the income elasticity of wealth also doubled during this period, the 
indirect effect of unemployment on wealth reduction in 1999 is around 27 per cent. 
The effect of party membership of the household head on wealth also has its 
direct and indirect components. In 1995, household net total wealth is around 27 per 
cent higher if a household head is a party member relative to households without a 
party member head, while its indirect effect through permanent income is around 2 
per cent. In 1999, however, the direct effect of party membership on wealth 
accumulation is 20 per cent, while its indirect effect through permanent income is 
around 17 per cent. Thus, although the direct effect of party membership on wealth 
accumulation may have been slightly lower in 1999, its overall effect is actually 
higher in 1999 than in 1995. 
The results from the estimation of the determinants of financial wealth are very 
similar to those of the net total wealth estimation. One noteworthy difference is that 
the income elasticity of wealth is very high for financial wealth relative to net total 
wealth, with the former ranging from 2.5 in 1995 to 3.3 in 1999. Once again, this is 
similar to that found in Carroll and Samwick (1997). Ruling out the possibility of 
inheritance, the question still remains as to whether the high saving rate of the rich 
is enough to explain this high discrepancy between income and wealth among 
households of different income levels. The answer probably is not. 
The result from the net housing wealth equation for 1995 is very unusual with a 
negative income elasticity of housing wealth. This, however, may not be unreasonable 
due to a limited housing ownership (one quarter of the total households) at that 
stage of the housing reform. The majority of households in 1995 did not own a 
house, including some very rich and powerful families, who had not had the need to 
buy the house provided to them by the government as heavily subsidised rent 
lasted until much later. 
The most interesting results from the net housing wealth equation is the effect of 
party membership. Controlling for its impact on income, in 1995 if the household 
head is a party member the housing asset is about 60 per cent higher than a 
household without a party member head. This effect increased to 79 per cent in 
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1999. What is more interesting is that having a household head whose father is a 
party member adds another 45 per cent more in household housing assets. These 
results accord well with the housing distribution process described earlier. Party 
members and their children acquired larger and better houses before the housing 
reform and took advantage of the housing reform by getting better houses at 
substantially subsidised prices. Thus, over and above the contribution of party 
membership on household income, a substantial effect of party membership on 
housing wealth is observed together with an additional effect of inherited housing 
wealth from having a party member as a father is also observed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this paper. First, the rate of growth of 
wealth is much faster than the growth of real income over the period studied. A large 
proportion of the increase in wealth accumulation may be through a non-saving 
channel. Although households at each income percentile have received an increase 
in non-saving wealth, it is much more so for the rich than for the poor. It is possible, 
therefore, that economically advantaged households have been receiving larger 
amounts of non-saving and non-inherited wealth such as housing bought at highly 
subsidised prices, gifts, or even monetary bribes, than the poor. 
Second, party members and their children have benefited significantly from the 
wealth accumulation process. It is not only that party membership contributes 
positively to wealth accumulation, having a party member father also adds an 
additional 50 per cent increment in net housing wealth. 
Third, while the precautionary motive is not apparent in the wealth accumulation 
in 1995, by 1999 households who have experienced large income variations over 
the 5 year period prior to the survey year have started saving more than households 
with stable income. 
NOTE 
1 The distribution of share of net housing wealth in net total wealth is fairly equal among different 
income decile, ranging from 36 per cent to 47 per cent. Hence, using average share does not 
change the story much. 
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Reforms and challenges of the social 
security system 
Qun Shi 
The Chinese social security system is undergoing a series of reforms. These reforms 
are often the government's short-term responses to imminent financial and social 
pressure. The long-term impacts, especially those on economic efficiency, are often 
ignored. 
The background of the Chinese social security system reform is unique. Like 
many other countries (mainly more advanced economies), China is facing an 
unprecedented demographic transition-an aging population. However, population 
aging in China is taking place at a much lower level of GDP per capita (Peterson 
1999). In the meantime, China is undergoing transition to a market-oriented economy. 
This is a challenge for the old Chinese social security system and is likely to 
remain a challenge for many decades. 
The old Chinese social security system originated from the command economy 
era, when the Communist government's development strategy was based on rapid 
industrialisation. This strategy taxed the agricultural sector, which included 80 per 
cent of the Chinese population, to cross-subsidise the industrial sector (Wen 2000). 
The social security system formed at the time was a dual system: a rural system, 
based on the People's Communes,1 that was very elementary, and an urban system 
that was much more generous and was based on the work unit system.2 
In rural areas, farmers were organised into People's Communes, and the commune 
was responsible for providing minimum subsistence to each member. Heavy 
agricultural taxation, and the need to provide this minimum living, led to a relatively 
330 
equal distribution of available food among members, leaving individual farmers with 
little incentive to work hard to improve their welfare (Wen 2000). Social security 
assistance from the government was very limited and only available when the 
commune could not provide subsistence to its members, such as when there was 
a natural disaster. 
People in cities had much more generous social security provisions and other 
related welfare benefits. The vast majority of them were guaranteed a job by the 
government in work units of the public sector and became lifetime employees of the 
work units. Such jobs also carried generous social security and welfare benefits for 
the employees and their family members, as specified by the Labour Insurance 
Regulations (U R). 3 By the late 1970s, the urban social security system was based 
around the work unit, with individual work units financing the benefits of its members 
and their families. This was feasible since the government would support them with 
budgetary appropriations if necessary. Urban residents (and their family members) 
who were not assigned jobs could receive limited assistance from the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs (MCA). 
This dual system relied heavily on other policies that segregated the rural and 
urban areas at the time. These policies included the household registration system 
(HRS),4 restrictions on travel, and comprehensive rationing of consumption goods. 
The HRS was the most important policy and remains in force. These policies 
effectively curbed domestic migration in general, and rural-to-urban migration in 
particular (Zhao 2003). 
The initiation of transition led to the collapse of the People's Commune system in 
the early 1980s, a process which essentially destroyed the rural social security 
system. At present, government-guaranteed access to land is often regarded as 
the social security provided by the government (Zhao and Wen 1999; Wen 2000). 
Most reforms to China's social security system have occurred in the urban areas. 
Facing demographic and economic transitions, the Chinese government's major 
social security reform challenge is to transform the old system into a new one that is 
in line with a market-oriented economy. The new system will have implications for 
economic efficiency. This chapter will analyse this issue, using selected social 
welfare programs as case studies. 5 
Economic transition changed the environment of the old urban social security 
system. First, the previous development policy of cross-subsidising the industrial 
sector by the agricultural sector was abolished. This meant that the state's control 
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and its capacity for mobilising resources from the agricultural to the industrial sector 
were reduced. As a result, it became increasingly difficult for the central government 
to subsidise state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 6 
Second, labour market and SOE reforms had gradually undermined the foundation 
of this work unit-based social security system. Reforms included using labour 
contracts to replace the previous lifetime employment guarantee by the government 
(Meng 2000) and policies to transform SOEs into independent economic agents in 
a market economy.7 
The 'SOE-based8 security system' (UR) had three major problems 
.. As an insurance system, it lacked diversifications of risk. The individual SOE-
based insurance could not share risks among a large population. This reduced 
the effectiveness of the system. For example, SOEs with a high retiree-
employee ratio had a higher pension burden . 
.. As a social security program, the scheme had shrinking coverage, when the 
emerging private sector was left out of the mandatory coverage of the scheme 
(see Table 18.1). 
.. The system prevented efficient specification of functions because each SOE 
had to be a production-based firm, an insurance company and a superannuation 
fund. 
Table 18.1 Employment structure by ownership in urban China, 1980-99 
(percentages) 
Other 
Year State-owned Collective-owned ownership Total 
1980 76 23 99 
1985 70 26 96 
1990 62 21 85 
1995 57 16 5 78 
1996 55 15 5 75 
1997 53 14 5 73 
1998 43 9 8 60 
1999 40 8 8 56 
Note: Figures are based on total urban employment, including all people who worked and received 
income during the year. 
Source: Figures are from State Statistical Bureau, 2001. China Statistical Yearbook, China 
Statistical Press, Beijing:8,14. 
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The first two problems diminished the provision of an adequate social safety net 
to people in need in cities, such as employees in loss-making SOEs and employees 
in the private sector. The third prevented SOEs from becoming independent firms in 
a market economy. 
Reforms of the urban social security system started in the mid 1980s. However, 
the major progress was in the 1990s, after the deepening of the SOE reform and the 
pressure from the large numbers of redundant workers it generated. Although the 
official number of retrenchments appears to be moderate (Table 18.2), it is estimated 
that SOEs had about 20-30 million excess employees by the late 1990s (Zhang 
1999:69). 
THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAM 
Along with the labour contract system, the government established an unemployment 
insurance program in 1986.9 However, this program was only to provide insurance 
for some redundant SOE employees, especially those who had lost their jobs because 
of policy changes. 
With two further reforms in 1986 and 1999 (Table 18.3), the unemployment program 
now aims to cover all urban employees (other than public servants). Insurance 
funds are contributed by employees and employers at the rate of 3 per cent of 
wages. The government also stands by to provide support if needed. Contributions 
are collected and pooled at the municipal level, with a provincial adjustment fund. 10 
The unemployment benefits include unemployment relief, medical care subsidies, 
funeral subsidies, and a lump sum subsidies for the dependants of deceased 
unemployed workers. The funds are also used to finance training and job-seeking 
Table 18.2 Number of retrenched workers of SOEs, 1997-2001 (by year end) 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Number of retrenched workers 
(million persons)a 6.3 6.1 6.5 6.6 5.2 
Total employees in state-owned work unitsb 
(millions of persons) 109.5 107.7 88.1 83.3 78.8 
Note: a Figures do not include reemployed retrenched workers. b State-owned work units include 
SOEs and other institutes and organisations. 
Source: Author's calculations based on figures from MOLSS available online at http:// 
www.molss.gov.cn.tongji/gb. 
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services for the unemployed (Kang and Feng 2000). The details of the benefits are 
determined by the provincial government. The maximum period of benefits is 24 
months for employees with at least 10 years of contributions. 
PENSION REFORM 
The pension program is the most expensive scheme among the social security 
programs specified in the LlR (Figure 18.1). 
By the late 1970s, the old pension program had evolved into an individual-SOE 
based 'pay-as-you-go' (PAYGO) system, where SOEs payed pensions to their retirees 
from current operating surplus. A series of reforms were introduced in the 1980s and 
1990s in response to the financial pressures generated by the scheme (Table 18.4). 
The first reform involved pooling the pension funds of SOEs at county or city 
level. It required all SOEs to contribute to a pension fund at a given rate. The fund 
then distributed the funds back to each SOE according to their pension liabilities. 
Figure 18.1 Expenditure of major social security programs in China, 1999 
medical care 
old age pension 
75.8% 
Occupational injury 
0.4% Mnirnum Living 
Security 
0.6% 
Maternity ins urance 
0.2% 
Source: Expenditures on old age pensions, medical care, unemployment insurance, occupational 
injury and maternity insurance are from State Statistical Bureau 2000. China Statistical Yearbook 
2000, China Statistical Press, Beijing. Figures for minimum living security program are from Shi 
(2000). 
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This was the first step towards risk sharing of pension liabilities among SOEs (Han 
and Jiao 1997, He 2000, Li 2000). 
This social pooling of pension funds among SOEs was unsustainable. First, SOEs 
with a relatively older employee profile had more incentive to contribute, while those 
with a younger profile had no incentive to contribute. Second, the public sector, 
which was covered by the pension program, rapidly became 'older', while young 
people were attracted to the emerging private sector, which was not covered by teh 
program (Table 18.5). The nature of a PAYGO pension scheme is that it is only 
stable if it is centrally enforced by regulations. Once the potential for labour mobility 
was created by the new private sector, young people had an incentive to move into 
private firms, so as to avoid having to pay for the pensions of the old. 
The pension scheme was further reformed in the 1980s and 1990s (Table 18.4). 
Reforms at this stage included increasing contributions (employee contributions) 
and adjusting benefits. By the end of 1990s, the pension scheme had become a 
three-pillar system with (targeted) coverage of all urban employees. 
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The first pillar is a scaled-down PAYGO system that provides the so-called 
elementary pensions. The second pillar is a compulsory, funded program of individual 
savings accounts that provides the so-called individual account pensions. The third 
pillar is a supplementary enterprise pension (Han and Jiao 1997; Liu 2000). It is 
expected that the first two pillars will provide a basic income-the basic pension-
to retirees. 11 
Table 18.4 A summary of public pension reforms in the 1980s and 1990s 
Major reform 
Social pooling of 
cities; later 
pension funds (1984) 
Fully-funded pension 
scheme for contract 
workers in SOEs (1986) 
Employee contributions 





Individual account, a 
three-pillar pension 
program (1995) 





Contract workers of 
SOEs 
Employees of SOEs 
and state-owned work 
units 
SOEs in pilot cities 
All urban employees 
All urban employees 
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Major reforms 
Within a pooling area (initially counties and 
provinces), SOEs contributed to a social 
pooling fund according to a unified rate. 
Pensions were then paid from the social 
pool. 
Employer: 15 per cent total wages of 
contract workers. Employee: about 3 per 
cent of wages. Contributed into separate 
funds from the social pool of permanent 
employees 
Employee contribution about 3 per cent of 
wages. Accumulated funds of contract 
workers were combined with social 
pooling funds of permanent employees of 
SOEs. 
Pensions = social pensions+ contribution 
pensions. Social pension = 15-25 per cent 
of local average wages in the previous 
year. Contribution pensions: depend on 
contribution years 
A three-pillar pension system that 
comprised: 1) elementary pensions 
(PAYGO, social-pooling fund at the city or 
county level); 2) individual account pinions 
(privately owned individual accounts, fully 
funded); and 3) other supplementary 
pensions (half-voluntary, at enterprise 
level. Still undergoing experiments). 
All pension programs within each province 
were required to be unified into one 
scheme, in terms of contribution rate, 
penSion benefits, management of social 
pooling funds and individual accounts, etc. 
For the PAYGO component, the aim is to establish a social pool at the province 
level, with funds contributed by employers. The targeted contribution rate is 17 per 
cent. The elementary pensions-20 per cent of provincial average wages-are paid 
from this social pool to retirees with at least 15 years' contribution. 12 
For the funded component, funds are accumulated in individual accounts 
contributed by both employers and employees at a rate of 11 per cent of wages. Of 
this, employees contribute 8 per cent, and employers contribute 3 per cent. Retirees 
who contribute for more than 15 years receive monthly individual account pensions 
equal to 1/120 of total funds in the account at retirement. Other retirees receive the 
accumulated funds (including credited interest) as a lump sum at retirement. 
THE URBAN MINIMUM LIVING SECURITY PROGRAM (UMLS) 
The Urban Minimum Living Security Program (UMLS) program is a new program for 
social relief. The old social relief program was based on the work unit, since work 
units looked after the employees and their families. Urban people with no work 
unit,13 no family, and no source of support from relatives-the so-called 'people 
without the three essentials' (sanwu)-were looked after by the MCA with limited 
assistance (Wang 1996; Zheng et al. 2000). 
Table 18.5 Retiree/employee ratios by ownership structure in China, 1982-98 
Retireel 
Total Total employee Retiree/employee ratios 
employees retirees ratio (per cent) 
(million) (million) (per cent) state-owned collectives other units 
1982 112.8 11.1 0.10 0.10 0.09 
1985 123.6 16.4 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 
1987 132.1 19.7 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.11 
1989 137.4 22 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.08 
1990 140.6 23 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.06 
1992 147.9 26 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.07 
1995 149.1 30.9 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.08 
1996 148.5 32.1 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.09 
1997 146.7 33.5 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.08 
1998 123.4 36 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.12 
Source: author's calculation based on China Statistical Yearbook, 2001a. China Statistical Press, 
8eijing. 
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During the early and mid 1990s, urban people in need could be broadly classified 
into three groups: 
'" residents who had local urban household registrations14 and were employed in 
the public sector 
'" other urban residents who had local household registrations 
.. migrants in cities who did not have local household registrations. 
This last category included those from other cities, but the majority were from 
villages (Jiao 2002). 
In terms of social relief provisions, the first group received the most generous 
benefits and were often entitled to be looked after by their work units, although in 
practice they did not always receive the benefits to which they were entitled. 1s The 
second group received minor benefits (the social relief for 'people without the three 
essentials' from the MeA), while the third group had almost no social safety net. In 
terms of the need for social support, however, the order was opposite: the most 
needy were often the third group and the least needy were the first group. 
The UMLS program was set up in 1997, designed to provide a guaranteed minimum 
per capita income for poor urban families (Wang 1999). It covers urban residents 
who have the local household registrations, but not the third category discussed 
previously-migrants. 
The amount of relief for an UMLS recipient family is calculated by the following 
formula (all in terms of a month): 
Total relief in yuan = Local UMLS line'number of household members 
- Total calculated household income 
The 'total calculated household income' may not be equal to the 'total actual 
household income'. The definition often changes slightly from city to city, which 
may detrimentally affect the poverty relief program. 
The city government is responsible for the administration and funding of the program. 
It determines the local UMLS level and delivers the cash assistance. The provincial 
government regulates and coordinates the programs of the cities under its jurisdiction. 
The number of recipients as well as government expenses of the program rose 
rapidly during the first five years of the program's operation (Table 18.6). 
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CHALLENGES FOR THE PENSION SCHEME 
The pension scheme faces a few challenges 
.. an aging population, which indicates that the PAYGO scheme is not feasible 
• financing the pension debt of the old PAYGO scheme in the new funded scheme 
during the economic transition 
• reducing the taxation impact of the funded scheme. 
Population aging and the PAYGO pension scheme 
The Chinese population is projected to age rapidly during the first half of the 21 si 
century. This means that the financial burden of supporting the elderly with a PAYGO 
scheme is going to rise. The old-age dependency ratio-the ratio of the number of 
retired people to the number of working people-is rising sharply in China compared 
with other economies (Figure 18.2). In 2000, there were about six working people to 
support every old person in China. By 2050, there will be fewer than two working 
people to support each old person. 
This population trend means that, in order to finance a defined-benefit (constant 
pension-wage ratio) PAYGO pension scheme from payroll tax, the tax rate will have 
to rise. Without other charges, the payroll tax rate in China would have to rise from 
13 per cent in 2001 to 53 per cent in 2050 under this scenario (see Figure 18.3).16 
Such a sharp rise in payroll tax rate would have significant efficiency costs, since 
the associated deadweight losses increase with the tax rate. A more efficient 
approach would be to smooth out the future high tax burden over a period of time 17 
by imposing a constant (optimal) tax rate to minimise the overall deadweight losses. 
Considering various possible future economic growth scenarios, this optimal tax 
rate needs to finance the old defined-benefit scheme in urban China-about 30 per 
cent. This tax rate, again, does not appear to be feasible. 
The major conclusion of these results 18 is that, with the rapid aging of the population, 
financing the old defined-benefit PAYGO pension scheme by collecting payroll tax 
in urban China is too expensive to be feasible. Even if the tax burden were evened 
out over a 50-year period, the optimal tax rate would have to be around 30 per cent 
of wages, which is not feasible either. 
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Figure 18.2 World population aging, 1950-2050 
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Europe, North America, Australia/new Zealand and Japan. b The less developed regions include all 
regions in Africa, Asia (except Japan), Latin America and the Caribbean plus Melanesia, 
Micronesia and Polynesia. 
Source: Author's construction based on United Nations, 2001. World Population Prospects: the 
2000 revision, United Nations, New York 
Table 18.6 Selected aggregate figures for the UMLS program, 1998-2002 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Recipients (million persons) 1.84 2.66 4.03 11.71 20.64 
Share of urban population (per cent) 0.49 0.68 0.88 2.44 4.11 
Relief costs (billion yuan) 0.7 2.37 3.45 5.00 10.87 
Source: Number of recipients and relief costs figures are from Ministry of Civil Affairs, various 
years. Urban population figures are from State Statistical Bureau, various years. China Statistical 
Yearbook, China Statistical Press, Beijing. 
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The pension debt. its finance and economic transition 
If the PAYGO pension scheme were reformed into a funded scheme, the government 
would have to finance the so-called 'transition costs', or the pension debt. This debt 
is not actually the cost of the pension reform. Instead, it is the implicit government 
debt accumulated during the PAYGO period, and becomes explicit when the scheme 
is to be changed to a funded one. 
For a given economy, the size of the explicit pension debt depends on factors 
such as the coverage and benefits in the old PAYGO system and the age structure 
of the population covered. The pension debt in China is estimated to be low compared 
with that in countries such as Chile and Argentina when they reformed their systems 
(World Bank 1997).19 
One way to examine the burden of the pension debt in China is to simulate the tax 
rate required to pay this debt. According to the World Bank (World Bank 1997), the 
scale of China's pension debt was about 50 per cent of GDP in 1996. Suppose the 
2000 pension debt level is equal to the level in 2000 and that this pension debt is to 
be financed by collecting payroll taxes20 between 2001 and 2050. The 50-year period 
allows the government to distribute the burden of debt over time in order to minimise 
the deadweight losses due to the tax. 21 
In the simulation mentioned previously, the Chinese taxation system was assumed 
to be efficient, that is, one yuan payroll tax collected can be used to pay one yuan 
pensions, and there was no 'waste' in the taxation system. However, a more realistic 
assumption for an economy during the transition is to consider a taxation system 
that is not very efficient initially, but becomes more efficient over time. This is 
because the command economy had no 'regularised' taxation system (McMillan 
and Naughton 1992).22 A new taxation system needs to be established in a market-
oriented economy and it takes time for the new system to begin operating efficiently. 
With this assumption, the optimal tax rate rises over time instead of being constant.23 
Bearing in mind these assumptions,24 when the taxation system is as inefficient as 
it was in 2000, the payroll tax rate for various scenarios25 ranges from 1 per cent to 
4 per cent. If the taxation system becomes more efficient over time, the optimal tax 
rate is even lower but rises during the 50 year period. Figure 18.4 shows the time 
path of the tax rate for three different growth rates of urban GDP, when the discount 
rate is 5 per cent a year. Obviously, when GDP per capita grows faster (and thus the 
wage rate increases faster), the taxation base for the payroll tax is bigger, and 
therefore the tax rate required for the pension debt is lower, ceteris paribus. 
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These results indicate that the payroll tax burden to finance the pension debt of 
the old PAYGO scheme in China is not high at all, if the government plans to spread 
it over a few decades. Faster growth rates of the urban economy tend to reduce the 
tax rate. 
The high tax component of the current pension scheme 
While the current, three-pillar pension scheme is a partially funded program to face 
the challenge of an aging population, both of the first two pillars need further reforms. 
The scheme embodies a high tax component and may have a negative impact on 
economic efficiency. 
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First, the social pooling, or the PAYGO component, of the scheme has problems. 
This PAYGO scheme is unusual since it appears to have both defined benefits and 
defined contributions: 17 per cent contribution over at least 15 years provides an 
elementary pensions equal to 20 per cent of provincial average wages. To finance a 
pension scheme on a PAYGO basis, the fund is financially viable if the following 
condition holds: 
P * NR t=- --
W Nw 
(18.1 ) 
where P is the average pension, W is the average wages, P/w is the aggregate 
replacement rate; NR is the number of retirees, and Nw is the number of workers, t 
is the contribution rate (as a percentage of total wages). 
According to Equation 18.1, a 17 per cent contribution (t) of wages would be 
sufficient to pay elementary pensions equal to 20 per cent (P/w) of the average 
wages for a retiree-employee ratio up to 0.85, if the scheme is financed on a year-
by-year basis. This is a very high retiree-employee ratio, and far above the prOjected 
old-age dependency ratio of the Chinese population by 2050. 
In fact, the government intends to use this social pooling to finance the implicit 
pension debt of the old PAYGO scheme (Han and Jiao 1997). But funds in this pool 
have been insufficient to pay the debt in the past. This has contributed to the 'empty 
account' problem-some local governments have used funds in individual accounts 
to pay pensions to current retirees. The central government has had to bail out local 
governments as well. According to Zhao and Xu (2002:404), '[bJetween 1997 and 
2000, subsidies [by the central government to local governments to pay pensions] 
doubled every year-from over 5 billion yuan in 1997 to over 10 billion in 1998, over 
20 billion in 1999, and over 40 billion in 2000'. In 2001, the subsidy was again 40 
billion yuan (Zhao and Xu 2002). In 2002, it was 40.8 billion yuan, which accounted 
for over 14 per cent of pension payments (Ministry of Labour and Social Security 
2003). 
Social pooling has other problems. Since only employees with at least 15 years of 
contribution receive the 20 per cent elementary pension, workers who contribute for 
less than 15 years lose all their contributions into the social pool-a very high tax 
on these workers given that the contribution rate is 17 per cent of their wages. In 
addition, people who only contribute for relatively short periods because they are 
only employed for short periods may well be the group that most needs the 
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Figure 18.4 Optimal payroll tax rate between 2001-50 to payoff historical 
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Source: Author's simulation results. 
government's assistance during retirement, since their lifetime income will probably 
be low. This income redistribution through the current system of social pooling misses 
the group who are more likely to be really poor. 
Second, the funded component also has problems. To reduce the taxation impact 
of the contribution to individual accounts, the account must be individually owned, 
earn market returns and be fully portable. Although individual workers own their 
individual accounts, including both funds and returns, there is confusion in some 
regulations and practices regarding this ownership. For instance, in the case of the 
death of an employee, the relatives may inherit only part of the residual funds in the 
account-the employee contributions and accumulated interest earnings, but not 
the employer contributions. 
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Currently, funds in individual accounts are not earning a market return. Instead, 
every year, the provincial government determines a rate of return, the 'accounting 
interest rate', with reference to bank deposit rates or rates of government bonds 
(Han and Jiao 1997; Liu 2000). Since the government controls the interest rate, this 
accounting interest rate tends to be lower than the market return. This implies that 
employees' labour income is taxed by the pension scheme. 
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that provincial governments have an 
incentive to choose a low interest rate for pension funds. As part of a mandatory 
public pension scheme operated at the province level, the accounting interest rate 
affects the future liabilities of the local government. The higher the interest rate 
chosen to calculate the return on pension funds, the higher the future liabilities of 
the local government to account owners. 
Regulations allow for individual accounts to be fully portable, but how feasible 
this portability is in practice needs to be monitored closely. This could cause problems 
if people working in a low-wage province move to a high-wage province owing to the 
future elementary pensions paid from the social pool. 
There are also problems with the management of individual accounts. One example 
is the 'empty account' problem, when funds in individual accounts are used to pay 
pensions for current retirees or to invest in local infrastructure, real estate or stocks 
(Han and Jiao 1997; Li 1998). From an employee's point of view, the key issue is 
whether or not the local government, as the management authority of their individual 
accounts, can pay back the money in the account when the employee retires. As 
long as employees believe that their future pensions from their individual accounts 
are secure, they will regard the pension contribution into their individual account as 
part of their deferred payment rather than taxes.26 Provided the government's assets, 
including its future tax revenues, are sufficient to finance its liabilities, they will be 
all right. 
Otherwise, either of the following, or both, may happen: the local government 
would have to raise taxes or reduce expenditures, or the central government will 
have to bailout provincial governments in order to keep the scheme running or 
retirees would receive less than they were promised. In the former case, the 
government would have to impose more taxes on the private economy, and this 
I 
would change the nature of the supposedly funded scheme to one that is essentially 
PAYGO, but with individual accounts. In the latter case, the supposedly individual 
accounts will turn out not to have been genuinely individual accounts. 
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One way to examine the tax component of the current pension scheme is shown 
in Table 18.7. Suppose there is a hypothetical pension scheme, Scheme H, which 
has the same contribution rate (28 per cent of wages) as the current scheme, but in 
which all contributions are accumulated in workers' individual accounts. For simplicity, 
also assume that, in Scheme H, pensions paid from individual accounts are equal 
to 1/120 of funds available at retirement, as in the current scheme. The replacement 
rates of the current Chinese pension scheme and of Scheme H are listed in Table 
18.7. For convenience, the results are calculated for workers whose real wages are 
equal to the local (provincial) average wage. It is also assumed that the return on 
funds in individual accounts is the same as the growth rate of wages, and that pensions 
grow at the same rate as wages. The retirement period is assumed to be ten years.27 
The comparison between columns A and B shows that, with the same contribution 
rate, workers receive a higher pension (shown as higher replacement rates) in Scheme 
H than in the current Chinese pension scheme, regardless of the length of working/ 
contribution period. In fact, it is clear that the longer the contribution, the more 
significant the difference is.28 
Table 18.7 Contributions, employment and replacement rate of pensions 
Contribution rate Excess 
Replacement required for the contribution 
rate" of the Replacement same rate of the 
Years of current Chinese rate" of replacement current Chinese 
employment! pension scheme scheme H rate as (A) pension scheme 
contribution (per cent)(A) (per cent)(B) (per cent)d(C) (percentage points) 
10 11.0b 28.0 11.0 17.0 
15 36.5c 42.0 24.3 3.7 
20 42.0 56.0 21.0 7.0 
25 47.5 70.0 19.0 9.0 
30 53.0 84.0 17.7 10.3 
35 58.5 98.0 16.7 11.3 
40 64.0 112.0 16.0 12.0 
Note: • Replacement rate is calculated as the ratio of the first month's (year) pensions to the last 
month's (year) wages. b Workers with less than 15 years of contribution are not eligible for the 20 
per cent local average wage. The number is calculated assuming pensions for the first month of 
retirement are paid as 1/120 of total funds in the individual account. c This and the following 
replacement rates in column A include 20 per cent of the local average wage. d Here, all 
contributions are accumulated in individual accounts. 
Source: Author's calculation. 
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Another way to see the difference between the two schemes is to look at extra 
pensions gained with longer years of contribution. While an extra 20 years of 
contribution (from 15 to 35 years) brings an extra 20 percentage points of replacement 
rate for workers in the current Chinese pension scheme, it would bring an extra 46 
percentage points for the same workers if they were in Scheme H (comparing columns 
A and B). 
Column C in Table 18.7 shows the contribution rate (percentage of wages) required 
of workers in Scheme H in order to achieve the same replacement rate as the 
current Chinese pension scheme. Obviously, the longer the contribution period, the 
lower the contribution rate required to receive the same pension as in the current 
Chinese pension system.29 This demonstrates that workers bear a higher tax burden 
the longer they stay in the current Chinese pension system. This is shown in the 
last column in Table 18.7, where these calculated contribution rates are subtracted 
from the contribution rate of the current Chinese pension scheme, which is 28 per 
cent. The results can be regarded as the excess contribution rate of the current 
Chinese pension scheme compared with Scheme H. 
CHALLENGES FACING THE REFORM OF THE UMLS 
PROGRAM 
The failure of the UMLS to provide a safety net to all residents 
As discussed earlier, the UMLS program only covers people with the local (urban) 
household registration. This means that a large proportion of people living in cities 
are not protected by this safety net, although many are poor. 
Since the mid 1980s, policies that curbed labour mobility during the pre-reform 
era have become less effective (Zhao 2003). In the meantime, surplus rural labour 
has been 'pulled'30 and 'pushed'31 towards cities (Hare 1999; Wang 2001; Zhao 2003). 
Most of these migrants are not allowed to register as urban households and 
consequently face discrimination in terms of social and economic entitlements (Meng 
2000; Jiao 2002; Zhao 2003). These migrants are often referred to as the 'floating 
population' (Li 2001). 
There is no consensus about the size of the floating population in Chinese cities. 
However, various sources indicate that, during the early 1980s, it accounted for 
less than 12 per cent of the urban population.32 By the mid 1990s, it accounted for 
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about 23 per cent (see Rawski and Mead 1998; Wang 2001; Jiao 2002; Rozelle et al. 
2002; Jiang 2003).33 
The limited coverage of the UMLS program has two problems. First, it excludes 
the poor groups in cities-rural migrants-from the social safety net, even though 
they contribute to the urban economy. Second, the local household registration 
requirement, and the difficulty of obtaining it, can reduce labour mobility, especially 
for urban people. Poor people in one city may choose to rely on the local UMLS 
relief instead of going to other cities where there are more job opportunities, since 
they are denied the access of a safety net in these cities. 
The high implicit tax of the UMLS program 
The current UMLS program imposes a high tax rate on its recipients. The amount of 
cash received by the recipient is dependent on household income. When a recipient's 
household income is increased by one yuan, the recipient household loses one 
yuan from the UMLS program. This feature effectively imposes a 100 per cent 
marginal tax rate on recipients' earned income. The recipient is not financially better 
off by working more and earning more income, so long as they remain a UMLS 
recipient. 
Of course, the 100 per cent marginal tax rate would be less relevant if an effective 
minimum wage were in place that was much higher than the city's UMLS line, and 
if part-time work were not available.34 On average in 1999 the UMLS line was about 
60 per cent of the minimum wage for the capital cities. Taking this figure, suppose 
that the average family size is three people: two parents and one child.35 Suppose 
only one parent worked in 1999 and received the minimum wage and the family had 
no other income, then the per capita income of this family would be about 56 per 
cent of the local UMLS line. Therefore, this family would be eligible for the UMLS 
poverty relief and would face a tax rate of 100 per cent on any family earnings. That 
is not sufficient to raise per capita above the local UMLS line. 
However, for some unemployed people, the relevant choice is between full-time 
employment and unemployment. For such people, the effective rate of tax on earned 
income is less than 100 per cent, particularly if minimum wage rates are actually 
enforced. For example, using the figures for the UMLS line and provincial minimum 
wage rates in 1999, a full-time job at the minimum wage for a month would typically 
pay about 67 per cent more than the monthly UMLS benefit. As a result, the average 
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effective tax rate facing a person choosing between the UMLS benefit and full-time 
employment at the minimum wage would be 60 per cent, not 100 per cent. This is 
still a very high and distortionary implicit tax. 
This high marginal tax rate has a strong negative impact on the labour supply. 
From the government's point of view, a social safety net that provides a minimum 
living for the poor is most efficient when the cost is minimised. One way to achieve 
this object is to minimise the number of people who rely on poverty relief, ceteris 
paribus. For this purpose, the design of the safety net must consider its negative 
impact on people's efforts to find jobs. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In addition to the problems of rapid population aging, reform of the social security 
system faces the challenge of the dynamic nature of the economic transition. If the 
government wishes to explore all possible benefits of the market, reforms to the 
social security system need to take into consideration ways of minimising the 
efficiency costs. These costs, such as possible disincentive impacts on labour 
supply and labor mobility, are particularly significant in the long run. 
Some reforms are possible in the current social security system in order to reduce 
these disincentive effects. 
• The contributions to the social pooling funds of pensions need to be reduced or 
eliminated. This will reduce the tax component of pension contributions on 
workers. 
.. The management of individual accounts must be improved to reflect the 
ownership of the accounts, to raise the return on pension funds to the market 
return and to minimise the possible impact on labour mobility. This reduces the 
perceived tax component of contribution to individual accounts. 
.. The pension debt of the old PAYGO scheme is not high for China. The most 
efficient way to finance this public debt is to spread the (payroll) tax burden 
over a long period of time, and to impose lower tax rates when the taxation 
system is not very efficient, but higher tax rates when it becomes more efficient. 
Faster economic growth helps to reduce the tax burden. 
• For the UMLS program, the high and distortionary tax rate on earned income 
needs to be abolished. Further reforms of this program also need to consider 
the provision for migrants and how to reduce the barrier of labour mobility. 
349 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This paper is based on the author's PhD thesis, completed in June 2003 at the 
Economics Division, Research School and Pacific and Asian Studies, the Australian 
National University. The author would like to thank the supervisory panel, including 
Professor George Fane, Dr. Xin Meng and Professor Ross Garnaut, for their 
comments on drafts of the thesis 
NOTES 
1 The People's Commune was an organisation established by the Communist government. It 
combined the function of the lowest level government with economic management in rural China. 
It was the institution that facilitated the role of the agricultural sector in the command economy: 
a net contributor to the national economy. 
2 The work unit was a general name for all sorts of organisations of the command economy, such 
as schools and factories. It could be state-owned or collective-owned. Each work unit was under 
the administration of a level of government or its agents. This in turn formed the hierarchy of the 
work unit system. The work units also combined economic activities with some government 
social functions, such as social security provisions. 
3 The LlR covered state-owned and large collective firms. Employees in other public sectors had 
social security provisions similar to the LlR. 
4 The HRS requires each citizen to register at the local police station, either as rural or non-rural 
(urban) resident. There are severe restrictions on people living in places other than their registered 
area. 
S The term 'social security' covers a wide range of programs in China; for example, see Shao and 
Chen (1991). 
6 Wang and Hu (2001) have an interesting discussion with regard to the declining state fiscal 
capacity in China since the economic reform. 
7 The SOE reforms in China have been well documented, for example, Dong, Tang and Du (1995), 
Walder (1996), Hay et al. (1994), and Gao (1999). 
8 Here 'work units' is replaced with 'SOEs' since most reforms have occurred in SOEs. 
9 At the time, the official notation was 'waiting for jobs' rather than 'unemployment' (see Table 18.3). 
10 This allows the provincial government to pool the risk among cities under its jurisdiction. 
11 Policies and detailed regulations with regard to the third pillar are yet to be formalised by the 
government. 
12 This included years of employment acknowledged according to the government rules, which 
mayor may not be equal to the actual working years of the individual (Uu 2000). 
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13 During the pre-reform period, once an individual was allocated to a work unit, the employment 
relationship was permanent. The work unit was also supposed to take care of the individual and 
his/her family for lifetime. 
14 This refers to the household registration at the city level, since moving within a city is not 
restricted by the HRS. 
15 This was often due to the financial difficulties of their work units and the reduction of government 
subsidies to SOEs in deficit during the SOE reform. 
16 This is based on author's simulation, taking into account the difference between urban population 
aging and overall population aging, and assuming the replacement ratio is the same as the 
average replacement ratio in 2000. 
17 Barro (1979) shows that the optimal tax rate over time for a given public expenses is a constant 
tax rate in each period. 
18 The author will supply details of the simulation and results of other scenarios of the simulation 
upon request. 
19 The World Bank (1997) estimates that the implicit pension debt in China in 1994 was about 46-
69 per cent of GDP that year. Compared with 100-200 per cent in most OECD countries, and 
40-130 per cent in Chile (depending on the discount rate chosen), the implicit pension debt in 
China is not very high. 
aJ Assume this payroll tax is the only tax imposed on the payroll. If there were already other payroll 
taxes, the tax rate required would be a little higher. 
21 In the simulations, this pension debt is rescaled to 2000 values. This approach means that the 
discount rate matters. In the simulations, several discount rates are used to examine the 
sensitivity of the results. 
22 Government revenues mainly came from the operating surplus of firms it owned (McKinnon 
1991). 
23 This can be shown mathematically in the model for the simulations. 
'" It is also assumed that pensions for future retirees of the new funded scheme are financed by 
accumulated pension contributions, and these contributions are not regarded as tax. 
~ These different scenarios include different growth rates of urban GDP per capita and different 
values of the discount rate. 
ffi Assuming the return is the same as the market return. 






where B is replacement rate, T is number of years of contribution, and r is the contribution rate. 
This formula follows the practice in the current Chinese pension scheme that the first year 
pensions equal to 1/10 of funds available in the individual account. 
2l Except for the case with only 10 years of contributions, when the worker does not receive the 
20 per cent elementary pension from the social pooling fund. 
29 With the exception of the case for the shortest contribution period, 10 years. 
3l Farmers are pulled towards cities and villages by, among other things, higher incomes and living 
standards. 
31 Improved agricultural production efficiency and the consequent surplus labour in rural areas are 
among the factors that pushed farmers to cities. 
32 This is calculated by assuming the floating population was 30 million, and those with urban 
household registration was, on average, 226.1 million between1981-85 (State Statistical Bureau 
2000a) 
3l This is calculated by assuming the floating population was 80 million in 1995. 
34 Legislation goveming minimum wages in China was issued in 1993 (Kang and Feng 2000). 
215 The average family size in 1999 was 3.14 persons (State Statistical Bureau 2000b). 
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Nation Social Secu 
The establishment of the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) is a significant step 
for China in addressing the magnitude of its current pension problem, and in assisting 
the Chinese Government to service its pension liabilities. Moreover, it is an important 
indication of China's desire to encourage the development of institutional investors. 
Despite this, the NSSF is still shrouded in some mystery. This chapter attempts to 
provide an insight into the management, funding and operation of the NSSF. The 
NSSF's role in developing China's fledgling funds management industry will also be 
considered. 
THE NATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY FUND 
The NSSF, which was set up in the second half of 2000, was only widely publicised 
by the Chinese Government in 2001. It was set up to act as a stable, medium to 
long-term reserve fund, with its main objective to ensure the future sustainability of 
China's social security system, particularly in relation to the provision of pensions. 
It is in this context that the Chinese Government hopes that the NSSF will remain 
untouched for at least 20 years, in order to enable it to accumulate sufficient funds 
to cover any future shortfalls in social security funding. Many commentators, such 
as Leckie (2002) and DiBiasio (2002b:28), have noted that the NSSF's role is that of 
a 'fund of last resort'. As such, the NSSF is expected to reduce the need for budgetary 
top-ups of the future pension shortfalls of Provincial Governments, particularly as 
the impact of China's ageing population becomes more severe. Such a view assumes 
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that the NSSF is a large fund pool, which will be paid out as required. This chapter 
assumes that the NSSF is, in fact, a large fund pool that will be used to cover future 
pension shortfalls as a last resort. 
While there is, generally speaking, broad consensus with regard to the role of the 
National Social Security Fund, other commentators, such as Ogborn,1 suggest that 
the NSSF consists of a multitude of individual accounts. This view is incorrect. The 
costs associated with managing a range of individual accounts, and keeping them 
separate from one another to ensure their integrity, would make it too costly for 
most fund managers to want to be actively involved in the management of such 
funds. In this way, a structure based around a set of individual accounts would not 
be attractive to most fund managers, and would defeat the purpose of the Chinese 
Government in using the NSSF to encourage institutional investors in that country. 
In its role as a large fund pool, the NSSF is considered by the Chinese Government 
to be a kind of Trust Fund. 
Management and structure of the National Social Security Fund 
In the context of funds management, the NSSF Council, which reports directly to 
the State Council, acts as a Board ofTrustees.lt is the main decision making body, 
and is made up of representatives from Government, business and academia. Among 
its members, all of which are appointed by the State Council, are Xiang Huaicheng, 
the former Minister for Finance and who was recently appointed President of the 
Council, Gao Xiqing, former Vice Chairman of the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission and who was recently apPointed as the Vice President of the Council, 
and Liu Yongfu, Vice-Minister for Labour and Social Security, and Feng Jianshen, 
mentioned below, who are Councillors. 
Although the Chinese Government views the NSSF as a Trust Fund, it is doubtful 
whether this is justified at this time. Generally speaking, Trust Funds are clearly 
defined and bound by relevant legislation and must specify details regarding sources 
of funding, how the funds will be invested, and how payments will be made. Information 
regarding the operation of the National Social Security Fund is available regarding 
the first two criteria. However, there is a general lack of information available for the 
last criterion. To date, there has been no clear indication from the Chinese Government 
of how payments from the NSSF will be made available to provincial governments. 
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With regard to its function as a Board of Trustees, the Council of the Chinese 
National Social Security Fund has appointed a number of custodians and funds 
management companies to manage part of the NSSF's assets. Of particular relevance 
to this chapter, the Council has appointed two custodians to oversee the activities 
of the six funds management companies, which act as investment managers. Those 
organisations are the Bank of Communications (Jiaotong Yinhang) and the Bank of 
China (Zhongguo Yinhang). The six funds management companies selected by the 
Council were Boshi Fund Management, Penghua Fund Management, Nanfang Fund 
Management, Changsheng Fund Management, Jiashi Fund Management and Huaxia 
Fund Management. 
Under the Council of the NSSF, there is a Secretariat, which is responsible for the 
day-to-day administration of the Council. It consists of the Administrative Affairs 
Section, the Finance and Accounting Section, the Investment Management Section, 
the Stock Management Section, and the Legal and Supervision Section. 
In addition to the Secretariat, there are a number of committees directly under the 
control of the Council of the NSSF. Those committees are the Investment Committee, 
the Risk Management Committee, and the Specialist Evaluation Committee. 
The Chinese Ministries of Finance, and Labour and Social Security, also have a 
role in the supervision of the NSSF, though that role is stili unclear. 
The Council of the National Social Security Fund has sought the assistance of 
consultants to provide advice and training in the areas of asset allocation and risk 
management. With regard to the role of those consultants, it should be noted that, at 
present, they do not perform the role of a consultant in the traditional funds management 
context. The NSSF's consultants do not provide advice directly to the Council of the 
NSSF regarding the allocation of the fund's assets and which funds management 
company should be employed to invest the funds, as is their traditional role. At the 
moment, the NSSF's consultants are largely involved with training staff in funds 
management principles and techniques, and in a wide range of risk management 
procedures. The role of consultants in the future remains unclear, though it is possible 
that they will be able to provide direct advice to the Council of the NSSF.ln this way, 
there is scope for foreign fund managers that specialise in this function to play an 
active role in developing China's fledgling funds management industry, and in 
reforming China's social security system. While there are a number of consultants 
working with the NSSF at present, the three major ones are Principal Insurance, 
Northern Trust Investor Services and Caisse des Depots et Placements du Quebec.2 
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It is clear that the fund managers report both to the custodians and to the Council 
(Figure 19.1). The custodians hold title to the assets of the fund managers, and may 
report to the Council, represented in Figure 19.1 by a dotted arrow. Consultants 
work with the Council of the NSSF and report to it, as do the Secretariat and its 
Committees. The diagram makes it clear that the Council of the NSSF itself reports 
to the State Council. The ministries of Finance and labour and Social Security only 
have a supervisory function. 
FUNDING OF THE NATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY FUND 
Although the NSSF, in theory, receives funding from the welfare lottery and the 
proceeds from the sell off of State shares, its major source of funding is the budgetary 
finances of the Central Government. The Ministry of Finance provides an undefined 
amount of money each year, in the form of a special block transfer, to top up the 
National Social Security Fund, thus ensuring that it 'maintains and increases its 
value'. The amount of funds provided by the Ministry of Finance is variable, and 
Figure 19.1 Reporting structure of the National Social Security Fund 
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depends largely upon the financial situation regarding the revenues and expenditures 
of the Central Government's finances towards the end of each financial year. 
Although the NSSF currently receives funds from the sell off of State shares, this 
amount of funding is very limited. The sell off of such shares was halted indefinitely 
because individual investors in China's stockmarkets feared a flood of shares, which 
caused them to drop sharply in value. However, State shares still account for some 
of the funding of the NSSF. An amount equivalent to 10 per cent of the Initial Public 
Offering or rights issues on those state-owned enterprises that list on overseas 
stockmarkets must be paid to the NSSF. There has also been speculation that the 
Chinese Government is considering another sell off of State shares. DiBiasio 
(2002b:28) comments that it is possible that the Chinese Government will transfer 
direct ownership of blocks of State shares to the NSSF, which would then sell them 
off. In this way, the NSSF could bundle them together and sell them off to strategiC 
investors in much the same way as the Tracker Fund in Hong Kong when the Hong 
Kong government intervened in the stock market after the East Asian financial crisis. 
The return on investment is also an important part of the NSSF's funding. Last 
year, the NSSF achieved a rate of return of 2.75 per cent, up from 2.25 per cent in 
2001 (China Labour Net 2003). Although not clearly stated, these are not real rates 
of return. The rates of return to date indicate that the NSSF is beating price inflation 
but not salary inflation. At the end of 2002, the funds of the NSSF were invested as 
follows: 
.. bank deposits: RMB 93.9 billion, comprising 75.6 per cent of the fund's value; 
.. bonds: RMB 27.4 billion, comprising 22.1 per cent of the fund's value; 
.. other equities, including corporate bonds and stocks: RMB 1.05 billion, 
compriSing 1.5 per cent of the fund's value (Xiao 2003). 
The value of the National Social Security Fund at the end of 2002 was approximately 
RMB 124.2 billion (A$24.84 billion), of which the Ministry of Finance provided RMB 
59.526 billion (A$11.9 billion) in the 2001 fiscal year, and RMB 41.6 billion (A$8.32 
billion) in 2002 (China Labour Net 2003). 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Following the establishment of the National Social Security Fund in late 2000, it 
took a long time for the Council to formulate a plan on how the fund would operate. 
In an important development, Feng Jianshen, one of the councillors of the NSSF, 
commented at the 35th Asian Development Bank Meeting, held in Shanghai in May 
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2002, that the operation of the NSSF had been settled upon. The Chinese Government 
decided that social security funds in the NSSF would be invested in a more diverse 
way. From his comments, it is understood that 50 per cent of the funds will remain 
in Government bonds and bank deposits, which currently remain the only form of 
approved investments for social security funds, 10 per cent will be invested in 
enterprise bonds, and the remaining 40 per cent will be able to be invested in stocks, 
equities and securities (Xu and Chen 2002). 
The Chinese Government expects that such a break up of investment streams 
will provide a higher return for the investment of assets in the NSSF. While this 40 
per cent is a positive move, and will help to develop China's fledgling securities and 
capital markets, it is not clear whether those funds will be able to be invested in 
overseas markets, especially since the Chinese currency is not convertible. It is 
also clear from the funding split that the Government appears to favour the use of 
bonds as an investment mechanism to raise more social security funds, although it 
could also be said that the Chinese Government is diversifying the scope of the 
NSSF and is trying to contain risk in the most effective way possible. 







Sell off of 
state shares 
In the current environment, the NSSF's reliance on bonds as the major form of 
investment appears to be a prudent move, especially since bonds have generally 
been quite stable in their performance in recent times. However, with the current 
upturn in stockmarkets all over the world, apart from China, it is increasingly likely 
that the returns on investments of NSSF assets will become more important over 
time. Moreover, it is clear that, by diversifying the NSSF's investments in this way, 
the Chinese Government is looking to the future, and is genuinely making an effort 
to try to maintain and increase the fund's value. 
In July 2001 , the NSSF was given permission to invest RMB 300 million (A$60 
million) in Sinopec shares on the A-based Share market. The current value of those 
shares is approximately RMB 900 million (A$180 million). Although this move was 
viewed as a pilot program, the Chinese Government also wanted the NSSF to become 
a strategic investor in Sinopec. While highlighting the emphasis that the Chinese 
Government places on developing institutional investors in China's emerging 
stockmarkets, this investment represented only a small portion of the value of 
China's stockmarkets, and reflects the insubstantial involvement of institutional 
investors in those markets at present. At 31 December 2002, the value of all shares 
in China was valued at approximately US$500 billion, while those shares floated on 
the stock market represent a total value of approximately US$150 billion (Leckie 
2001). Institutional investment in China's stockmarkets comprises 10 per cent of 
the market, with fund investments making up 1.7 per cent of the market (Leckie 
2001 ). 
The move to encourage institutional investors is widely regarded as a positive 
one, although it is acknowledged that it will take some time before institutional 
investors become a dominant force in the stock market, as they have done in many 
developed economies, such as those of the United States of America and Australia. 
The involvement of the NSSF in China's stockmarkets, coupled with the recently 
approved Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) scheme, means that the 
number of institutional investors in China's stockmarkets could increase considerably 
over the coming years. The QFII scheme is also an integral part of the Chinese 
Government's efforts to encourage institutional investment in that country's 
stockmarkets, though the scheme has been slow on the uptake. Its primary objective 
is to allow foreign companies to trade in the A-based share market. While the QFII 
scheme is expected to be successful, there has been some scepticism in the 
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scheme because the money is tied up for a period of two to three years, the 
governance of stockmarkets, particularly in the area of transparency, needs to be 
improved, and there is a shortage of quality stocks. 
In the light of its role as a primary means of encouraging institutional investment 
in China, there is general consensus that the National Social Security Fund could 
become one of the largest institutional investors in that country, and, indeed, in the 
Asian region. Some commentators, such as DiBiasio (2002b:28) have noted that it 
could become a very significant and influential institutional investor in Asia, with the 
exception of those investors found in Japan. 
In the second half of 2002, the Council of the NSSF invited tenders to manage 
part of its funds. The tender was open to any company that met the qualifying 
conditions (See Box 19.1) as laid down in the Temporary Methods for the Investment 
and Management of the National Social Security Fund, which were issued jointly by 
the Ministries of Finance and labour and Social Security.3 
The tender process clearly favoured domestic Chinese funds management 
companies,4 and excluded the possibility of joint ventures or foreign companies 
being able to manage NSSF funds because none of them had a two-year track 
record. It is also important to bear in mind that this tender determined the first group 
of companies eligible to manage social security funds. It is reasonable to expect 
that more opportunities to manage these funds will arise in the future, and the 
Box 19.1 Qualifying conditions to manage funds in the NSSF 
The qualifying conditions to manage funds in the NSSF are as follows 
.. Be registered in China or be an investment management organisation of the kind stipulated by 
the State Council; 
.. Have a licence from the China Securities Regulatory Commission as a funds management 
company; 
.. Possess real capital of not less that RMB 50 million, and, at any time, have not less than RMB 
50 million in net assets; 
.. Have had a representative office in China for more than two years, and possess more than 
two years experience in securities and investment management in China; 
.. Be cautious in the management of funds, have a high reputation, and possess a standard 
international operational structure; 
.. Have no evidence of illegal behaviour in the last three years; 
.. Possess a perfected corporate governance structure; 
" Have enough competent staff specialised in funds management; and 
"Possess a comprehensive and effective internal risk management system, including an 
independent regulation section. 
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Chinese Government has indicated that this will happen (Yang 2003). In the future, 
it may be possible for foreign funds management companies to have the opportunity 
to manage NSSF assets, particularly if they exploit the opportunities created by 
China's recent accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, this will 
take time. Under the accession rules, foreign funds management companies can 
own up to 33 per cent of a funds management company immediately, and 49 per 
cent of the company three years after China's accession to WTO. Moreover, foreign 
and jOint venture funds management companies also will be able to manage pension 
funds. At present, there are already a number of jOint venture funds management 
companies in China, although it is unclear whether they are currently licensed to 
manage funds in that country.5 
The six fund management companies selected to manage part of the NSSF's 
assets were given formal approval to invest a portion of those funds on the stock 
market. Before commencing operations, they were required to sign an agreement 
with the NSSF. 
When appointing the funds managers, the Council of the NSSF also discussed 
the rates of return that it hopes to achieve if the funds managers wish to keep their 
mandates. Those target rates of return are quite ambitious. They must be at least 
three percentage pOints higher than the rate of price inflation, and 120 per cent of 
the yearly interest rate for a term deposit in a bank (Yang 2003). To clarify the point, 
it should be noted that these target returns are by no means definite at this stage 
and are still the subject of much discussion by the Council of the NSSF. If those 
targets are being considered seriously by the Chinese Government, then it is likely 
to provide enough of an incentive for the funds managers. It may lead the fund 
managers to seek positive absolute rates of return for the monies under their control. 
In total, RMB 28 billion (A$5.6 billion) was made available to the fund management 
companies. Nanfang Fund Management, Boshi Fund Management and Huaxia Fund 
Management companies each received RMB 6-7 billion (A$1.2-1.4 billion), while 
Changsheng Fund Management, Penghua Fund Management and Jiashi Fund 
Management companies received RMB 3 billion (A$600 million) each to invest. The 
funds available to each of these funds management companies can only be invested 
in stocks and bonds (Yang 2003; Xiao 2003). The total amount of funds to be invested 
will enter the stockmarkets gradually. This is being done, in part, to avoid any 
perception by individual investors that there is a flood of money going into China's 
stockmarkets, which could cause prices to rise. It should be recognised that there 
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are no guarantees that the entry of the NSSF will boost the value of the stockmarkets. 
In a recent article, the China Daily (2003) commented that the entry of the fund 
could not sustain buying momentum on 13 June 2003, and that it is expected to 
provide a boost in the medium to long term only. Approximately half of the RMB 28 
billion (A$5.6 billion) will enter the stock market within a short space of time and it 
is understood that RMB 4 billion (A$800 million) will be invested within three months 
from June 2003 (Xin 2003). 
Given the importance of the NSSF for the Chinese Government, there were also 
a number of restrictions placed upon the funds managers with regard to the investment 
of NSSF assets. In particular, investment funds managed by funds management 
companies in China's stockmarkets should not rise above 80 per cent, and investment 
in bonds must not exceed 20 per cent. The total administrative costs of the six 
funds management companies must not exceed 10 per cent of the value of assets 
in the National Social Security Fund, and funds managers cannot hold more than 
five per cent of a listed company's shares. Such restrictions on the investment of 
NSSF assets indicate the sensitive nature of the fund, and the Chinese Government's 
desire for its assets to be invested in a safe and reliable way, while still maintaining 
and increasing its value. In recent times, there has been discussion within the 
Chinese Government surrounding the possibility of a Oualified Domestic institutional 
Investor (0011) scheme, which is likely to be an even more sensitive issue than the 
OFII scheme, as investments under the 0011 scheme are capital outflows. There 
may be scope for the NSSF to participate in the 0011 scheme, but it remains unclear 
whether it would be allowed to do so. 
The chapter has provided a description of the management, funding and operation 
of China's National Social Security Fund, and the most recent developments in that 
regard. Its establishment indicates that the Chinese Government is looking to the 
future, and that it is making an effort to solve China's future pension problems. The 
most recent developments regarding the NSSF, particularly that of allowing it to hire 
fund managers to invest in the stockmarket, also suggest that there is a conscious 
effort on the part of the Chinese Government to maintain and increase its value. In 
addition, the chapter has demonstrated that it is an important vehicle for the 
development of the funds management industry in China, and for encouraging 
institutional investors in that country's stockmarkets. It is also clear that the NSSF 
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will assist the Chinese Government in meeting its future pension liabilities. In this 
context, it is highly likely that the Chinese Government will proceed with great 
caution to ensure and maintain the integrity of its National Social Security Fund. 
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NOTES 
1 Dr Ogborn, a former employee of the Australian Department of Family and Community Services, 
was involved in a World Bank funded social security reform project between 1999 and 2002. His 
comments were sourced from information obtained by comments he provided on a previous 
paper by the author. 
2 Principal Insurance, a US based company, is training NSSF staff in funds management, and is 
keen to keep that relationship going after its contract expires, though it is unclear what form that 
relationship would take (DiBiasio 2002a). Northern Trust Investor Services is providing assistance 
to the NSSF with regard to its risk management systems, including asset allocation, investment 
management monitoring, performance reporting (Northern Trust Corporation, 2003). Caisse des 
Depots et Placements du Quebec is assisting the NSSF in relation to investment management 
(DiBiasio 2002b:28). 
3 My translation 
4 At that time, only ten domestic Chinese companies were in a position to manage NSSF funds. 
Those companies were: Nanfang Fund Management, Guotai Fund Management, Penghua Fund 
Management, Fuguo Fund Management, Jiashi Fund Management, Hua'an Fund Management, 
Boshi Fund Management, Changsheng Fund Management, Dacheng Fund Management and 
Huaxia Fund Management. 
5 At least three foreign funds management companies have set up joint venture funds management 
companies with Chinese companies, and could, potentially, manage NSSF funds in the future. 
Those companies are Allianz AG from Germany with Guotai Jun'an Securities, SG Asset 
Management from France with the Huabao Trust and Investment Company, and ING with China 
Merchant Securities. 
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Joint venture funds management companies in China requires two licences. The first licence 
gives permission to set up a joint venture funds management company, while the second allows 
the company to launch funds. As such, approval to set up a joint venture has been given, but it 
remains unclear whether they have been granted the other license necessary to manage funds 
(Information obtained from the author's discussion with Stuart Leckie, Chairman of the Hong Kong 
Retirement Schemes Association). 
Of relevance to Australia, Colonial First State, the funds management arm of the Commonwealth 
Bank of Australia, is awaiting the China Securities Regulatory Commission's approval to participate 
in a joint venture funds management company with Hantong Securities from Shenzhen (DiBiasio 
2003b; Korporaal 2003). 
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The 14th congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held in October 1992. It 
was here that Deng Xiaoping officially declared that the aim of China's economic 
reform was to establish a socialist market system, and since then, China's state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) have been reformed. With faster development of markets 
and the rapid growth of collectives and small private businesses, SOEs were further 
exposed to market competition in 1992 when dual track prices were merged with 
market prices. 
Different SOEs required different approaches to reform. A variety of contracts 
were introduced to provide incentives for managers to improve enterprise performance. 
Some small SOEs were leased to private agents. A number of well-performing SOEs 
were listed in domestic and international stockmarkets. Many loss-making SOEs 
experienced liquidation or internal restructuring, and more than 7,000 insolvent SOEs 
went bankrupt. Mergers and acquisition of SOEs were also allowed. 
Despite SOEs' poorly-defined property rights of, most Chinese economists did 
not suggest large-scale privatisation in the earlier economic reform period. Instead, 
concerns about a possible backlash caused the Chinese government to adopt a 
piecemeal reform approach and pursue GDP growth. 
Recent studies analyse the success of this path to economic reform. For example, 
(Lau, et al. 2000) and Wen (2002a) claim that keeping major SOEs from privatisation 
may have helped China evade a decline in industrial output during the earlier period 
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of economic reform. Tian (2000) shows that an optimal ownership arrangement is 
dependent on marketisation. Pure private ownership would not have been welfare-
optimal in an economy with very low levels of marketisation. Lau et al. (2000) argue 
that because China's economic reforms were Pareto-improving, backlash forces 
were minimised. Yet productivity growth among SOEs indicates that the SOE reforms 
were at least partially effective (Jefferson, et al. 1999 and Jefferson et al. 1996). 
And the social safety net function of SOEs has been widely recognised. 
Clearly, in almost every facet of its economy, contemporary China is vastly different 
from the China of the 1980s. While at the beginning of the reform, there were few 
free markets in major cities for trading agricultural products and small industrial 
commodities, at the beginning of the 21 st century, China not only has networked 
product markets, but also an imperfect financial market, an imperfect labour market, 
housing markets, future markets, and even e-commerce. By 1996, less than 10 per 
cent of commodity categories were under government control. Over 90 per cent of 
retail prices and 80 per cent of agricultural and producer good prices (as a proportion 
of output value) were determined by the market. 
In addition, major industrial players have changed substantially. At the beginning 
of economic reform, industrial SOEs contributed over 80 per cent of national industrial 
output value, with individuals (a type of small private enterprise with fewer than 
eight employees) and collectives contributed the rest (less than 20 per cent). By 
2001, only 46,767 of the 171,256 of industrial enterprises (with a sales-revenue 
above 5 million yuan) were either state-owned, or the state had controlling shares in 
them. These 46,767 enterprises produced 44 per cent of the national industrial 
output value, contributing 52 per cent to national value added of industry. More than 
two decades after opening up the economy, foreign and overseas Chinese-funded 
enterprises (above the designed size) rose from zero in 1978 to 31,423 in 2001, 
contributing 29 per cent and 25 per cent respectively to gross industrial output value 
and value added by industry. In addition, there were 31,028 collectives and 5,692 
shareholding corporations, which produced 11 and 13 per cent of gross industrial 
output value, and 9 and 16 per cent of value added of industry. 
Since China opened its economy to foreign investors and encouraged the 
development of private enterprise, firms with different ownership types competed in 
product markets. This has significantly contributed to China's industrial growth (Wen 
2002b). However, there were distortions in the market place. First, changing SOEs 
from administration units to economic entities did not change their objective to 
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pursuing profits, due to poorly-defined property rights and institutional constraints. 
In fact, because of the lack of a sound social security system, overstaffing in 
SOEs had been a major obstacle to achieving internal efficiency (Dong et al. 2003 
and Wen et al. 2002). 
Second, although the increasing power of SOE managers of enabled them to 
make autonomous decisions based on market information, it also enabled them to 
strip state assets by pursuing short-run benefits, with SOEs competing more 
aggressively in the market place than otherwise. This led to a low returns on capital 
in SOEs and further lowered the accumulation of state assets. 
Third, state ownership of major banks meant they were unable to lend to firms 
according to marginal returns to capital. Loan policies favoured SOEs, which became 
the major holder of banks' bad loans. 
Fourth, to attract foreign investment, tax exemptions and tax reduction policies 
were given to enterprises with foreign investment and overseas Chinese investment. 
These preferential policies made taxation for foreign and overseas Chinese invested 
enterprises much lower than their industrial competitors.l 
The development of domestic private firms in this distorted market place could be 
very difficult. Since the late 1990s, increasing international competition, large amounts 
of state assets stripping, relative poor performance of SOEs, and accumulated bad 
loans in state banks have led to growing governmental concerns about the 
maintenance of SOEs and about further reforms in the state sector. Because of the 
interdependency between the reform of SOEs and that of state banks, and the 
development of other institutions, the government possibly feels pressured towards 
further reform, despite the difficulties. 
KEY ISSUES IN FURTHER REFORM OF SOES AND STATE 
BANKS 
Evidence of significant differences in technical efficiency between SOEs and other 
firms can be seen in the survey data of the third national industrial census (Zhang 
et al. 2001; Wen et al. 2002). China's competitive industries have problems with 
internal efficiency, as do industrial market economies and other transitional 
economies (Wen 2002a). Ownership transformation (zhuanzhior gaizhl) of SOEs in 
one way or another is desirable to improve the technical efficiency of current SOEs, 
especially in competitive industries. Although the 'keep the large and let the small 
go' (Zhuada Fangxiao) policy officially initiated SOE privatisation in China, 
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diversification of ownership of SOEs has not yet solved inefficiencies in SOEs and 
the managing of state assets. There is no unified national account of the sales 
revenues of small and medium-sized SOEs, and very few comparisons of the different 
mechanisms used for privatising small and medium-sized SOEs, so it is difficult to 
estimate the net benefits of 'letting the small go'. Concerns about major state assets 
and mass unemployment made the government reluctant to change SOE ownership 
structure substantially. 
All Chinese citizens are the nominal owners of state assets, and the various 
levels of government exercise owners' rights on their behalf. But there are now 1.3 
billion Chinese citizens, a very small fraction of the nominal owners can exercise 
their rights. Because of an imperfect legal enforcement system and tax evasion, 
central and local governments have been forced to use their own state enterprises 
for fiscal revenue purposes. Therefore, the vested interests of central and local 
government officials may have become one of the obstacles to effective 
diversification of ownership in the reform of large SOEs. 
Central and local governments are clear about the growth objectives of SOEs. But 
they are also clear about their low profit-assets ratios and competitive inefficiencies. 
However, governments have a dilemma because of institutional shortcomings. If 
SOEs in competitive industries are fully privatised no matter what their size, the 
government may risk revenue decline if the revenue from selling the SOEs and from 
increasing taxation is smaller than the revenue from lifetime return to state assets 
and the costs incurred in social security payments to laid-off workers (ceteris paribus). 
Meanwhile, maintaining large SOEs in competitive industries in spite of continuing 
poor performance will certainly result in efficiency losses, and is likely to result in 
slower development of domestic private enterprises and slower growth of domestic 
industries. 
If the legal enforcement system were effective and there were sound assets 
markets, after privatising large SOEs in competitive industries, the faster industrial 
growth and stronger domestic industrial sector would generate more taxation income. 
This, together with the revenue from selling the SOEs, would create a higher fiscal 
revenue than keeping these enterprises in government hands. Meanwhile, return to 
domestic capital would be higher, due to the efficiency gain in industrial enterprises, 
ceteris paribus. 
Establishing an efficient legal enforcement system requires new legislation, which 
demands political reform and would diminish benefits to government officials. It is 
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questionable whether government officials have strong incentives to establish an 
open and fair auction of those SOEs operating at a loss as opportunities for bribery 
and corruption would be lost. Illegal personal gains from state asset stripping since 
the 1990s have resulted in large capital losses. According to Gu (2002) and Zhang 
(2002), China's annual capital flight increased from US$1 0 billion in 1990 to US$80 
billion in 2000. The lack of clearly defined property rights in SOEs means that these 
SOEs are less attractive as a target for domestic capital in the context of open and 
competitive industries . The longer-term outcome is that SOEs become 
undercapitalised, and hence must lean on the government to cover investment 
shortfalls and financial losses. This places a further burden on the govemment's 
fiscal situation and indicates that competitive industry is at the cost of loss of 
faster growth potential for domestic capital, which will result in loss of long-term 
fiscal revenue. 
Because of these problems, central government has adopted measures to improve 
the performance of SOEs, including the establishment of a State Asset Supervision 
and Administration Committee (SASAC), changing performance criteria for the central 
government-owned SOEs to profits and costs, and strengthening the monitoring of 
SOEs and the general stress of enterprise governance. According to the 'Temporary 
Provisions of State Assets Monitoring and Management in Enterprises', State Asset 
Supervision and Administration Committee can have a say on whether the SOE 
should undergo further reform towards restructuring, merger, bankruptcy, closing 
down, changing size or issuing company bonds. 
This new system might not solve the problem of high agency costs and it could add 
new costs for the following reasons. First, normal profits and production costs vary 
from industry to industry. When one large SOE is reported to have performed so 
poorly that it should be closed down, arguments about its poor performance could 
arise, especially in industries where there are only one or two large SOEs. Managers 
of the SOE could argue their firm may perform better with finance for expansion. 
Second, due to a less than accurate accounting system, the risk of loss of 
employment for managers of poorly-performing SOEs could lead them to expend 
more effort on manipulating the accounts and lowering product quality. While the 
regionalism and short sighted-behaviour of some managers of SOEs has caused a 
lot of redundant investment and excess production capacity in the 1990s, changing 
the performance criteria of SOEs could result in further short-sighted behaviour by 
managers. 
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Third, like many large SOE managers, SASAC personnel are not the genuine 
owners of state assets. They are also nominal owners and are apPointed by 
government officials to exercise owners' rights. So there is no guarantee that the 
SASAC will behave differently from former government officials in charge of large 
SOEs, especially when final decisions about the fate of a large SOEs is still in the 
government's hands. If the SASAC were able to help SOEs improve internal efficiency 
by matching performance with profits and costs, former government offices in charge 
of large SOEs should be able to do the same. 
Fourth, under SASAC monitoring, the selection of managers, one of the most 
important enterprise governance measures, will not substantially change. It is well 
known that the selection of most SOEs managers in China was not based on 
individual business acumen and management capability. If government officials 
have been reluctant to sack incapable managers because of low profits and high 
costs, excuses can be found in the large labour force and heavy social burden 
carried by the SOE. 
Fifth, SASAC is already a considerable size, with 20 bureaus as well as the 
general office. Although former direct government intervention in SOEs apparently 
became indirect after SASAC was established, increased intervention costs would 
not necessarily reduce government intervention if these costs were not a concern 
for government officials. While SASAC might help to collect data on existing state 
assets, the establishment of SASAC itself will not guarantee an efficiency gain for 
the state sector. Instead, expectations of SASAC to improve the SOE internal 
inefficiencies will depend on how SASAC can facilitate diversification of ownership 
of SOEs, and whether more efficient ownership transformation mechanisms can be 
adopted for these enterprises. 
According to Chen (2003), there are currently about 9,000 SOEs under state 
government surveillance. The assets of 196 of these are now directly monitored by 
SASAC. Except for these 196 large SOEs, further reform of the remaining SOEs 
may involve ownership diversification in one way or another in coming years. Although 
strong industrial competition, fast development of the non-state sector and high 
economic growth rates have made issues in the state sector less crucial, many 
scholars regard reform of SOEs over the past ten years as unsatisfactory. Had the 
reform of SOEs been more efficient, China's economy may have grown even faster. 
Institutional shortcomings and the failed efficiency gains to mark the policy of 'keep 
the large and let the small go'. Accurate evaluation of SOEs assets in is a difficult 
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and important issue in ownership diversification. The economic value of these assets 
always changes with their usage. Potential buyers of assets may know the value to 
them but may not reveal that value in their bids if the auction is not well designed.2 
More asset markets should be established with well-designed auction mechanisms. 
If the current government objectively reviews the results of 'letting the small go' 
and learns from past experience, further reform of SOEs may yet move towards 
more efficiency and fairness. Estimates on the book value of total state assets 
vary greatly. While Zhao (2003) reports that total state assets was over 11.8 trillion 
yuan at the end of 2002, Chen (2003) reports total assets of SOEs controlled by the 
state government at about 17.4 trillion yuan. As the nominal owners of state assets 
are all Chinese citizens, searching for an optimal reform approach of SOEs and a 
management approach for state assets should not be limited to approaches of 
increasing the value of these state assets under government control. 
Compared with state government managed assets, further privitisation of SOEs 
may increase opportunities for more efficient enterprises operation, more even income 
distribution, and faster growth of domestic capital. This would require more appropriate 
mechanisms for reforming SOEs in different industries and could be an opportunity 
to reduce state asset stripping through a fair redistribution of assets and clearer 
identification of property rights among different interest groups. Yet further ownership 
diversification of the majority of SOEs (in terms of numbers) need not contradict 
the fact that keeping some SOEs in non-competitive or crucial industries in the 
governments' hands would be a sensible strategic tool. 
State banks form a large proportion of state assets. In addition to current sole 
state ownership of the People's Bank of China, now working as China's central 
reserve bank, and four major commercial banks (Bank of China, Industrial and 
Commercial Bank, Construction Bank and Agricultural Bank), there are other state 
banks, and many regional commercial and development banks. In the past, state 
banks had loan policies favouring SOEs because of ideological discrimination against 
domestic private entities. Severe industrial competition and high agency costs 
resulted in the majority of SOEs suffering losses in the 1990s. State banks had to 
lend funds to many of these SOEs because of the problems associated with mass 
unemployment and hopes for improving the performance of SOEs. 
Consequently, state banks accumulated US$400 billion in bad assets by 1999 
and SOEs were the major holders of NPLs in state banks. In the late 1990s, many 
foreign banks were allowed to open branches in big cities like Shanghai and Beijing. 
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By January 2003, 60 foreign banks were allowed to open branches and to conduct 
foreign currency businesses without any regional location constraints. Fifty-three 
foreign banks were approved to open renminbi businesses in nine of the most 
developed Chinese cities including Shanghai and Shenzhen. Because the loan 
policies of state banks support the reform of SOEs, soft budget constraints and 
poor performance resulted in a huge amount of NPLs in state banks. According to 
Woo (2002), after 170 billion yuan of bad assets were transferred from state banks 
to the four asset management companies (Huarong, the Great Wall, DongFang, and 
Xinda) in 1999, the ratio of Non-Performing Loans to total outstanding loans of the 
four biggest state commercial banks was 0.35 at the beginning of 2002. This ratio 
indicates a poor performance of state banks relative to many Western banks, creating 
concerns for the domestic banking sector with drastic increases in international 
competition and growing appeal of developing domestic private banks. 
The trend for ambitious foreign entries with abundant banking experiences in market 
economies means that further reform of state banks is both urgent and inevitable 
for their own survival and for the future of the domestic banking sector. More 
competition is one way to improve efficiency in the banking sector. As renmimbi 
businesses have now opened to foreign banks, pending rigorous competition will 
force state banks into better management structures and lending behaviour to survive. 
This cannot, however, remove the high principal-agency problem in state banks, or 
guarantee the fastest increase in the value of the state assets in these banks. 
In 2003, foreign investment banks such as Gaosheng and Morgan Stanley were 
permitted to purchase bad assets from major state commercial banks when the 
state banks were trying to reduce NPL ratios. Nevertheless, as long as the vicious 
circle of SOEs and state banks cannot be broken, new NPL will accumulate and 
state banks will have more bad assets. In fact, rapid changes in market structure in 
China's banking sector has forced the People's Bank of China to consider exit 
mechanisms for insolvent banks. Three banking laws3 were recently passed. However, 
if the state banks can move towards ownership diversification (through listing in the 
stockmarkets within the next few years) and break the ownership link between them 
and SOEs along with the establishment of better governance structure, the efficient 
reforms of these banks may allow them to gain a first-mover advantage. Recently, 
domestic private entities and foreign investors have been invited to participate in 
the ownership diversification of some small and medium-sized regional commercial 
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banks. This may significantly increase foreign shares in the banking sector as well 
as enlarge disparity in income distribution. 
In China today, banks incur bad loans due to the lack of effective credit evaluation 
effective legal enforcement. Although credit evaluation will gradually improve with 
the increasing collection of information about business and business people, by 
increasing the number of banks, and having more experienced banks evaluate credit, 
the system's effectiveness will still be affected by the degree of personal grey and 
black income in the economy. The forthcoming new provisions in China's constitution 
for further protection of private property and domestic private businesses could 
help solve the problem. 
Many former SOE workers have been major losers in the reform of SOEs since 
the 1990s. The hard life of laid-off (Xiagang) and sacked workers has been widely 
observed (Yin 1998). Lack of social security funds (SS F) and a sound social security 
system is often regarded as an obstacle to reform. A recent study paints out that 
conditions for maintaining a large proportion of exiting employees in an ex ante 
SOE often made the buyer ask for discounts on the value of the firm and sometimes 
even made potential buyers reluctant to purchase the firm. This implies that attaching 
the labour force to state assets in the sale of SOEs may become an excuse for 
significant reduction in the value of state assets even though there is no long-term 
employment guarantee for attached employees. 
China is establishing a social security system with economic reform, but current 
social security is not unified and does not provide the unemployed with enough 
security. Current unemployment benefits for former SOE employees are from three 
channels: one third from SOEs, one third from the social insurance system, and 
one third from the fiscal budget. The unemployment benefit for young unemployed 
people with little work experience is a minimum payment from the fiscal budget at 
the poverty line with voluntary work required. Unemployment benefits for young 
people are available only in some large cities, and not nationwide.4 Although there is 
wide concern about the dramatic increase in the number of laid-off workers from the 
state sector since 1992, there are few studies focusing on finding the best linkage 
mechanism for the establishment of a unified social security system with reform of 
SOEs. 
This is a topic worthy of many separate studies. Perhaps one approach would be 
to establish more secondary asset markets and auction state assets openly and 
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fairly in the market. Direct transfer to social security funds of part of the revenue 
from the sales of state assets would be required, plus funds raised from selling 
state shares of listed SOEs transferred to social security funds, but the employment 
issue would be separated from ownership transformation in order for the sale of 
state assets to reach the highest amount. This would raise SSF more rapidly and 
increase the chance of providing unemployment benefits through a unified social 
security channel, and different SOEs would have different additional benefits 
arrangements for their former employees with some regulated cap, depending on 
the enterprise's financial situation. 
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS FOR FAIRER INCOME AND 
WEALTH DISTRIBUTION 
The key issues in the further reform of SOEs and state banks are the following 
.. more efficient operation of existing SOEs and state banks 
" sales revenues of state assets 
.. settlement of sacked workers in a unified social security system 
.. reduction of opportunity for bribery and state asset stripping 
.. efficient ownership diversification of some of state banks 
.. fairer sale of state assets among Chinese citizens for more equal income and 
wealth distribution both within and across regions. 
As the current government has publicly emphasised that it is to serve the Chinese 
people, and the nominal owner of state assets are all Chinese citizens, an integrated 
reform package is possible in the coming years. Because SOE and state bank 
inefficiencies are mainly due to poorly defined property rights and usually 
accompanied by over-staffing, unemployment may increase in the short term. The 
development of the non-state sector and fast economic growth will provide more re-
employment opportunities. Settlement of former employees of SOEs, state banks, 
and redundant government officials should be given priority. This would require that 
part of the revenue raised from further reform of SOEs or state banks5 should first 
be directly transferred to the SSF for covering unemployment benefits. 
Only after the required transfer to the SSF had been made could the remaining 
revenue be kept either by the SASAC for further reinvestment or be partly transferred 
to the Treasury. Direct transfer to the SSF would help establish a unified social 
security system, which could provide unemployment benefits to former employees 
of the state sector, and to unemployed who formerly worked in the non-state sector, 
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as well as training programs for re-employment and information services for re-
employment. Two important conditions for developing a sound social security system 
are raising more funds for the SSF and establishing open management of the SSF. 6 
While transparent accounting of the SSF would reduce the risk of mismanagement 
of the funds, fundraising of the SSF could be closely related to mechanisms used 
in further reforms. More asset markets and open state asset auctions would clearly 
help increase revenue from the sale of the assets of SOEs and state banks. These 
measures would help the government fight corruption reducing discrimination among 
potential buyers and corruption opportunities through establishing definite objectives 
for efficient re-allocation of assets. 
More small and medium-sized SOEs will be bankrupted, sold directly, or merged 
(in industries with increasing returns to scale). Ownership diversification of the 196 
large SOEs whose assets are currently under the direct administration of the SASAC 
and ownership diversification of state banks, can proceed in two steps: first, listing 
those unlisted large SOEs and banks in stockmarkets, and second, reducing state 
holdings of the shares of these economic entities. As these large enterprises and 
state banks are major state assets, ownership diversification could provide an 
excellent opportunity for the government to use market forces to reduce income 
disparities and improve wealth distribution within and across regions. In many 
industrial market economies, governments provided equal initial share offerings to 
their citizens at prices significantly lower than expected market prices, for example, 
privatisation of the Commonwealth Bank and privatisation of Telstra in Australia. 
After people begin to trade their shares in the market, an increase in share prices 
engenders more equal income distribution among citizens. More importantly, this 
approach fits with prevailing socialist ideology as it provides nominal owners with 
equal ownership rights of state assets. Citizens become the real owners of large 
SOEs or state banks and are able to exercise their owners' rights by selling, holding 
or purchasing shares. 
The size of the population would be the basis of objections to this approach. What 
is stated here is a principle. Actual implementation could be flexible. For example, 
when we consider diversifying ownership for major state commercial banks, an 
equal initial share offering of the Bank of China, the Industrial and Commerce Bank, 
and the Construction Bank could be limited to urban citizens and 49 per cent of total 
shares (with the state holding the remaining 51 per cent) while an equal initial share 
offering of the Agricultural Bank could be limited to rural citizens and 70 per cent of 
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total shares (with the state holding the remaining 30 per cent). Superficially, this 
may look like uneven income distribution between urban and rural citizens. But the 
direct transfer of part of the revenue from the former three banks to the SSF could 
be made while sales revenue of the Agricultural Bank could be kept by the bank for 
further investment. 
This would bring about appreciation of the shares once they were traded in the 
market. Together with different initial offering prices of the shares of different banks, 
it could generate a relatively even income distribution between rural and urban citizens. 
interestingly, an asset increase in the Agricultural Bank after partial privatisation 
could raise more funds for further development of the agricultural sector in the short 
term. An equal initial share offering of regional state banks could be limited to 
regional urban and rural citizens. As locations of the 196 large SOEs are 
geographically uneven, an initial share offering could vary according to the net assets 
of the enterprises. If net assets are large, the approach used for banks could be 
adopted. Otherwise, the first-come-first-served principle could be used, with initial 
offering prices being at a level very close to estimated market prices. It is worth 
pOinting out that while the state could control the speed of ownership diversification 
through its holding of the shares, this approach does not exclude foreign ownership 
of state-controlling banks or enterprises. Foreign purchases of shares of these 
enterprises and banks could be allowed after market trading commences but some 
different aggregate caps on foreign ownership could be set for different banks and 
each of the 196 different enterprises. Currently, there are calls for renminbi 
appreciation. The timing of ownership diversification of state banks and SOEs, the 
speed of their ownership diversification, and the timing of renminbi appreciation all 
have strong implications for future domestic wealth. 
Like the management of the SSF, open or semi-open management of SASAC 
would be the most efficient way to battle corruption and state asset stripping. SASAC 
could hold central records on sales of state assets for each of the major state 
banks and each of the 196 enterprises, with all details of sales revenues and transfers. 
These records would facilitate state monitoring and surveillance. Meanwhile, the 
SASAC should provide public monthly reports on aggregate sales revenue of state 
assets and major sales. In addition, a public monitoring and reporting system of 
further reforms could be created so that people would be encouraged to observe 
monthly reports and reforms closely. With open management of SSF, and open 
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accounting of SASAC, together with strong regulation of both SSF and SASAC, 
public monitoring and enhanced legal enforcement would better protect state assets 
and would significantly reduce the chances for corruption. 
Effectiveness of further reforms of SOEs and state banks will be interdependent 
as SOEs budgets cannot be hardened with state ownership of major banks. Poor 
performance of SOEs has been generating huge NPLs for state banks. In further 
reforms, especially in the ownership diversification of state banks and large SOEs 
through stockmarkets, government restraint from intervention in the business 
decisions of these economic entities is important for their ex post efficiency. The 
establishment of SA SAC and semi-open accounting of SASAC would increase the 
cost of government intervention. The board of directors should be selected according 
to the 'one share one vote' principle and selection of CEOs should be left to the 
board of directors for these enterprises and banks to establish a good governance 
structure. With gradual reduction in state holding shares, more directors will be the 
genuine owners of the ex post corporations and they will have a stronger incentive 
to choose CEOs according to their management capability and entrepreneurship. 
Development of assets markets is a preliminary condition for the sale of state 
assets. The sale of state assets, either in whole or in part, can involve different 
selling mechanisms. The most popular mechanism when the value of a selling item 
is uncertain is by auction. Auction, a frequently used sale mechanism for achieving 
high revenue, can achieve efficiency in the allocation of final goods in many 
circumstances (Dasgupta and Maskin 2000). However, the auction of production 
capacity in transitional economies has many features that are not considered in the 
conventional auction literature, which make many usual auction mechanisms 
inefficient (Wen forthcoming). In transitional economies, either more complicated 
auction mechanisms need to be designed for achieving efficiency in the presence 
of an externality, or institutional constraints should be removed for existing auction 
mechanisms to function effectively. The efficient sale of state assets in China is not 
a simple issue even theoretically. Expert opinions should be sought in the auction 
of state assets. 
One feasible way would be to employ an expert team (5-10 experts) to choose and 
design auction mechanisms. The tasks of the expert team would be to review all the 
major cases of state assets, study appropriate mechanisms, and supervise actual 
auctions and ownership diversifications. This would not be directly involved in the 
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operation of any actual sale. This team could work closely with the SA SAC and 
People's Bank of China in further reforms of SOEs and state banks. Although some 
funds would be needed to pay their salaries, the efficient auction of the assets of one 
large SOE or one major state bank would generate enough benefits to justify this.? 
The regularity of stockmarkets and their normal operation with less government 
intervention are important in the whole process. Since the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
and Shanghai Stock Exchange were established in 1992, a decade of development 
of the stockmarket together with legislation of Corporation Lawin 1993 and legislation 
of Security Law in 1998 have enabled more Chinese enterprises to gain finance 
through markets. In October 20021,215 corporations listed in domestic stockmarkets 
and issued A or B shares, and 69 corporations were also listed in foreign 
stockmarkets, mainly the NYSE. The China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) has been accumulating legislative experience in administration and 
supervision of company listings, shares issuing, market transactions, for the 
institutions establishment, funds flowing into the market and future markets. 
China's security market is still far from perfect. Unfortunately, because the CSRC 
is affiliated with the government, it is not able to make impartial judgments. A 
regulation committee like the CSRC should not be associated with any of the players 
in the market-that is, it should be independent. But its affiliation with a major 
market player, the government, means that it cannot fulfil this requirement. China's 
stock market may gradually improve with further reforms of the state sector and 
more consistent regulation of the market. Development of the legal enforcement 
system is crucial if a benign circle between the further development of China's 
security market and further reform of SOEs and state banks is to be set up. 
Opening up China's economy has provided foreigners with opportunities to 
participate actively in China's economic development. It has also brought China 
many chances to learn from market economies about advanced technologies and 
institutions. Since the early 1990s, China has paid great attention to developing its 
legal system and has legislated a large number of economic and institutional laws. 
Economic laws in China are similar to economic laws in advanced market economies. 
However, when an investor gets into trouble in China and has to endure lawsuits, 
dissatisfaction may arise with legal enforcement, especially for ordinary Chinese, 
who have little social power or international influence. Lack of rule-of-Iaw is the main 
reason for corruption. While strengthening legal enforcement is essential for efficiency 
gains in further reform of the state sector, reforms should also provide opportunities 
382 
to reduce corruption and hence remove some obstacles to the development of legal 
enforcement. 
Vested interest groups (especially government officials) must be treated 
appropriately. Together with strengthening legal enforcement and reducing 
opportunities for corruption, an increase in the salary of public servants is necessary, 
along with gradual changes in local and state government functions in this process 
of further reforms of SOEs and state banks. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
China's accession to the WTO and the rapid increase in international competition in 
its secondary and tertiary industries have made the further reforms of SOEs and 
state banks crucial and urgent. The effectiveness of further reform of the SOEs and 
further reform of state banks is interdependent. Appropriate ownership transformation 
is the most important issue. Efficiency of these reforms requires many other 
institutional developments, including that of asset markets, a sound social security 
system, an insurance industry and other service intermediaries, further development 
of a security market, and reinforcement of legal enforcement. These institutional 
developments are just part of the whole process of improving China's market, which 
will further promote economic growth through gains in efficiency and from a more 
competitive allocation of resources. 
As China's income disparity is of great concern, partial privatisation of large SOEs 
and state banks with a more even income distribution is both socially desirable and 
ideologically justifiable. While further reforms and institutional developments provide 
the government with an opportunity to reduce corruption significantly, efficient reforms 
and institutional development can be part of the fight against illegal economic conduct. 
If China can be successful in these state-sector reforms and institutional development 
it will attract more investments because of its rapid increase in per capita GDP, but 
also by significant improvements in living standards. 
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Taiwan and Macau) funded enterprises. The ratio of value added tax of SOEs and enterprises 
with the state having controlling shares was about 1.71 times of foreign funded enterprises, and 
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Challenges facing small private 
enterprises 
Kim Houghton and lan Cavies 
This chapter reports on the main findings from a survey of entrepreneurship and 
small private enterprises in Qingdao (Shandong Province) and Harbin (Heilongjiang 
Province). The survey1 consisted of questionnaires distributed to existing small 
private enterprises (both Getihuand siying-qiye). Additional information (not reported 
on here) was obtained from unemployed and laid-off workers (xiagang) on issues 
relating to establishing and growing a small private enterprise. 
The two pilot cities were selected for the following reasons 
.. Harbin is a large inland capital city with a strong heavy industrial and engineering 
base and a large-scale state-owned sector which is undergoing major reform 
and restructuring. The city has a high rate of xiagang unemployment. 
.. Qingdao is a large coastal city with a busy port, a major development zone, 
and a focus on trade and service industries. The city has a relatively favourable 
foreign investment environment, with a much larger non-state sector and lower 
rates of xiagang and other unemployment. 
With China's small private enterprises developing fastest in the coastal regions and 
central inland regions, the survey findings from these two cities are likely to provide 




Importance of small enterprises in economic reform 
China's economic structure is changing rapidly. Privately owned firms, all but illegal 
15 years ago, make up around 30 per cent of the country's economy. In 1997 it was 
estimated that more than half of Chinese economic activity stemmed from the 
private or household sector (IFC 2000), and this share could have reached two-
thirds of economic activity by this year. Small-scale private enterprises (those with 
fewer than 100 employees) in particular are driving the Chinese restructuring and 
reform process. The key is employment-with small and medium-sized private 
enterprises being a policy cornerstone in soaking up unemployment generated by 
lay-offs in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and displacement of rural workers. From 
1990to 1999, employment in private enterprises increased from 1.7to 20.2 million, 
an annual growth rate of 31.7 per cent. Over the same period, employment as a 
whole increased by 1.1 per cent per annum, with employment in SOEs declining by 
2.1 per cent per annum. 
China's pool of unemployed people continues to grow, as old small and medium 
SOEs are wound down, restructured, privatised, or merged with foreign investors, 
and as new school, college and university graduate entrants to the urban labour 
force peak in 2002-05 at around 8-10 million annually. In October 2002 there were 
75.08 million workers employed in SOEs compared with 112 million in 1994-96, 
with SOE jobs continuing to decrease every year. By the end of 2002, there are 
reported to have been around 10 million xiagang (or laid-off SOE workers) currently 
needing new jobs, as well as 7.3 million registered unemployed, and there are over 
150 million surplus rural labourers also in need of alternative jobs.2 The Chinese 
Government is beginning to recognise the vital role that the emerging small, private 
enterprise sector will have in soaking up these jobless workers and new entrants to 
the labour force and building a new framework for the Chinese economy. 
There are also other very important roles for the small to medium enterprise 
private sector. These include: provision of business service infrastructure required 
by larger firms-China's traditional mainstay; rapidly expanding and bringing China's 
services sector into the new millennium; acting as a source of innovation and being 
an important vehicle for getting new products or services to market; and building a 
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broader base for the economy-allowing it to rely less on key enterprises in key 
industries in particular regions. 
Legal structures of private enterprises 
The recent history of economic policy and market reform and its impact on private 
sector development has been well summarised in the 2000 IFC report, China's 
Emerging Private Enterprises, and in the companion volume by economists from 
the Australian National University (Garnaut et al. 2001). 
There are two main legal structures for small to medium-sized private enterprises 
in urban China: individual or household-owned enterprises (Getihu) and small to 
medium-scale private enterprises (Siying Qiye or limited liability companies). In 
addition, although numbers are much smaller, there are a variety of other legal 
structures such as urban collectives and township and village enterprises (most of 
which have converted or are converting to Siying Qiye), shareholder or public 
companies listed on the stock market, partnerships, and foreign-invested enterprises 
Goint equity venture, contractual jOint venture and wholly-owned foreign companies). 
Getihu are owned and operated by an individual or family and are permitted to hire 
up to seven people. They operate with total liability but without standard accounting 
systems, are not required to declare and register Registered Capital, and are subject 
to a district government-determined income tax based on a certain percentage of 
estimated revenue in their sector (an average 8 per cent in the cities surveyed). 
Siying qiye are limited liability firms with 2-50 shareholders, can employ more 
than seven people, and have a variable minimum Registered Capital depending on 
sector categories. These enterprises operate under 1988 laws, modified in 1994, 
and are subject to normal Chinese company income tax and a VAT or business tax. 
There is also a new legal structure in China for solely-owned private enterprises, 
with limited liability and minimum registered capital of RMB 1.00, which operate 
using standard accounting systems, and are subject to company tax. These new 
enterprises operate under the 1999 Solely-Owned Business Law. 
Establishing and developing a small private enterprise 
This survey looks specifically at the small end of the private sector business spectrum 
in China and the institutional and regulatory challenges facing this sector. One of 
the compelling reasons for this research was the limited amount of previous research 
on this end of the market-despite the very large numbers of these enterprises. 
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Another reason was the perception in China that very small, new-start enterprises 
have a significant role as a vehicle for getting the unemployed and xiagangback to 
work and for employing the great bulk of new entrants to the labour force. This 
makes this end of the small business sector particularly important in terms of 
economic and labour policy and social stability. 
In China, the perception is that many small enterprises start as Getihu-
characterised as a small shop or transport operation run by a husband and wife, or 
a home-based business. Running your own business is seen as a real option for 
people who were laid-off from SOEs, or registered as unemployed. Such new-start 
enterprises often involve the whole family in the early stages, and often use the 
home as a base of operations as a way of reducing set-up costs. This pathway to 
employment is important, as China's unemployed and xiagang are typically 
disadvantaged in the labour market, with low-level qualifications and poor prospects 
of finding alternative employment. 
A compounding positive impact of new business formation, especially new 
businesses formed by people disadvantaged in the labour market, arises when 
these new businesses are managed well, and start taking on their own staff. With 
limited financial backing, these new businesses are generally labour rather than 
capital intensive, and may well grow to offer employment opportunities for other 
unemployed and xiagang. 
This research focuses on issues faCing the starting and developing of small private 
businesses, as a way of identifying key barriers to start-up and development, and 
the policy changes and support structures most likely to foster growth. 
The number of small private firms in the two survey areas is estimated to be 
large, and is growing rapidly (Table 21.1). 
Survey methodology 
Surveying very small firms is difficult in most countries, and China is no exception. 
Particular difficulties hinge on access, trust and honesty of feedback. Many new-
start business operators are uncomfortable with people they do not know who ask 
questions about their business, especially when they are 'officials'. They may be 
uncooperative, or even obtuse in their feedback-saying what they think the 
interviewer wants to hear. 
To reduce these sampling risks, the survey was tested and modified, the survey 
teams (coordinated by the China Society for Research on Economic Systems Reform 
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with help from local SCORES officials) were trained in survey techniques, and 
particular emphasis was placed on the value of honest responses in helping create 
a better operating environment for small enterprises. 
Two survey modes were used-questionnaires for self-completion, and face-to-
face interviews. Table 21.2 shows the matrix of responses by business type, survey 
mode and city. In addition to the business survey responses that are reported here, 
a sample of unemployed people (of various types) who were planning on starting 
businesses was also surveyed. The results of those surveys are not covered in this 
paper. 
The businesses surveyed were not selected randomly. Six industry groups were 
selected for particular attention (information technology, business services, retailing, 
catering/restaurants, community services, and light manufacturing). Businesses 
were identified through registers, networks and by their location. 
RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS 
The survey focused on businesses in six industries (Table 21.3), 
'" IT (15 per cent of respondents), such as computer software and applications, 
system support 
'" business services (16 per cent) such as marketing, legal, accounting and 
business management and feasibility study advice 
" retailing (20 per cent) 
It catering/restaurants (15 per cent) 
Table 21.1 Siying Qiye and Getihu in Harbin and Qingdao, 2002 
Harbin Qingdao 
Siying Qiye Total Sole Partner- Limited Total Sole Partner- Limited 
venture ship Liability Venture ship liability 
18,608 4,094 958 13,528 32,361 4,207 6,311 21,843 
Getihu Total No. of Regstrd Total Total 
employees capital' prodn. No. of Rgst. prodn 
value' Total employees capital' value' 
205,517 406,282 422,997 280,047 166,250 236,749 27.37b 1,607,687 
Note: * Unless otherwise noted, the capital unit is 1,000 yuan. 
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" community service sector (9 per cent) such as home help, aged care, childcare, 
deliveries 
" light manufacturing (16 per cent) such as clothing, handicrafts and piece work 
outsourcing. 
Two-thirds of the businesses surveyed were under five years old, including 11 per 
cent less than one year old (Table 21.4). This age profile reflects the rapid growth in 
the number of Chinese small businesses in recent years. By way of comparison, a 
similar 14 per cent of small businesses in Australia are under one year old, while a 
very different 51 per cent are overfive years old (Australian Bureau of Statistics 
2002). The businesses surveyed in Qingdao were slightly younger than those in Harbin. 
The 469 Getihubusinesses surveyed employed a total of 1 ,785 people-an average 
of just 3.8 people per enterprise. The Siying Qiye businesses were considerably 
larger, with the 318 businesses surveyed employing a total of 14,872 people-an 
average of 46.8 people per business. 
Table 21.2 Responses by business type and survey mode 
Harbin Qingdao 
Questionnaire Interview Total Questionnaire Interview Total 
Siying Qiye 219 28 247 99 24 123 
Getihu 225 9 234 244 8 252 
Total 444 37 481 343 32 375 
Source: Small business survey 2002 
Table21.3 Distribution of respondents by industry and legal structure, by city 
Harbin Qingdao Total 
Getihu Siying Qiye Getihu Siying Qiye 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
IT 48 21.3 26 11.9 23 9.4 21 21.2 118 15.0 
Business service 40 17.8 27 12.3 42 17.2 20 20.2 129 16.4 
Retailing 42 18.7 24 11.0 81 33.2 14 14.1 161 20.5 
Catering/restaurant 19 8.4 41 18.7 37 15.2 21 21.2 118 15.0 
Community service 35 15.6 10 4.6 23 9.4 1.0 69 8.8 
Light industry/ 
processing 28 12.4 74 33.8 14 5.7 10 10.1 126 16.0 
Others 13 5.8 17 7.8 24 9.8 12 12.1 66 8.4 
Total 225 100.0 219 100.0 244 100.0 99 100.0 787 100.0 
Source: Small business survey 2002 
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Most of the operators reported that they work long hours-with operators of Getihu 
businesses working slightly longer than operators of Siying Qiye businesses (Table 
21.5). Very few of the businesses surveyed were 'part-time' businesses, with over 
half the operators surveyed reporting that they work 8 to 12 hours per day. A further 
14 per cent reported that they work 12 to 14 hours per day. 
Looked at by region, it appears that business operators in faster-growing Qingdao 
City were working slightly longer hours than their counterparts in Harbin. 
Operators were mostly male (69 per cent), relatively young (57 per cent under 40 
years old) and quite well educated (27.9 per cent having university or postgraduate 
degrees and 37.9 per cent having college qualifications). 
On a range of social indicators (car ownership, home ownership and schooling 
preferences) the small-scale entrepreneurs seemed to be generally reasonably well 
off, despite their young average age. 
Table 21.4 Age of businesses, by city (per cent) 
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Table 21.5 Average hours worked per day, by legal structure (per cent) 
Getihu Siying Qiye 
Under 6 hours 2.7 4.7 
6-8 hours 16.2 19.1 
8-12 hours 54.1 58.3 
12-14 hours 17.0 12.7 
14-16 hours 6.6 3.3 
Over 16 hours 3.5 1.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Source: Small business survey 2002 
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MAIN SURVEY FINDINGS 
The survey was designed to focus on issues relating to establishing and developing 
a small business in China, particularly as a means to employment for xiagang (Iaid-
off workers). Of the respondent SME operators, 65 per cent used to work for SOEs 
(that is, are laid-off workers). 
The survey findings suggest that, contrary to generally held views, small enterprises 
(Siying Qiye and Getihu) are generally not home-based businesses, and do not rely 
heavily on family members as employees. Overall, just under 13 per cent of 
respondent businesses were based at home, and just under 7 per cent of employees 
were family members. 
One of the biggest issues in setting up a small private enterprise in China is 
access to start-up capital. A particular impediment is the requirement for lodging 
proof of Registered Capital for Siying Qiye, whereby new businesses must, as part 
of their registration process, prove that they have certain minimum amounts of fixed 
assets and liquid funds available. The amount varies by legal status and industry 
(for example, from 100,000 yuan for consulting and personal services, to 300,000 
yuan for retail businesses and 500,000 yuan for manufacturing and processing), but 
such registered capital requirement is not needed for Getihu operations. The rationale 
behind the Registered Capital requirements is not to ensure that new-start businesses 
have development capital, but rather to ensure that debtors can be paid if the venture 
bankrupts. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many new-start small entrepreneurs 
beg and borrow funds from family and friends for just long enough to prove they 
have the amounts required, then return the borrowed funds. 
Problems in raising start-up and Registered Capital are exacerbated by weaknesses 
in the banking system that make it very difficult for small enterprises to borrow 
funds, unless they have equivalent funds that can be put up as surety. The survey 
showed that just 10.5 per cent of respondents used a bank to source their start-up 
capital (20.6). By far the most important sources were own savings (51.8 percent), 
investors (19.8 per cent), and borrowings from friends or family (19.7 per cent). 
The high emphasis on own or family finance raises an important question-in the 
absence of alternatives, is family wealth a prerequisite to starting a business. The 
amount of start-up capital required for Siying Qiye was often quite large-8i per 
cent requiring over 50,000 RMB for Registered Capital, including 52.5 per cent 
requiring over 300,000 RMB (Table 21.7). 
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Turnover trends reported by respondents were very positive-which should be 
expected, given China's high economic growth rate. Perhaps surprisingly, a lower 
percentage of respondents from Qingdao than Harbin reported increasing turnover 
over the previous three years, despite Qingdao's recent history of strong economic 
growth.3 
The survey asked respondents specifically about barriers they had faced in setting 
up their business (Table 21.9). The biggest barrier, in both cities, was start-up capital 
(nominated by a total of 58.4 per cent of respondents). The importance of this issue 
has also been identified in other surveys (for example, Song 2001 and IFC 2000). 
The next two barriers related to the difficult bureaucratic environment facing small 
enterprises in China. Government regulations were nominated as a barrier by 28.8 
per cent of respondents. These consisted of (in order of importance): limitations of 
Table 21.6 Sources of start-up capital, by city 
Harbin Qingdao Total 
Number Per cent Number Per cent Number Per cent 
Own savings 236 53.2 172 50.1 408 51.8 
Friends' savings 41 9.2 39 11.4 80 10.2 
Borrowing from friends 68 15.3 87 25.4 155 19.7 
Bank 46 10.4 37 10.8 83 10.5 
Investor 133 30.0 23 6.7 156 19.8 
Business partner 69 15.5 29 8.5 98 12.5 
Government grant or loan 21 4.7 4 1.2 25 3.2 
Others 6 1.4 0.3 7 0.9 
All respondents 444 343 787 
Note: multiple choices possible. 
Source: Small business survey 2002. 
Table21.7 Registered capital, by legal structure, Siying Qiye ('000 yuan) 
'000 yuan Number Per cent '000 yuan Number Per cent 
Up to 10 40 8.7 201-300 59 12.8 
11-30 22 4.8 301-400 8 1.7 
31-50 22 4.8 401-500 124 26.9 
51-100 49 10.6 Over 500 110 23.9 
101-200 27 5.9 Total 461 100.0 
Source: Small business survey 2002. 
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city management, complex licencing processes, difficult registration processes, 
difficulties in providing proof of property and limitations in health, sanitation and 
environmental services. In addition, 21.1 per cent of respondents nominated 
government fees and charges as a barrier. These consisted of (in order of importance): 
high taxation levels, other administrative management fees and charges, and the 
high level of registered capital required. 
The other main types of barriers nominated related to business practices and 
operational issues, including finding customers (17.5 per cent), finding staff (7.1 per 
cent) and business planning (12.1 per cent in total). 
The pattern of the barriers nominated was quite similar between the two cities, 
though there were some interesting differences. Start-up capital seems a bigger 
issue in inland Harbin (nominated by 66 per cent of respondents) than coastal Qingdao 
(48.7 per cent). Conversely, Qingdao's vibrant economic environment is probably 
the major factor behind the lower ranking of customer numbers as a barrier to business 
growth-nominated by 23.2 per cent of Harbin respondents but by just 10.2 per cent 
of Qingdao respondents. Similarly, more Harbin respondents had trouble finding 
skilled staff (9.7 per cent) than Qingdao respondents (3.8 per cent). 
Table 21.8 Main barriers in starting up businesses, by city 
Harbin Qingdao Total 
Numbers Per cent Numbers Per cent Numbers Per cent 
Start-up capital 293 66.0 167 48.7 460 58.4 
Government regulations 132 29.7 95 27.7 227 28.8 
Government charges 92 20.7 74 21.6 166 21.1 
Not enough customers 103 23.2 35 10.2 138 17.5 
Difficult to find skilled staff 43 9.7 13 3.8 56 7.1 
Difficult to find suitable 
business premises 27 6.1 10 2.9 37 4.7 
No clear idea about what 
the business would do 14 3.2 14 4.1 28 3.6 
Lack of business plan 19 4.3 7 2.0 26 3.3 
Lack of business skill 16 3.6 6 1.7 22 2.8 
Too low prices of 
commodities/services 9 2.0 10 2.9 19 2.4 
Others 5 1.1 5 1.5 10 1.3 
Note: Multiple choices possible. 
Source: Small business survey 2002. 
395 
Red tape is a common concern for small businesses in many countries. The main 
source of this frustration is the multiple roles of the small business owner, which 
means the main entrepreneur and manager is also the main administrator. Time 
spent by the small business owner in dealing with red tape is time away from 
developing the business. The survey sought information on how much time the 
small business operators spend on reporting to government, and the average was 
1.8 days per month, or 22.8 days per year. With the average annual output value per 
person of respondent enterprises in the order of 56,500 yuan, the direct value of this 
time is some 5,083 RMB per year-a significant level for most small businesses. 
The survey showed very high levels of concern in China about red tape. By way of 
comparison, a recent Yellow Pages Business Index Survey4 listed the main concerns 
facing small businesses in Australia as 
" lack of work/sales (16 per cent) 
" cash flow (9 per cent) 
.. finding quality staff (8 per cent) 
.. consumer confidence (6 per cent) 
.. lack of time/hours in the day (6 per cent) 
.. GST (6 per cent) 
.. government financial regulations (5 per cent). 
With access to capital being the biggest barrier facing start-up businesses in the 
two cities, the survey sought more detailed information on the nature of capital 
required, uses, possible sources, and difficulties in accessing the various sources. 
The survey found that 73.2 per cent of respondents will be looking for expansion 
capital in the next 12 months (67.2 per cent of Harbin respondents and 84.2 per cent 
of Qingdao respondents). The uses of expansion capital are shown in Table 21.10. 
The main uses nominated by respondents were: exploring new markets (39.1 per 
cent), developing manager's skills (30.5 per cent), developing new products and 
services (23.7 per cent) and developing staff skills (22.3 per cent). Higher percentages 
of respondents from Harbin nominated manager and staff skills development than 
their counterparts in Qingdao. 
The sources of expansion capital are shown in Table 21.10. The main source 
nominated by those who responded to this question was investors (33.4 per cent). A 
further 27.4 per cent will be looking for bank finance-considerably above the share 
of 10.5 per cent who had used bank finance in establishing their business. Another 
24.3 per cent will be looking for capital from family and friends. 
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There is considerable difference in the responses from the two cities. Respondents 
from Harbin favoured investors, while those from Qingdao favoured banks and family/ 
friends. 
Respondents were also invited to comment on the difficulties they expected to 
run into in accessing expansion capital (Table 21.11). The main difficulties reflect 
the preferred sources of expansion capital, relating primarily to banks (problems 
with loan deposits (30.1 per cent) and loan guarantees (23.3 per cent)) and problems 
finding investors (27.5 per cent). Once again, small business operators in Qingdao 
Table21.9 Use for expansion capital in next 12 months, by city 
Harbin Qingdao Total 
Number Per cent Number Per cent Number Per cent 
Explore new market 
Develop manager's skill 
Develop new products or services 
Develop staff skills 
Get new equipment 
Advertising & marketing 
Move into new premises 
Finance a new partnership or venture 
Other 
Total 
Notes: Multiple choices possible. 











37.6 119 41.3 
34.4 71 24.6 
23.0 71 24.6 
27.9 40 13.9 
18.1 42 14.6 
14.9 36 12.5 
7.0 12 4.2 
5.1 11 3.8 
0.7 8 2.8 
100.0 288 100.0 
Table 21.10 Sources of expansion capital, by city 
Harbin Qingdao 
Number Per cent Number Per cent 
Investors 130 40.5 27 18.1 
Bank 80 24.9 49 32.9 
Family member or friends 66 20.6 48 32.2 
Risk capital 13 4.0 13 8.7 
Government 19 5.9 4 2.7 
Business union 10 3.1 6 4.0 
Others 3 0.9 2 1.3 
Total 321 100.0 149 100.0 






















were much less worried about finding investors (nominated by 13.4 per cent) than 
their colleagues in Harbin (38.7 per cent). On the other hand, 12.9 per cent of Qingdao 
respondents reported poor relationships with banks, compared with 3.2 per cent of 
those from Harbin. 
The final set of issues covered in the survey relates to the development of business 
skills amongst the operators of small businesses in the two cities. Survey respondents 
were asked to nominate the types of business skills they would like to develop over 
the next 12 months. The results describe the 'hot topics' of interest to small 
entrepreneurs, and provide clear directions for government agencies and private 
providers interested in fast-tracking small business growth in China. 
The responses to the question on business skill needs for the next 12 months are 
shown in Table 21.12. At the top of the list are the core small business management 
competencies: marketing and promotion (26.4 percent), financial management (25 
per cent), staff management (23.8 per cent) and customer service (23.8 per cent). 
The ranking of topics was similar across respondents from the two cities, but 
operators from Harbin were much more likely to nominate staff management-a 
finding that fits with earlier results showing staff skills and training to be a significant 
issue for those operators. 
By way of comparison, a survey of 860 home-based businesses in Australia in 
1999 (Auslndustry 2000) found that the top five business skills sought were 
" marketing (36 per cent) 
" computer/IT skills (34 per cent) 
" business management (27 per cent) 
Table 21.11 Difficulties expected in accessing expansion capital, by city 
Harbin Qingdao Total 
Number Per cent Number Per cent Number Per cent 
Loan deposit required by bank 70 27.7 67 33.2 137 30.1 
Cannot find interested investors 98 38.7 27 13.4 125 27.5 
Cannot get loan guarantee 53 20.9 53 26.2 106 23.3 
Poor relations with banks 8 3.2 26 12.9 34 7.5 
Bank fees and charges 14 5.5 15 7.4 29 6.4 
Bank paperwork 8 3.2 10 5.0 18 4.0 
Other 2 0.8 4 2.0 6 1.3 
Total 253 100.0 202 100.0 455 100.0 
Source: Small business survey 2002. 
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" financial management (25 per cent) 
.. product or service knowledge (15 per cent). 
Respondents were also invited to indicate their preferred mode of acquiring their 
desired business development skills (Table 21.13). The responses show a marked 
difference between the cities, with operators in Qingdao clearly showing a preference 
for face-to-face modes like training and seminars, while a very large 41 per cent of 
respondents from Harbin nominated books or handbooks. Respondents from both 
cities rated coaching, mentoring and one-to-one advice very low on the list. This is 
likely to be due to an almost complete absence of creditable providers of these 
services in these two cities. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The survey findings show that while the number of small enterprises in China is 
growing, there are significant impediments to establishing and developing a small 
private business. Three key themes are bureaucratic obstacles, lack of business 
skills, and difficulties in accessing finance. 
Table 21.12 Business skills sought in next 12 months, by city 
Harbin Qingdao Total 
Number Per cent Number Per cent Number Per cent 
Marketing and promotion 147 33.1 61 17.8 208 26.4 
Financial management 134 30.2 63 18.4 197 25.0 
Staff management 156 35.1 31 9.0 187 23.8 
Customer service 128 28.8 59 17.2 187 23.8 
Marketing 93 20.9 33 9.6 126 16.0 
Computer/information 68 15.3 21 6.1 89 11.3 
Project management 44 9.9 27 7.9 71 9.0 
Networking 40 9.0 15 4.4 55 7.0 
No skills needed 34 7.7 13 3.8 47 6.0 
Business plan 34 7.7 10 2.9 44 5.6 
Risk assessment 27 6.1 9 2.6 36 4.6 
Negotiation 26 5.9 10 2.9 36 4.6 
Pricing 12 2.7 5 1.5 17 2.2 
Exporting 6 1.4 9 2.6 15 1.9 
Balancing family and work 7 1.6 5 1.5 12 1.5 
Other 0 0.0 1 0.3 1 0.1 
All Respondents 444 100.0 343 100.0 787 100.0 
Note: Multiple choices possible. 
Source: Small business survey 2002. 
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Bureaucracy 
The maze of bureaucratic requirements to establish a business, and the high level 
of ongoing reporting necessary to run a business need to be addressed if an attractive 
small business environment is to be created and small private enterprises are to 
flourish in China. initiatives like One-Stop-Shops where a business operator can go 
to have all the necessary registration, license and approval forms processed and 
stamped in the one location, need to be rolled out across China. City and district 
planning and management departments should considerthe impact on Getihutrade 
and small businesses and the employment opportunities and services they offer 
when City/district or street committee authorities try to clean up local markets. The 
arbitrary consolidation of street market activities into commercial multistorey 
buildings, often long distances from the original market location, where higher rents 
are charged, often destroys the basis of the small business, and those Getihu and 
Siying Oiye made to relocate are ultimately forced out of business and their staff 
made to join the unemployment queue. Registered Capital requirements for Siying 
Oiye need to be reviewed nationwide to test whether or not they work, and to determine 
whether they are an obstacle preventing the growth of small private enterprise start-
ups or are an obstacle to employment growth by hindering the process of graduation 
from Getihu to Siying Oiye. If they are still considered necessary, any review should 
reassess the registration capital level to ensure that they are standardised across 
the country and are set at an appropriate level favourable to business growth. 
Table21.13 Preferred skills training delivery modes, by city 
Harbin Qingdao Total 
Number Per cent Number Per cent Number Per cent 
Book or handbook 182 41.0 38 11.1 220 28.0 
Training course 107 24.1 82 23.9 189 24.0 
Seminar with experts 122 27.5 61 17.8 183 23.3 
Lecture with experts 49 11.0 22 604 71 9.0 
Internet reference material 44 9.9 22 604 66 804 
Workshop with experts 29 6.5 10 2.9 39 5.0 
Business coach or mentor 21 4.7 15 404 36 4.6 
One to one advice 19 4.3 12 3.5 31 3.9 
Other 1 0.2 2 0.6 3 004 
All respondents 444 100.0 343 100.0 787 100.0 
Notes: Multiple choices possible 
Source: Small business survey 2002 
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Business support 
The relative youth of China's small private business sector brings both challenges 
and opportunities. The challenges are that there is little appreciation of the needs of 
small business or how to improve the small business operating environment among 
city government authorities who have direct responsibility for managing Getihu and 
Siying Qiye. Also, there is little depth of experience among the new entrepreneurs, 
there are few credible business mentors, coaches and teachers, and the 'business 
intermediaries'-who should provide professional advice on legal, accounting, 
business planning and marketing matters-are not very evolved. The opportunities 
arise from the high levels of demand for building skills in these areas. 
Initiatives piloted under the AusAID-funded project to address these shortcomings 
and impediments to growth include Business Advisory Services and Business 
Support Centres. Drawing on extensive Australian experience and models, the 
Business Advisory Services are supported by local and city administrations or are 
integrated into the operations of model small business support centres to provide 
help to small and aspiring entrepreneurs in setting up a business and in basic 
business planning. The Business Advisory Service provides training, referral services 
and advice to laid-off workers, the unemployed, aspiring entrepreneurs, the self-
employed and small businesses on matters necessary to start, support and maintain 
the running of a small business, including recruitment of staff and preparation of 
new enterprise business plans. The Business Advisory Services need to be proactive 
in publicising their existence and relevance to these target groups. 
The Business Support Centres are a Chinese version of 'small business or general 
(mixed) incubators', offering a mix of office, sales and production space, with on-
site business development systems and support. The in-house mentoring services 
focus on solving business problems and identifying growth opportunities, and they 
directly contribute to the minimisation of small business failures and the expansion 
of employment opportunities. In Western economies these facilities are generally 
public-private partnerships, with the local government providing buildings and facilities 
free of charge. Field work for this project indicates that Chinese demand for these 
facilities in the two pilot cities is so strong that they can be run as private, profit-
making ventures in their own right. 
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Access to finance 
Improving access to formal financial markets by small private enterprises will be 
essential if this pivotal sector is to play the necessary role of soaking up structural 
unemployment in China. It is a complex problem, and a seven-step process to 
reform small enterprise financing in China is outlined below 
• Address the perception by banks that small enterprises are an unacceptable 
credit risk. This requires training of bank loan assessors and credit managers, 
more sophisticated assessment processes, working through intermediaries like 
accountants and business incubators to improve company assets and profiV 
loss assessments and reduce business failure rates, and application forms 
that include requirements for sound business planning. 
• Establish city-level small business support funds, possibly linked to employment 
of a certain level of xiagang and the unemployed. 
• Seriously evaluate the performance of the existing SME Credit Guarantee 
Agency system-followed either by reform (if required) or closure of the Agency 
and diversion of city funds to other city-based intermediary organisations (since 
its establishment in 1999, the credit guarantee system has shown itself to be 
risk-averse, duplicating the services of the state banking sector, and servicing 
only medium-scale SOEs, not the private sector). 
• Policy initiatives to develop small and community-based banks or credit 
cooperatives to better serve local small enterprises (the five new private banks 
currently under consideration for approval by the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission are a start in the creation of a proper capital market in China, but 
this does not go far enough). 
• Attract foreign banks into China by 2005, under WTO accession rules. 
• Introduce and finance urban micro-credit facilities to the small-scale enterprise 
and Getihu sector-funded by city governments and channelled through city 
Commercial Banks (the former urban credit cooperatives) and/or intermediary 
organisations such as business incubators. 
• Formalise the large 'grey capital market' in China and partially remove informal 
(illegal) private household and company lending by initiating or allowing other 
forms of capital raising. As well, it would be of great benefit to direct some of 
China's high volumes of household savings through special small enterprise 
credit facilities, with variable bank interest rates, and to formalise and secure 
the legal status of contracts. 
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NOTES 
1 The survey, conducted in October-November 2002, was part of a larger technical assistance 
project on developing models of support for small private sector enterprises commissioned by 
AusAID under its China Capacity Building Program. The project, known as Support for Small 
Scale Business in the Service Sector and Community Services in China, was undertaken in 
cooperation with, and with the support and guidance of, the State Council Office for Restructuring 
the Economic Systems (SCORES), which since March 2003 has been integrated into China's 
highest level economic and reform policy authority, the restructured National Development Reform 
Commission. The project also received considerable support from SCORES' municipal offices in 
Harbin and Qingdao, two cities which were chosen as pilot cities for development of small business 
support programs. 
2 Speech by Mr. Xu Hua, State Development and Reform Commission, to the Dissemination 
Workshop of the Sino-Australian Project and Promoting the Development of Small and Medium-
sized Enterprise (SME) in China, Qingdao, April 2003. 
3 Gross regional product growth rates of 11-13 per cent per annum in recent years. 
4 Yellow Pages Business Index, Small and Medium Enterprises, Feb 2002. 
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22 
Industrial location and regional 
development 
JaneGolley 
Rising regional inequality has become an undeniable aspect of China's economic 
reform and development during the last 25 years. Throughout the 1990s and into the 
2000s inter-provincial disparities in per capita income have continually increased. It 
is generally accepted that diverging rates of development in the coastal (or eastern) 
and interior (or central and western) provinces are a major source of these income 
disparities (Yang 1997; Demurger 2001; Yao and Zhang 2001; Bao et al. 2002). This 
divergence, in turn, stems largely from the regional pattern of China's industrial 
development during the same period (Lyons 1991; Yao 1997; Mody and Wang 1997; 
Fujita and Hu 2001; Golley 2002). It is this pattern which is the primary focus of this 
chapter. 
Regional development has always been an integral part of the Chinese Communist 
Party's policy agenda. Soon after their rise to power in 1949, developing China as a 
major industrial and military power became the number one priority. But distributional 
and equity goals were also important. In particular, the government sought a more 
even geographical distribution of industry, claiming that foreign domination had 
resulted in an 'irrational' pattern of industrial development, in which output capacity 
was concentrated in coastal China. Mao Zedong was determined to achieve a more 
balanced geographical distribution of industry for strategic military purposes, and 
also because, in the long run, growth leading to increasing regional inequalities ran 
counter to the goal of creating a politically unified and economically integrated nation 
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state (Lardy 1978). The relocation of industrial capacity was achieved through the 
nationalisation of industry and an increasing share of state investment allocated to 
'backward', that is, interior, provinces, in what became know as the 'Interior 
Development Strategy'. While it is widely acknowledged that the strategy was fraught 
with economic inefficiencies, it is an indisputable fact that the geographical structure 
of industry was levelled out to some extent: in 1953 the interior accounted for 31 per 
cent of national gross value of industrial output (GVIO); by 1978 this share had 
increased to 46 per cent. 1 
Regional development has also been a major component of the economic reforms 
since they commenced in the late 1970s. The 1980s witnessed a significant shift in 
regional policy towards the coastal region. The primary focus on efficiency and 
rapid growth justified the promotion of the more developed coastal region, with Deng 
Xiaoping (1984:45) arguing that 'since conditions for the country as a whole are not 
ripe, we can have some areas become rich first. Egalitarianism will not work.'This 
policy stance was made clear from the onset, with the introduction of the Open 
Door Policy and the establishment of special economic zones (SEZs) in the coastal 
provinces of Guangdong and Fujian. The 'Coastal Development Strategy', adopted 
by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council in March 1988, formally 
endorsed the shift in policy, calling for development to extend 'progressively from 
the special economic zones to coastal cities, then to coastal economic regions and 
finally to interior areas' (Zhao 1987:27). Indeed, it was always the intention that the 
focus on the coastal region would ultimately shift towards the rest of the country. 
According to Deng (1986:163), 'The purpose of allowing some regions and some 
people to become prosperous before others is to enable all of them to prosper 
eventually. We have to make sure there is no polarisation of SOCiety-that's what 
socialism means.' 
In contrast with the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-90), which clearly favoured 
coastal provinces, the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1991-95) advocated an absence of 
regional favouritism and a more level playing field. This was a political response to 
increasing discontent and widespread criticisms from interior provinces regarding 
the divergent levels of development in the first decade of reforms. However, the shift 
was undermined by Deng Xiaoping's 'southern tour' in 1992, during which he strongly 
supported more rapid growth in the southeastern provinces, and also by declining 
revenues, which limited the central government's ability to back its policies with 
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fiscal measures. Policy proved inadequate to reverse the trend of the coastal region's 
share of industrial output, which rose steadily from 55 per cent of the national total 
in 1978 to 65 per cent in 1995. 
The Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) indicated a further strengthening of the 
central government's commitment to addressing regional disparities. Numerous fiscal, 
credit and investment-based measures, combined with policies to encourage foreign 
trade and investment, and measures to enhance co-operation between coastal and 
interior provinces were implemented during this period. In 2000 both Prime Minister 
Zhu Rongji and President Jiang Zemin said that the large-scale development of 
central and western China was a major policy decision for the new century (Zhu 
2000; Zeng Peiyan 2000). During the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001--05), and now under 
the new leadership of Hu Jintao, Jiang's 'Western Development Strategy' or 'Go 
West Campaign' is continuing to receive emphasis, as witnessed by a surge of 
statements during the Tenth National Party Congress in March 2003 (for example, 
China Daily, 3 March, 5 March, 6 March, 13 March 2003). Despite this policy 
strengthening, however, the coast has continued to increase its share of the national 
gross value of industrial output, reaching 72 per cent in 2001. 
The key point to take from all of this is simple: regional development matters to 
the Chinese government. In particular, the location of industrial development-and 
its implications for regional patterns of income inequality-matters.2 Moreover, the 
government's approach to regional development is far from laissez faire: its current 
objective is to alleviate the inequalities that it hitherto helped to create. What 
combination of policies, if any, would enable the government to succeed in this 
endeavour, is an extremely complex question that cannot be resolved here.3 Instead, 




The idea that the agglomeration of production in a particular location yields 
advantages, and that these advantages in turn explain such agglomeration is vital 
for understanding the spatial unevenness of industry and development. Consider a 
multi-region economy in which 'transport costs' (interpreted broadly to include not 
only physical transport costs but also the informational, sales, and support 
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complications involved in doing business at a distance) are initially so high that 
industry is distributed across regions in accordance with population in order to serve 
isolated local markets (that is, there is no inter-regional trade). Note also that this is 
not an entirely unreasonable representation of China prior to 1978, when transport 
development lagged well behind other aspects of national development and provinces 
were highly self-sufficient. 
Now consider an economic reform and development process which leads to a 
gradual reduction in 'transport costs', thereby eliminating the need to locate production 
perfectly in line with demand. In the presence of economies of scale and inter-
industry-or cost and demand-linkages, this draws firms to the larger markets in 
order to benefit from access to their larger (and hence cheaper) supply of intermediate 
inputs. In some industries, firms will be drawn to the larger market in order to benefit 
from externalities associated with knowledge or technological spillovers. As long as 
there is some degree of inter-regional labour mobility, workers will also be drawn to 
larger markets in order to access higher wages (as in the case of China's 'floating' 
population). The result will be industrial agglomeration, which will be accompanied 
by relatively rapid growth of per capita GDP and hence rising regional inequality. 
According to Myrdal (1957), exactly where that agglomeration occurs will come 
down to an 'accident of history'. Regardless of the precise nature of that 'accident', 
the process of agglomeration in one location, and not another, results in a cumulative 
process where that location industrialises ahead of the rest. I n other words, location 
matters. 
However this process is not boundless. As long as there is some degree of inter-
regional labour immobility (which in China there is), rising wages in the agglomerating 
region will lead to rising costs, which will offset the reduced costs stemming from 
more intermediate inputs and other externality-driven benefits. As 'transport costs' 
continue to fall, wage and other cost differentials may reach a point where it is 
optimal for firms to relocate to less-developed regions. That is, the benefits of industrial 
agglomeration in a 'Core' region will eventually 'trickle down' or 'spread' to the 
'Periphery'.4 In the (theoretical) long run, industry is evenly spaced across the 
economic landscape and per capita incomes are equalised. Adopting Krugman's 
(1995) interpretation of 'transport costs' (-r) as a proxy for economic development, 
this generates an inverted U-shaped pattern between economic development and 
industrial agglomeration over time.5 There is significant evidence to suggest that 
China lies on the upside of that U, with rising industrial agglomeration in coastal 
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provinces and rising coast-interior income inequality.6 However it is not quite that 
clear cut. What is needed is an empirical means of identifying exactly where industrial 
agglomeration is occurring. This will be in those provinces which have 'Iocational' 
advantages for industrial development. This is where shift-share analysis comes in. 
Shift-share analysis? 
Let L1 Yijdenote the change in output for the ith sector in region jfrom the base period 
to the end period. By definition, it is the product of total output of the ith sector in 
region j in the base period, Y o multiplied by the growth rate of output of the ith sector ij,
in region j over the whole period, Rjj: 
(22.1) 
Let Rk and Rik denote growth rates of output for the country and for the ith sector 
of the country respectively. Equation 22.1 can then be decomposed into three 
components: 
(22.2) 
















The first term on the right-hand side of Equation 22.2 is called the national 
component of growth. It shows, ceteris paribus, the growth that would have resulted 
had sector i in location j exactly matched the national trend (RJ The second term 
is the structural component. It calculates the change in the ith sector that can be 
attributed to the region's industry mix. If the region has a 'favourable' mix, comprising 
more industries that are experiencing rapid growth (higher Rik), it will, ceteris paribus, 
experience faster output growth than the rest of the country. 
However, having a favourable industrial structure in the base period is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for faster growth. The third term on the right 
hand side is often called the differential (or residual) component, because it is the 
part of regional growth not explained by the national and structural components. It is 
a catch-all for measuring the extent to which sector i in region j grew faster or slower 
than it would have had the local industry experienced the national growth rate (in the 
former, Rij > Rik so that the value is positive). For this reason, it makes perfect 
sense to call it the locational component, which is the terminology adopted here. 
Finally, Equation 22.2 can be rearranged as follows 
(22.3) 
The left-hand side is the 'net relative change' (NRC), which is the difference between 
the actual change and the national component. The NRC shows whether the ith 
sector in region j experienced faster or slower growth of industrial output than the 
national average, with a positive value reflecting the former. The NRC can therefore 
be regarded as an index of relative performance, which the right-hand side seeks to 
explain. 
As Equation 22.3 shows, each NRC can be decomposed into its structural and 
locational components (SC and LC respectively). In total, there are six different 
combinations of signs on the NRC, SC and LC (Table 22.1). 
In Types 1,2 and 3 the NRC is positive, which translates to a growth rate above 
the national average. Identifying those provinces that record positive NRCs will 
provide one way of determining where industrial agglomeration is occurring in each 
sector. In Types 1, 3 and 6, locational factors make a positive contribution to the 
NRC, that is, to the growth of manufacturing output, which means we can identify 
which provinces have location working in their favour. A closer look at the actual 
figures will also provide a measure of the importance of location (as opposed to 
sectoral structure) in determining provincial industrial performance. This will enable 
us to establish a clear case that location does indeed matter. 
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Since 1978 China has recorded an average annual rate of real GDP growth of around 
10 per cent, a remarkable growth rate by any standards. However, this growth has 
not been evenly distributed across the country. Provincial rates of real GDP growth 
between 1978 and 2001 ranged between 13.5 per cent in Fujian (in the East) to 7 per 
cent in Gansu (in the West) (Table 22.2). Note that the top five provinces in terms of 
GDP growth are the five Southeastern provinces, Fujian, Guangdong, Zhejiang, 
Shandong and Jiangsu.lt is also interesting to see that Xinjiang (a Western province) 
and Henan (a Central province) are the next two provinces in the ranking. Shanghai, 
on the other hand, ranks second to last, while Liaoning (another coastal province) is 
also a relatively poor performer in terms of GDP growth. 
The table also ranks provinces in terms of changing shares of the gross value of 
industrial output over the same period. While there is not a one-for-one matching 
with the GDP ranking, there is a strong correlation (of 0.93). The top seven provinces 
in terms of GDP growth are also the top seven in terms of increases in GVIO 
shares, while Shanghai and Liaoning both record declining GVIO shares. This 
correlation follows through to changes in per capita GDP, as shown in the final four 
columns. Zhejiang's per capita GDp, for example, was 0.87 times the national average 
in 1978, increasing to 1.94 times the national average in 2001. This implies that 
Zhejiang recorded the fastest growth of per capita GDP during that period. Again, 
the same provinces rank in the top seven, while Shanghai remains at the bottom of 
the ranking. The correlation between per capita GDP growth and growth of GVIO is 
0.90, while the correlation between per capita GDP growth and GDP growth is 0.91. 
It is not surprising that GVIO growth is strongly correlated with growth rates of 
GDP and per capita GDP. This implies that understanding provincial disparities in 
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Table 22.2 Rankings of GDP growth, GVIO shares, and changes in per capita 
GDP 
Change in Ratio provincial-national per capita GDP 
Real GDP share of Change in 
growth GVIO Ratio Ratio ratio 
Province 1978-2001 Province 1978-2001 Province 1978 2001 1978-2001 
Fujian 13.5 Guangdong 10.0 Zhejiang 0.87 1.94 1.07 
Guangdong 12.9 Zhejiang 5.3 Fujian 0.72 1.64 0.92 
Zhejiang 12.7 Jiangsu 4.3 Guangdong 0.97 1.82 0.85 
Shandong 11.4 Shandong 3.1 Jiangsu 1.13 1.71 0.58 
Jiangsu 10.9 Fujian 1.7 Shandong 0.83 1.39 0.55 
Xinjiang 10.9 Henan 0.3 Xinjiang 0.83 1.05 0.22 
Henan 10.5 Xinjiang 0.2 Henan 0.61 0.79 0.17 
Hubei 9.9 Inner Mongolia 0.1 Hubei 0.88 1.04 0.16 
Hebei 9.8 Ningxia -0.02 Hebei 0.96 1.11 0.15 
Yunnan 9.8 Yunnan -0.1 Yunnan 0.60 0.65 0.05 
Guangxi 9.7 Qinghai -0.2 Anhui 0.64 0.69 0.05 
Anhui 9.6 Guizhou -0.3 Hunan 0.75 0.80 0.05 
Hunan 9.3 Hubei -0.4 Sichuan 0.67 0.71 0.04 
Inner Mongolia 9.2 Anhui -0.6 Guangxi 0.59 0.62 0.03 
Beijing 9.1 Guangxi -0.6 Inner Mongolia 0.84 0.86 0.02 
Sichuan 8.9 Jiangxi -0.6 Jilin 1.01 1.01 0.01 
Jiangxi 8.9 Tianjin -0.7 Beijing 3.40 3.38 -0.02 
Jilin 8.9 Hebei -0.8 Jiangxi 0.73 0.69 -0.04 
Guizhou 8.6 Jilin -0.8 Guizhou 0.46 0.38 -0.08 
Ningxia 8.5 Shaanxi -0.9 Shaanxi 0.77 0.67 -0.10 
Shaanxi 8.5 Gansu -0.9 Liaoning 1.79 1.60 -0.20 
Tianjin 8.4 Shanxi -0.9 Shanxi 0.96 0.72 -0.24 
Liaoning 8.3 Hunan -1.4 Heilongjiang 1.49 1.24 -0.25 
Heilongjiang 7.9 Beijing -1.6 Ningxia 0.98 0.71 -0.27 
Shanxi 7.9 Sichuan -1.8 Gansu 0.92 0.55 -0.37 
Qinghai 7.7 Heilongjiang -2.4 Qinghai 1.13 0.76 -0.37 
Shanghai 7.4 Liaoning -4.7 Tianjin 3.06 2.67 -0.39 
Gansu 7.0 Shanghai -5.6 Shanghai 6.59 4.96 -1.64 
Source: Figures drawn from State Statistical Bureau (SSB) (1997. 2002) and calculated by 
author. 
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industrial performance is a critical component of understanding regional income 
disparities more generally. It is perhaps more interesting to observe that the standard 
East-Centre-West and coast-interior regional classifications obscure the fact that 
each region has some provinces performing well and others performing badly. This 
is a particularly important point in light of the central government's tendency to 
focus on these classifications when formulating regional policies. 
The empirical analysis that follows draws on a dataset of GVIO for 30 provinces 
and 28 manufacturing sectors drawn from China Industrial Economic Statistical 
Yearbooks (State Statistical Bureau 1990, 1995, 2001). Table 22.3 presents gini 
coefficients for each sector in 1989, 1994 and 2000. Gini coefficients measure the 
extent of geographical concentration (or agglomeration) in specific manufacturing 
sectors relative to the level of manufacturing concentration overall. The closer the 
provincial spread of a particular sector is to the provincial spread of manufacturing 
overall, the closer the gini is to zero. The more concentrated a certain sector is, the 
closer the gini is to one. As the table shows, in all but two sectors (wood products 
and petroleum processing and coking), the gini coefficient rose between 1989 and 
2000, suggesting that Chinese industry is indeed becoming more agglomerated. It 
remains to be seen in which provinces this agglomeration is taking place, and why. 
Focusing on the period 1994-2000, this is the main task of this section.8 
Several preliminary points are worth highlighting. First, the coastal region's 74 per 
cent share of national manufacturing output is far above its population share of 42 
per cent. This dominance exists across the board, with the coastal region producing 
92 per cent of all clothing, 89 per cent of leather and furs, 97 per cent of cultural, 
educational and sports goods (CESG) and 90 per cent of electronic and 
telecommunications equipment (ETE). The region produces more than 60 per cent 
of output in all but two sectors and at least 80 per cent of output in close to half the 
sectors. 
Second is the dominance of certain provinces. In 2000 Guangdong, with 7 per 
cent of China's population, produced more than a quarter of its clothes, leather and 
furs, CESG, furniture, plastics, electronic equipment and machinery (EEM), ETE, 
and instruments and metres. Jiangsu produced almost a quarter of the nation's 
chemical fibres, machines and textiles, while Shandong produced more than 20 per 
cent of its food processing manufactures, rubber products and special purpose 
equipment. Zhejiang produced 17 per cent of China's textiles and clothing, and 
neighbouring Shanghai, with less than 2 per cent of the nation's population, produced 
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19 per cent of chemical fibres, 14 per cent of transport equipment and 12 per cent 
of smelting and pressing ferrous metals (SPFM).ln combination with Fujian, these 
six contiguous provinces produced 57 per cent of national manufacturing output in 
2000. This seems to suggest that industry is concentrated at both the regional and 
provincial levels along China's southeastern coast. 
Not only does the coastal region dominate manufacturing production, but its share 
has risen over time. Between 1994 and 2000, the region increased its share of 
China's manufacturing output by 5.0 percentage pOints. This followed an increase of 
6.5 percentage points between 1989 and 1994. At the provincial level, Guangdong 
experienced an increase of 4.4 percentage pOints during the last six years, on top 
of 4.1 percentage pOints in the previous period. Zhejiang, Shandong and Fujian all 
experienced further increases in their shares, while Liaoning and Guangxi suffered 
further declines. Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei, in contrast with the early 
1990s, also saw their shares increase between 1994 and 2000. The only non-coastal 
provinces that increased their output shares were Henan, Xinjiang and Tibet. The 
continuing rise in the coastal region's share of manufacturing over time translates to 
industrial agglomeration there.9 But note that this agglomeration is not benefiting all 
coastal provinces. 
Table 22.4 presents the net relative changes, structural components and locational 
components for each sector in each province between 1994 and 2000, classifying 
each of the 1,108 observations as Types 1-6 following the methodology introduced 
above. Note first some simple information contained in the table. The final column 
records the NRCs for total provincial output. In a sense this captures the overall 
'Iocational' value of each province (since the NRC at the provincial level is based 
solely on the locational components). These will be positive for those provinces in 
which manufacturing overall grew above the national average, which translates to 
those provinces which increased their output shares. This is only the case for the 
provinces mentioned in the previous paragraph, revealing that manufacturing growth 
is skewed in favour of a small number of provinces. The bottom row of the table 
records the NRC at the national level for each sector, which is equivalent to the SC 
(since the LC is zero at the national level). These will be positive for all sectors 
which grew above the national average. 
As Table 22.4 shows, however, there is no guarantee that a positive SC will result 
in a positive NRC, since locational factors may still manage to drag the growth rate 
of a given sector in a given province below the national average (Type 5). This is the 
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case, for example, in Guangxi's food manufacturing sector, which has a positive SC 
but a negative NRC. This is because the LC for food manufacturing is negative and 
large enough to override the positive SC. That is, despite the fact that the sector 
grew above the national average, when located in Guangxi it dropped to below average. 
In the furniture sector this is the case for all western provinces other than Xinjiang, 
while in the transport equipment sector it is the case for all western provinces other 
than Sichuan. Surely an entrepreneur producing in these sectors would prefer to 
locate elsewhere. 
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By contrast, an NRC can be positive even though the sector on the whole performed 
below the national average (Type 3). Take the clothing sector as an example. The 
negative SC resulted in negative NRCs in virtually all provinces. Only in Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong and Hainan did locational factors override this, resulting 
in positive NRCs in these provinces. In all other provinces location compounded the 
performance of the sector and dragged the growth rate further below average (Type 
4). The machine-building sector provides a similar example, with only Zhejiang and 
Guangdong scoring positive NRCs. The point is that these provinces must have 
something working in their favour. 
The results from Table 22.4 are summarised in Table 22.5. There are two main 
issues of interest. First is the number of sectors in which provinces record positive 
NRCs (Types 1,2,3), since this equates to above average growth and hence rising 
industry shares. Guangdong is the frontrunner with positive NRCs in 23 out of its 28 
sectors. Zhejiang has 21 such sectors, followed by Fujian and Shanghai with 18 
each and then Tianjin and Hebei with 15. Henan and Hubei (neighbouring central 
provinces) come in just behind with 14 sectors each. With at least half of their 
sectors growing above average, it is not surprising that these provinces (with the 
exception of Hubei) increased their shares of national manufacturing output over 
the period in question.10 Moreover, it shows that provincial growth rates are not 
necessarily contingent on the exceptional growth of one or two boom sectors, but 
instead derive from above average growth in the majority of sectors. This suggests 
that location rather than industry structure may be the main determinant of growth. 
Building on this point, note that growth is above average in 16 out of the 28 
sectors (positive values in the bottom row of Table 22.4). And yet Qinphai, Shaanxi 
and Inner Mongolia record positive NRCs in only six sectors. This implies that 
locational factors dragged 22 sectors in each province below average. The two 
coastal provinces of Liaoning and Guangxi perform even more poorly, recording 
positive NRCs in only five and three sections respectively. Producing output in 
sectors that grow above average (which all provinces do) is not enough to ensure 
above-average provincial growth. That is not to say that a 'lucky' sectoral structure 
doesn't help. Xinjiang, for example, only records positive NRCs in ten sectors, one 
of which is petroleum processing and coking, which experienced a growth rate close 
to double the national average. The fact that close to a third of Xinjiang's manufacturing 
output is produced in this sector explains Xinjiang's share of manufacturing output 
overall. This, however, is the exception rather than the rule. 11 
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The second issue of interest is the number of sectors in which the locational 
component is positive, that is, location favours growth (Types 1, 3, 6). Guangdong 
and Zhejiang have 25 and 24 sectors in these three categories respectively, followed 
by Tianjin and Fujian with 18 each. Most other coastal provinces score highly on 
this front as well, other than Liaoning and Guangxi. Locating production in either of 
these provinces made a positive contribution to growth in just two sectors. This 
placed them behind all western provinces from Ningxia's 11 sectors to Sichuan's 
five. 
For the central provinces, locational advantages tended to exist in relatively few 
sectors: three in Anhui and Hunan, four in Jiangxi, five in Heilongjiang, and so on. 
Henan (which increased its share of output) was a favourable location for growth in 
15 sectors, placing it above numerous coastal provinces. Hubei also performed 
relatively well within the central region, with 11 sectors recording positive locational 
components. These figures are noteworthy from two perspectives. First, the overall 
performance of the region is well behind that of the East, suggesting that the gains 
from industrial development in the latter have not yet trickled down, or across as the 
case may be. However the delineation of East and Centre is somewhat blurry, 
particularly in light of the relatively strong performances of Henan and Hubei. Second, 
the average performance of the region in terms of sectors favoured by location is 
actually worse than the West's (7 sectors versus 8), with a significant number of 
central provinces ranking below their western counterparts. Given the present focus 
on western development, this is a significant point. 
The emphasis here has been on the importance of locational factors in determining 
rates of manufacturing growth. This is not to say that industrial structure is irrelevant 
to provincial performance, as that is clearly not the case: those provinces blessed 
with a 'lucky' industrial structure (that is, relatively more production in sectors that 
are performing relatively well) will obviously perform better than those that are not. 
However, structure is simply not enough. In more than 70 per cent of the 1,108 NRC 
calculations in Table 22.4, the absolute value of the locational component is greater 
than the absolute value of the structural component. This implies that discrepancies 
in industrial performances across provinces stem more from discrepancies in 
provincial 'environments' than from discrepancies in their industrial structures. In 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Having established that location matters, the crucial question for China's 
policymakers, which shift-share analysis does not provide any answers to, is whether 
or not they can influence the locational advantages of individual provinces in order 
to encourage industrial development in less developed areas. And if this is not the 
appropriate way to address regional inequality, what is? This section raises some 
key issues in this regard. 
China's immense size and diversity suggest a natural tendency towards regional 
inequality. With populations ranging from 2.5 million in Tibet to 117 million in Sichuan, 
and areas ranging from roughly 6,000 square kilometres in Shanghai to 1.7 million 
square kilometres in Xinjiang, it should be rather obvious that patterns of development 
would not conform across provinces. This has certainly been the historical experience 
of China. As long ago as the Song dynasty (960-1279), the economic centre was 
shifting towards the coastal region. By the end of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) 
foreigners began to invest in and establish foreign-run factories along the east coast. 
The concentration of industrial enterprises in coastal China increased through the 
second half of the nineteenth century, partly because of the opening of numerous 
treaty ports there. The Treaty of Nanjing saw the opening of Guangzhou, Fuzhou, 
Xiamen, Ningbo and Shanghai on the southeast coast to foreign economic activities. 12 
When market forces were re-introduced in the late 1970s, it seemed fairly natural 
that industrialisation would take up where it had left off prior to the era of command 
planning. Put simply, 'accidents of history' have favoured China's coastal provinces. 
This historical background was clearly recognised by Deng Xiaoping in his Open 
Door Policy, which was a major initiative underlying the commencement of China's 
economic reforms. In 1979 four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were established 
in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou (all in Guangdong) and Xi amen (in Fujian). SEZs 
were granted special administrative and economic powers and enjoyed tax breaks 
and other privileges. This initial kick-start to development began a cumulative process 
of industrial agglomeration, by making these provinces more attractive locations for 
both foreign-invested and domestic industrial production. Rising industrial profits 
generated higher incomes which, as a result of fiscal decentralisation, remained in 
provincial hands. Re-investment in infrastructure and other local-level services led 
to relative cost reductions, which further encouraged firms to locate in areas where 
success bred success. This process continues today. 
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While extremely difficult to quantify, it is difficult to overlook the vital role that 
government policy has played. Guangdong provides the best example. While it 
certainly had the geographical advantage of proximity to Hong Kong, initial policy 
support through the central government's regional policies compounded this 
advantage, facilitating the rise of reform-minded provincial leaders who in turn came 
up with innovative local initiatives to obtain foreign capital and technologies and to 
Table 22.5 Summary of types 
Location Structure 
Total number of sectors favours favours Positive 
in each category growth growth NRC 
2 3 4 5 6 Sum 1+3+6 1+2+5 1+2+3 
Beijing 5 2 2 9 9 28 8 16 9 
Tianjin 10 2 3 4 4 5 28 18 16 15 
Hebei 9 4 2 6 3 4 28 15 16 15 
Shanxi 3 9 13 2 28 6 16 4 
Inner Mongolia 3 2 10 11 28 5 16 6 
Uaoning 2 3 12 11 28 2 16 5 
Jilin 6 1 11 9 28 7 16 7 
Heilongjiang 5 2 12 9 28 5 16 7 
Shanghai 9 6 3 7 2 28 14 16 18 
Jiangsu 6 6 2 6 4 4 28 12 16 14 
Zhejiang 13 2 6 1 5 28 24 16 21 
Anhui 2 4 11 10 28 3 16 7 
Fujian 8 3 7 2 5 3 28 18 16 18 
Jiangxi 1 9 15 2 28 4 16 2 
Shandong 5 4 3 6 7 3 28 11 16 12 
Henan 8 3 3 5 5 4 28 15 16 14 
Hubei 5 7 2 6 4 4 28 11 16 14 
Hunan 2 5 1 11 9 28 3 16 8 
Guangdong 14 8 3 28 25 16 23 
Guangxi 2 11 13 28 2 16 3 
Hainan 9 1 6 5 5 27 16 15 16 
Sichuan 3 3 10 10 28 5 16 7 
Guizhou 4 2 5 7 10 28 9 16 11 
Yunnan 4 3 2 9 9 28 7 16 9 
Tibet 4 3 6 5 18 7 9 7 
Shaanxi 5 11 11 28 6 16 6 
Gansu 4 2 9 10 2 28 7 16 7 
Qinghai 5 11 10 0 27 6 15 6 
Ningxia 7 2 8 8 2 28 11 16 10 
Xinjiang 8 2 10 6 2 28 10 16 10 
National average 6 2 2 8 8 2 28 10 10 
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promote non-state sector developments (Chung 1997). As a recent article pOints 
out, 'Twenty years ago Shenzhen was a small, non-descript area of three square 
kilometres with a population of 30,000. Ten years later it was a cluster of labour-
intensive processing workshops. Today it is the most developed and compact hi-
tech area on China's mainland' (China Today, 2003:13). Recently Shenzhen has 
obtained further rights to experiment with WTO-related reforms ahead of the rest of 
the country, which should enable the city to continue its role as China's 'pacesetter'. 
In light of these continuing advantages, no wonder Guangdong remains China's 
most desirable location for industrial production, with agglomeration there still on 
the rise. 
Guangdong is not the only province to have benefited from preferential treatment 
by the central government, although the timing of central government support for 
the reform process varies. Surely not cOincidentally, so does the timing of rapid 
economic growth. The Shanghai people have identified 'policy gifts'from the centre 
as the crux of the economic reform process. 'Policy is wealth', according to one of 
their vice-mayors.13 As Jacobs (1997) argues convincingly, it is not difficult to see 
how they have reached this conclusion. At the end of the 1980s Shanghai was still 
tightly controlled by the central government, in large part due to the centre's heavy 
reliance on the municipality for revenues. In 1990 the Pudong area-subsequently 
China's fifth SEZ-was opened, offering incentives such as tax holidays, a free-
trade zone, and extended land leases. Following that, Shanghai's enterprise tax 
rates were lowered and policies permitting the establishment of the stockmarket, 
futures exchanges and liberal foreign investment policies have attracted funds from 
both overseas and domestic investors. In other words, Shanghai has benefited from 
policy rather than funds from centre. 
Prior to 1990 Shanghai's share in the gross value of China's industrial output 
declined continually while growth rates of real GDP and per capita GDP were 
consistently below average (Table 22.2). However since the early 1990s this situation 
has reversed, with Shanghai recording annual real GDP growth above the national 
average between 1993 and 2001. In 2002 Pudong recorded its highest investment in 
fixed assets and highest materialisation rate of foreign investment to date, with 
GDP increasing by 16.7 per cent over the previous year. This made 2002 the twelfth 
consecutive year of two-digit growth for Pudong (China Today April 2003:26-27). 
The shift-share analysis provides further evidence of this dramatic turnaround for 
Shanghai. In contrast with a similar analysis conducted between the years 1989 
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and 1994, in which only four sectors recorded locational components working in 
their favour, Shanghai recorded 14 sectors with positive locational components 
between 1994 and 2000. Similarly, 18 sectors recorded positive NRCs during the 
period 1994-2000, compared with only seven sectors in the previous period. A 
similar reversal has clearly not been experienced by Liaoning or Guangxi, coastal 
provinces which appear to be relatively neglected on the preferential policy front. 
This is hardly proof that policy is the definitive cause of industrial success, but it 
certainly suggests that it has a role to play. 
Unfortunately the claim that policy has assisted industrial development via creating 
locational advantages in certain coastal provinces does not lead to an equally valid 
claim that this could be repeated with success in China's interior. The most significant 
difference is that Deng's decision to favour the coastal region compounded the 
natural tendency-stemming from historical, geographical, political, cultural and 
other factors-towards regional inequality. In contrast, the 'Go West Campaign' 
appears to be aiming to counteract this natural tendency, making the current task 
inherently different and also more difficult. But that does not necessarily make it 
impossible. 
The natural process of industrial agglomeration in a market economy is not 
boundless. Instead, rising costs in industrialising regions, combined with falling 
transport, transactions and other costs of doing business across regions, should 
eventually encourage firms to relocate to less developed regions. The shift-share 
analysis suggests that this process of trickle down remains fairly confined to the 
coastal provinces and a few neighbouring central provinces.14 An equalising regional 
policy is thus a question of how best to speed up this process. 
It is tempting to suggest a set of central government policies which improve the 
'Iocational advantages' of less developed regions. The key idea is that the 'core-
periphery' pattern could be reversed if policy measures were able to tilt the pattern 
of industrial production in favour of peripheral areas. Preferential policy measures 
such as investment and credit incentives could reduce the relative costs of producing 
in Peripheral areas. Subsidies to specific industries in certain regions or expenditure 
on local infrastructure could, theoretically, serve a similar purpose. Alternatively, 
direct fiscal transfers from richer to poorer areas should increase expenditure in the 
latter, thereby strengthening demand linkages there. However, the vast differentials 
in present industrial capabilities across provinces would require significant expenditure 
by the central government in order to create locational advantages-or agglomeration 
427 
forces-which could outweigh those already firmly established in the coastal region. 
Weak central government finances and the sheer size of the problem (that is, western 
and most of central China), combined with problems such as 'picking winners'-
either in terms of industries or locations-suggest that in reality such measures are 
highly unlikely to prove effective. China's entry into the WTO, and the consequent 
increase in foreign involvement in virtually all industrial sectors alongside various 
requirements regarding non-discrimination (between state-owned and private firms, 
and also among provinces), further constrain the central government's options in 
this category. 
A superior set of policy measures focuses on reducing broadly defined 'transport 
costs'. A key point to observe is that initial reductions in transport costs will actually 
worsen regional inequality (as we observe in the case of China). In other words, this 
set of measures necessarily focuses on the medium to long term. The underdeveloped 
transport system is only one factor contributing to the overall cost of dOing business 
at a distance within China's domestic economy. Expenditure on the national transport 
system clearly reduces the costs of relocating to distant, peripheral areas. The 
Qinghai-Tibet Railway project, scheduled for completion by the end of 2006, is one 
example of this kind. Beyond efforts to reduce physical costs, policy could aim to 
reduce the informational, sales and support costs of doing inter-regional business 
by improving the provision and transmission of information. This could be 
accomplished by expanding telecommunications networks, providing access to 
computers and the Internet, organising inter-regional trading organisations and so 
on. Similarly, continued efforts to eliminate administrative and other ad hoc barriers 
to inter-provincial trade-or to integrate the domestic market-should encourage 
the dispersal of industry to hitherto underdeveloped provinces. 15 The central 
government's call for 'mutually beneficial co-operation' between coastal and interior 
provinces in the Ninth Five-Year Plan is just one example of a potentially effective 
policy in this regard. While some of these measures would be costly, if implemented 
without regional bias they would at least overcome potential problems associated 
with 'picking winners'. Moreover, rather than attempting to counteract market forces, 
policy measures in this category simply seek to speed up the process of relocation 
which is an inherent part of industrial development in an increasingly marketised 
system. 
Aside from central government policies, provincial governments can seek more 
actively to create economic environments that are conducive to industrial 
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development. As one example of this, a recent Beijing Review (20 February 2003:34-
36) article discusses how in the last two years Qinghai Provincial government has 
revised its 300 economic laws and regulations in accordance with international 
practice and formulated a set of preferential policies to protect the interests of 
foreign investors. It has chosen projects in industries with 'strong potential', including 
nonferrous metals, salt chemicals and medicine in order to attract foreign investors. 
(It is perhaps a coincidence that the positive locational component accounted for 66 
per cent of the positive NRC on Qinghai's smelting/pressing nonferrous metals and 
chemical materials, and that its NRC and locational component for medical and 
pharmaceutical products were also positive). This is more likely to succeed at a 
provincial level than a national one (although success is far from guaranteed). 
According to Wu Dawei, Director of the Department of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Co-operation of Qinghai, the policies have succeeded in bringing substantial increases 
in foreign investment to the province: foreign-funded enterprises invested US$270 
million in 2001, a 25 per cent increase over the previous year, and in the first half of 
2002 they had already invested US$347 million, a 130 per cent increase over the 
same period in 2001. While this evidence is anecdotal, it does suggest that provincial-
level policies may be important. They would perhaps be even more so in combination 
with an increased focus on the 'transport cost' category of policies at the central 
government level. 
CONCLUSIONS 
China's current trends in the growth of provincial and regional per capita income, 
underpinned by a process of industrial agglomeration, suggest that the central 
government has quite a challenge on its hands given its current objective of alleviating 
the regional inequalities that it has hitherto helped to promote. 
The inverted U-shaped relationship between industrial agglomeration and 'transport 
costs', which in their very broadest sense provide a proxy for economic development 
(Krugman 1995) clarifies the notion that these trends are, to a large extent, a natural 
consequence of economic development in a market economy. On the upside of the 
U, firms and workers choose to locate near other firms in order to benefit from cost 
and demand linkages and other externalities associated with larger markets, which 
in turn draws in more and more firms and workers. During this phase, regional 
inequalities rise. There is ample empirical evidence to suggest that China remains 
on this side of the process. On the downside of the U, firms relocate in order to 
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benefit from lower wages and other costs associated with industrial production in 
hitherto less developed areas. The theoretical endpoint of this process is an even 
distribution of industry and incomes across space. While this is unlikely to be the 
case in reality, an equalising regional policy becomes a question of how best to 
speed up the process of relocation. Although this is a question without obvious or 
simple answers, the empirical analysis and discussion above provide a few key 
points. 
The shift-share analysis enabled us to identify locations where industrial 
performance appears to be above average for no reason other than that production 
was located in that area, and not elsewhere: location matters. The identification of 
certain coastal provinces as those locations confirmed that industrial agglomeration 
is an important component of the continuing rise in regional income inequality. But 
the methodology also enabled us to identify that some coastal provinces, particularly 
Liaoning and Guangxi, and virtually a" the central provinces, were among the worst 
performers during the period in question. Given the current focus on western 
development, it is important to recognise the potential for non-western provinces to 
become areas of neglect in terms of regional policy formulation. Moreover, it is 
necessary to continually update the analysis in order to pinpoint how the 'winners' 
and 'losers' are changing over time. 
The recognition that regional development is a dynamic process in which the 
beneficiaries certainly do change over time points to the difficulties a central 
government would face in trying to pick winners by directing (limited) fiscal resources 
either to specific industries or provinces. In an increasingly marketised and 
internationally integrated economy, it is better to leave the decisions of where to 
invest to the firms themselves, while provincial and lower level governments focus 
on making their own localities competitive as locations for investment. Central fiscal 
resources would be much better spent on efforts to reduce the physical and other 
costs of relocating to distant areas. Policies promoting the integration of the domestic 
economy fall into this category and would increase the likelihood that the benefits of 
industrialisation and WTO entry will benefit provinces beyond those in the current 
industrial Core. While more effort is needed to establish exactly what policies stand 
the greatest chance of alleviating China's regional inequalities, taking into account 
the issues addressed here will at least raise the likelihood of success. 
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NOTES 
1 This does not imply that the policy goal was successful, as this levelling came at significant cost. 
2 Of course industrial development is not the only aspect of development that matters, but it certainly 
features significantly in China's policy agenda. 
3 See Golley (2000) for a much more comprehensive discussion. 
4 Hirschman (1958) and Myrdal (1957) introduced the terms 'trickle down' and 'spread' respectively 
to describe the eventual levelling out of development across regions within a country. 
5 See Golley (2000) for a more detailed justification of using 'transport costs' as proxy for China's 
transition process. 
6 See Golley (2000, 2002). 
7 This method is adapted from Liu, Yao and Zhang (1999). 
8 Golley (2002) conducts a similar analysis for the period 1989-94. This section will make reference 
to some of those results. 
9 Further evidence of this claim is provided in Golley (2000, 2002). 
10 Whether or not total output shares rise clearly depends on how much of their output is derived 
from sectors growing above average. Space limitations prevent a closer analysis of this point. 
11 Again, space limitations prevent a more detailed analysis of sectoral shares in each province, 
which would validate this point. 
12 Golley (2000) discuss these issues in much more detail. See also Yang (1997). 
13 Xie Kequiang, quoted in Jacobs (1997:169). 
14 See Brun, Combes and Renard (2002) for further evidence of this. 
15 Young (2000) and Poncet (2002) discuss China's lack of domestic market integration. 
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23 
Government transfer payments and 
regional development 
Tingsong Jiang and Zhiyun Zilao 
Rapid economic change in China has been accompanied by worsening regional 
disparity. The income gap between China's coastal and inland regions1 has been 
widening since the economic reforms began in 1978 (Figure 23.1). Of the three 
regions, the Eastern coastal region (the richest region) experienced the fastest 
economic growth in the past two decades. Average per capita GDP in the Eastern 
region increased sevenfold, while per capita GDP in the Western region (the poorest 
region) increased less than fivefold. The gap in per capita GDP between the Eastern 
and Western regions increased from 380.6 yuan in 1978 to 3,354.9 yuan in 2000 in 
real terms. This phenomenon has been well documented by many authors, for 
example, Wu (1999), Sun (2000), Sun and Parikh (2001) and Jiang (2002). 
One way to tackle this problem is to use intergovernment transfer payments.2 
Transfer payments could ease the regional disparity through three channels. First, 
payments to households in less developed regions could directly narrow the regional 
income gap. Second, transfer payments to finance more investment in health, 
education and infrastructure in less developed regions could improve these regions' 
economic growth potential and ease the disparity in the longer term. Third, transfer 
payments may reduce the tax burden in the recipient regions and thus give additional 
stimulation to their economies. 
Transfer payments have played an important role in local government budgets in 
China. In 2001, about 41.3 per cent of local government revenues were transfers 
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from the central government (Table 23.1). Most of these transfers, however, were 
purely tax revenues that were redistributed among the central and local governrnents 
through the tax sharing system (fen shui zhl). Only a very small proportion of transfers 
are dedicated to lessening the regional disparity. The share of the 'equalisation 
transfer' in total transfer payments from the central to the local governments was 
only 1.8 per cent in 2000 (He 2001). Therefore, many studies find that the transfer 
system failed to equalise per capita fiscal expenditure and per capita income (for 
example, Wong 2002a; Ma 2003).3 
GOVERNMENT TRANSFER PAYMENT SCHEMES 
China's government transfer payment practices have evolved along with its fiscal 
system. Before the economic reforms of 1978 there were no systematic transfer 
payments. Transfer payments, as supplementary measures, were made within other 
fiscal instruments under a centralised fiscal system. Public finances were gradually 
decentralised under the fiscal contract system (caizheng baogan Z/) implemented 
in the 1980s and early 1990s, until the implementation of the tax sharing system in 
1994. The implementation of the Transfer Payment Arrangement during the transitional 
period in 1996 marked the establishment of a formal and comprehensive program of 
government transfer payments. Thus, the evolution of transfer payment schemes 
can be divided into four periods: pre 1979, 1980-93, 1994-95 and post 1996. 
Transfer payments before 1979 
Before 1979, the Chinese economy was centrally planned and local governments' 
finance was strongly controlled by the central government. Revenues were allocated 
between central and provincial governments according to pre-defined shares. Under 
this fiscal regime, the central government's transfer payments to local governments 
took the form of 'deficit subsidy' and 'special purpose grants'. 
On the basis of these pre-defined terms, the central government examined local 
governments' actual revenue and expenditure. Local governments either remitted 
all their surpluses to, or received full subsidy from, the central government to balance 
their deficits. The central government also provided grants to local governments in 
special cases such as natural disasters and large infrastructure projects. 
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Although the form of transfer payment was simple during this period, the amount 
was usually large. 
Transfer payments between 1980 and 1993 
Between 1980 and 1993, as part of China's economic reform, government finance 
was gradually decentralised and a governmental fiscal contract system established. 
Under this system, the scope and base of revenues and expenditures was defined 
jOintly by the central and local governments and local governments were responsible 
for the balance of their budgets. Transfer payments occurred in three forms-fixed 
transfer, earmarked special purpose grants, and settlement subsidies. 
Fixed transfer was guaranteed by the contract system for those local governments 
whose base revenues did not cover defined expenditures. The amount of this type 
of transfer payment was fixed by the level of the deficit in the base year. However, 
additional settlement subsidies and special purpose grants could still be available. 
Settlement subsidies were made when items of revenues and/or expenditures defined 
in the contract were changed, for example, when the ownership of firms transferred 
from the central government to local governments or vice versa. Special purpose 
grants were paid in two forms. Some were earmarked to finance special programs, 
such as agricultural support, large infrastructure projects, and so on. Others were 
used in the case of natural disasters. 
Transfer payments during this period were diversified and informal. In 1988, for 
example, there were nine forms of fixed transfers, 21 forms of special purpose 
grants and 15 forms of settlement subsidies. Administrative costs were therefore 
high, and efficiency low. 
Transfer payments between 1994 and 1995 
In 1994, as part of a comprehensive tax reform package, the central government 
replaced the fiscal-contract system with a tax-sharing system. Under this system, 
tax revenues received by the central and local governments were clearly defined 
and collected by different agencies. Tax revenues assigned to the central government 
included customs duties, excises and value added tax (VAT) on imports; excise; 
enterprise income tax collected from central government-owned enterprises; taxes 
collected from railways, headquarters of banks and insurance companies; 75 per 
cent of domestic VAT; and 91 per cent of security stamp duty. Tax revenues assigned 
to local governments included 25 per cent of domestic VAT; business tax except 
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that collected from railways, banks and insurance companies; company income tax 
except that collected from central government-owned enterprises; personal income 
tax; resources tax; urban maintenance and construction tax; real estate tax; 
agricultural tax and others (Zhang 2002). 
As a result of the tax-sharing system, the central government's revenue, and thus 
the transfer payments, increased significantly. In 1994 and 1995, transfer payments 
to local governments amounted to 213 and 245 billion yuan, accounting for 78 and 
76 per cent of the central government's revenue, and 60 and 52 per cent of local 
governments' expenditure, respectively (Du 2001 :49). Most of the transfer payments 
were in the form of 'returned revenues', which were designed to ensure that local 
governments' revenues after the implementation of the tax assignment system did 
not fall below the 1993 level. The returned revenues, accounting for 77 per cent of 
total transfer payments in 1995, were not a real increment to the transfer payment 
as they were originally part of the local governments' revenues. Nevertheless, they 
provided the central government more room to use fiscal instruments. The remaining 
transfer payments were equivalent to previous settlement, fixed transfer and special 
purpose grants. 
Transfer payments after 1996 
In 1996, transfer payments were formalised and systematised when the Transfer 
Payment Arrangement was implemented. These 'transitional' transfer payments 
consisted of two parts: objective factor-determined transfer payments and policy-
based transfer payments. The amount of objective factor-determined transfer 
payments ( TO; ) is calculated according to the formula, 
(23.1) 
where Ei and Ri are respectively region Ps standard fiscal revenues and 
expenditures, and a is the coefficient of objective factor-determined transfer 





where Tis the total amount of transfer payments nationwide, TP is the amount of 
national policy based transfer payments, and Rand E are, respectively, national 
standard fiscal revenues and expenditures. No objective factor-determined transfer 
payments are made to regions with more revenues than expenditures. 
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Policy-based transfer payments were dedicated to ethnic minority autonomous 
regions, according to the difference between regional standard fiscal revenue and 
expenditure. The amount of this type of transfer payment was affected by two factors: 
the difference of fiscal capacity in the growth rate, and the difference in fiscal 
capacity per capita, between the nation and the particular region (Ma 1998:94). 
In 1998, some changes were made to the Transfer Payment Arrangement, mainly 
involving the adjustment of the calculation of standard fiscal revenues and 
expenditures. In 2002, a new decree, the General Transfer Payment Arrangement, 
was promulgated, mainly to address the issue of transfer payments to the inland 
regions. General transfer payments were similar to the objective factor-determined 
transfer payments, except that the transfer payment coefficient differed across 
regions (Ministry of Finance Budget Department 2003). 
However, the 'transitional transfer payment' played a very limited role because it 
accounted for only a small proportion of total transfer payments, just above 2.5 per 
cent in 2001.ln the Eastern, Central and Western regions, its share in local governments' 
total revenues was only 0.01, 1.63 and 2.17 per cent, respectively (Table 23.1). 
At present, 41.3 per cent of local governments' total fiscal revenues are from 
transfer payments from the central government (Table 23.1). These transfers fall 
into four broad categories-fixed transfer, returned tax revenue, special purpose 
grants, and general purpose grants. General purpose grants include transitional 
transfers, transfers to ethnic minority regions, transfers to increase the salaries of 
public servants and improve social security networks, and other grants, such as 
settlernent subsidies. The shares of these four categories in total transfer payments 
are shown in Figure 23.2. 
AN EVALUATION OF THE TRANSFER PAYMENT SYSTEM 
The impact of transfer payments on regional development can be examined from 
two aspects-whether the structure of transfer payments is appropriate to address 
the problem of regional disparity, and whether the transfer payments actually 
contributed to regional fiscal equalisation and growth convergence. 
Are richer provinces receiving more transfer payments? 
It is often argued that the transfer payments in China have failed to ease regional 
disparity, as richer regions receive even more transfers than poor regions (Ma 2003). 
This could happen for two reasons. First, the central government collects more 
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taxes from the more developed regions, and under the tax-sharing system these 
regions receive more transfers in the form of returned tax revenue (Table 23.1). 
Second, the transfer payment system is virtually a negotiable scheme, meaning 
developed regions can receive fairly large amount of transfers in other forms. 
The situation has changed, however, and this concern may no longer be valid. 
Although richer regions still receive more transfers in the form of returned tax 
revenues, poorer regions receive more transfers in total. As shown in Table 23.1 , 
the total amount of transfer payments in 2001 to the Central and Western regions 
was, respectively, double and three times the amount of transfer payments to the 
Eastern region. 
This pattern is also evident at the provincial level. Figure 23.3 plots per capita 
total transfer payments (23.3a) and per capita transfer payments other than returned 
revenues (23.3b) received by each province, autonomous region or municipality 
against its per capita GDP in 2000. It can be seen from the charts that there is a 
negative relationship between per capita transfers and per capita GDP. 




















This is confirmed by the following OLS regressions of per capita transfer payments 
against per capita GDP: 
PCTIj ;:: 543.359 - 0.021OPCGDp; 
(5.19) (1.50) 




where PCTrj , PCTOj and PCGDp; are, respectively, per capita total transfer 
payments, per capita transfer payments other than returned revenues, and per capita 
GDP in province i; and numbers in brackets under the equation are t-ratios for 
estimated coefficients. It can be seen that there is a significant (at 5 per cent level) 
negative relationship between per capita GDP and other transfers. That is, poorer 
regions receive more transfers than returned revenues from the central government. 
There is a weaker negative relationship between per capita total transfer payments 
and per capita GDP if the outliers-Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai-are 
excluded. 
This indicates that in recent years poorer regions have received more transfer 
payments from the central government than richer regions. 
TRANSFER PAYMENTS AND REGIONAL FISCAL INEQUALITY 
The pattern of China's regional fiscal inequality has been changing over time while the 
impact of transfer payments on regional fiscal capacity has been a debatable issue. 
Under the fiscal-contract system that prevailed during the 1980s and early 1990s, 
China's fiscal system was decentralised and regional governments were required to 
finance themselves. Economists have been concerned that regional self-finance 
may have worsened the inequalities. Jin et a!. (1999), however, find that regional 
fiscal inequality actually improved during the fiscal contract system period. 
Table 23.2 reports the coefficients of variation for per capita revenue and expenditure 
across provinces between 1982 and 1992. It shows that the regional disparity for 
budgetary and extra-budgetary revenues and expenditures improved over the period. 
For example, the coefficient of variation for budgetary revenue fell from 1.99 in 
1982 to 0.98 in 1992. On the other hand, the coefficient of variation for per capita 
budgetary revenue remittance (the difference between budgetary revenue and 
expenditure) rose from 4.25 in 1982 to 7.78 in 1992, implying greater revenue 
redistribution from rich to poor provinces. In other words, the transfer payments 
helped ease regional fiscal inequality during the period. 
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Wong (2002a) observes that regional fiscal inequality started worsening in 1993. 
For example, the coefficients of variation for per capita expenditure rose from 0.534 
in 1992 to 0.675 in 1998, and the maximum to minimum ratio jumped from 6.6 to 
19.1 during the same period (Table 23.3). Based on these observations, Wong argues 
that the transfer payment system failed to equalise. 
However, it seems that regional fiscal inequality has improved in recent years. 
Both the maximum to minimum ratio and the coefficient of variation for per capita 
revenue and expenditure were lower in 2001 than in 1998 (Table 23.3). Because our 
data sources and variable definitions may be different to Wong's (2002a), our results 
may not be directly comparable with hers. The results for 2000 and 2001 , however, 
are comparable as they have consistent data sources and definition. At least for 
these two years, there was an improvement in regional fiscal inequality. 
Table 23.1 shows that, in 2001 , the Eastern, Central and Western regions received 
24.2, 36.0 and 39.8 per cent respectively, of the central government's transfer 
payments. Given that these regions account for 42.5, 34.8 and 23.7 per cent of the 
Chinese population, respectively, it is clear that the improvement in regional fiscal 
inequality was a result of increasing transfer payments from the central government 
to less developed regions. 
Table 23.2 The coefficients of variation for per capita revenue and expenditure 
across provinces, 1982-92 
Budgetary Budgetary Budgetary Extra- Extra-
revenue expenditure revenue budgetary budgetary 
remittance revenue expenditure 
1982 1.9 0.6 4.2 1.0 0.8 
1983 1.8 0.6 5.0 1.0 0.9 
1984 1.7 0.6 6.1 1.0 1.0 
1985 1.6 0.6 6.9 1.0 0.9 
1986 1.5 0.6 5.3 1.0 1.0 
1987 1.3 0.5 3.9 1.0 1.0 
1988 1.2 0.5 4.5 1.0 1.0 
1989 1.0 0.5 4.8 0.9 0.9 
1990 1.0 0.5 6.2 0.9 0.9 
1991 0.9 0.5 6.1 0.9 0.9 
1992 0.9 0.5 7.7 0.8 0.8 
Source: Jin, H., Quian, Y., and Weingast, B.R., 1999. Regional decentralisation and fiscal 
incentives: federalism, Chinese style, Stanford University, Stanford, unpublished:Table 22.6. 
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TRANSFER PAYMENTS AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 
The ultimate purpose of transfer payments is to stimulate regional economic growth. 
Jiang (2002) observes a divergence of per capita income in Chinese provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities after 1995. One way to evaluate the impact 
of transfer payments on regional disparity is to examine whether payments have 
contributed to this divergence. 
Ma (2003) presents an econometric analysis of the impact of transfer payments 
on regional growth. He estimates the following regional economic growth equations 
using regional data from 1995 and 2000 
(23.5) 
InYiT -lnYio = C -(l-e-/3T)lnYio +1I'RANSF; +£i ' (23.6) 
where Yio and YiT are, respectively, per capita GDP of province iin year 0 and year 
T; TRANSF; is the per capita transfer payment received by province i during the 
Table 23.3 Trends in the inter-regional distribution of fiscal resources, 
1990-2001 
Per capita expenditure (yuan) Per capita revenue (yuan) 
Max.lMin. Average Coeff. var. Max.lMin. Average Coeff. var. 
1990 6.1 241.0 0.551 17.5 227.0 1.084 
1991 6.6 268.0 0.539 16.5 256.4 1.007 
1992 6.6 282.9 0.534 15.8 271.0 0.998 
1993 8.1 355.5 0.546 15.0 360.9 0.940 
1994 9.7 417.6 0.665 15.2 271.6 0.992 
1995 16.6 512.2 0.768 16.3 333.5 1.010 
1996 18.1 612.7 0.801 15.9 413.7 1.029 
1997 19.5 708.8 0.882 16.8 486.3 1.094 
1998 19.1 817.5 0.864 16.8 558.2 1.093 
2000 7.6 1058.1 0.705 7.7 1076.4 0.698 
2001 7.0 1326.4 0.675 7.0 1348.3 0.675 
Note: 1990--98 indicators are calculated from data of 29 provinces, municipalities and autonomous 
regions, with Tibet excluded and Chongqing included in Sichuan for 1990--98; 2000--01 indicators 
are calculated from data of all 31 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions in mainland 
China. 
Source: 1990--98 figures from Wong, C., 2002. Issues of Equalization in China, presentation to 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in East Asia Workshop, 8ali, 10--11 January. 2000--01 figures 
from authors' own calculation. 
445 
period from year 0 to year T; and f3 is a convergence coefficient. A positive (negative) 
f3 indicates convergence (divergence); that is, regions with higher per capita GDP 
level in the base year have a higher (lower) growth rate. Ma finds that the transfer 
payment variable is not included, f3 is between -0.012 without regional dummy and 
-0.021 with regional dummy and is statistically significant. If the transfer variable is 
included, the coefficient of transfer payment (y), is significant and positive, and 
the value of f3 falls to -0.018 and -0.023, respectively, without and with regional 
dummy. From these results, Ma concludes that the 'transfer widens regional gaps'. 
We believe, however, that the above results should be interpreted in the opposite 
direction. Although regional economic growth diverges, transfer payments help to 
mitigate this trend. In Equation 23.5, f3 captures all the impacts on regional growth, 
whilst in Equation 23.6 it captures other impacts except transfer payments. As the 
value of f3 in Equation 23.5 is smaller in absolute value than in Equation 23.6, the 
regional growth is less divergent if the transfer payments are included than if they 
are not. This may become clearer from the following derivation. 
According to the estimates made earlier, the transfer payment received by a 
particular region is negatively related to its GDP level. For convenience, this 
relationship may be written as 
TRANSF; = f - ai InYio 
where f is a fixed amount which is independent of regional income, a i is a positive 
coefficient which is region specific. Replacing TRANSF; with the above relationship, 
Equation 23.6 becomes 
(23.6') 
It is clear from comparing Equation 23.5 with Equation 23.6' that f3 in Equation 
23.5 includes the effect of transfer payment )lXi' 
The above discussion reveals that, during 1995-2000, regional gaps in per capita 
incomes were widening at a rate of 1 .2-2.1 per cent per annum. However, if there 
were no transfer payments, the widening rate would have been 1.8-2.3 per cent. 
OUTSTANDING ISSUES 
Although the above analysis shows that transfer payments have played a positive 
role in improving regional disparities in recent years, it does not imply that the system 
is problem-free. In fact, many imperfections have been associated with this system. 
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First, the structure of the transfer payments is problematic. As shown in Table 
23.1 and Figure 23.2, general-purpose grants account for only 15 per cent of total 
transfer payments. Within the category of general-purpose grants, only the 'transitional 
transfer', which accounts for less than 7 per cent of general-purpose grants or 1 per 
cent of total transfer payments, is dedicated for the purpose of 'equalisation'. Most 
of the grants are still allocated for special purposes. For example, about half of the 
general purpose grants were used to increase payments to public servants and 
improve the social security system. This structure gives little flexibility for local 
governments to arrange the use of transfer payments according to their own needs. 
Moreover, special purpose grants often require matching funds from the recipient 
regional governments. This arrangement may have two negative impacts. First, it 
may in fact increase rather than decrease the tax burden on recipient regions as 
these regions have to raise the matching funds. Alternatively, the recipient 
governments may try to divert the earmarked grant to other purposes, thus corrupting 
the fiscal discipline. 
The second problem of the current fiscal and transfer payment system is that it 
does little to deal with extra-budgetary and off-budget revenues, which include user 
charges for government provided goods and services, administrative fees for 
government services and incomes from government-owned enterprises. Local 
governments have good reason to collect extra-budgetary and off-budget revenues 
under the tax-sharing system because they are responsible for providing vital public 
services, such as education, health care, social security and welfare,4 but their 
budgetary revenues are not enough to fund the provision of these services. As a 
result, the magnitude of extra-budgetary revenues is equivalent to that of budgetary 
revenues. For example, extra-budgetary and budgetary revenues in 1999 were 
equivalent to 12 and 14 per cent of GDP respectively (Wong 2001, 2002b). This 
huge amount of extra-budgetary revenues and expenditures not only makes budgetary 
management more difficult, but also widens regional gaps in regional government 
fiscal capacity and government services. For example, in 2001, the World Bank 
ranked China 61 st out of 191 countries in overall quality of health, but 188th in terms 
of fairness in financial contribution (World Health Report 2000, cited in World Bank 
2001). One of the two fieldwork counties referred to in World Bank (2001) could not 
provide six years of primary schooling. 
The third problem is the uneven tax burden on local economies. Figure 23.4 plots 
each province's average tax rate-the ratio of total taxes collected by the central 
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and local governments from a province to that province's total GDP-against its per 
capita GDP. The relationship displays a U-shape: the most developed and the least 
developed provinces have higher tax rates than the middle-income provinces. It 
becomes clearer if the provinces are grouped into the three regions as shown in 
Figure 23.5-the Western region has the highest average rate (12 per cent), followed 
by the Eastern region (10.8 per cent) and the Central region (9.2 per cent). This tax 
disparity not only further distorts the economy, but also hinders economic 
development in the least developed regions. 
Finally, those involved in the discussion and design of a transfer payment scheme 
were preoccupied by equity criteria; although efficiency criteria are also important. 
Jiang (2003) shows that simply transferring funds from the Eastern coastal region 
to inland regions may reduce total welfare even though the regional gap might be 
narrowed. This is because the coastal region has better infrastructure, a higher 
technology level and a more market-oriented policy environment. Thus returns to 
resources are higher than those of the inland regions. 
STYLISED SIMULATION OF INCREASING TRANSFER 
PAYMENTS TO INLAND REGIONS 
The above discussion reveals that transfer payments in China have helped slow 
the trend of worsening regional disparity. However, the effect has been limited by 
the structure and scope of those programs. This section simulates different programs 
of increasing transfer payments to inland regions using a general equilibrium model 
of the Chinese economy with regional details (CERD). 
Description of the model 
This subsection gives a brief introduction to the model of the Chinese economy 
used in the analysis. 5 (For more details of the model, see Jiang 2003). 
As the name suggests, CERD is a multi-regional model of the Chinese economy. 
In this study a simple version of CERD is used, in which Chinese provinces are 
grouped into East, Central and West regions, as defined above.6 
CERD uses the 'bottom-up' approach. Each region in CERD is treated as an open 
economy with its own agents and behavioural functions (Figure 23.6). Agents in 
each region make their decisions on the demand for, and supply of, commodities 
and primary factors, and regional economies are linked through commodity and 
factor flows. 
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It can be seen from the diagram that CERD mimics a global model of multiple 
regions as in the GTAP model (HerteI1997). However, it has some peculiar features. 
First, regional links in CERD are more intensive than in a global model, especially 
for the movement of primary factors. Four types of labour are identified in CERD: 
urban labour, rural agricultural labour, rural non-agricultural labour and migrant labour. 
It is assumed that urban labour and rural migrant labour engage in non-agricultural 
activities only. CERD also assumes perfect mobility of capital across domestic 
regions and sectors. 
As labour and capital can move across regional boundaries, it is important to 
distinguish between the usage and ownership of these factors, in order to calculate 
regional household income and consumption more accurately. 
Another feature of CERD is that rural and urban households are distinguished in 
each region according to their possession of primary factors. This is appropriate for 
an analysis of the Chinese economy, where rural and urban areas are still separated 
to some degree because of various restrictions, although significant improvements 
have been made. For example, the household registration system, which identifies 
a person as a rural or urban resident, is still in effect and prevents people from 
freely moving across regions, especially from the countryside to cities. 
Another difference between CERD and other global models lies in its treatment of 
regional links. Ideally, inter-regional flows of commodities and factors would be 
presented in the model, however, such information is not available as there are no 
'customs' in each province to register 'imports' from and 'exports' to other provinces. 
In order to avoid arbitrary decisions in creating the database, CERD models inter-
regional trade indirectly via a national pool of commodities and factors. Each region 
sells its excess supply to and buys excess demand from the national pool. For 
example, as shown in Figure 23.7, migrant labour in the national pool is a constant 
elasticity of SUbstitution (CES) aggregation of migrant labour supplied by each region. 
The aggregate migrant labours are then allocated to each region to meet regional 
demand according to a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) process. The 
CES and CET processes represent regional differences in migrant labour supply 
and demand. 
CERD also distinguishes between regional and national governments, which allows 
for the analysis of transfer payments. To simplify the treatment, it is assumed that 
tax collections (except import tariffs and export taxes), government saving and 
consumption are made by regional governments, while the central government serves 
450 
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only to transfer payments to regional governments.? Therefore, each regional 
government's revenue is the regional tax revenues plus transfers from the central 
government. 
There are two closures in modelling regional governments' behaviour, namely, 
exogenous revenues and exogenous expenditures. In the former closure, regional 
tax rates and transfer payments are fixed; consequently local governments allocate 
the resultant revenues to government saving and consumption. On the other hand, 
in the latter closure, local governments' expenditures on saving and consumption 
are fixed at pre-defined levels, while the tax rates or the amounts of transfer payment 
vary to balance their budgets. 
CERD gives a reasonably detailed representation of commodities with 44 sectors 
in each region, including 5 agricultural sectors, 25 industrial sectors, one construction 
sector, and 13 service sectors. 
A particular feature of CERD is that its database has been compiled based on the 
provincial 44-sector input-output tables for 1997. The 44-sector classification follows 
the 40-sector classification in the 1997 national input-output table (National Accounts 
Department 1999) with the agricultural sector further disaggregated into five sectors. 
I n total, there are 28 provincial tables available.8 These provincial input-output data 
have been aggregated into three regions. Other data and parameters are drawn from 
GTAP database 5, Yang and Huang (1997) and the China Statistics Yearbook series. 
Stylised simulations 
Three stylised changes in transfer payments are simulated using the CERD model 
described above. All these simulations are centred on increasing transfer payments 
to the Central and Western regions by 9.2 and 12.0 billion yuan, respectively, or 10 
per cent of each region's general purpose grant in 2001. However, different treatments 
are made in each simulation. A summary of these simulations is given in Table 23.4. 
Table 23.4 Summary of simulations 
Simulation 1 
Increase transfer payment to 
central and western regions by 
9.2 and 12.0 billion yuan, 
respectively 
Simulation 2 
Changes in transfer 
payments as set in 
Simulation 1 
Simulation 3 
Changes in transfer 
payments as set in 
Simulation 1 
Fixed government spending Fixed regional tax rates 
Endogenous regional tax rates Improvement in input efficiency 
to prevent welfare loss 
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The first simulation is carried out with an exogenous revenue closure. Regional 
tax rates are fixed and regional governments' revenues changes along with the 
changes in transfer payments.9 
The second simulation is carried out with an exogenous expenditure closure. 
Regional governments' expenditures are fixed, and the increase in transfers to central 
and western regions is used to bring down the tax rates in these regions. 
The third simulation takes the efficiency issue into consideration. As mentioned 
above, improving regional disparity through pure transfer payments may actually 
reduce total welfare. However, it is also possible for transfer payments to increase 
total welfare through improving the productivity in less developed regions. However, 
Table 23.5 Simulation results of increasing transfer payments to inland regions 
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we do not have sufficient concrete information to establish the relationship between 
transfer payments and productivity improvement to be included in the CERD. Rather, 
we proceed in the opposite direction, asking how much productivity improvement is 
required to offset the inefficiency brought about by transfer payments. This simulation 
is also carried out with an exogenous revenue closure. The simulation results are 
summarised in Table 23.5. Several points may be made in relation to these results. 
First, increased transfer payments to inland regions can improve regional inequality. 
For example, in Simulation 1, the Western region benefits the most, with household 
and government utility increases by 0.89 per cent, followed by the Central region, 
with utility up by 0.48 per cent, while the Eastern region suffers, with utility down by 
0.4 per cent because increased transfer payments to inland regions are financed 
with decreased transfer payments to the Eastern region. 
Second, a pure increase in transfer payments (Simulation 1) is welfare decreasing. 
Although the equivalent variations (EV) in the Central and Western regions increase 
by 9.9 and 12.7 billion yuan, respectively, the Eastern region's equivalent variation 
decreases by 25.7 billion yuan, causing a net loss of 3.0 billion yuan. This is because 
the inland regions have lower returns to resources. Although the impacts of Simulation 
1 are mainly on the demand side and the real GDP virtually does not change, the 
lower returns in inland regions are represented by lower utility of household and 
government savings in these regions. 
Third, reducing tax rates in inland regions through higher transfer payments may 
increase total welfare. This is because the reduction in tax rates would provide 
additional stimulus to the regional economy. For example, tax rates decrease by 
0.17 and 0.40 percentage points in the Central and Western regions, respectively, 
leading to increases in real GDP by 0.42 and 1.03 per cent, respectively. 
Finally, a 10 per cent increase in general purpose grants to inland regions requires 
a 0.04 per cent generic improvement in output efficiency in these regions in order to 
keep total welfare unchanged. 
CONCLUSION 
China's governmental transfer payment scheme has been evolving along with the 
fiscal regime. The implementation of the Transfer Payment Arrangement during the 
transitional period in 1996 marked the establishment of a formal and comprehensive 
program of governmental transfer payments. It has played a positive role in easing 
regional inequality. However, the scheme has some imperfections. Most importantly, 
the amount of transfer payments aimed at 'equalisation' is limited. 
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Using a general equilibrium model of the Chinese economy with regional 
dimensions, several approaches to increasing transfer payments to inland regions 
have been simulated. It was found that a pure transfer payment increment would 
decrease total welfare, as the decline in the Eastern region's welfare more than 
offsets the gains in the inland regions. In order to keep the total welfare unchanged, 
a 0.04 per cent generic improvement in regional output efficiency is required for a 
10 per cent increase in general purpose grants to the inland regions. 
It was also shown that, if an increase in transfer payment were used to reduce tax 
rates in the inland regions, total welfare nationwide could be improved. This may have 
some implications for the so-called 'tax for fee' reform which aimed at reducing the 
tax (fee) burden by replacing various administrative fee schemes implemented by 
regional governments with a uniform tax system. As the 'tax for fee' reform usually 
reduces governments' revenue in less developed regions, the central government 
should provide enough transfer payments for these governments to fulfil their duties. 
Otherwise, local governments may simply reduce vital public services. 
NOTES 
1 Thirty-one provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions in mainland China are normally 
classified into three regions-Eastern coastal, Central and Western regions-according to their 
geographical location and economic development situation. The Eastern coastal region is the most 
developed region in China and contains 12 provinces and municipalities-Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, 
Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiansu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan. The 
Central region includes nine provinces and autonomous regions with a middle degree of economic 
development: Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan. 
The Western region is the least developed region and contains the remaining six provinces-
Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Qinghai and Ganshu; three autonomous regions-Tibet, 
Ningxia and Xingjiang; and one municipality-Chongqing. 
2 This system was intended to reinforce the fiscal power of the central government, which had 
eroded under the fiscal contract system. 
3 Wong (2002) does not give an exact definition of per capita expenditure and revenue. It is conjectured 
that she includes both budgetary and extra-budgetary expenditure and revenue, which may 
explain the inconsistency between her numbers and those in Jin et al. (1999). 
4 According to the World Bank (2001), governments at county and township level spend 70 per cent 
of budgetary expenditure on education, and 55-60 per cent on health. Cities at the prefecture and 
county levels use all expenditures on unemployment benefits and social security. 
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5 For more details of the model, see Jiang (2003). 
6 The detailed version of the CERD model identifies 28 regions, each of which corresponds to one 
province, autonomous region or municipality directly under the central government in mainland 
China, with exceptions where Hainan, Ningxia and Tibet are included in Guangdong, Gansu and 
Qinghai respectively. 
7 If the central government is allowed to consume, it should make decisions about where the 
commodities it consumes are bought and sold as well as how much of them it consumes. This 
would unnecessarily increase the burden of computation as it can be embodied in the decisionmaking 
process of individual regional governments. 
8 Three provinces or autonomous regions, Hainan, Ningxia and Tibet, do not have input-output 
tables. These regions are small in economic scale and their input-output data were constructed on 
the basis of information about neighbouring regions with similar natural and economic characteristics. 
Specifically, Hainan is included in Guangdong, Ningxia in Gansu, and Tibet in Qinghai. 
9 More accurately, government revenue is endogenous even in this 'exogenous revenue' closure 
case because it is also affected by the tax base, which is endogenous. The effect, however, would 
be of second order. 
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A new engine for pragmatism in the 
international security order? 
Greg Austin 
In 2002 China appointed senior diplomat Wang Shijie as special envoy to the Middle 
East and in 2003 it approached NATO with a proposal for a formal relationship 
similar to that which Russia has with the Atlantic alliance.1 In recent years China 
has gradually been resuming its economic aid programs to poorer developing countries 
at the same time as it has been intenSifying its efforts to shape global arms control 
and proliferation regimes and expanding the reach of its defence diplomacy. China's 
international security policy has gone global. Is this a gradual accretion of global 
interests following on the internationalisation of China's economy, or does it represent 
a more deliberate effort by China to return to an international security strategy with 
the sort of global reach China pursued in the 1950s and 1960s? 
If China were pursuing a global reach now, it would be for far different reasons 
than in the 1950s and 1960s. But it is worth recalling that era. At that time, China 
supported wars by national liberation movements in Africa through the provision of 
military and economic aid, it supported the export of communism in Southeast 
ASia, and it engaged in proxy wars against both the former Soviet Union and the 
United States. By 1974, China began abandoning these global aspirations and 
retreated to a periphery-oriented national security strategy while it undertook important 
domestic economic and political reforms. 
China's leaders now appear to be abandoning the periphery-dominated national 
security strategy in favour of a new international security strategy with global reach. 
According to well-placed sources in Beijing, China's leaders decided through the 
course of 2002 that this was the only choice open to them in the face of continuing 
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US strategic pressure on them overTaiwan and in light of the significant changes in 
the international situation, especially on their periphery.2 
China's emerging globally-oriented national security strategy has three main 
characteristics: it is defensive, pragmatic, and gives a low priority to use of military 
force. In all three respects, it contrasts with the current US national security strategy, 
which is pre-emptive (offensive), ideological and gives a high priority to use of 
military force. 3 It is this contrast, particularly between the pragmatism of China's 
new global strategy and the ideological pretensions of the US strategy that is the 
main subject of this chapter. 
Five main catalysts have prompted the shift in China's national security strategy 
.. changes in US national security policy since 11 September 
.. the subsequent, further deterioration in relations between the Islamic world and 
the West 
.. the opening of NATO to a global role and the securitisation of the European 
Union 
.. the deepening and intensification of US-Taiwan military relations under a 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidency in Taiwan 
.. the reintroduction of US counter-proliferation military planning for North Korea 
and the subsequent moves by Japan to upgrade its military posture. 
Each of these is, self evidently, sufficient in and of itself to affect Chinese 
perceptions of the international security order. Together, these five catalysts look 
likely to have a profound effect on China's fundamental national security strategy. 
We have seen strong early signs of a shift away from a periphery-based strategy to 
one with a global compass. It will remain to be seen whether the shift is consolidated. 
This chapter does not describe the five catalysts separately. Rather, it seeks to 
draw them together through an overview of the increasing US strategic pressure on 
China's periphery. It then looks briefly at China's possible responses. It is here that 
the hypothesis about China as an engine for positive change in the international 
security order is canvassed. The chapter concludes with some brief musings about 
the impact of this analysis on some theoretically derived propositions about China. 
CHINA'S SENSITIVE AND VULNERABLE PERIPHERY 
China's leaders have appeared to be 'border sensitive' in ways that have often 
puzzled outside observers. This puzzlement was exacerbated by the extravagant 
approach taken by China in the 1950s to the limits of 'historical China' and by the 
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belligerent approach of China across virtually all of its borders between 1962 and 
1969. But, apart from the Cultural Revolution period, China has not had a disposition 
towards borders and sovereignty that has been all that different from that of other 
states (Watson 1966:19-20,212-3). That is, except in one important respect. For 
China, the final chapter of national territorial unity has yet to be written. The civil war 
may be over, but for many in China national unity has not yet been restored. China 
is the only country in the world, and therefore the only major power, that is facing a 
serious 'secession' problem from a territorial entity with a large economy, powerful 
armed forces and global diplomatic representation (albeit unofficial). The decades 
of diplomacy and international noise that have surrounded Taiwan's international 
status have to a certain extent numbed outside observers to the true sensitivity of 
this fundamental consideration of China's nationhood. The resumption of Chinese 
sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997 and Macao in 1999 has created a new time 
pressure on leaders in Beijing to reunify China. However these pressures work out 
(and a peaceful settlement should not be excluded) the defining aspect of China's 
international relations is now, and will be for coming years, the approach taken by 
Taiwan to the question of China's national unity and dignity. 
What marks out the 1990s as substantially different from the 1970s and 1980s is 
that China's leaders have begun to be far more conscious and far more defensive 
of the country's vulnerabilities on its periphery. This mood has been facilitated in 
some senses by a rise in China's physical capacity to control its borders as defined 
in a legal, technical sense but it has also been provoked by a growing sense of 
incapacity to contain and control threats in other dimensions. For China's leaders, 
the boundaries of their power-their international borders in both physical and social 
senses-are now facing multiple and intensifying threats. In some areas, the threat 
is one of legal, technical separation (as in Taiwan), while in others (such as Tibet 
and Xinjiang), the threat is seen only as one of resisting and repudiating the remit of 
the central state. 
For 16 years (1979-95), China was prepared to assign a lower priority to borders 
as a source of threat relative to a vision of borders as a source of opportunity, or 
even of economic necessity. As Chinese scholar Tianbao Zhu pOinted out in a 
recent article, Chinese leaders must now choose whether they will continue to 
accept that prioritisation (Zhu 2001). They are being pushed in the direction of 
change both by rising nationalist conceptions of the country's borders and by an 
unambiguous and radical stepping up of international and domestic repudiation of 
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the leadership's remit. As Jiang Zemin noted in the concluding four paragraphs of 
his report to the 16th Communist Party Congress in November 2002, 'it is essential ... to 
bring about the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation', a formula which he repeated 
one paragraph later, before noting in the third paragraph that China had to be 'keenly 
aware of the rigorous challenges brought about by the ever-sharpening international 
competition'.4 He noted earlier in the speech that 'uncertainties affecting peace and 
development are on the rise' and that 'hegemon ism and power politics have new 
manifestations'. And that the Party had faced a number of 'unexpected challenges 
bearing on China's sovereignty and security' since 1989.5 
The December 2002 Defence White Paper noted that a 'new serious disequilibrium 
has occurred in the balance of military power' (PRC State Council Information Office 
2002)-a reference to US military pre-eminence. The White Paper listed periphery 
security as one of the few internationally oriented tasks of the country's security 
policy ('striving for a favourable environment in China's periphery'). The Paper also 
reported thatTaiwan separatists remain the biggest threat to security in the Taiwan 
Strait (and hence on China's periphery), and that they were being encouraged by a 
few countries selling weapons to Taiwan. It reported that 'China resolutely 
opposes ... any country entering into a military alliance with Taiwan'. Jiang's speech 
called on China to 'strengthen state security, keeping vigilance against infiltrative, 
subversive and separatist activities'. 
Geopolitics of the China periphery and the US political challenge 
In Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, China's leaders have for many years seen themselves 
as facing threats to the country's national integrity and territorial sovereignty. Except 
at the most general level, these three problems have not really been linked either in 
concrete practicalities or in perceptions since the CIA abandoned its covert political 
agitation inside China some three decades ago. The specific circumstances ofTaiwan, 
Tibet and Xinjiang remain quite different and there has been little reason to see 
them as connected. But strategic policymakers in Beijing are beginning to see 
these once distinct problems as having new common threads that make them 
together a much higher order of security problem than any of the three cases had 
represented individually. 
The Single most important thread in this evolving perception is the view that, 
since President George W. Bush came to power in January 2001 , the United States 
has been positioning itself to limit China's potential strategic power and has been 
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using developments in these three areas to do that. Even to the non-specialist eye, 
this challenging trend in US policy has been relatively conspicuous in connection 
with Taiwan, especially in the rejuvenation of the US-Taiwan military relationship to 
levels unprecedented since 1979, and now little different from the alliance that was 
abandoned in that year. 
But, as this chapter contends, it can be seen also in the cases of Tibet and 
Xinjiang, albeit in more complex or attenuated ways. The insertion into Central Asia 
in late 2001 of a potentially permanent US military presence can only magnify the 
vulnerability and risk that China feels in light of increased US military support for 
Taiwan. China's leaders do see the US military presence in Central Asia as positive 
in that it contributed to the removal of the Taliban, but they see it on balance as 
negative in that it will position the United States better to influence and challenge 
China's management of its internal affairs in Xinjiang. This reflects the essentially 
political nature of the new US challenge on China's periphery. And it is the political 
dimension that is evident in new US positioning on Tibet. There is no US military 
involvement in Tibetan 'separatism', nor is there likely to be much potential for such 
involvement. But China's leaders see even US political pressure on Tibet issues as 
gathering momentum, and as an intensification of US pressure on China as a whole 
for 'peaceful evolution' of China domestically and for containment of it on the 
international stage. 
The evolution of US-China relations through 2002 has been sufficiently positive 
to dampen some of the more visible forms of tension between the two nations. In 
particular, the US need for China's support in Security Council votes on possible 
war with Iraq in late 2002 overshadowed and even contained some of the emerging 
negative trends in US-China security relations that were so visible in 2001. But this 
chapter contends that the underlying fundamentals remain negative. China's support 
for the US (and UK) position in the UN Security Council is based on shared values 
to some degree but is also part of China's strategy for responding to the new US 
strategic challenge that is emerging on its periphery. 
The history of international relations shows convincingly that strategic pressure 
by one major power on another's periphery areas is a recipe for instability in 
international order. Where the power being subjected to pressure is a rising power, 
with not just a history but a historiography premised on recovery from national 
humiliation or fragmentation, the risk of strategic instability is even greater. This 
sort of consideration was prominent in the ideology of aggression advocated by the 
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regimes in Germany and Japan prior to the Second World War. Thus, recent US 
positioning on each of the three problem areas arguably presents a new security 
challenge not just for China but for the international community as a whole. As a 
recent study from a US ally put it, our 'interest in a stable, cooperative, prosperous 
future for Asia is threatened by the possibility that America and China might drift 
into animosity or even war in coming years. The risk of this outcome is not high, but 
it is real and significant' (Australian Strategic Policy Institute 2002). 
Each of China's three periphery problems (Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang) is becoming 
more bound up with US global strategic power, an expansion of US regional 
alliances, and a reorientation of US military strategy and force deployments. The 
Bush Administration has vigorously followed up on the Clinton Administration's 
commitment to 'democratic expansion'. And Bush's first review of strategic policy in 
2001 concluded that the most likely potential threat for major war in the future would 
come from China. As a result, the United States has been undertaking more and 
more concrete measures in both political and military strategy that directly impinge 
on China's periphery. 
Over the last decade, there has been an escalating contest of ideas in Beijing, 
Washington and Tokyo about the future balance of power in East Asia. With both 
China and the United States seeing the resolution of Taiwan's status as reflecting 
seriously on their credibility as great powers, US planning for Taiwan-related 
contingencies is not just about Taiwan's status but has become part of a bigger 
balance of power contest with global ramifications. In February 2002, the Director of 
the CIA, George Tenet, told a Congressional committee that China's cooperation 
with the United States in the war against terrorism changed none of the fundamentals 
of the long-term strategic competition between the United States and China. That 
cooperation, he said, would not deflect China's bid to emerge as a power likely to 
challenge US strategic pre-eminence in Asia; and China's cooperation did not reduce 
the need for the United States to prepare for the contingency of military confrontation 
with it. 6 There are other statements by senior US officials that explicitly discuss the 
need to contain China's rising power. 
The September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States represented 
a further challenge to China, not because of the changes in military deployment 
that it foreshadowed, but for the return by the United States to a Kennedy-esque 
ambition of going anywhere and paying any price to to defend freedom. For China, 
the reference in the Strategy to the US intention to 'defend the peace by fighting 
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terrorists and tyrants', was a reference (in the second word 'tyrants') to the Chinese 
leadership (Government of the United States of America 2002). The suggestion in 
that document that '[i]n time, they [China's leaders] will find that social and political 
freedom is the only source of national greatness' is reasonable enough. But until 
they do accept liberal pluralism, language like the following seems to place them at 
odds with the main thrust of the US strategy: 'We seek ... to create a balance of 
power that favours human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies 
can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic 
liberty'; and 'The United States will stand beside any nation determined to build a 
better future by seeking the rewards of liberty for its people' (Government of the 
United States of America 2002:n.p.). 
We can diasgaree on what these words mean, but over the last decade there has 
been an unambiguous intensification in US national security strategy of measures 
premised on the need to prepare for the contingency of military confrontation with 
China as a possible evolution either of an emerging balance of power contest in 
Asia or as a result of some Taiwan crisis. According to veteran China-watcher, 
Jonathan Pollack, what we are seeing in the United States is not threat-based 
planning, not capabilities-based planning, but 'possibilities-based planning'.l 
Taiwan and the Western Pacific 
Beginning in 1995, China has undertaken a series of military manoeuvres designed 
to intimidate Taiwan and its international supporters into reversing Taiwan's move 
away from the 'one China' principle. Resort to such a drastic measure was evidence 
that, even then, China felt that it was losing ground on Taiwan. In its White Paper on 
Taiwan, issued in 2000, China imposed a new condition that indicated its continuing 
sense of losing ground. China insisted for the first time that Taiwan could face use 
of force if it sought to put off reunification indefinitely. In November 2002, President 
Jiang said bluntly that China was looking for a positive move towards reunification 
'at an early date'.B As two prominent US scholars observed in 1999, 'Taiwan is 
perhaps the only external issue where raw emotion and nationalist fervour trumps 
the realpolitik calculations that normally govern China's external policy' (Lampton 
and May 1999). The reason for this is that the 'Beijing leadership believes it could 
not remain in power if it buckled on an issue central to Chinese nationalism'. By late 
2002, Taiwan was not backing down and it had more international support than ever, 
especially from the United States. In response, China was determined to show its 
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resolve and refused to back down. In mid October 2002, it signalled a possible 
expansion of its military pressure on Taiwan by dispatching one of its warships on 
an unprecedented cruise parallel to the east coast ofTaiwan. 
The United States and its allies in the Western Pacific, especially Japan and 
Australia, are now positioning themselves, in political and strategic terms, for a new 
confrontation between the United States and China over Taiwan. The United States 
and its allies reacted strongly to China's military intimidation of Taiwan in 1995 and 
1996. The United States deployed two aircraft carriers, Japan hurriedly completed a 
number of measures with the United States to extend US military access to its 
territory, and Australia's Defence Minister declared his country's readiness to join 
combat alongside the United States if hostilities broke out. While these reactions 
were appropriate, there is little doubt that this military response by the United States 
and its allies was seen by Beijing as an unacceptable intervention in its 'domestic' 
Taiwan problem and only encouraged China in subsequent years to intenSify its 
military readiness opposite Taiwan. 
The eight years since 1995 have seen a gradual escalation in military preparation 
by China and the United States for the contingency of military hostilities of some 
sort associated with Taiwan. For example, China has deployed some 300 medium-
range missiles to its coastal areas opposite Taiwan, and reliable sources estimate 
that the number will rise to 800 by 2006. In the same period, China has conducted 
large-scale military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. For its part, the United States 
has been conSistently enhancing its military capabilities in the Western Pacific. 
While this has not so far seen dramatic increases in US military forces permanently 
deployed to the region, the United States has steadily improved its infrastructure 
and operational readiness by 
• reactivating military facilities on Guam to provide forward-basing options for 
China-related contingencies 
• conducting carrier battle group exercises in the South China Sea (on one occasion 
at least involving two carriers) 
.. carrying out US carrier transits of the Taiwan Strait 
.. extending US-Japan mutual support arrangements for Korea-related and China-
related contingencies in the second half of the 1990s (Austin 1997) 
.. rejuvenating the military alliance with the Philippines during the Clinton 
Administration (Austin 2003) 
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.. notifying of its intent to withdraw from the ABM treaty (this was not directed at 
China but is seen by it as a threat since it opens the way to develop theatre 
missile defence technologies which China suspects will be transferred to Taiwan). 
The forced landing on Hainan Island in April 2001 of a US military intelligence 
aircraft that had been involved in a mid-air collision with a Chinese air force fighter 
highlighted publicly the intensity of US military intelligence collection efforts against 
China. And that was even before the new Bush Administration had completed its 
first review of US strategic policy, which elevated the possibility of major war with 
China to a central plank of long-term US strategic planning. 
Citing China's continuing military intimidation of Taiwan as the justification, the 
Bush Administration took US policy towards Taiwan on a more confrontational path 
by radically enhancing its military relationship with Taiwan. In the second week of 
March 2002, the United States permitted a visit by Taiwan's Defence minister to 
participate in public and private discussions of his official portfolio interests, even 
though the United States sought to pass off the visit as 'unofficial'. 9 This visit was 
the first substantive one by a Taiwanese foreign affairs or security minister since 
1979. The minister held a 1 OO-minute meeting with Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Paul Wolfowitz. Also in March 2002, news broke of a Pentagon document detailing 
a nuclear posture review by the Bush Administration that called for US planning for 
the use of nuclear weapons in a Taiwan Strait contingency-a report that Chinese 
officials predictably described as 'shocking' (Arkin 2002). Other moves include 
.. new arrangements for military exchanges with Taiwan 
It normalisation of the timing and manner in which the United States approved 
arms sales to Taiwan 
.. expansion of the scope of arms sales to Taiwan 
.. committing to pursuing combat interoperability between US and Taiwanese armed 
forces 
.. committing to supporting substantial reform in Taiwan's administration of defence 
policy and development of jOint force operational capability. 
Tibet, India and US policy trends 
In contrast to the relationship between Beijing and Taipei, the situation in Tibet is far 
less dramatic for the Chinese leadership on a day-to-day basis. Despite this, it is no 
less threatening. On the one hand, Beijing controls the territory in Tibet and has in 
place a highly developed system of public administration. This is backed by a large 
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number of uniformed personnel and residents who are not of Tibetan origin, but are 
migrants (or the children of the migrants) sent there in the past four decades by 
Beijing to provide a substantial population base for continued rule by China. The 
enemy for Beijing in Tibet is the authority of a religious leader who commands no 
armed forces, who is not supported by any quasi-military alliance with the United 
States, and who preaches non-violence. There is therefore no question of Tibet as 
a political entity continuing to resist Beijing's efforts to control it physically, as with 
Taiwan. This is not an issue of re-unification. 
On the other hand, there is a Tibetan government in exile, located in Dharamsala 
in northern India. The spiritual leader of the Tibetans, the Dalai Lama, vigorously 
cultivates international support for his resistance to Beijing's rule, without ever really 
being too preCise about his long-term political ambition for Tibet. He says he is 
interested in increased autonomy for the local (non-Chinese) Tibetan community, 
but Beijing fears that he really wants independence. And the Dalai Lama has recently 
rebuked Beijing publicly for lack of response to his conciliatory approach, a rebuke 
that carries with it the implication for Beijing that the Tibetan government in exile will 
more directly advocate total independence from Beijing. The authorities in Beijing 
continue to suppress the collective activities of Buddhist monks in Tibet, and thereby 
continue to fuel not only resistance by Tibetans to its rule but also international 
support for this resistance. Thus, while this is not an issue of reunification, it is for 
Beijing an issue of national integrity and internal security on almost the same level 
of complexity as the Taiwan problem. 
For Beijing, the Tibetan problem is getting worse. Sentiment in Western countries 
in favour of Tibetan independence continues to snowball. The number of legislative 
resolutions or other measures taken in Western parliaments to register disapproval 
of Beijing's style of rule continues to grow. The Dalai Lama has extended his 
international profile. China's main assets (physical control and transmigrants) offer 
no guarantee of any sort in the absence of other fundamental changes in the loyalty 
of the local population. The cases of the former Soviet republics, especially Estonia, 
where the former Soviet Union had military and internal security forces and where 
some 40 per cent of the population identified as ethnically Russian, do not reassure 
Chinese leaders that their possession of such assets in Tibet offers any ultimate 
protection against eventual political separation. 
Where is the US hand in propping up or bolstering Tibetan resistance to Chinese 
rule? One scholar has rightly observed that it has been the Congress and not the 
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Administration that has maintained interest in the 'Tibet cause' in the United States 
(Knaus 2000). There is certainly no public evidence of direct use by the US 
Administration of any military strategic instrument, and the Administration's public 
face on Tibet is one of acceptance of Chinese sovereignty. A series of Congressional 
initiatives on Tibet were taken most visibly in 1987 after the Dalai Lama addressed 
the Congressional Human Rights Caucus (Knaus 2000). But President Bush Senior 
initiated the 'drop-in' meetings between the Dalai Lama and the President in the 
White House, a practice continued by Clinton and George W. Bush. 
With the emphasis in the Clinton Administration on the expansion of democracy, 
new moves were taken by parts of the US government to support Tibetan resistance 
to Chinese rule. For example, when Clinton visited India, he signed a jOint declaration 
with the Indian Prime Minister which provided for the opening of an office there of 
the US National Endowment for Democracy (NED), an office which has provided 
low levels of funding to Tibetan exile groups.10 Some Chinese sources refer to the 
NED as a CIA front. In the Clinton period, the US Senate passed on 9 March 2000 
a bill to designate 10 March as the 'national day' of Tibet (China Daily Online, 9 
March 2001). 
The political contest between Washington and Beijing over Tibet has escalated 
under the Administration of George W. Bush.ln May 2001, the US Congress (both 
houses) passed the Tibet Policy Act, which declared Tibet-including Tibetan 
nationality areas in parts of four neighbouring Chinese provinces-to be an 'occupied 
country',11 and called on the US government to undertake a range of measures 
including 
.. reappointment of a Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues within the State 
Department 
to annual reporting to Congress on progress in US efforts to get a Tibet-China 
negotiation on autonomy under way 
" imposition of conditions on US-supported multilateral aid projects in Tibetan 
areas of China 
to application of best efforts to establish a State Department office in Lhasa 
to stepping up advocacy by the US State Department of an end to 'all interference' 
by Beijing 'in the religious affairs of the Tibetan people' 
" increasing the visibility of Tibetan groups and Tibetan issues within the United 
Nations. 
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The Act also provides for Tibet to be an issue of discussion between the US-
European Interparliamentary Group. In response, on 17 May 2001, the Bush 
Administration gave to Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs Ms Paula 
Dobriansky the assignment of US Special Coordinator for Tibetan Affairs. Her duties 
are to 'help preserve Tibet's unique cultural, religious, and linguistic heritage'. 
Dobriansky is the highest-ranking official to hold this post since it was set up in 
1997.12 
On 5 March 2002, a Resolution was introduced into the House of Representatives 
by 42 members calling on the Bush administration to 'give serious consideration to 
recognising the authorities of Tibet who are currently exiled in Dharamsala, India, 
as the legitimate representatives of Tibet' if they cannot reach an agreement with 
Beijing within three years that 'provides for the political autonomy of Tibet' .13 
So, at many levels, the Act and other recent Congressional moves on Tibet 
represent a significant expansion of the 'internationalisation' of the Tibet issue, 
something which Beijing has always opposed. If one takes as a precedent the way 
in which Congressional opinion on Taiwan has helped to shape US Administration 
policy in the last decade, then these Congressional measures on Tibet will only be 
viewed in Beijing with great concern. 
Xinjiang and the shifting alliances of Central Asia 
Some members of the Uighur community and some otherTurkic ethnic groups have 
been waging a low-level campaign of sabotage and murder against the Chinese 
government in support of claims for independence from China. Their violent resistance 
to Chinese rule first resurfaced between 1989 and 1993,14 died down somewhat in 
1994-95, and again intensified after February 1997 (South Asia Analysis Group 
1999). The rise in armed Uighur nationalism can be attributed in part to the service 
in Afghanistan during the 1980s of Chinese citizens of Uighur nationality; and in 
part to the relatively easy interchange that had existed between radicals in Pakistan 
and Western China. A number of the violent activists in Xinjiang have been trained 
in Pakistan. 
The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) retains many appearances of a 
colony of China. 15 Except in the capital and a few other places, it has highly 
segregated and mutually antagonistic populations. It has a violent (though low 
intensity) rebellion of the indigenous population, and an irrational and highly centralised 
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system of economic exploitation, through the Xinjiang Production and Construction 
Corps (somewhat reminiscent of the British East India Company in its heyday).16 
There are marked differences between northern parts of the XUAR, including cities 
like Urumqi and Turfan, which are 'Sinicised', have quite high proportions of Han 
Chinese, and are less troublesome, and the southwestern parts around Kashgar, 
where the Uighur community accounts for 90 per cent of the population, where 
modernisation has not been profound, where there are deep-seated inter-communal 
tensions, and where there is a pervasive 'wild west' atmosphere (Kemenade 
1998:403-4). 
According to sourcesin Beijing, the Chinese government now feels it is losing the 
fight against the Moslem rebels. The reasons cited for this by Beijing sources are 
as fo"OWS. 17 There is now a net outflow of Han Chinese from Xinjiang. This has 
come about because the policy of migration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang was a 
policy of forced migration, when jobs were assigned by the Party and people had 
little choice but to go where they were sent. Now that China effectively has a free 
labour market and its controls on residency have largely evaporated, many of the 
forced migrants to the West are returning to their original homes (for family reasons) 
or to other places in the richer provinces (for economic reasons). Even a number of 
Han Chinese born in the west find it more attractive for economic reasons to migrate 
eastwards. This net outward migration is a long-term problem for the Chinese 
leadership, and though it can be corrected over time with special incentives, the 
issue bears heavily on leadership calculations of the nature of the problem. There 
are other indirect signs that China is losing control, and these include a rapid increase 
in the number of illegal mosques and religious schools. 
The rebellion in Western China weighs even more heavily on Chinese leadership 
perceptions of internal security because official sources in Beijing believe that China 
has lost control of infiltration across the borders with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, 
two tiny countries of Central Asia facing immense problems of governance and 
armed incursions of their own. China has significantly increased its military relations 
with Kyrgyzstan at least and is providing support to the development of its border 
surveillance programs. But these programs are at a low level and the flow of weapons, 
money and drugs to support the operations of the rebels in Xinjiang has increased 
in recent years. Chinese sources make it clear that China does not have the capacity 
to seal its borders in the west. Chinese military and police assets even now have to 
rely on citizen support for surveillance of the borders. Since long stretches of the 
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border are in very sparsely populated areas, the citizens are not much help-even 
if they were well disposed to Beijing or the government, and most in southwestern 
Xinjiang are not. 
China supported US military intervention in Afghanistan to attack and root out AI-
Qaeda and Taliban forces. China had also supported a series of Security Council 
resolutions beginning in 1998 calling on the Taliban to stop harbouring (and to 
hand over) indicted terrorists. 18 So, it could be argued that the arrival of US military 
forces in Central Asia in the war against terrorism is not of great concern to Beijing 
and is indeed welcomed. At one level this is true and it is not difficult to find 
commentaries in the Chinese media to this effect. 
But the leadership view is more likely negative on balance, taking much the same 
view as has often appeared in Chinese open source commentaries.19 While the 
more negative public commentaries were published prior to China's more fulsome 
welcoming of the US military action in Afghanistan, they are still useful as a reflection 
of the basic instincts of at least some Chinese leaders. Much earlier commentaries 
were quite strong, painting US strategic intentions in Central Asia in a negative 
light, suggesting that the United States was trying to bring the region 'under its 
security system', and that it was trying to gain control of the region's energy 
resou rces. 20 
China's military leaders in particular are not happy with the expansion of Europe 
(OSCE and NATO Partnership for Peace) to their western borders. They are even 
less content about the new US presence in Central Asia after 11 September 2001. 
It should be noted that the main requirement from China's point of view in support 
of a temporary US presence in Central Asia at that time was an internal security 
one. China had to put aside its geo-political concerns in the interests of eliminating 
the threat of the export of revolution to Xinjiang from Afghanistan, Pakistan and 
some of the Central Asian states. China also no doubt saw virtue in being seen to 
be friendly to the United States in its moment of great need from the point of view 
of trying to make a dent in US public opinion. But now that the immediate threat of 
export of revolution has been reduced significantly, the geopolitical concerns will 
almost certainly begin to re-emerge. 
Until the US military presence arrived in Central Asia, China had been quite 
successful in shaping the geopolitics of the region. Along with the former Soviet 
Union, China had established in 2001 the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, an 
outgrowth of the multilateral border negotiating forum, the Shanghai Five, that had 
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been in place since the collapse of the USSR.21 China's active leadership in formation 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which included Jiang Zemin 
attending a summit meeting in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, is one of the 
most visible manifestations of the seriousness with which China views the geopolitics 
of the region. The SCO has both regional and global ambitions. At the regional 
level, it provides a formal legal framework for cooperation in anti-terrorism and 
border security, among other regional security issues such as the illegal arms trade. 
At the global level, it has the ambition of providing the foundation for a new international 
order22 premised on multipolarity and the 'renunciation of unilateral military superiority 
in contiguous areas'.23 But the organisation gives priority in the security sector to 
regional security. In this sphere, the determination of both China and Russia to 
apply maximum resources consistent with political constraints, such as sensitivity 
about deploying troops across borders, should not be underestimated. In forming 
the SCO, both China and Russia saw the existing and emerging threats in 
Afghanistan and Central Asia as among the most serious they then faced. 
But in geopolitical terms, the fate of the SCO now seems to hang in the balance 
and the organisation will have to go through the next few years under competing 
pressures. On the one hand, leaders of all member states share China's very hard-
line approach to internal security and national unity. It would appear at first glance 
that they should easily be able to continue to cooperate on internal security matters. 
But under the influence of the rapid and large scale US strategic insertion into 
Central Asia after 11 September, cleavages are beginning to show. Uzbekistan 
failed to attend the last SCO summit, and Russia made a dramatic strategic tilt 
towards the United States and Europe that can only compromise the embryonic 
strategic partnership that was emerging between China and Russia. The energy 
aspect of the Russian strategic tilt, embodied in President Putin's agreement to 
consult with the United States on oil prices, is one area where this may be felt most 
keenly by China. After 11 September, China is reported to have taken a decision to 
establish a strategic oil reserve, partly out of fear of an interruption of Persian Gulf 
supply, but partly out of concern about long-term access to Central Asian reserves. 
The insertion into Central Asia of a potentially permanent US military presence 
can only aggravate the sense of vulnerability and risk that China feels about the US 
military support for Taiwan. This has three dimensions. First, a mooted US military 
presence on China's western border had been portrayed in some Chinese 
commentaries before 11 September in classic geopolitical terms as encirclement, 
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even if that was not the primary motivation for the US deployment once it took 
place. Second, Chinese leaders could be forgiven for viewing the new US military 
presence in Central Asia as giving the United States a second theatre option for a 
military confrontation with China over Taiwan. Third, the US military presence in 
Central Asia brings with it the inevitable pressure from the United States for political 
reform and liberalisation in the neo-Communist states there. Chinese leaders almost 
certainly see this link in Central Asia as likely to lead to more pressure from the 
United States on China over the political order in western Xinjiang. 
CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES: CHALLENGE 
WORLD ORDER OR SOFTEN ITS EDGES? 
The circumstances analysed in this chapter raise big questions about future directions 
in Chinese strategic policy. Will these common threads to distinct periphery problems 
push China's leaders to a different strategic choice than the one they have accepted 
in the last two decades? Will they hold to the 1989 injunction of Deng Xiaoping of 
'First, observing coolly; second, securing our position; third, dealing with things 
calmly'? (Austin 1998:239). Can China make the domestic political adjustments 
(significant political liberalisation) to contain its growing problems? Or will they begin 
to accept that 'strategic breakout' is the only option, and begin to probe in one or 
other area of the periphery as a means of forcing a realignment of US international 
alliances on key China issues, especially the status of Taiwan. Or can China go 
further? Can it begin to contemplate a more comprehensive challenge to US power 
through a new global rivalry that pits a China-led coalition of non-democratic Third 
World states against a US-led coalition of democratic industrialised Western states? 
For Tibet and Western Xinjiang, China's possible responses stretch across a wide 
area of domestic policy (nationalities policy, religious policy, political pluralism, 
regional development programs, legal and police responses). And for all three 
periphery problems, there is a variety of international policy options (security treaties, 
economic cooperation, trade and investment, or even coercive diplomacy). China 
has been trying a mix of policies, including both carrots and sticks, in all three 
cases and will continue to do so. By 1999, Chinese leaders had agreed to increase 
their reliance on coercive diplomacy in international policy and increased police 
repression in domestic policy. 
But the four years since the end of the 1990s, when China tilted in the direction of 
more confrontational responses, have seen only a deterioration in China's domestic 
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and international security situations. Relations with the United States and Japan 
have worsened, as both countries have more openly prepared themselves for military 
contingencies involving China (or North Korea). In response, as discussed at the 
outset, there is evidence that China's leaders have decided to shift their national 
security strategy away from the confrontational choices that rose most visibly to 
the surface in 1999 and early 2000. China appears to have decided that, if it can't 
challenge world order, it will soften it. 
This has been evident in the change in China's strategy toward Taiwan from a 
threat-based one to a largely incentive-based one. China now relies on the military 
threat only as part of a broader political strategy. China has signalled its willingness 
for the two sides to move forward in cooperative moves on concrete areas of policy 
without Taiwan's total surrender on the issue of its status.24 China is moving more 
towards treating Taiwan as an equal, at least in negotiating terms if not in formal 
legal terms. This position is reflected in China's formulation, now a couple of years 
old, that the 'mainland and Taiwan are parts of one China', a phrase intended to 
repudiate China's earlier position that Taiwan is a province of China. China wants to 
give the impression that it is no longer proceeding on the view that it should be the 
dominant partner. Through 2003, China has shown new determination to find some 
common ground with Taiwan, going so far as to open the first ever talks at officials' 
level at the WTO in Geneva in December 2002. 
But China's new push to soften the international security order is visible in other 
ways, not least in its determination to avoid a new military clash on the Korean 
peninsula and its refusal to take side in crucial votes in the UN Security Council. 
The apPOintment of China's first special envoy to the Middle East is another example. 
China may now have gone somewhat beyond the parameters of Deng's admonition 
of securing China's p,Osition by observing coolly. China appears now to have set 
itself the positive mission of reducing international tensions through a vigorous 
globally-oriented security policy of a type not seen in China since 1974. 
CONCLUSION 
In the early 1990s, the academic community was divided on China's emerging 
position in international security affairs. Would its new wealth and power line up 
behind previous Chinese impulses towards aggression or empire? Or would China 
become a cooperative member of the international system? Few scholars or 
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commentators outside China were prepared then to contemplate a third scenario: 
China as an engine for positive changes in the international security order. 
One decade later, the dominant view in scholarly analysis is that China has recorded 
an unambiguous commitment to cooperative and stabilising international regimes. 
Remnants of the 'China-threat' thesis can still be found in the United States, both in 
scholarly analysis and in positions of power, including the Pentagon, the CIA and 
the Congress. But most observers are still reluctant to consider China as a potential 
locomotive force for positive change in the international security order. 
It is the contention of this chapter that China is now demonstrating the potential 
to be such aforce for positive change. But the main cause of this does not flow as 
directly from China's own wealth and growing power, especially its military power, 
as much from other factors, some of which reflect China's relative military 
weaknesses. There have been three main factors 
• China's perception of a growing US threat to its periphery 
• China's perception of its inability to counter that threat militarily 
• China's understanding of its capacity to alter the balance of power in its favour 
through a peaceful settlement with Taiwan. 
Thus, in the normal logic of action and reaction in international affairs-as ironic 
as it seems-China is looking to influence peaceful change in the international 
security order because of the strategic pressure applied on it by the United States, 
especially over Taiwan, but in a positive way. 
At a superficial level at least, this response seems to suggest that the neo-
realists and the 'China-threat' advocates might have been right. It does appear, at 
least at first glance, as though dealing with China from a position of strength has 
produced positive outcomes. But since the basis of the neo-realist assumption was 
China's power, not its weakness, something fundamental was wrong in their 
positioning. Moreover, the neo-realists had premised their argument largely on the 
need to discipline China and contain it within the eXisting international security 
order. They never quite imagined this more complete evolution, with China seeking 
to change that order by peaceful means. 
This author's assessment of China's shift to new global security strategy is partly 
intuitive, and for this reason the assessment might be challenged on an evidentiary 
basis. After all, direct access to the strategic thinking of the highest level Chinese 
leadership is hard to come by. But, whatever the correct assessment of changed 
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Chinese strategic perceptions, it is important to note the significant, unambiguous 
and factually incontestable changes in international security order during the last 
two to three years and to ask whether they have been sufficiently far-reaching to 
produce a profound change in China's security policy. If the answer is yes, was the 
change more likely to be of the sort hypothesised in this chapter or one of a more 
belligerent nature? Any objective assessment of China's weaknesses in the face of 
US strengths and power could only find in favour of the former: a determination to 
work actively around the world to soften existing international confrontations in 
order to reduce the escalating potential for military confrontation between China and 
the United States. 
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NOTES 
1 Information provided by a member of staff of the office of the European Union's High Representative 
for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, May 2003. 
2 Interviews, Beijing, November 2002. 
3 These characterisations of US national security strategy should not necessarily be seen as 
negatives. Rather, as discussed later in the chapter, they are just what the September 2002 
National Security Strategy released by President Bush describes. 
4 Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Australia, Full text of Jiang Zemin's Report at 16th 
Party Congress, www.chinaembassy.org.au/eng/37883.html 
5 This reference is to the date of Jiang's appointment as Secretary General of the CCP in the 
immediate aftermath of the Tian An Men suppressions in June of that year. 
6 Tenet told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 6 February 2002 that 'China is developing 
an increasingly competitive economy and building a modern military force with the ultimate objective 
of asserting itself as a great power in East Asia. And, although Beijing joined the coalition against 
terrorism, it remains deeply sceptical of US intentions in South Asia. It fears we are gaining 
influence at China's expense, and views our encouragement of a Japanese military role in counter-
terrorism as support for Japanese rearmament-something the Chinese oppose.' 
7 Comments made to the author. 
S Report at 16th Party Congress. 
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9 In its 1979 communique with China on normalisation, the United States 'recognises the government 
of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China'. The next sentence in the 
same article says that '[w]ithin this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, 
commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan'. Even though the United States 
broke off its formal defence relations with Taiwan at that time, it was understood between the 
United States and China at the time that the question of the US-Taiwan military relationship, 
especially arms sales, would be a subject of further US-China discussions. At any rate, the United 
States made plain in its December 1978 statement on normalisation its expectation that the Taiwan 
question will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves. (This was in contrast to the December 
1978 statement of China on normalisation, which said that th? Taiwan question 'has now been 
resolved between the two sides'.) 
10 NED was established under President Reagan and is funded by Congress. In 2000, it gave the 
following small grants to Tibetan groups: 'International Campaign for Tibet-$30,00D-to support 
meetings, symposia, speeches, publications and articles designed to improve communication 
between Tibetans and Chinese; Tibetan Literary Society-$20,00D-to publish the Tibet Times, a 
Tibetan language newspaper providing in-depth coverage of Tibetan, local and international issues 
for Tibetans in Tibet, international audiences and Tibetan exiles; Tibetan Multimedia Centre-
$30,000-to disseminate news and information about the struggle for a democratic Tibet inside 
Tibet and China, among Chinese democrats throughout the world, throughout the exile communities 
of Tibetans in India, and to the Indian public; Tibetan Review-$20,00D-to publish and distribute 
Tibetan Review, a monthly English language news magazine, throughout the Tibetan community in 
exile and international community'. 
11 A measure echoing similar resolutions in earlier years. 
12 Her predecessor, Julia Taft, had the rank of Assistant Secretary of State. 
13 See State Dept website, http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/eaiuschinairez357.htm 
14 Between 1944 and 1950 in the area around Yining, Uighur nationalists managed to establish an 
independent East Turkestan. 
15 A recent study of Xinjiang in the 1990s, albeit one based on fieldwork mostly conducted several 
years ago, supports the general thrust of the assessment this paper is suggesting, though it 
differs on some of the causes. The study by Nicholas Becquelin (2000:54, 90) concludes that the 
'1990s led to a very major shift in relations between the state and SOCiety in Xinjiang'. The system 
had changed, the author suggested, from one that discriminated (presumably positively) on the 
basis of nationality to one that segregated on the basis of nationality. The study identified major 
risks in Beijing's current strategy in the XUAR, and described the heightening of inter-ethnic 
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conflicts-and in southern Xinjiang in particular, a renewed repressive climate and increased 
segregation. (The Becquelin study appears to differ from this paper in its emphasis on new Han 
migration into Xinjiang, whereas this paper has reported a net outflow of Han Chinese. Becquelin 
does note that 'information on recent Han arrivals is extremely difficult to verify'.) 
16 See Seymour (2000). Seymour notes that the Corps is a 'major institution for the ethnic Han 
(Chinese) colonisation of Xinjiang'. 'Although quasi-military in origin, its military role is now eclipsed 
by its economic role. Traditionally it was primarily a collection of state farms, but in recent years its 
industrial enterprises have expanded. It has also played a role in imprisoning convicts from 
eastern China. Largely destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, it was actually abolished for a few 
years beginning in 1975. But the perceived need to project Chinese influence into the area, and to 
protect against ethnic unrest and Soviet pressures, persuaded the authorities that the Corps 
should be revived. Today the Corps has 2.8 million members, or 14 per cent of Xinjiang's population, 
and plays a significant role in the region's economy'. According to the Uighur American Association, 
the Corps has a special legal status that subordinates it to Beijing, not to the Autonomous Regional 
government; the Corps plays an integral part in Beijing's strategies for control of the region; and the 
Corps' exploitative activities are the main source of the 'ethnic' rebellion in the XUAR (Uyghur 
American Association n.d.). 
17 Interviews with the author, October 2000. 
18 UNSC Resolution 1214,8 December 1998; Resolution 1267, 15 October 1999; Resolution 1333, 
19 December 2000. 
19 See, for example, Ba Ren (2001 :n.p.). Two excerpts are indicative: To China, it means that the US 
fills the last gap in the northeast of its ring of encirclement (or at least hammers in a wedge). If the 
US uses the opportunity to occupy Afghanistan, or set up a puppet government in that country, the 
US military stationed in Afghanistan and in the Persian Gulf will take up two corners, and possibly 
use national and religious factors to give strategic pressure on China's western region. China will 
feel prickles down his back ... To summarise the above, if the US military marches into Afghanistan, 
the strategic situation as a result of the military actions will greatly change, accelerate the demolition 
of the original power balance in Central Asia, and make Central Asia a region with a prominently 
unbalanced security mechanism in the world. We should attach enough importance and be vigilant 
to this possible variable of the international security situation that has an effect on China.' 
ID See, for example, Xinhua Domestic Service, 3 August 1997, carried in FBIS-CHI-97-217: 'US 
Central Asian strategy faces challenges'. 
21 The members are China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan (the original Shanghai Five) 
and Uzbekistan. The negotiations built on significant progress that had been made between China 
and the USSR before 1991. 
478 
:12 See Article 2 of the Declaration on the Creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. 
ID See Article 5. 
24 See International Crisis Group (2003). The present author was the principal author of that ICG 
report. 
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